Operation Overlord D-Day Normandie

[Carl Schwamberger]

The US equivalent was the JASCO - Joint Assault Signal Company. ... the JASCO was commanded by a major and comprised 502 O & EM, both soldiers and sailors. The company was divided into a HQ (3 O and 74 EM), a Naval Shore Fire Control Section (18 O and 45 EM), an Air Liaison Section (13 O and 39 EM), and a Beach Party Communications Section (10 O and 190 EM).

Each JASCO typically formed nine or more Naval Shore Fire Control parties. ....

How were the radios divided up? How many?

To digress briefly.
One of the bitter lessons the Marines learned was that during an assault all radios were fire control property and all radio networks fire control. When the NGF spotting team went down or its radio failed every other radio in reach was the back up. Did not matter who thought they controlled the radio, during those critical minutes or hours the fire support owned it. Thus when the radio operators and supervisors back at the CP of the Messkit Repair Company had a call for naval gunfire support come in on their radio frequency they had to be trained to recognize it and rapidly forward the message to the NGF control. No excuses, no hesitation. The lesson became institutionalized and reflected in our training in the 1980s. During my years as a artillery FO in there were a couple occasions I sprinted from my RO to the next nearest and relayed the call for fire via some other network. Messy, but critically essential.

[Carl Schwamberger]

...

But as some one said earlier, a lot of allied casualties were down to divisional artillery and mortars because these field pieces and medium mortars were zeroed onto the beach before hand and I am sure that these weapons used all their ammo doing this job and struggled to get re-supplied, which gave the Americans breathing space.

Has anyone else heard of this ammunition problem? Or am I wrong here.

...

Yes, there was a thread where it was discussed in some detail. Eleven pages covering maybe 5% of the subject of fire support in Normandy.

https://forum.axishistory.com//viewtopi ... n+Normandy

One of the things I noticed in that discussion was the low density of German cannon in proportion to the site of the assault. Two heavily reinforced assault regiments and a engineer brigade spread across 7000+ meters front were more than the number of cannon in range could cope with. The density of cannon, rockets, and mortars looks above average for that size front, but given the number of companies or battalion crossing the beach and bluffs in the first two hours it does not match the requirements I was taught back in the day. Enough to suppress portions of the beach, but not enough suppress all of it or neutralize any significant amount of the attacking companies

[Richard Anderson]

How were the radios divided up? How many?

Good question. The nine teams were originally organized each with one Army captain and one Navy lieutenant with five Army EM. At Normandy, each team was augmented by seven additional EM, both Army and Navy. Each had an SCR 609 FM voice radio, which was new, but IIRC they also had an SCR-608. The 609 sets were compact combined receiver-transmitters, but the 608 set was a larger two piece receiver and transmitter and needed a vehicle to transport it. However, both were bulky and fragile, many were lost or broken in the confusion of the landing. For more details, see TO&E 11-147 dated 21 October 1943.

I earlier forgot to mention that each of RCT also had a Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer attached.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Sheldrake,

You have to be aware that Husky and Avalanche were not rehearsals for Op Overlord. In neither operation was an attempt made to land on a beach as heavily defended as Normandy. Op Husky was launched at night H Hour 02.00 while Op Avalanche was supposed to be unopposed and welcomed by the now friendly Italians. The combined Operations observer to Op Husky wrote a very pointed report about all the lessons that could not be applied to Op Overlord. (Of course there were lots of lessons that did apply about managing large landing armadas, sea and air co-operation etc)

During 1943, didn't the density of defence in Normandy very much reflect that found during Husky and Sicily? There are several references in UK National Archives file names to both 21 Army Group and COSSAC files evaluating the lessons of Husky (I'm hoping to look at a couple later this month).

IFAIK SP guns were not deployed early on the beaches on Op Husky.

I guess it depends on your definition of "early", but according to their war diary 25 pdr Bishop SPs of 142 Fd Regt RA landed on BARK WEST Beach at 0500 10 July 1843 in support of 1 Cdn Inf Div. It records that by 1800 all guns were ashore.

