D-Day Started while Hitler was Sleeping - Which Sources?

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Aida1
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Re: D-Day Started while Hitler was Sleeping - Which Sources?

Post by Aida1 » 16 Aug 2022 14:47

Sheldrake wrote:
16 Aug 2022 11:19
Aida1 wrote:
15 Aug 2022 16:19
Kriegsgeschichte der 12.SS panzer division Hitlerjugend, Hubert Meyer quotes on pp55-56 a statement by Otto Gunsche to the author that Hitler was woken up early in the morning of June 6 by Linge at the request of Schmundt who urgently wanted to speak to Hitler after a a call from Jodl. .According to Gunsche, Hitler was, against his habit, already towards 8 am in the big hall of the Berghof.
The history of the 12 SS has a source bias. Hubert Meyer, the author, promulgates the WW2 Nazi fake history "Durchstoss" myth, that the Wehrmacht was betrayed by high placed anti Nazi staff officers: specifically Hans Speidel who misled the high command.

The quote from Gunsche is a recollection of a man some time after the event, with all the problems of old soldier's memories.

About fifteen years ago the battlefield guide and author Tim Saunders heard that Hubert Meyer was still alive and worked with an Oxford German professor to obtain what he hoped would be new primary source material on the Normandy Campaign. The results were presented at RUSI with a well informed audience. The question session started with Anthony Beevor denouncing the results as Durchstoss bollocks - though he used more polite terms.
No sign of the so-called Durchstoss legend in Hubert Meyers history of the 12 ss pz div. On p 56 he is not even critical about the decisions concerning the release of the pz divisions on June 6. He shows a lot of understanding for the decisions made including these by Speidel. He does mention that political grounds were mentioned for not sending 2 and 116 pz div to Normandy- in the years after the war also based on statements by speidel himself. He mentions that heinz gunther guderian will certainly have authentical information about that in his history of the 116 pz. Heinz Gunther Guderian does elaborate on that on pp 59-61 of Das letzte Kriegsjahr im Westen Die Geschichte der 116.Panzer Division. He mentions that David Irving reproached Speidel to have kept back the 116 pz div from the front to be used in the overthrow of Hitler. In a letter to Guderian of 04 10 1978, Speidel confirms that before the invasion there were considerations to keep back trustworthy pz div(2 and 116) for coming events. He states these considerations happened within the controversy about where to station the pz div. After the invasion there can be no talk anymore about keeping back the 116 pz division for these reasons. That the 116 pz was only released on 19.07 must be due to its refit not being ended. Guderian then elaborates some more and still is clearly not entirely convinced that there were no political considerations concerning the movements of 116 pz in the period after the invasion .
There is no reason to doubt Gunsche. It would be doubtful that Hitler was not woken up when the invasion happened. Anyway,there was nothing really abnormal about some hesitation before releasing the OKW reserves which you would not want to commit too quickly. And 12 ss pz was already moving earlier as it's pulling forward had been authorized at 10 am despite its release being refused (H Meyer p 55).

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Re: D-Day Started while Hitler was Sleeping - Which Sources?

Post by Aida1 » 16 Aug 2022 15:46

Sheldrake wrote:
16 Aug 2022 11:19
Aida1 wrote:
15 Aug 2022 16:19
Kriegsgeschichte der 12.SS panzer division Hitlerjugend, Hubert Meyer quotes on pp55-56 a statement by Otto Gunsche to the author that Hitler was woken up early in the morning of June 6 by Linge at the request of Schmundt who urgently wanted to speak to Hitler after a a call from Jodl. .According to Gunsche, Hitler was, against his habit, already towards 8 am in the big hall of the Berghof.
The first incidents were airborne landings reported in the hours after midnight. The decision to respond to an allied invasion rested with Hitler. However, there were standing orders for mopping up commandos which required prompt action. Fifteenth Army screamed louder than Seventh Army and the 12th SS was diverted to mop up paratroops on the coast to their north - and away from the best route to the invasion beaches. Thereafter, once the seaborne assault landings 12 SS was stuck until OKW made a decision, which took a lot longer.
Hitler was only needed to release the OKW reserves. 12 ss pz was at first certainly not directed forward straight towards the invasion beaches but the situation was not really very clear then. 12 ss pz was not really stuck as it took time for all of the units to reach its assembly area. It was still moving when it got its orders to move towards the invasion beaches.

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Re: D-Day Started while Hitler was Sleeping - Which Sources?

