FDR's Tragic Refusal to Deal with the German Resistance and Abandon "Unconditional Surrender"

[rcocean]

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I'm not sure why you're posting this. I submitted my support for my statement I didn't give him the page number. is that required? Just asking.

[Christian Ankerstjerne]

Several posts that did not add to the discussion were removed.

To clarify:

• Comments about other members are not allowed (see Be respectful)
• Gatekeeping is now allowed (see Be respectful)
• When asked for a source, enough information must be provided to allow others to identify the source (see Back up your claims)

I'm not sure why you're posting this. I submitted my support for my statement I didn't give him the page number. is that required? Just asking.

The absolute minimum is the title or archive reference. Whether more is required depends on the circumstances. If the person asking for the source is unable to find it using the information provided and a reasonable amount of effort, this is a strong indication that the amount of information provided was not sufficient.

[rcocean]

Thanks.

[daveshoup2MD]

I think one, very important, fact is being missed here. The plot to kill Hitler failed. This means any negotiation would have to be with Hitler, not one of his croneys or resistance member. There are no conditions that would be acceptable to both Hitler and the Western Allies. About the only terms Hitler would ask for is to stop the war and join fighting the Soviets or at least stop fighting Germany so they could concentrate on destroying communism. Hitler was either going to Win or go down fighting to the ladt German with or without unconditional surrender.

Thanks

Mark

Fair point; it's also a point worth making that at no point in 1939-45 was there "any" German resistance that could have overcome a Nazi successor to Hitler, even if Hitler was assassinated.

[rcocean]

Here's an extract from Hanson Balwin's "Great Mistakes of the War," published in 1951. Baldwin, of course, was no "Right winger" but the well respected Correspondent for the NYT's. He states:

B. H. Liddell Hart, the British military writer, found in his postwar interviews with German generals
that “but for the unconditional surrender policy, both they and their troops would have yielded sooner,
either separately or collectively .” The German underground, as noted by Albrecht von Kessel 15 in
his diary, felt the unconditional surrender formula greatly handicapped their efforts. In the negotiations
leading up to the Italian surrender and collapse, the harsh and strident note of unconditional surrender,
modified only slightly and then but temporarily, probably delayed the inevitable collapse of Italy four to six weeks — ample time to permit the reinforcement of the Italian front by the Germans, a reinforcement which was the direct.

Allen W. Dulles’ book, German fs Underground , points to the same conclusions. It seems clear that the Unconditional surrender policy, plus the policy of indiscriminate bombing, helped to unify Germany and to weaken the anti-Hitler opposition.

FDR's tragic unconditional surrender policy was condemned by many after WW 2.

[Michael Kenny]

Here's an extract from Hanson Balwin's "Great Mistakes of the War," published in 1951. Baldwin, of course, was no "Right winger" but the well respected Correspondent for the NYT's. He states:

B. H. Liddell Hart, the British military writer, found in his postwar interviews................

Basil was not exactly an unsympathetic ear for those wishing to blame others for their mistakes.

[daveshoup2MD]

Here's an extract from Hanson Balwin's "Great Mistakes of the War," published in 1951. Baldwin, of course, was no "Right winger" but the well respected Correspondent for the NYT's. He states:

B. H. Liddell Hart, the British military writer, found in his postwar interviews................

Basil was not exactly an unsympathetic ear for those wishing to blame others for their mistakes.

LOL ... what is never offered up in these "good German" scenarios is who, exactly, in Germany was going to accept a "conditional" surrender in (presumably) 1941-45?

And what "conditions" would have ever been acceptable to the Allies, given German diplomatic history in 1933-39 and Germany's war crimes in 1939-45?

[rcocean]

The Kersten Memoirs 1940-45 (1957), goes into quite a bit of detail on the Himmler's negotiations with Hewitt on conditional surrender in Nov/Dec 1943. See the book, page 190-191. Conditions:

1. Abolition of Nazi party and Hitler dictatorship
2. Handing over of war criminals (Himmler excepted) to a outside court for trial
3. Evacuation of all occupied territories and return to 1914 borders
4. Control of German War industry by Allies
5. Reduction of German forces so no future aggression is possible.
6. Democratic Elections.

Basically a return to Germany's status in 1932. Except for the 1914 borders. I'm not too sure how reliable the Memoirs are, but the introduction is by Trevor-Roper, and the details reconcile to what is shown in the Foreign Relations of the United states where the American Ambassador reports the details to the state department.

