Operation Overlord D-Day Normandie

[Richard Anderson]

Here is an iconic photo of the Canadians landing on Juno, I don't know which sector it was taken, maybe that house will give us a clue, but that looks very much like a Cromwell AA tank in the foreground, so whats the chances of that being my dads vehicle. I suppose that you would have to find the landing zone through the building and see just how many Crusaders landed in that sector and take it from there.

Yan, that is a photo of NAN WHITE at Courseulles. So the Crusader AA is likely from G or H Troop of 375 Battery. They were part of ‘P’ Antiaircraft Assault Group, 80th AA Brigade. The five casualties in 114th AAA were incurred with 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade, so were incurred on NAN RED or NAN WHITE. Beyond that is difficult to say.

[yantaylor]

Thanks Sheldrake.
I wonder if the story of the gunner was from a later date in the campaign as I do vividly remembering him mentioning this.
He died in 1981 and most of his recollections were from the 1970s, maybe he was talking about the the day and later the weeks after D Day as the 114th regimental casualty figure don't mention about any gunner KIA for the 6-6-44.

Yan.

[Richard Anderson]

Thanks Sheldrake.
I wonder if the story of the gunner was from a later date in the campaign as I do vividly remembering him mentioning this.
He died in 1981 and most of his recollections were from the 1970s, maybe he was talking about the the day and later the weeks after D Day as the 114th regimental casualty figure don't mention about any gunner KIA for the 6-6-44.

Yan.

Yan, it could just also have been the gunner he remembered killed was initially reported as WIA or MIA in the confusion of D-Day. I find the CWGC site has the following dead of 114th Lt AA RA on 7 June:

Gunner GRICE, ROBERT, Service Number 1765821, Died 07/06/1944, Aged 38, 372 Bty., 114 Lt. A.A. Regt., Royal Artillery
Gunner CAPPER, COLIN, Service Number 1839928, Died 07/06/1944, Aged 23, 372 Bty., 114 Lt. A.A. Regt., Royal Artillery
Gunner MULLEN, MICHAEL, Service Number 1768288, Died 07/06/1944, Aged 31, 372 Bty., 114 Lt. A.A. Regt., Royal Artillery

Three more are listed for 24 June:

Serjeant COWAN, VALENTINE EDWARD, Service Number 1553165, Died 24/06/1944, Aged 24, 373 Bty., 114 Lt. A.A. Regt., Royal Artillery
Bombardier HASTIE, JAMES WATSON, Service Number 1766680, Died 24/06/1944, Aged 30, 373 Bty., 114 Lt. A.A. Regt., Royal Artillery
Gunner McCARTHY, LAWRENCE, Service Number 3768350, Died 24/06/1944, Aged 30, 373 Bty., 114 Lt. A.A. Regt., Royal Artillery

The next two were:

Lieutenant POUND, FREDERICK STANLEY ERNEST, Service Number 262272, Died 25/06/1944, Aged 28, 114 Lt. A.A. Regt., Royal Artillery
Gunner LEAH, LESLIE MORRIS, Service Number 1769543, Died 30/07/1944, Aged 38, 372 Bty., 114 Lt. A.A. Regt., Royal Artillery

Much later and buried in Belgium was:

Serjeant GOLDS, FRANK CHARLES FREDERICK, Service Number 1758020, Died 24/12/1944, Aged 24, 114 Lt. A.A. Regt., Royal Artillery

The only other I can find was a postwar death in England. I am uncertain if he may have died of wounds:

Gunner WILSON, JOHN, Service Number 11416724, Died 12/02/1947, Aged 42, 114 Lt. A.A. Regt., Royal Artillery

If Sheldrake can check the casualties listed for those dates in the WD, we might better know, which death your Dad may have witnessed.

[Sheldrake]

War diary entry 7th June.

ME109 attack – killed 3 wounded 3, one gun out of action 20 hrs

[yantaylor]

brilliant stuff guys, Richard your data is top notch mate, thanks.

He definitely served in either the 372nd battery or the 375th, did the 373rd battery have Crusader AAs?
I have found stuff on the TAC HQ, 80th AA Brigade and ‘P’ Antiaircraft Assault Group, 80th AA Brigade.

I wonder if I tried to search the army numbers on the first three men who died on the 7th of June, if their army history lists the places my dad served, EG: Scapa Flow 1939 and Luss in Scotland, then it may shed some light on the subject.

One of the gunners KIA on the 24th June had the same surname as my dad, his name was Gunner Laurence McCarthy.

Thank you both again.
Yan.

