Differing views of Overlord

[Richard Anderson]

I still have the book and Big Bill's critique of it, but both have been in storage for some 30+ years. It would take many more hours to unearth them than I am willing to spend at present. Sorry. I would then have to clear it with Bill, I guess. He is currently in Boston, I am told.

Well then, how about a precis? I'm always curious about criticism of Trevor's methodology, but too often it is nothing new under the sun.

How valuable do you think the North African Campaign was as a learning experience for the US Army? Do you think it made any difference to the success of the various landings in Italy and France that the divisions used were not entirely raw? A similar question could be asked of the British.

I think its really hard to say exactly, since the opposition and terrain in Normandy was so different from North Africa and Sicily. Certainly it gave about 20,000 to 30,000 troops the chance to "see the elephant" as the American Civil War expression had it. The most experience was gained by the 1st ID, which may have been pivotal on OMAHA. The 2d AD learned to scrap the distinction between light and medium tank battalions and created integrated battalions, but more importantly learned on the battlefield the difference between effective armored maneuver in an exercise environment and on the battlefield, emphasizing thorough reconnaissance and deliberate movement rather than the freewheeling "charging about" that characterized too much of Z/I training. However, they only had three abbreviated days of combat in North Africa, against a vastly outgunned and confused "enemy", plus five weeks of fairly desultory action in Sicily - after the initial landing. The 9th ID's experience was also pretty perfunctory and IIRC the whole division was never really in action as a unit. That leaves the 82d, whose experience taught them the flaws in the early airborne concept, which probably came to fruition in the last minute decision to change the division's LZ's.

[Richard Anderson]

My 2p

By 1943-44 the British and Americans had well trained formations. They had years to see how the Germans operated and understand their doctrine. The units formed at least for the first waves had years to get to know each other and train as units and as formations. All arms training for the D Day assault itself was thorough and well practiced. Newly trained soldiers had a boldness and enthusiasm that would be lost after they had seen the elephant, casualties among comrades and suffered near death experiences.

Agree completely. In some cases they may even have been over-trained...there were some complaints about "staleness" IIRC with some British Home Forces units and in the 29th ID after its long stay in Britain.

But there were some lessons that could only be learned in combat.

1) How to read the battlefield. At an individual level what was the difference between the noisy and the dangerous. Which incoming rounds were likely to be a threat to the individual or to someone else. For commanders : how to pick out the early signs of success or failure amid the chaos as plans fell apart at first contact with the enemy or the elements. The middle of Omaha Beach was perhaps not the best place to have to work these out. Those who had done it before were best able to react.

Absolutely. Having a few experienced officers and men like George Taylor, John Spalding, and Philip Streczyk was critical for the 16th Infantry.

2) Troops never practiced how close they really had to be to supporting fire to guarantee that the enemy would be neutralised and not ready to cut them down. Safety distances of 150 yards were 100 yards too long against the Germans.

Absolutely.

3) No one knows how they will react under fire. It was useful to weed out men in key positions particularly commanders, who could not cope with the pressure of mortal danger, of having to making tactical and leadership decisions The most high profile of these was Fredendall, but at a lower level lots of officers were posted away quietly because they could not cope with the reality of command under fire.

Absolutely. Staying for a moment with the 90th ID, cases such as McKelvie's collapse, his replacement Landrum's incompetence despite his experience, and Ginder's deadly failures as a regimental commander are less well known, but demonstrate how common they were. Ginder is actually aa fascinating case, since most probably don't realize he was relieved without prejudice and given a second chance with the 2d ID. There, in a different environment, with no baggage with his troops as a replacement for a well-liked leader, he performed well and had a pivotal role in the events of 16-19 December at Krinkelt-Rocherath. It is one of the many reasons I dislike cookie-cutter assessments of units as "crack" or "good" or "bad"...it misses the complex nature of how those factors can interact and affect results on the battlefield.

4) Which commanders made the best team. A top sports team never pits a bunch of unknown players against the best in the world. If you want to win a serious competition you need practice matches. Normandy was the fourth campaign conducted by the Allied Senior Command team. It was the third for the big Red one who had some significant changes of command since Nov 1942.

Yep.

