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"Nuts" + Battle of the Bulge
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South
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OpanaPointer
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Re: "Nuts" + Battle of the Bulge
By Deb Kiner dkiner@pennlive.com
"Nuts."
Those were the words - or word - of Gen. Anthony C. McAullife, acting commander the 101st Airborne Division, when asked by the Germans to surrender at Bastogne, Belgium, during World War II's Battle of the Bulge.
The 101st was able to hold Bastogne.
On Dec. 16 in 1944 Germany launched its last major offensive of World War II, known as the Battle of the Bulge.
According to www.history.com the Battle of the Bulge was "so-called because the Germans created a 'bulge' around the area of the Ardennes forest in pushing through the American defensive line, was the largest fought on the Western front."
"In December 1944, Adolph Hitler attempted to split the Allied armies in northwest Europe by means of a surprise blitzkrieg thrust through the Ardennes to Antwerp. Caught off-guard, American units fought desperate battles to stem the German advance at St.-Vith, Elsenborn Ridge, Houffalize and Bastogne. As the Germans drove deeper into the Ardennes in an attempt to secure vital bridgeheads, the Allied line took on the appearance of a large bulge, giving rise to the battle's name. Lt. Gen. George S. Patton's successful maneuvering of the Third Army to Bastogne proved vital to the Allied defense, leading to the neutralization of the German counteroffensive despite heavy casualties."
The Battle of the Bulge lasted until Jan. 25, 1945. American casualties were 20,000 killed, 20,000 captured and 40,000 wounded.
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tigre
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Re: "Nuts" + Battle of the Bulge
Hello to all 
; a complement............................
The "Bulge" 1944.
Ever since September the whole of the Eiffel front had been remarkably quiet when, on 17 December, a rather curiously worded SHAEF communique reported a number of apparently secondary German attacks. The number of tanks, we were told, did not exceed a division in strength. It was only gradually that the full import and power of Model's attack was disclosed. The fact is, the German commander had succeeded, without arousing Allied suspicions, in concentrating twenty divisions on a front of almost exactly sixty miles by map (all distances are given by map in this article). That gives one division per three miles. If we assume that the Americans could oppose a force of six divisions, that gives them one division per ten miles.
Under the circumstances it is nofsurprising that Model got a good flying start, and by 22 December he reached the line of flood tide (see sketch) and had penetrated within four miles of the Meuse at Dinant. But for three splendid stands by American troops, he might have got much farther. In the first place the two flank bastions - Montjoie (Monschau) to Malmedy, and Echternach - stood firm, thus contracting the frontage of attack. In the second place, St. Vith, a big road junction, held out for several days, thus denying the enemy some important arteries and splitting up their attack. In the third place - and most important of all -- Bastogne refused to fall.
This also was an important road center in an area where good roads were at their fewest. The panzer advance swept round it, like an incoming tide sweeping round an outlying rock and coverting it into an island. Fortunately, the frontage on which they bypassed the town to the south was so narrow that there was little power in this part of the blow. But the situation was ugly in appearanceif not nerve-shattering.
The Commander of the 21st Army Group acted promptly, resolutely, and confidently as soon as he heard of the German breakthrough, and his action had an incalculable effect upon the morale of the Allied forces. General Patton (or General Bradley) seems to have acted promptly also. To switch from attacking in one sector to counterattacking or defending in another is a difficult operation of war-especially on the logistical side. Yet his presence on the southern side of the "bulge" made itself felt on about the seventh day of the battle, and on 27 December he achieved the signal success of relieving Bastogne, thus forming that peculiar Bastogne pocket.
By 22 December our troops had established themselves along the line of the Meuse between Namur and Dinant, and held all the bridges. From there they advanced a few miles east along the prominent ridge running from Dinant to Ciney. Just east of this town, USA troops were in contact with the panzer spearhead and, backed by our airborne troops on the ridge just behind them, they prevented any more forward movement. Simultaneously, about four miles to the southwest they succeeded in cutting off and then cutting up the panzers who had penetrated to Celles. High tide had come!
Looking at the sketch map at least six points can be noted from it:
1. The curiously symmetrical shape of the attack. A perpendicular from the center of the start line crosses the point of deepest penetration opposite Givet.
2. Both start line and perpendicular are almost exactly sixty miles in length. This gives the advance a speed of sixty miles in seven days, i.e., eight and a half miles per day not particularly fast, judging by previous panzer attacks in this war.
3. The advance was brought to a halt just short of that belt of fairly open country in which the famous battles of August 1914 were fought.
4. The direction of the axis of advance was at about an angle of seventy degrees to the direction of Antwerp-the reputed objective.
5. The importance of the Bastogne "island," and later "bastion," is clearly shown. It badly cramped the style of Model's attack.
6. The line attained was roughly parallel to the line of the River Meuse on all three sides.
Source: The Strategy of the Battle of the Ardennes. Military Review. June 1945.
Cheers. Raúl M
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; a complement............................The "Bulge" 1944.
