LVT and D Day

Discussions on WW2 in Western Europe & the Atlantic.
ChristopherPerrien
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Post by ChristopherPerrien » 02 Dec 2006 05:15

RichTO90 wrote: I think you need to set aside some of your obvious prejudices and preconceived notions and think again with a bit more openmindedness.

So you think "the world" of Hobart and yet have a bias against specialized armor? How does that work? And you obviously believe the calumny perpetrated by Hobart and his brother in law Chester Wilmot that the US Army foolishly "refused" the open-handed offer by the British of all the specialized armor except for the "foolish" DD tanks (of course it never get explained why DD tanks in the hands of the British were brilliant but were foolish in the hands of Americans - probably just our sheer provincial Yankee ignorance I suppose?)
Obvious prejudice and preconceived notions????????? :lol:

Here's some . Hobart was put in command of and training of the British 79th Ar Div a huge composite unit of all types of specialized armour which really never operated a whole unit. He was excellent at training men as his record proves with the 7th and 11th Ar Divs. He was an engineer before he was a tanker so I am sure he was the best man for the job. I have never gave any thought if he pushed the specialized armour idea on the Americans or not, it doesn't concern me or my views on this topic. I simply agree with B. L Hart that he was a military genius and any TANK advocate is alright by me, even if he used to be an engineer. :)

Now lets get to the other side of the coin, Omar Bradley and perhaps why he might have had a prejudice against "specialized armour"

From what I have read there were two reasons why he or the Americans did not use specialized armour much on D-day,

1.Training of soldiers to operate such equipment

2.The extra logistics and maitenance to keep that equipment operational.

Excuse me, Gotta go I'll get back to this tommorrow.

ChristopherPerrien
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Post by ChristopherPerrien » 02 Dec 2006 16:52

From what I can tell Bradley, nixed most of the specialist armour being adopted by US forces based on his view that the economic costs of doing so, outweighed the "one day" gain that the use of such things might cause to occur.

This is what I think the two reasons given to mean as a whole

1.Training of soldiers to operate such equipment

2.The extra logistics and maitenance costs to keep that equipment operational.

Bradley was looking at the "Big Picture". He already had alot of experience with training soldiers and the special problems associated with converting large numbers of citizens into soldiers out of the skeleton cadre that the US Army had been before the war. while he was not a tanker or engineer or sailor , I think he just did not expect that you should attaempt to "cross-train" soldiers in tasks that are in addition to what their normal duties are. With specialist armour , you need tankers to begin with and it takes at least a year for anyone to get slightly competent at just doing that job. With specialize armour you not only have teach people one complicated job you are then asking them to do something else. And there are two thing that make this prohibitive when you only have so many resources and are rapidly trying to train large groups of soldiers in just their basic tasks.

1.Training of soldiers to operate such equipment
2.The extra logistics and maitenance cost to keep that equipment operational.

To do so you need alot of people who already know both sides (cadre). I don't think these existed in sufficient quantities to do. One you train soldiers on specialized armour you also end up with units that you are loath to use for other tasks. While DDtanks might be a good idea during the few hours of attempting a landing or a river crossing , it also works against you using them in the normal "day to day" combat. Sure few battalions of DD tanks would be nice, but what happens if you just need "tanks". If you attrit these specialized units rather than holding them "in reserve, you won't have them when they are required to cross a river later. And this is the casewith all specilized armour, they are nice to have for those rare moments when you need them , but the extra training of the crews and the modification of the vehicles makes them "special" so they are lost to you if you just need a standard tank, which is what you need MOST of the time. The same can be said of Crocidiles and ARVES as with DDtanks . In the case of these, sure they are nice to have to bust up fortifications but such obstacles don't happen every day or every where in a war.

Perhaps it was the British preference for "specilized armour" on D-day which enabled them to take "lower" casualties on D-day, but if so, it also worked against them after that one day to "break-out". Conversely the lack of specialized armour in American forces at normandy might be part of the reason they incurred higher losses on D-day, if so it can also be argued that the Americans were able to "break-out" for this same reason.

Specialize armour demands a certain mindset and put restrictions on using those assets in normal armour operations. LVT's being a VERY specialized asset , being more "boat" than anything else, really had no place or use at Normandy except for those first few hours, after that they would have been "cost " for just about every day after that till the end of the war.

Overall I can see why the point Hobart and the British are seen as "advocates" of the use of specialized armour on D-day, but I think the same idea explains why Bradley, looking at a "bigger picture", might have opposed such an "advocation".


