It would have been incredibly risky to establish a bridge head in the hope that future, currently available, divisions could deploy. Anzio demonstrate that the Germans had the capability to seal off a landing by an inadequate force.
Except the force to be landed is the same size as Husky, which was too big to be sealed off in the same way as Anzio. Anzio was a very bad idea to begin with because of tiny size of the force landed.
It would also have been rather stupid to tell the Germans that we were definitely going to invade France through Cherbourg, but could only land ten divisions for now!
Perhaps I have misunderstood, but I am feeling weary. Can you explain how occupying a small patch of France before ready to exploit with full forces would deliver a better result than the historical. After all Eisenhower's men did something rare in military history. They did what they said they were going to do ahead of time.
It's not about landing ten Divisions. It's about landing the force earmarked for Husky to Normandy instead, along with all the follow-on forces that were sent to Italy.
It's better than the historical in two main ways. First of all, the beach defenses were still considerably weaker in 1943 than in 1944. Secondly, no real breakout was possible in Italy that would threaten the German heartland. Even if the Germans completely collapse any Italian campaign cannot ultimately win the war because the Alps are in the way. As it stood the campaign predictably bogged down because of the terrain.
Landing in France by contrast would provoke a much more extensive reaction and hence likely lessen pressure on the Eastern Front; while creating a reasonably safe zone for build-up for an eventual breakout in late '43 or early '44. Even if the Germans deploy extensive forces the Allies would be able to use the bocage to their advantage to defend against it; and it's not as though the Allies were always restricted to just one big landing even if Normandy bogs down. People forget that while defending Pas-de-Calais was seen as a mistake in 1944 the Germans would have been in deep trouble had the Allies been able to do a second landing and take them as flank just as they imagined in their worst-case scenarios.
The risk of course is less experienced troops and that the Allies might be driven to the sea immediately after the initial landing because of this; or they may get "Kasserine"'d sometime after the landing that would result in panic and withdrawal.
The main point however is not whether a 1943 landing is necessarily wiser than a '44 one - history has moved past the date where we could have changed it to know for sure. My point is that it's more possible and doable than often given credit for; and that the diversion to Italy had always been more political for want of doing something than a serious way to end the war and get into Germany. If you really wanted to bulk up on the chances of success of Normandy '44 then all of the resources spent in Italy probably should have gone to Normandy instead.