[Delta Tank]

Carl and all,
I will cast aspersions on the US Navy, they should of sent more capital ships for the initial phase of the bombardment, and if you believe what D'Este wrote in his book "Decision in Normandy", the US Navy was not going to send any battleships! The bombardment plan relied almost entirely on the Army Air Forces to bomb the beach fortifications, field fortifications. Now it worked over on Utah, but the unit that bombed Utah flew parallel to the beach and all the bombs landed on the Germans and not cows, they also flew below the clouds so they could actually see the target area. The units that bombed Omaha Beach, flew perpendicular to the beach, above the clouds and they dropped their bombs by using dead reckoning, that's right by azimuth and a stop watch!!! All of this is explained in the two books by Balkoski.
Mike

I posted this on another thread, but I need to post it here, when I make a mistake I feel obligated to post the correction.

I need to correct my post, the information I posted was not in Carlo D’Este book, but here:

“Eisenhower’s Lieutenants” by Russell F. Weigley, page 72.

“ Early in the year, Admiral Ramsey could assign only one battleship, one monitor, seven cruisers, and seven destroyers to the Western Naval Task Force to provide escort in addition to fire support to the convoys destined for Utah and Omaha Beaches. Few American warships were expected to be available to help the British, yet the Royal Navy not only had to support both the American and British Invasion forces; the Admiralty also thought it must hold strength in reserve lest the German Navy venture forth for a miniature Jutland. The consequent disparity between available fire support and the Neptune planners’ desires notwithstanding, Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief United States Fleet, was loath to release American vessels from his navy’s battles in the Pacific. King’s resistance even to small sacrifices by the Pacific Fleet for the sake of the campaign in Europe was a bitter draft for his countrymen in England, who both perceived Germany as a more dangerous adversary than Japan, and believed that for the climactic effort against Germany, American soldiers deserved the formidable fire support of their own country’s ships: an American destroyer had nearly the firepower of a British light cruiser, and an American cruiser a weight of guns in similar proportions.
Over dinner at the Connaught following the Norfolk House Landing Craft Conference in February, Admiral Hall commented explosively about this situation to King’s chief planner, Rear Admiral Charles M. Cooke. Though Cooke felt obliged to reprimand Hall for his choice of language, the episode served to wring from Washington an additional destroyer squadron and the ancient battleships Arkansas, Texas, and Nevada. . . . “

There is more, but typing this on my IPad is tiresome! No footnote that I can see.


Mike

[Carl Schwamberger]

Part of whats being described in the paragraph quoted from Weigley are the changes required by the expansion from three to five corps beach heads. Another aspect is COSSAC was confined to planning for only what was actually available at hand in the UK. Eisenhowers writ allowed him to demand about anything from anywhere. It took some weeks for the requirements to sink in. While technically the priority for OVERLORD was made back in December it was not until Monty briefed his new plan in January that the new requirements were made known outside 21 AG planning group. & those had to be refined written out as messages to the assorted agencies.

Theres a misperception I occasionally run across that OVERLORD required years of preparation. Sort of true as some aspects like the Mulberry harbors reached back into 1942. The reality is the plan used was only roughed out 4 1/2 months before execution. So its no surprise there was shouting over a mass of requirements handed out in January & February. The air Forces leaders were little different from their Navy counterparts, claiming stubbornly not a sortie could be spared from the strategic bomber attacks on German cities for preparation for Operation OVERLORD.

[Richard Anderson]

Theres a misperception I occasionally run across that OVERLORD required years of preparation.

Quite true. While COSSAC began its work 17 April 1943, what they completed in November and presented in December 1943 was an "outline plan" rather than an actual operational plan. Operational planning by 21 Army Group FUSA, Second British Army, and their subordinate corps and divisions, the navies, and the air forces, did not begin until the first week of February 1944.

Sort of true as some aspects like the Mulberry harbors reached back into 1942.

Actually MULBERRY began in 1943 as well, in August.

The reality is the plan used was only roughed out 4 1/2 months before execution.

The final loading plan was not frozen until three weeks before D-Day, while the 82d had to completely redo its planning two weeks before D-Day.

So its no surprise there was shouting over a mass of requirements handed out in January & February. The air Forces leaders were little different from their Navy counterparts, claiming stubbornly not a sortie could be spared from the strategic bomber attacks on German cities for preparation for Operation OVERLORD.

Yep.

[EwenS]

Sort of true as some aspects like the Mulberry harbors reached back into 1942.

Actually MULBERRY began in 1943 as well, in August.

Well, the go ahead for Mulberry itself was given in Aug 1943, but it didn’t just appear out of thin air. The need for elements of it, like the piers, went back to 1942 (see Churchill’s May 1942 memo for example). Between then and Quebec a great deal of thought and design work went into how to achieve it. At Quebec the whole Mulberry concept was presented to the Combined Chiefs and heads of Govt.

By then there was hardware, like the pierhead spud pontoons and connecting roadways, being tested at Garlieston in Scotland. And various other concepts had been trialled and dismissed.

https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/the-mulberry-harbours/
https://mulberryharbour.info/

[EwenS]

It is probably worth noting that in one of articles I linked, the code name “Mulberry” was not allocated to the artificial harbour project until the end of Aug 1943, after sign off at Quebec. Perhaps that is what leads to the belief that that was when it started, as you won’t find that code name applied before that.