Regards, Chris


I think this post of mine goes in whole lot of directions , but I hope I got some points across.

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Post by JonS » 02 Dec 2006 19:16

ChristopherPerrien wrote: Conversely the lack of specialized armour in American forces at normandy might be part of the reason they incurred higher losses on D-day, if so it can also be argued that the Americans were able to "break-out" for this same reason.
How would you categorise the Cullen Hedgerow Cutter?
ChristopherPerrien wrote:While DDtanks might be a good idea during the few hours of attempting a landing or a river crossing , it also works against you using them in the normal "day to day" combat.
That would explain why those regiments re-equipped with regular Shermans fairly promptly.

Actually - could you please elaborate how using DDs as regular tanks "works against you" please. Be specific.
Last edited by JonS on 02 Dec 2006 19:23, edited 1 time in total.

JonS
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Post by JonS » 02 Dec 2006 19:20

Incidentally, just to put things into perspective: the specialised armour amounted to about 6 or 7 regiments, out of about 50 the British used in Normandy.

ChristopherPerrien
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Post by ChristopherPerrien » 02 Dec 2006 20:02

JonS wrote:
ChristopherPerrien wrote: Conversely the lack of specialized armour in American forces at normandy might be part of the reason they incurred higher losses on D-day, if so it can also be argued that the Americans were able to "break-out" for this same reason.
How would you categorise the Cullen Hedgerow Cutter?
An "attachment", field expedient and battlefield improvised.

It didn't require any special training to use and the outlay in "man-hours" to make and attach several hundred was "negliable". They had practically no "opportunity costs" or real costs either. They did not make a tank, specialized armour. I rate them about like reversing track centerguides for better traction on ice, and even those have more costs associated with them than the "Cullen Hegderow Device".

Even when they were not being used as Hedge row cutters, I am certain they made an excellent "step" for getting on and off your tank, tankers think that way :wink: and I have seen pictures of them being used as "cargo racks" too. Besides they sort of look like "TEETH" , what tanker wouldn't like them. They would have looked "cool" on my M1.


Truely a great piece of "battlefield improvisation" and I think Sgt. cullen deserved more than the "Legion of Merit" for it. Of course no telling what he got, unofficially. I'd buy him a drink myself if I had ever met him. All bull aside, I am sure the satisfaction was reward enough.

Chris

JonS
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Post by JonS » 02 Dec 2006 21:33

Sounds about like the DD then.

ChristopherPerrien
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Post by ChristopherPerrien » 02 Dec 2006 22:04

JonS wrote:
ChristopherPerrien wrote:While DDtanks might be a good idea during the few hours of attempting a landing or a river crossing , it also works against you using them in the normal "day to day" combat.
That would explain why those regiments re-equipped with regular Shermans fairly promptly.

Actually - could you please elaborate how using DDs as regular tanks "works against you" please. Be specific.


Hi Jon S,

Sure , When you use a specialized asset as a regular asset, you are forfeiting the exta cost of training those crews, the time invovled and the extra cost of those modified tanks themselves if they are lost or damaged. And this extra cost is going to be reincurred if you actually need more DDtanks as DDtanks in the future because you have to do the entire process again. While it may not seem like the opportunity cost invovled with DDtanks is not much per tank, (couple weeks training I guess and and few 1000 dollars), you have to consider, maintaining the training organization and logistics involved(special maintenance, parts, mechanics, and the additon supply line/train) adds more fixed and variable costs to the opportunity cost invovled when DDtanks are use as regular tanks.

I don't know any real figures for all these costs I speak of , but I venture to guess in terms of Man-hours and money, DDtanks with trained crews, easily cost twice as much as regular tanks.

I hope you can see simply that DDtanks or any "specialized armour" has a much higher cost than a regular armour asset, and how often(days in combat) you can use them as such, multiplies the problem.

All of this would make an interesting statistical study and I would think I could justify my arguements, as with statistics you can justify almost anything.

For what it is worth , I note that I may seem to have a strange way to look at the topic of "specializied armour" but I try to bring my own incite into this topic. Not only have I been on "tanks" , one of the tanks I drove for year was a "dozer tank", I have worked on several types of "specialized armour" while I was civilian contractor for the USMC/Navy( I have changed an impellor) an AAV-7/LVT, beat that :D , and I even have messed around with LCM-8's and have been on them in operation, plus I have a degree in statistics :roll: , so if I seems like I might be little out in left field about how I talk about this, please excuse "my obvious prejudices and preconceived notions".