Regards

Tom

[Tom from Cornwall]

Rich,

Hobart briefed at the "Conference on Landing Assaults" at the U.S. Assault Training Center on 23 May-23 June 1943, but it is not clear exactly what he briefed on, because he demanded the briefing not be recorded. However, given he was given the mission of developing "flotation tanks, searchlight tanks, anti-mine tanks, and self-propelled guns" by Brooke on 11 March following KRUTSCHEN it seems likely that is what he discussed. It also appears that Brooke actually meant self-propelled flamethrowers when he referred to “self-propelled guns” since that is how he referred to them in later meetings with Hobart on 1 April and 17 June 1943.

It is unclear though how much Hobart could have discussed regarding the AVRE, since the War Office request for complete development of such a vehicle as well as other engineering devices went to the Ministry of Supply on 2 February 1943 and the order for AVRE was not made until 21 May 1943. At the time of the conference there were probably two AVRE and 10 Petard mortars in existence.

Fascinating, thanks. Do you happen to remember if the War Office request for development of the AVRE was specifically related to beach assaults? Or more general support to the attack?

Regards

Tom

[Sheldrake]

The US equivalent was the JASCO - Joint Assault Signal Company. ... the JASCO was commanded by a major and comprised 502 O & EM, both soldiers and sailors. The company was divided into a HQ (3 O and 74 EM), a Naval Shore Fire Control Section (18 O and 45 EM), an Air Liaison Section (13 O and 39 EM), and a Beach Party Communications Section (10 O and 190 EM).

Each JASCO typically formed nine or more Naval Shore Fire Control parties. ....

How were the radios divided up? How many?

To digress briefly.
One of the bitter lessons the Marines learned was that during an assault all radios were fire control property and all radio networks fire control. When the NGF spotting team went down or its radio failed every other radio in reach was the back up. Did not matter who thought they controlled the radio, during those critical minutes or hours the fire support owned it. Thus when the radio operators and supervisors back at the CP of the Messkit Repair Company had a call for naval gunfire support come in on their radio frequency they had to be trained to recognize it and rapidly forward the message to the NGF control. No excuses, no hesitation. The lesson became institutionalized and reflected in our training in the 1980s. During my years as a artillery FO in there were a couple occasions I sprinted from my RO to the next nearest and relayed the call for fire via some other network. Messy, but critically essential.

You have put your finger on one of the key issues limiting the effectiveness of NGS in Normandy, certainly for the British. Loss of the NGS FOB was critical to the delay in taking the Hillman position on D Day

Not all radios or signalers were trained to talk to ships. Ships were not that good at talking to the army and accommodating the idiosyncrasies or limitations of its equipment. This is where the US marines had an advantage from being an arm of the Navy would

[Tom from Cornwall]

I also found this site which covers the remains of one of the areas where pre-D-day assault experimentation was conducted:

http://www.pillbox-study-group.org.uk/g ... tise-area/

Regards

Tom

[Richard Anderson]

Not all radios or signalers were trained to talk to ships. Ships were not that good at talking to the army and accommodating the idiosyncrasies or limitations of its equipment. This is where the US marines had an advantage from being an arm of the Navy would

That point is implied in the USN AAR, but the major problem was lack of time to coordinate and gain experience. They note that the American heavy bombardment ships were based in the Clyde and Belfast and did not get to participate in the pre-invasion exercises.

[Richard Anderson]

Fascinating, thanks. Do you happen to remember if the War Office request for development of the AVRE was specifically related to beach assaults? Or more general support to the attack?

The original impetus for the AVRE was the failure to get tanks off the beach at Dieppe.

[yantaylor]

As I mentioned before, my dad landed on Juno beach, he was serving with the 114th Light Anti-aircraft Regiment and fought in a Crusader AA tank [Bofors], now I have been looking at a map of Juno beach and see that it is split into three landing area's in Love, Mike and Nan. Would it be possible to find out just which area out of the three that this unit landed their Crusaders?

I know it is a big ask, but I would like to visit the area of the beach where he landed.

Yan.

[Richard Anderson]

As I mentioned before, my dad landed on Juno beach, he was serving with the 114th Light Anti-aircraft Regiment and fought in a Crusader AA tank [Bofors], now I have been looking at a map of Juno beach and see that it is split into three landing area's in Love, Mike and Nan. Would it be possible to find out just which area out of the three that this unit landed their Crusaders?