Although only a minority of formations that were deployed to Normandy had services in North Africa and Italy, Individual officers and soldiers were cross posted to provide as leavening of expertise. While neither 2nd nor 5th Rangers had been battle before D Day, 5th Rangers was commanded by a veteran from 1st and 4th Rangers. Collins commanding the VIIth Corps (Utah Beach) had experience from the Pacific. The British cross posted an experienced an armoured regiment from the veteran 8th Armoured Brigade with the untested 27th

Not really sure how much effect that had in U.S. forces or overall? While Max Schneider was combat experienced, the 5th Rangers experience on OMAHA was probably more benefited by their landing as a unit in a sheltered spot. His experience could not effect the 2d Ranger TF at Pointe du Hoc or Company C, 2d Rangers at the "White House", which did just as well or better under more trying circumstances. Collins I suspect would have been Collins with or without his Pacific experience. Corlett's similar and much ballyhooed experience in the Pacific did not seem to translate in a remarkably better performance of the XIX Corps.

[Tom from Cornwall]

How valuable do you think the North African Campaign was as a learning experience for the US Army? Do you think it made any difference to the success of the various landings in Italy and France that the divisions used were not entirely raw? A similar question could be asked of the British.

Not forgetting that senior commanders (both U.S. and British) from the Mediterranean gave regular lectures on their return to the UK. A good example is noted by Lt. Gen. Humfrey Gale (head of admin at SHAEF) in his diary:

23 March 1944 LONDON

[...]

Attended a Lecture given by Gen. LUCAS on the ANZIO bridgehead.

Hopefully, Lucas gave them a "warts and all" description of how hard it was to rapidly secure a good beachhead before the rapid German reaction pinned the landing forces to a very small area.

Regards

Tom

[Tom from Cornwall]

All of which makes the travesty of Carlo d'Este's hatchet job on the British army in Normandy in a grossly biased chapter in his Decision in Normandy even more inexcusable. I must go and find that soap box I keep handy for this discussion!

Yes, he basically repeated Hargest, Wilmot, and van Creveld, with a soupcon of Hastings for good measure, but he was not repeating Trevor, since Trevor never opined on the subject of British effectiveness in Normandy, since he had no engagements to measure with.

And for a while d'Este also thought he had discovered the nefarious British conspiracy by Alanbrooke to starve 21st Army Group of replacements by keeping a million or so unemployed troops in Blighty. At least he had a reasonable source he developed his error from and later admitted it IIRC?

Meanwhile Hastings made up stories about the 90th ID, which his acolyte Beevor merrily repeated, citing Hastings as the source.

And then Russell A. Hart took the "trash the British army" ball and ran with it in his rather amusing Clash of Arms... Trevor Dupuy's NPW is in his bibliography but I'm not sure I can handle reading his polemic again to see if he mentions any of the analysis that is in Dupuy's book as it wasn't good for my blood pressure the first time round.

Regards

Tom

[Richard Anderson]

And then Russell A. Hart took the "trash the British army" ball and ran with it in his rather amusing Clash of Arms... Trevor Dupuy's NPW is in his bibliography but I'm not sure I can handle reading his polemic again to see if he mentions any of the analysis that is in Dupuy's book as it wasn't good for my blood pressure the first time round.

I forgot about his work...he reminds me of David Isby, another Britishized American.

[Geoffrey Cooke]

You are now making an unsupported inference regarding "7th US Army, Veritable-Grenade and everything from the 1945 fight". You have no idea what the force ratios or casualty ratios were, so do not know if the Allies "dominated" or simply overwhelmed their German opponents. Given that I suspect from the force ratios I could suss out that the Germans were overwhelmingly outnumbered and outgunned in those cases, it is hardly unsurprising they were defeated, but that gives us zero evidence that Trevor's inference drawn from the existing data set did not hold true.

(...) It is not a problem of "non random data" it is a problem of nonexistent data.

I thought you had guessed: I am pretty familiar with both SUSA and Veritable-Grenade. So, no, it wasn't a case of "overwhelming" the Germans, and I am absolutely certain you also know that. You repeat that data about these campaigns is "nonexistent". This is a preconceived opinion. I found a lot of data about these events, as did authors who worked on them before me.

On the operational scale the Germans were extremely outnumbered and outgunned in Operation Grenade, and the only estimates I have seen for German casualties in Operation Grenade are by the US 9th Army guessing at what they inflicted on the 15th Army, not actual German casualty reports. An Army guessing its opponent's losses might be considered accurate in terms of men captured, but killed and wounded? I think not....

[Mori]

On the operational scale the Germans were extremely outnumbered and outgunned in Operation Grenade, and the only estimates I have seen for German casualties in Operation Grenade are by the US 9th Army guessing at what they inflicted on the 15th Army, not actual German casualty reports. An Army guessing its opponent's losses might be considered accurate in terms of men captured, but killed and wounded? I think not....

That was the situation for operation Grenade: thanks to Veritable, which drew all reserves up north, the US 9th army got considerable superiority on his front.