Regards,
Chris

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Post by JonS » 02 Dec 2006 22:36

Nah. All military units are wasting assets. Give it a few weeks and a goodly proportion of your originals are going to be out of the picture anyway, regardless of their level of training. Couple that with the planned re-equipping of the DD regts shortly after D-Day with regular Shermans, the sheer number of armd regts, and the fact that the scale and importance of NEPTUNE justified a fairly large amount of what you might call waste, and we're left with CP grasping for straws.
I try to bring my own incite into this topic
You certainly do that.

ChristopherPerrien
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Post by ChristopherPerrien » 03 Dec 2006 16:45

JonS wrote:Nah. All military units are wasting assets. Give it a few weeks and a goodly proportion of your originals are going to be out of the picture anyway, regardless of their level of training. Couple that with the planned re-equipping of the DD regts shortly after D-Day with regular Shermans, the sheer number of armd regts, and the fact that the scale and importance of NEPTUNE justified a fairly large amount of what you might call waste, and we're left with CP grasping for straws.
I am at a loss about this. Surely all assets, even gold, will waste away eventually. But I suppose the idea is of no consequence, at the time, if you can count on tons of free assets and logistics ( nationalistic statements deleted, CDP)
and we're left with CP grasping for straws.
No , I make the straws, if you don't like them , make your own.

Warm Regards, :)

Chris
Last edited by ChristopherPerrien on 04 Dec 2006 21:21, edited 1 time in total.

RichTO90
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Post by RichTO90 » 04 Dec 2006 05:53

ChristopherPerrien wrote:
RichTO90 wrote: So you think "the world" of Hobart and yet have a bias against specialized armor? How does that work?
Obvious prejudice and preconceived notions????????? :lol:

Here's some . Hobart was put in command of and training of the British 79th Ar Div a huge composite unit of all types of specialized armour which really never operated a whole unit. He was excellent at training men as his record proves with the 7th and 11th Ar Divs. He was an engineer before he was a tanker so I am sure he was the best man for the job. I have never gave any thought if he pushed the specialized armour idea on the Americans or not, it doesn't concern me or my views on this topic. I simply agree with B. L Hart that he was a military genius and any TANK advocate is alright by me, even if he used to be an engineer. :)
I'm tired and sick so can't pay much attention right now, but....would you care to answer the question? How can you think "the world" of Hobart but be biased against specialized armor? I'm curious how you reconcile that? :D

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Post by RichTO90 » 04 Dec 2006 19:54

ChristopherPerrien wrote:From what I can tell Bradley, nixed most of the specialist armour being adopted by US forces based on his view that the economic costs of doing so, outweighed the "one day" gain that the use of such things might cause to occur.
I expect you are trusting to Chester Wilmot as the source for this? See Note 2, p. 265 in "The Struggle for Europe"? The curious thing about this account, derived from a letter to Wilmot from his brother-in-law, Hobart, on 10 November 1946, is the sole source for this ever happening. In fact, conversion of Churchill to AVRE did not begin untill December 1943, they first got into the hands of the operational RE Assault Squadrons in April 1944, and none of the assault squadrons in the Commonwealth sectors were at establishment on 6 June 1944.
This is what I think the two reasons given to mean as a whole

1.Training of soldiers to operate such equipment

2.The extra logistics and maitenance costs to keep that equipment operational.
3. There were no AVRE available to equip US units prior to D-Day.
4. Even if they could have been added to the landing schedule it would have required a complete reallotment of landing craft, changes to the landing plan, and so on.
5. Substitutes for the British AVRE were planned, the T-19 7.2-inch armored rocket launcher was originally scheduled for the M-4 on the LCT(A) in the assault wave, but had to be scrapped when they increased the already too high CG of the LCT(A). Otherwise the Germans might have been faced with direct fire from 7.2-inch rockets at close range, which probably would have been as useful as the Petard (i.e., in a few specialized circumstances). But on OMAHA there were in fact few circumstances where a British AVRE would have made any differance, or as little differance as they actually made on the British beaches. :D
6. Mineclearing tanks are a slightly different problem. Originally they were planned for, but none of the US MX units or vehciles arrived in time, so tankdozers were substituted, with little real differance in the end effect on D-Day (the mines that needed to be cleared on D-Day at OMAHA beach were in general inaccessible to mechanized mineclearing).