Post by Montgomery » 30 Oct 2022 16:55

Aida1 wrote:
15 Aug 2022 16:19
Kriegsgeschichte der 12.SS panzer division Hitlerjugend, Hubert Meyer quotes on pp55-56 a statement by Otto Gunsche to the author that Hitler was woken up early in the morning of June 6 by Linge at the request of Schmundt who urgently wanted to speak to Hitler after a a call from Jodl. .According to Gunsche, Hitler was, against his habit, already towards 8 am in the big hall of the Berghof.
Hitler was in Berghof on 6th of Jun!!! I thought he was in the Bunker!!
He was also awake!! This is a statement by an eye witness Otto Gunsche !!
Sounds strange really ,,
Sounds like the statement Hitler was sleeping is not true!!
Pehraps as user Aida1 said it took longer time to the panzer to get assembled near the beaches.

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Re: D-Day Started while Hitler was Sleeping - Which Sources?

Post by LAstry2 » 13 Dec 2022 23:54

see Cornrkius Ryan Copy of German radio message The Longest Day

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Re: D-Day Started while Hitler was Sleeping - Which Sources?

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 14 Dec 2022 17:59

Digressing slightly from the topic:
Sheldrake wrote:
19 Jul 2021 10:14

...In case anyone has forgotten, Hitler was unhappy with the proposals made by Rundstedt and his staff for a defence inland. He appointed Erwin Rommel to command a new Army group to command the troops on the likely invasion front, removing Rundstedt from direct command. Rommel's shared Hitler's views about the importance of defeating the allies on the coast. All weapons pointing at landing beaches. All reserves close at hand for rapid counter attacks - except where they could only be released by OBWest or OKW

Everything in Rommel's concept depended on prompt effective actions on D Day - hence the name of the book and film - "The Longest Day."

I don't think Hitler entirely shared Rommels views. While he supported the beach fortification program Rommel urged and supported moving more of the static & mobile infantry divisions to the beaches he did not overrule Rundsteadt on the question of the Pz corps positions. Rommel was allowed direct control of some for his Army Group G, but Schweppenbergs PZ Grp West was retained, positioned where Rundsteadt preferred, and was to be kept in reserve. One would think that if Rommel were fully supported Pz Grp West would have been positioned as per his recommendations dating back to January.


I
t was a risky strategy selected by Hitler which failed when tested. Lots of predictable problems had not been thought through.

1. There is no evidence of test exercises to check response times or identify problems in reporting "D Day" During the cold war NATO responses depended on political leaders being made rapidly aware of Warsaw Pact aggression. This was tested in annual communication exercises. Nothing seems to have been done to test what might happen on the eve of D Day.
There seem to have been exercises. They get mentioned a lot in assorted accounts. Rommel witnessed a map exercise in January about the same time as taking over at Army Group G. the exercise tested the response to a invasion north of the Seine River in the 15th Army area. The center piece of the exercise is described as rehearsing the movement of PGW to the invasion site & then methodically attacking and defeating the lodgment. This map exercise covered about four days on the calendar, & took the better part of the day to complete. Rommel criticized the exercise for waiving away the effects of Allied airpower, citing his experience in Africa and that of Kesselrings army Group in Italy. The response from Schweppenberg & his team was they recognized the Allies had air superiority pre invasion, but the Luftwaffe would respond, and their experience in the east indicated air attacks would not be a severe problem.

Ive seen remarks about other map exercises and some field exercises subsequent to January, unfortunately have zero details.

[/quote]2. There was no contingency Army Group B plan for what would happen if there was a D+1. ARKO 1st SS Panzer Corps artillery said that there was no prior survey of possible artillery positions or provision of 1:25,000 scale maps. [/quote]

As a former S-2 in the artillery I can say this was not unusual, tho not desireable. 7th and 15th Army covered a lot of territory or coast and the problem of stocking enough 1:25,000 maps for everyone boggles my mind. 1:10,000 would be even worse. Just distributing 1:100,000 scale maps for the most likely coastal regions to all division & corps HQ of the reserve would be a challenge. This is just one of a multitude of problems with maintaining a highly centralized reserve covering a entire army groups front. If the Pz corps were distributed to local assigned sectors, then providing maps and surveying artillery positions would be easier.

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Re: D-Day Started while Hitler was Sleeping - Which Sources?

Post by Richard Anderson » 14 Dec 2022 19:02

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
14 Dec 2022 17:59
Digressing slightly from the topic:
Oh, we never do that... :lol:
I don't think Hitler entirely shared Rommels views. While he supported the beach fortification program Rommel urged and supported moving more of the static & mobile infantry divisions to the beaches he did not overrule Rundsteadt on the question of the Pz corps positions. Rommel was allowed direct control of some for his Army Group G, but Schweppenbergs PZ Grp West was retained, positioned where Rundsteadt preferred, and was to be kept in reserve. One would think that if Rommel were fully supported Pz Grp West would have been positioned as per his recommendations dating back to January.
It is a bit more complex than that. Hitler may have shared some of Rommel's viewpoints about a fortified forward defense but he adjudicated a Solomonic decision on the dispute between Rommel, Rundstedt, and Geyr. To do so on 28 April - just 39 days before the invasion - he split the former HG-D of four armies into HG-B under Rommel with 1., 7., and 15. Armee and AG-G under Blaskowitz with 19. Armee (1. Armee was transferred to AG-G on 13 May). Panzergruppe West remained a training organization directly under command of Ob.West - remember it only had a operational function in the event of invasion.