[ljadw]

Here's an extract from Hanson Balwin's "Great Mistakes of the War," published in 1951. Baldwin, of course, was no "Right winger" but the well respected Correspondent for the NYT's. He states:

B. H. Liddell Hart, the British military writer, found in his postwar interviews with German generals
that “but for the unconditional surrender policy, both they and their troops would have yielded sooner,
either separately or collectively .” The German underground, as noted by Albrecht von Kessel 15 in
his diary, felt the unconditional surrender formula greatly handicapped their efforts. In the negotiations
leading up to the Italian surrender and collapse, the harsh and strident note of unconditional surrender,
modified only slightly and then but temporarily, probably delayed the inevitable collapse of Italy four to six weeks — ample time to permit the reinforcement of the Italian front by the Germans, a reinforcement which was the direct.

Allen W. Dulles’ book, German fs Underground , points to the same conclusions. It seems clear that the Unconditional surrender policy, plus the policy of indiscriminate bombing, helped to unify Germany and to weaken the anti-Hitler opposition.

FDR's tragic unconditional surrender policy was condemned by many after WW 2.

This condemnation was unjustified .
The German resistance to Hitler was a question of words, but not of acts .
We can easily throw away what Allen Dulles said ,after the war,because his points were politically inspired : his brother was the future GOP secretary of state .
Besides, conditional surrender would have had the same results as unconditional surrender = the Soviets in Berlin .
Everyone, except the Germans, was happy that the Red Army was in Berlin .
And, everyone's opinion, except that of the Germans, was that the Germans deserved what happened to them .

[ljadw]

About Baldwin : he said what he said in 1951,when US was fighting in Korea, and with hindsight, he said that there would be no war in Korea if there was a separate peace with Germany during WWII .
But he was wrong : even with a separate peace with Germany there would be still a war in Korea .
And, Kersten is not reliable at all: many of his documents were fabricated .This has been proved by L.de Jong .

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi rcocean,

So according to this, at the end of 1943 Himmler wanted to retain over 12% more territory than in 1933 (including Alsace and Lorraine, Schleswig-Holstein and a larger chunk of Poland along with a majority of non-Germans in these areas).

In other words Himmler wanted to negotiate a peace in which Germany would emerge from WWII as the victor!

This is not a serious proposition to the point of being ridiculously implausible.

As ljadw says, Kersten has long been debunked in the Netherlands, which was the subject of one of his major WWII fantasies. (https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/ ... 73.77/html)

Cheers,

Sid.

[rcocean]

Kersten's comments on the Himmler's conditional surrender terms ties to what Hewitt and others were reporting to the state department. As to whether Kersten was inaccurate in other things, including those that made him look good, is quite possible. However, those areas would have to relate to the Surrender negotiations. Trevor Roper in his introduction discusses a controversy over the rescue of Jews during the war and Kersten's role. He casts no doubt on anything else.

According to the author of "The Second most powerful man in the world" Admiral Leahy lied to the official historian in the 1950's about FDR's approval of the Morgenthau plan and Leahy's knowledge of the plan. However, that doesn't mean Leahy's wartime diary is unreliable. The same can be true of Kersten's memoirs. A lie in one area, doesn't mean everything is a lie.

[daveshoup2MD]

Hi rcocean,

So according to this, at the end of 1943 Himmler wanted to retain over 12% more territory than in 1933 (including Alsace and Lorraine, Schleswig-Holstein and a larger chunk of Poland along with a majority of non-Germans in these areas).

In other words Himmler wanted to negotiate a peace in which Germany would emerge from WWII as the victor!

This is not a serious proposition to the point of being ridiculously implausible.

As ljadw says, Kersten has long been debunked in the Netherlands, which was the subject of one of his major WWII fantasies. (https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/ ... 73.77/html)

Cheers,

Sid.

This one is entertaining:

Handing over of war criminals (Himmler excepted) to a outside court for trial

Himmler and what army, exactly, were going to enforce this one? Jodl and Keitel, after all, had one; Goering had his own. Presumably, between the SS, police, etc, there were a number of individuals who might object to Himmler handing them over to the Allies.

Load of bunk.

[ljadw]

No one protested when Neville Chamberlain said on September 3 1939 that the war would last til Nazism was totally destroyed , which means : unconditional surrender .
And ,no one protested,when after the death of FDR, Truman said that the aim of the US remained unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan .
If unconditional surrender was good for Japan, why would it not be good for Germany ?

[ljadw]

General MacArthur said of Roosevelt that he never told the truth if a lie would suffice

The allied armies in Italy had a huge logistics tail stretching back to the US and UK. This tail also consumed supplies on a large scale and then there was the Italian population. It would be surprising if the Italian campaign was not much costlier for the allies than the Germans.

That is not a good argument : after May 1943 the choice was between doing nothing or invading Italy .
And about FDR : he was a politician, thus ....
Besides : if everyone always would say the truth,it would be a bad world .