ChristopherPerrien
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Post by ChristopherPerrien » 04 Dec 2006 22:18

Interesting post Rich.

Honestly , I have never even heard of a Chester Wilmot, perhaps I have run across this letter in some book, and don't recall it . But the idea that Bradley declined the use of "specialist armor " for those two reasons cited has been in just about every D-Day book or account I have seen and that's alot . In my prejudices , I suppose I have taken that to me to be an underhanded way of calling Bradley and the Americans , STUPID, for not taking BRITISH advice and they prove it :roll: because that Americans took high casualties at Omaha. I know this is not true, because they never bother to note how easy the invasion was at Utah beach and Americans landed there too, And as we know Omaha was the only beach possessing good defensive topography with an overlooking bluff and was the only one defended by a veteran and an actual German combat unit.

Your post does well in suggesting that Bradley never cancelled the use of specialist armor simply rather they were not available and all this garbage I have run across about Bradley and the Americans being stupid about specialist armor is exactly that.

However I think many people accept this garbage as gospel, and I don't like it, since I am more concerned with who Bradley was, the situation he was in. I basically am cooking up what I think would have been sound logical and economic thinking( modern-day operational analysis, I guess) for why Bradley would have good reason to do so. The letter, from "the other side of this coin" you cite adds credence to my theory so to speak, more so because I had no knowlegde that something like it existed.

Personally , I like your theory better than my own, it is closer to "Ocaam's razor",( No Bradley/Hobart controversy ,because there simply was no specialist armour available for the American forces) but my theory is more a lower level rational explanation meant to counter what is commonly accepted in the many books.

As to how I can like Hobart and don't like specialist armor that simply ain't true. Specialist armor has a place on the battlefield , and I realize the uses and limitations and costs and benefits of employing such gadgets. My obection is more to short range thinking that exists in the history books that only considers getting across the Normandy beaches and not getting to Berlin so to speak. Hobart , I am sure understood the overall goal of Overlord, but that was not his "job" at the time, his was the devlopement and training of specialized armor units, and I suppose his drive to do this well is why he is presented as the "poster boy" of specialist armor. I would rather think that Bradley and Hobart would have done the same thing if they had been in the other man's shoes.

Chris

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Post by RichTO90 » 05 Dec 2006 21:37

ChristopherPerrien wrote:Interesting post Rich.

Honestly , I have never even heard of a Chester Wilmot, perhaps I have run across this letter in some book, and don't recall it . But the idea that Bradley declined the use of "specialist armor " for those two reasons cited has been in just about every D-Day book or account I have seen and that's alot .
In 1952 Chester Wilmot wrote one of the best single-volume accounts of the Campaign in Northwest Europe, The Struggle for Europe. It also happened to be one of the first single-volume accounts. Combined with that Wilmot was in many cases speaking from first-hand experience, he was an Australian War Correspondent based in London who spent much of the campaign at 21 Army Group HQ, and he was a well-known and respected journalist and commentator on military matters (a rival in some respects of B.H. Liddel-Hart) prewar. He also happened to be Hobart's brother-in-law.

And I think you missed my point. Wilmot's is the ur-account of "Bradley declining the AVRE" that as you say appear "in just about every D-Day book or account I have seen". But it doesn't have any substance that I can find, and I've been looking for two years now. Essentially every authority or source ultimately leads back to page 265 in The Struggle for Europe. :roll:

Smll bit of interesting trivia. Wilmot was killed in the Comet airliner that broke up and crashed into the Med off of Elba in 1954.
In my prejudices , I suppose I have taken that to me to be an underhanded way of calling Bradley and the Americans , STUPID, for not taking BRITISH advice and they prove it :roll: because that Americans took high casualties at Omaha.
That's how its transmogrified over the years, but I tend to think now that Wilmot simply accepted the account without question, which is understandable considering the source was a relative and friend. And as a journalist he could hardly avoid a good story, confirmed by a reliable source (well, the confirmation was the source, but it's not my purpose here to criticize journalistic ethics :lol: ). Hobart's motive is less clear, although I suspect that it was a bit of innocent self-promotion for himself and the British Army.
I know this is not true, because they never bother to note how easy the invasion was at Utah beach and Americans landed there too, And as we know Omaha was the only beach possessing good defensive topography with an overlooking bluff and was the only one defended by a veteran and an actual German combat unit.
Yes, but.... 352. Inf.-Div. was an "actual" unit of course, but then I suspect so were the other German units on the coast? :) But it wasn't "veteran" by any means. Apparently nearly all of its EM were recruits from the conscript classes of 1925 and 1926, it's NCO staff was 30 percent understrength although a fair percentage of them were probably Ostkampfer, but half the 333 officers in the division had no combat experience at all. In any case, the defenders of OMAHA actually consisted on one battalion from 352. Inf.-Div. (II./Gren.-Regt. 916) and 716. Inf.-Div. (III./Gren.-Regt 726 and elements of I./Gren.-Regt. 726).