What really muddies the waters is that Panzergruppe West was also partly split between the various armies. Administratively the corps headquarters - I-SS, XXXXVII, LVIII Reserve were directly under Geyr's control, but he had operational control of they and their attached units only with regards to administration and training. Even better, the corps and their divisions did not comprise a physical central reserve as Rundstedt and Geyr wanted but were split geographically over the entire are of Ob.West as operational reserves in potential - partly out of necessity but also partly as part of the compromise. So XXXXVII Panzerkorps was the operational reserve of HG-B with its two "ready" divisions 2. and 21. Panzer attached to 15. and 7. Armee respectively and its "rebuilding" division 116. Panzer training east of Rouen. In the same way, LVIII Reserve-Panzerkorps was the operational reserve of AG-G, albeit none of its divisions were ready - 2. SS and 9. Panzer were rebuilding, while 11. Panzer was still in transit from the Ostfront as of 6 June, and 273. Reserve-Panzer was solely a training formation. Only I. SS-Panzerkorps directly under Panzergruppe West was a true central reserve - and its divisions were also scattered in various states of readiness. 17. SS-Panzergrenadier was attached to LXXXX Armeekorps of 1. Armee, 1. SS-Panzer was rebuilding and not ready, and only 12. SS and Lehr were ready and a central reserve under Panzergruppe West.

So of the ten divisions available, only five were actually ready. Of those, three were attached to three separate armies a la the desires of Rommel and two were a central reserve a la Rundstedt and Geyr.
There seem to have been exercises. They get mentioned a lot in assorted accounts. Rommel witnessed a map exercise in January about the same time as taking over at Army Group G. the exercise tested the response to a invasion north of the Seine River in the 15th Army area. The center piece of the exercise is described as rehearsing the movement of PGW to the invasion site & then methodically attacking and defeating the lodgment. This map exercise covered about four days on the calendar, & took the better part of the day to complete. Rommel criticized the exercise for waiving away the effects of Allied airpower, citing his experience in Africa and that of Kesselrings army Group in Italy. The response from Schweppenberg & his team was they recognized the Allies had air superiority pre invasion, but the Luftwaffe would respond, and their experience in the east indicated air attacks would not be a severe problem.

Ive seen remarks about other map exercises and some field exercises subsequent to January, unfortunately have zero details.
The January one seems to be the only major exercise that gamed that out. The other two exercises - April and the famous 6 June exercise - were both predicated on defeating a mass desant by the ten Allied airborne divisions then known to be in England, which was actually Geyr's major worry. :lol:
As a former S-2 in the artillery I can say this was not unusual, tho not desireable. 7th and 15th Army covered a lot of territory or coast and the problem of stocking enough 1:25,000 maps for everyone boggles my mind. 1:10,000 would be even worse. Just distributing 1:100,000 scale maps for the most likely coastal regions to all division & corps HQ of the reserve would be a challenge. This is just one of a multitude of problems with maintaining a highly centralized reserve covering a entire army groups front. If the Pz corps were distributed to local assigned sectors, then providing maps and surveying artillery positions would be easier.
Staudinger said a lot of things, much of which constitute sour grapes, like most German generals postwar. The divisions along the coast were adequately supplied with 1:25,000 maps for artillery plotting purposes - some of them, marked up with coded concentrations, are still available at BAMA. If Staudinger did not have access to maps its because he failed to properly coordinate with Armee-Kartenstelle 530 (mot) of 7. Armee, or ARKO 118 and 474 of LXXXIV Armeekorps, or the Artillerie-Führer of the divisions in place along the coast. It is more likely a reflection of his culpability and possible incapability rather than that of HG-B or Ob.West.
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Re: D-Day Started while Hitler was Sleeping - Which Sources?