Ever since September the whole of the Eiffel front had been remarkably quiet when, on 17 December, a rather curiously worded SHAEF communique reported a number of apparently secondary German attacks. The number of tanks, we were told, did not exceed a division in strength. It was only gradually that the full import and power of Model's attack was disclosed. The fact is, the German commander had succeeded, without arousing Allied suspicions, in concentrating twenty divisions on a front of almost exactly sixty miles by map (all distances are given by map in this article). That gives one division per three miles. If we assume that the Americans could oppose a force of six divisions, that gives them one division per ten miles.
Under the circumstances it is nofsurprising that Model got a good flying start, and by 22 December he reached the line of flood tide (see sketch) and had penetrated within four miles of the Meuse at Dinant. But for three splendid stands by American troops, he might have got much farther. In the first place the two flank bastions - Montjoie (Monschau) to Malmedy, and Echternach - stood firm, thus contracting the frontage of attack. In the second place, St. Vith, a big road junction, held out for several days, thus denying the enemy some important arteries and splitting up their attack. In the third place - and most important of all -- Bastogne refused to fall.
This also was an important road center in an area where good roads were at their fewest. The panzer advance swept round it, like an incoming tide sweeping round an outlying rock and coverting it into an island. Fortunately, the frontage on which they bypassed the town to the south was so narrow that there was little power in this part of the blow. But the situation was ugly in appearanceif not nerve-shattering.
The Commander of the 21st Army Group acted promptly, resolutely, and confidently as soon as he heard of the German breakthrough, and his action had an incalculable effect upon the morale of the Allied forces. General Patton (or General Bradley) seems to have acted promptly also. To switch from attacking in one sector to counterattacking or defending in another is a difficult operation of war-especially on the logistical side. Yet his presence on the southern side of the "bulge" made itself felt on about the seventh day of the battle, and on 27 December he achieved the signal success of relieving Bastogne, thus forming that peculiar Bastogne pocket.
By 22 December our troops had established themselves along the line of the Meuse between Namur and Dinant, and held all the bridges. From there they advanced a few miles east along the prominent ridge running from Dinant to Ciney. Just east of this town, USA troops were in contact with the panzer spearhead and, backed by our airborne troops on the ridge just behind them, they prevented any more forward movement. Simultaneously, about four miles to the southwest they succeeded in cutting off and then cutting up the panzers who had penetrated to Celles. High tide had come!
Looking at the sketch map at least six points can be noted from it:
1. The curiously symmetrical shape of the attack. A perpendicular from the center of the start line crosses the point of deepest penetration opposite Givet.
2. Both start line and perpendicular are almost exactly sixty miles in length. This gives the advance a speed of sixty miles in seven days, i.e., eight and a half miles per day not particularly fast, judging by previous panzer attacks in this war.
3. The advance was brought to a halt just short of that belt of fairly open country in which the famous battles of August 1914 were fought.
4. The direction of the axis of advance was at about an angle of seventy degrees to the direction of Antwerp-the reputed objective.
5. The importance of the Bastogne "island," and later "bastion," is clearly shown. It badly cramped the style of Model's attack.
6. The line attained was roughly parallel to the line of the River Meuse on all three sides.
Source: The Strategy of the Battle of the Ardennes. Military Review. June 1945.
Cheers. Raúl M
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Carl Schwamberger
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Re: "Nuts" + Battle of the Bulge
Exactly how Model got surprise here is understudied. Among the literature I've read:tigre wrote: ↑26 Jan 2023 14:57Hello to all
The "Bulge" 1944.
Ever since September the whole of the Eiffel front had been remarkably quiet when, on 17 December, a rather curiously worded SHAEF communique reported a number of apparently secondary German attacks. The number of tanks, we were told, did not exceed a division in strength. It was only gradually that the full import and power of Model's attack was disclosed. The fact is, the German commander had succeeded, without arousing Allied suspicions, in concentrating twenty divisions on a front of almost exactly sixty miles by map (all distances are given by map in this article). That gives one division per three miles. If we assume that the Americans could oppose a force of six divisions, that gives them one division per ten miles.
German security was excellent. Few officers with compromising documents were captured. Briefing of corps and division command levels came at the last minute reducing the odds of captures.
The use of radio for coordinating the planning and transmitting other prebattle information appears to have been insignificant. The Allies were dependent on Enigma, perhaps over dependent. Nothing in the prebattle radio traffic gave a useful clue about a attack. Ikes senior intel officer has been criticized for a over dependance on Enigma. Other radio signals intel, such as traffic or signals analysis failed to warn as well.
There seems also to have been a problem within the US First Army. Legend has it the corps intel officers were forwarding information from patrols & other local sources that there was unusual activity on the Ardennes sector. The story is the First Army intel chief dismissed this in favor of the lack of confirmation from Enigma and other sources. There is also that the First Army had not made use of the OSS. Both the US 3rd and 7th Armies had accepted the OSS liaison teams in September-October and integrated them into their G2 operations. Conversely the 1st Army G2 was indifferent to their reporting in during October, and they were directed to leave the First Army area after a few days.
Air reconnaissance was less effective due to the bad weather of December.
Patton definitely did anticipate a German offensive. its not clear if he really did anticipate to date and exactly location, but he did direct his staff to prepare contingency plans for a German offensive on the 12th Army Group front. I've found nothing about what the adjacent 21st Army Group estimated in November or to 16 December.