The critical element was the terrain and the major planning flaw that was followed to one degree or enough across the entire Normandy front, the tendancy to direct the assault at the best beach exit points, which of course were also the most heavily defended points.
Your post does well in suggesting that Bradley never cancelled the use of specialist armor simply rather they were not available and all this garbage I have run across about Bradley and the Americans being stupid about specialist armor is exactly that.
It's simply a case of cart before the horse thinking in most cases. OTOH, Bradley simply wasn't the bright light and "soldier's soldier" that his wartime and postwar propaganda would have us think, many of the problems enocuntered by American forces in NWE can be laid directly at his doorstep. :(
(snip)
As to how I can like Hobart and don't like specialist armor that simply ain't true. Specialist armor has a place on the battlefield , and I realize the uses and limitations and costs and benefits of employing such gadgets. My obection is more to short range thinking that exists in the history books that only considers getting across the Normandy beaches and not getting to Berlin so to speak. Hobart , I am sure understood the overall goal of Overlord, but that was not his "job" at the time, his was the devlopement and training of specialized armor units, and I suppose his drive to do this well is why he is presented as the "poster boy" of specialist armor. I would rather think that Bradley and Hobart would have done the same thing if they had been in the other man's shoes.

Chris
Er, it was impossible to get to Berlin unless the beaches were gotten across first. But I agree that planning did become unfocused in that it tried to plan for establishing a secure beachhead as the primary objective, which was necessary and correct, but then failed to provide for an adequate expolitation or - worse - for the contingency of the Germans failing to withdraw across the Seine (which was the expectation).

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Post by ChristopherPerrien » 06 Dec 2006 00:59

RichTO90 wrote:
ChristopherPerrien wrote:Interesting post Rich.

Honestly , I have never even heard of a Chester Wilmot, perhaps I have run across this letter in some book, and don't recall it . But the idea that Bradley declined the use of "specialist armor " for those two reasons cited has been in just about every D-Day book or account I have seen and that's alot .
In 1952 Chester Wilmot wrote one of the best single-volume accounts of the Campaign in Northwest Europe, The Struggle for Europe. It also happened to be one of the first single-volume accounts. Combined with that Wilmot was in many cases speaking from first-hand experience, he was an Australian War Correspondent based in London who spent much of the campaign at 21 Army Group HQ, and he was a well-known and respected journalist and commentator on military matters (a rival in some respects of B.H. Liddel-Hart) prewar. He also happened to be Hobart's brother-in-law.

And I think you missed my point. Wilmot's is the ur-account of "Bradley declining the AVRE" that as you say appear "in just about every D-Day book or account I have seen". But it doesn't have any substance that I can find, and I've been looking for two years now. Essentially every authority or source ultimately leads back to page 265 in The Struggle for Europe. :roll:
Giving it more thought ,It's possible I have or have read Wilmott's book, I just don't recognize his name. I get your point, good luck on finding more than this one source. We are definitely in agreement it is far easier to find " obvious prejudices and preconcieved notions" about this , simply because most intersted parties were, or are, " separated by a common language".
That's how its transmogrified over the years,
"Calvin and Hobbes" :D
Er, it was impossible to get to Berlin unless the beaches were gotten across first. But I agree that planning did become unfocused in that it tried to plan for establishing a secure beachhead as the primary objective, which was necessary and correct, but then failed to provide for an adequate expolitation or - worse - for the contingency of the Germans failing to withdraw across the Seine (which was the expectation).
Perhap the Allies failed to realize Rommel's change in strategy, to a crust or beach defense, led to a much greater chance that the Germans would end up trying, throw us back in the sea wherever we landed rather than withdrawing.