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 14 Dec 2022 19:40

Richard Anderson wrote:
14 Dec 2022 19:02
...
As a former S-2 in the artillery I can say this was not unusual, tho not desireable. 7th and 15th Army covered a lot of territory or coast and the problem of stocking enough 1:25,000 maps for everyone boggles my mind. 1:10,000 would be even worse. Just distributing 1:100,000 scale maps for the most likely coastal regions to all division & corps HQ of the reserve would be a challenge. This is just one of a multitude of problems with maintaining a highly centralized reserve covering a entire army groups front. If the Pz corps were distributed to local assigned sectors, then providing maps and surveying artillery positions would be easier.
Staudinger said a lot of things, much of which constitute sour grapes, like most German generals postwar. The divisions along the coast were adequately supplied with 1:25,000 maps for artillery plotting purposes - some of them, marked up with coded concentrations, are still available at BAMA. If Staudinger did not have access to maps its because he failed to properly coordinate with Armee-Kartenstelle 530 (mot) of 7. Armee, or ARKO 118 and 474 of LXXXIV Armeekorps, or the Artillerie-Führer of the divisions in place along the coast. It is more likely a reflection of his culpability and possible incapability rather than that of HG-B or Ob.West.
I am looking at it from the point that Staudinger might not know specifically where his artillery would be deployed. a 1:10,000 or 1:25,000 map does not cover much territory. collecting a maps sufficient for a artillery group, for multiple locations is difficult. In Korea my battalions contingency area was the Chore Wan valley & while we trained in the central corridor our actual likely area of war operations included a region perhaps 15x in area. The we used 1:50,000 maps for artillery ops & enough of those for the region would filled most of five ton truck for just our battalions requirement. We had to trust the US Army would bless us with the right maps at the right moment. Whatever our requests might have been. If Staudinger knew accurately where the artillery group would be deployed then yes its on him. Otherwise i see yet another aspect of a overly complex plan.

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Re: D-Day Started while Hitler was Sleeping - Which Sources?

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 14 Dec 2022 20:16

Richard Anderson wrote:
14 Dec 2022 19:02
Carl Schwamberger wrote:
14 Dec 2022 17:59
Digressing slightly from the topic:
Oh, we never do that... :lol:
I don't think Hitler entirely shared Rommels views. While he supported the beach fortification program Rommel urged and supported moving more of the static & mobile infantry divisions to the beaches he did not overrule Rundsteadt on the question of the Pz corps positions. Rommel was allowed direct control of some for his Army Group G, but Schweppenbergs PZ Grp West was retained, positioned where Rundsteadt preferred, and was to be kept in reserve. One would think that if Rommel were fully supported Pz Grp West would have been positioned as per his recommendations dating back to January.
It is a bit more complex than that.

Making the Allies look like models of clarity & simplicity.

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Re: D-Day Started while Hitler was Sleeping - Which Sources?

Post by Richard Anderson » 14 Dec 2022 20:32

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
14 Dec 2022 20:16
Richard Anderson wrote:
14 Dec 2022 19:02
Carl Schwamberger wrote:
14 Dec 2022 17:59
Digressing slightly from the topic:
Oh, we never do that... :lol:
I don't think Hitler entirely shared Rommels views. While he supported the beach fortification program Rommel urged and supported moving more of the static & mobile infantry divisions to the beaches he did not overrule Rundsteadt on the question of the Pz corps positions. Rommel was allowed direct control of some for his Army Group G, but Schweppenbergs PZ Grp West was retained, positioned where Rundsteadt preferred, and was to be kept in reserve. One would think that if Rommel were fully supported Pz Grp West would have been positioned as per his recommendations dating back to January.
It is a bit more complex than that.

Making the Allies look like models of clarity & simplicity.
Oh hell no! :lol:
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Re: D-Day Started while Hitler was Sleeping - Which Sources?

Post by Richard Anderson » 14 Dec 2022 20:37

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
14 Dec 2022 19:40
I am looking at it from the point that Staudinger might not know specifically where his artillery would be deployed. (snip) If Staudinger knew accurately where the artillery group would be deployed then yes its on him. Otherwise i see yet another aspect of a overly complex plan.
Yes but he did know accurately where his artillery headquarters - it was not technically a group of artillery - would deploy when he was given his orders to deploy. I'm not sure that anyone knows accurately or precisely where they may deploy when the contingency of their deployment covers potentially hundreds of miles of coastline. Wasn't it then part of his responsibility to secure the required maps from the map depot? Or to liaise with the artillery headquarters already in place to obtain the required maps?
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Re: D-Day Started while Hitler was Sleeping - Which Sources?

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 16 Dec 2022 02:39

Thats a question of timing. If the lead time and travel time is short then the map request and delivery will not be as timely as you'd like. When the invasion alert comes its not the time for X number of ARKOS, Y corps HQ, and Z number of divisions to all be sending requests for truckloads of maps to the depot. But, lets talk about fuel & ammo questions for supplying these Pz corps scattered all about. ...no on second thought lets not. Theres likely already a frustrating thread on that already.

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