Some German casualty reports exist in the files of the medical channel for one of the corps. For some divisions, you can also find strength reports published before and other prepared after the operations. The number of hand weapons (Gewehre), when it's reported, is another source. All in all It's patchy but it gives a sense of the losses as seen by the Germans.

Surprisingly, these German sources add up to more than the Allied estimates.

[Texas Jäger]

On the operational scale the Germans were extremely outnumbered and outgunned in Operation Grenade, and the only estimates I have seen for German casualties in Operation Grenade are by the US 9th Army guessing at what they inflicted on the 15th Army, not actual German casualty reports. An Army guessing its opponent's losses might be considered accurate in terms of men captured, but killed and wounded? I think not....

That was the situation for operation Grenade: thanks to Veritable, which drew all reserves up north, the US 9th army got considerable superiority on his front.

Some German casualty reports exist in the files of the medical channel for one of the corps. For some divisions, you can also find strength reports published before and other prepared after the operations. The number of hand weapons (Gewehre), when it's reported, is another source. All in all It's patchy but it gives a sense of the losses as seen by the Germans.

Surprisingly, these German sources add up to more than the Allied estimates.

This seems…dubious. SOME casualty reports from ONE corps?

[Mori]

On the operational scale the Germans were extremely outnumbered and outgunned in Operation Grenade, and the only estimates I have seen for German casualties in Operation Grenade are by the US 9th Army guessing at what they inflicted on the 15th Army, not actual German casualty reports. An Army guessing its opponent's losses might be considered accurate in terms of men captured, but killed and wounded? I think not....

That was the situation for operation Grenade: thanks to Veritable, which drew all reserves up north, the US 9th army got considerable superiority on his front.

Some German casualty reports exist in the files of the medical channel for one of the corps. For some divisions, you can also find strength reports published before and other prepared after the operations. The number of hand weapons (Gewehre), when it's reported, is another source. All in all It's patchy but it gives a sense of the losses as seen by the Germans.

Surprisingly, these German sources add up to more than the Allied estimates.

This seems…dubious. SOME casualty reports from ONE corps?

Yes. And it's a an excellent starting point. Coupled with strength reports.

A full detailed analysis with all figures and assumptions has been published, just go read it.

[Texas Jäger]

On the operational scale the Germans were extremely outnumbered and outgunned in Operation Grenade, and the only estimates I have seen for German casualties in Operation Grenade are by the US 9th Army guessing at what they inflicted on the 15th Army, not actual German casualty reports. An Army guessing its opponent's losses might be considered accurate in terms of men captured, but killed and wounded? I think not....

That was the situation for operation Grenade: thanks to Veritable, which drew all reserves up north, the US 9th army got considerable superiority on his front.

Some German casualty reports exist in the files of the medical channel for one of the corps. For some divisions, you can also find strength reports published before and other prepared after the operations. The number of hand weapons (Gewehre), when it's reported, is another source. All in all It's patchy but it gives a sense of the losses as seen by the Germans.

Surprisingly, these German sources add up to more than the Allied estimates.

This seems…dubious. SOME casualty reports from ONE corps?

Yes. And it's a an excellent starting point. Coupled with strength reports.

A full detailed analysis with all figures and assumptions has been published, just go read it.

Where?

[Mori]

Yes. And it's a an excellent starting point. Coupled with strength reports.

A full detailed analysis with all figures and assumptions has been published, just go read it.

Where?

In this book. Check the appendix.

[Westphalia1812]

And then Russell A. Hart took the "trash the British army" ball and ran with it in his rather amusing Clash of Arms... Trevor Dupuy's NPW is in his bibliography but I'm not sure I can handle reading his polemic again to see if he mentions any of the analysis that is in Dupuy's book as it wasn't good for my blood pressure the first time round.

Regards

Tom

Is it that bad? I am thinking about getting it after reading his rather excellent article in 'Feeding Mars'.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Is it that bad? I am thinking about getting it after reading his rather excellent article in 'Feeding Mars'.

My reading of it was that he carefully cherry-picked his sources to reinforce his pre-existing conviction that the British army was bottom of the pile in terms of effectiveness in Normandy.

That was just my opinion though!

Regards

Tom

[Westphalia1812]

Is it that bad? I am thinking about getting it after reading his rather excellent article in 'Feeding Mars'.

My reading of it was that he carefully cherry-picked his sources to reinforce his pre-existing conviction that the British army was bottom of the pile in terms of effectiveness in Normandy.

That was just my opinion though!

Regards

Tom

Well, I got 'Raising Churchills Army' so I hope that's a better one...