But as I have maintained in many posts and topics , I stand by my belief that Overlord as far as the landing goes , was an eggshell on a hammer , and of course all that one-day thinking and planning to just get across the beach , is simply that and works against you after that. Or even on that ONE DAY since Caan was a first day objective.
Excuse me, I couldn't resist.

Actually all this goes to show that that much of the planning and execution of Overlord suggests that alot of "people" believed that it was more an amphibiuos assault rather than a wide river crossing. Too much thinking and effort was done on how to just land, in that case we should have used LTV's and Marines and specialist armor and brought beach chairs. My view is it was a large scale river crossing and all you need then is standard army units and a whole bunch of signs with arrows saying which way Paris and Berlin are , so the troops have some "direction" and a "goal" after hitting the beach.

Oh well, I think we have got all we can out of this off- topic of course, I appreciate your clarifications and info about some of the things discussed.

Unless someone asks me to reply to something I am going to take my leave of this topic, and let it get back to LTV's and D-Day and just that.

Regards to all,
Chris

ChristopherPerrien
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Post by ChristopherPerrien » 06 Dec 2006 01:06

RichTO90 wrote:
ChristopherPerrien wrote:Interesting post Rich.

Honestly , I have never even heard of a Chester Wilmot, perhaps I have run across this letter in some book, and don't recall it . But the idea that Bradley declined the use of "specialist armor " for those two reasons cited has been in just about every D-Day book or account I have seen and that's alot .
In 1952 Chester Wilmot wrote one of the best single-volume accounts of the Campaign in Northwest Europe, The Struggle for Europe. It also happened to be one of the first single-volume accounts. Combined with that Wilmot was in many cases speaking from first-hand experience, he was an Australian War Correspondent based in London who spent much of the campaign at 21 Army Group HQ, and he was a well-known and respected journalist and commentator on military matters (a rival in some respects of B.H. Liddel-Hart) prewar. He also happened to be Hobart's brother-in-law.

And I think you missed my point. Wilmot's is the ur-account of "Bradley declining the AVRE" that as you say appear "in just about every D-Day book or account I have seen". But it doesn't have any substance that I can find, and I've been looking for two years now. Essentially every authority or source ultimately leads back to page 265 in The Struggle for Europe. :roll:
Giving it more thought ,It's possible I have or have read Wilmott's book, I just don't recognize his name. I get your point, good luck on finding more than this one source. We are definitely in agreement it is far easier to find " obvious prejudices and preconcieved notions" about this , simply because most intersted parties were, or are, " separated by a common language".
That's how its transmogrified over the years,
"Calvin and Hobbes" :D
Er, it was impossible to get to Berlin unless the beaches were gotten across first. But I agree that planning did become unfocused in that it tried to plan for establishing a secure beachhead as the primary objective, which was necessary and correct, but then failed to provide for an adequate expolitation or - worse - for the contingency of the Germans failing to withdraw across the Seine (which was the expectation).
Perhap the Allies failed to realize Rommel's change in strategy, to a crust or beach defense, led to a much greater chance that the Germans would end up trying to throw us off the beach wherever we landed rather than withdrawing and throwing us back in the sea later.


But as I have maintained in many posts and topics , I stand by my belief that Overlord as far as the landing goes , was an eggshell on a hammer , and too much one-day thinking and planning to just get across the beach , works against you afterwards. Or even during the ONE DAY since Caan was a first day objective.

In a way , there might be something to comparing the "Atlantic Wall" to "Operation Fortitude" in terms what they actually were and what they accomplished in causing errors in thinking and actions on the others' side.I may make this into a topic of its own.

And maybe

Is it a certainty that "Fortitude was solely a deception"?, perhaps it might have become a second landing by the 3rd Army at Pas de Calaise if Overlord/Normandy had turned out different.


All this goes to show I think, is that much of the planning and execution of Overlord suggests alot of "people" believed it was more an amphibiuos assault rather than a wide river crossing. Too much thinking and effort was done on how and when and where to just get ashore, in that case we should have used more LTV's and Marines and specialist armor and brought beach chairs 8-) . My view is it was a large scale river crossing and all you needed was standard army units and a few boat-loads of signs with arrows saying which way Paris and Berlin are , so the troops have some "direction" and a "goal" after hitting the beach. 8-)



Oh well, I think we have got all we can out of this off- topic of course, I appreciate your clarifications and info about some of the things discussed.

Unless someone asks me to reply to something I am going to take my leave of this topic, and let it get back to LTV's and D-Day.

Regards to all,
Chris

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