I know it is a big ask, but I would like to visit the area of the beach where he landed.

Yan.

Yan, do you know which battery he was in? 372 or 375? Or was he in the regimental HQ? The only casualties (5 unspecified) I know of for the 114th on D-Day were on NAN Beach with 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade.

[yantaylor]

Hi Richard, I don't really know which battery he was in but he was a sergeant commanding the gun and the only two things I can remember him saying was that the beach was littered with dead and wounded Canadians and his loader got shot in the head and died instantly.

That would fit in nicely with the information you provided, which is a great help and much appreciated.

Here is his gun crew, my father is on the extreme right, there is some debate when or where this picture was taken, but Scotland [Luss] is the best bet.

[img]

IMG_1167.JPG

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Thanks again for your help.

Yan.

[yantaylor]

Here is an iconic photo of the Canadians landing on Juno, I don't know which sector it was taken, maybe that house will give us a clue, but that looks very much like a Cromwell AA tank in the foreground, so whats the chances of that being my dads vehicle. I suppose that you would have to find the landing zone through the building and see just how many Crusaders landed in that sector and take it from there.

slide_351042_3781742_free.jpg

[Tom from Cornwall]

Rich,

The original impetus for the AVRE was the failure to get tanks off the beach at Dieppe.

That makes sense, thanks.

Regards

Tom

[Sheldrake]

Here is an iconic photo of the Canadians landing on Juno, I don't know which sector it was taken, maybe that house will give us a clue, but that looks very much like a Cromwell AA tank in the foreground, so whats the chances of that being my dads vehicle. I suppose that you would have to find the landing zone through the building and see just how many Crusaders landed in that sector and take it from there.

slide_351042_3781742_free.jpg

I think its the Nan Red exit just east of Bernieres (Nan White) The big building looks a bit like the "Norman house" on the sea front near the station, but it isn't because it has that turret at the back. Except that the war diary says that they landed on Nan white...

From the 114 Light AA War Diary.
Note each troop was a composite, with three crusader SP Bofors each towing a Mk 1 gun

“The plan was that 372 A and B Tps should land with the Crusader mounted 40mm and a mark I gun towed on Mike Sector with D/321 under command equipped with triple Oerlikons mounted on Crusaders and each towing a triple equipment trailer”
On Nan Sector G and H Tps 375 similarly equipped with E/321 under command were to do likewise.

Jun 6 The plan went fairly well to schedule on Nan but not on Mike
Between 0850 and 0920 AA recce parties with 6 guns G and 2 guns H beached on Nan White. En sa and mors. Only one exit usable beach solid with vehs. It was possible to move away from the exits and occupy temporary positions uner the dunes, sea wall and inland. Final posn occupied by 1700 hrs
H Tp recce and one tractor of G Tp landed on Nan Red at 0855 under hy mg and mors. The tractor received a direct hit from a mortar and was burnt out. 4 H Tp guns due to land on Nan Red were switched to Nan White where they were joined by Tp recce and E/321 landed on Nan Greeen at 1700 hrs and were in action at the beach exit by 1830 hrsLess opposition on this beach. Little bombing despite the excellent targets offered all day. AA cas light. 2 missing and 3 wounded, no offr cas. All guns came ashore successfully

Timetable on mike disrupted by resistance on beach and inland at Vaux and by obs wrecking craft.
Bty HQ recce due 1025, landed 1530 estb AARC
B Tp guns landed 1615 went in to action on beach as approached mined
A Tp recce due 1030 lnded at 12
A Tp guns, BHQ A Gp and RHQ rcecce landed at 1900. guns ia 1910
Problems with Rhinos
Ju88 attacked and were engaged by guns while landing
D/321 recce due 1035 landed 1315 and guns at 1900 deployed round exits. No cas, all guns landed successfully two thrown tracks
2300 F tp 321 arrive
Night En attacks singly, mostly on fleet. Rhino and LCVP set on fire obs B Tp rescue survivors
No radars or SL. LAA barrages permitted

IIRC two soldiers from 114 were awarded the George Medal for rescuing the survivors from the burning ferry