Operation Overlord D-Day Normandie

[donsor]

I've watched many documentaries and read many articles regarding the landing in Normandie and I came up with a couple of questions. (1) We had air superiority and a vast armada of capital ships off shore. However, despite intense naval and air barage, at the time of landing, much of the German gun implacements still remained intact which resulted in havoc, chaos and at great cost in Allie men and material. Couldn't we have made a better "softening up" job of the enemy implacements, perhaps more intensified and longer air and naval bombardement? Also was the airborne assault necessary or at the least could have been better planned?

[Aber]

The problem with a longer bombardment is that it announces to the Germans where you are going to land - the outcome might have been different if there were more German panzer divisions in Normandy. The major targets of the naval bombardment were not the infantry emplacements on the beach but German artillery position inland, as these were the bigger threat to men on the beaches and ships.

The airborne assault was necessary to get more troops on the ground as quickly as possible and to guard the flanks of the invasions. The British airborne was very effective in taking key locations - the Orne bridges and the Merville battery; the US did not have specific targets and would have benefited from realistic training for the transport pilots to get more organised landings.

[John Hilly]

How about this:
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 4&t=162043

Greets
J-P

[donsor]

I believe that the Germans already had a suspicion that the landing will occur in Normandie vs. Calais. The bombardment started early that morning and they (Allied) should have targetted both the beach and inland German defenses with much more intensity (air and naval). There were no (I believe) major German reinformcements headed for the beaches. I was never a believer of airborne assaults of major proportions such as those applied in Normandie. The area was well defended and our forces seemed to be ill prepared. How does this compare tactically to the landings in Iwo Jima and Okinawa?

[Delta Tank]

I believe that the Germans already had a suspicion that the landing will occur in Normandie vs. Calais. The bombardment started early that morning and they (Allied) should have targetted both the beach and inland German defenses with much more intensity (air and naval). There were no (I believe) major German reinformcements headed for the beaches. I was never a believer of airborne assaults of major proportions such as those applied in Normandie. The area was well defended and our forces seemed to be ill prepared. How does this compare tactically to the landings in Iwo Jima and Okinawa?

What books have you read on the Normandy landings?

Mike

[donsor]

Only short documentaries plus what I've seen in Military History Channels. I've read no thick hard copy books by any well known authors. At times I don't know which version of the event is true. For example: I saw on the Militray History Channel yesterday that there seemed to be a logical reason why Gen. Eisenhower agreed to allow the Russians to occupy Berlin, other than ego or political reasons, and that was that the Russians were eager to avenge Stalingrad and are willing to sacrifice any number of Russians lives simply for the glory of having occupied Berlin. Eisenhower thought on the other hand that although he could've easily entered Berlin, but at the cost of many US and British lives. The glory was not worth it. Is this close to the truth?

[Delta Tank]

Only short documentaries plus what I've seen in Military History Channels. I've read no thick hard copy books by any well known authors. At times I don't know which version of the event is true. For example: I saw on the Militray History Channel yesterday that there seemed to be a logical reason why Gen. Eisenhower agreed to allow the Russians to occupy Berlin, other than ego or political reasons, and that was that the Russians were eager to avenge Stalingrad and are willing to sacrifice any number of Russians lives simply for the glory of having occupied Berlin. Eisenhower thought on the other hand that although he could've easily entered Berlin, but at the cost of many US and British lives. The glory was not worth it. Is this close to the truth?

I guess it is close enough, he did not believe in suffering casualties for a prestige objective that had no real military value. Plus Berlin was going to be in the Soviet Zone after the war. Now some will argue that it was a worthy political objective.

Back to Normandy. I am a very boring guy so I read boring books according to my friends, so some book recommendations;
Cross Channel Attack, by Gordon Harrison, on line here:
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA ... index.html
Omaha Beachhead. can find it here: http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/ ... 100-11.HTM
Utah Beachhead. can find it here: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA ... index.html

The maps are excellent if you can get a hard copy of the books. They are on line, but I hate reading that much information off of a screen, I an old fashion.

Other books that are good and not boring according to my friends.
Omaha Beach: D-Day, June 6, 1944 [Paperback] Joseph Balkoski
http://www.amazon.com/Omaha-Beach-D-Day ... 815&sr=1-1

Utah Beach: The Amphibious Landing and Airborne Operations on D-day, June 6, 1944 [Paperback]
Joseph Balkoski
http://www.amazon.com/Utah-Beach-Amphib ... 943&sr=1-1

I would start with some of those books for the American point of view.

Enjoy!
Mike

[redcoat]

How does this compare tactically to the landings in Iwo Jima and Okinawa?

The landings in this Pacific Isles had the advantage that they didn't have to worry about massive enemy reinforcements arriving quickly at the beach head so they could have preliminary bombardments lasting for days before the invasion forces actually landed.

[Andy H]

I've watched many documentaries and read many articles regarding the landing in Normandie and I came up with a couple of questions. (1) We had air superiority and a vast armada of capital ships off shore. However, despite intense naval and air barage, at the time of landing, much of the German gun implacements still remained intact which resulted in havoc, chaos and at great cost in Allie men and material. Couldn't we have made a better "softening up" job of the enemy implacements, perhaps more intensified and longer air and naval bombardement? Also was the airborne assault necessary or at the least could have been better planned?

Hi Donsor

The fact that the Allied High Command expected the actual casualties on D-Day to be somewhere in the 30k region as I recall, is some testiment to how effective the bombardment was. Could it have been better, well yes as every real general and armchair general will tell you. Mistakes and human error occur, as do equally the fortitude, guile and bravery of the enemy troops, to upset the most detailed plans & timetables.

The length of the bombardment is a valid question but its does have its limitations. As another poster has mentioned, there is a trade off to be had, time versus surprise lost and enemy reinforcement rates increased.

The books posted by the old timer DT are great books on the subject, and they will give you a good foundation to build up your knowledge base.

Regards

Andy H

[Carl Schwamberger]

Tactical suprise was lost before the naval bombardment started. The airbourne landings that started after midnight caused alerts to be sent to all combat and support units across Normandy. At Omaha & Utah beaches the German sentries spotted the ships & reported them 10 to fifteen minutes before the naval gunfire started.

In the case of the British beaches the landings were delayed 60 to 90 minutes after the US landings started, so the defenders on those sectors had some eight hours warning after the airbourne landings started, and over two hours after the ships were first seen.

Bottom line is the Germans were alerted and sent to their battle stations during the hours between midnight and dawn. Most of the companys stationed on the beaches were in battle positions two - three hours before dawn.

Operational and stratigic suprise are a different matter, but I doubt starting the preperatory fires a hour earlier would make any difference there.

Also a better preperatory fire does not necessarily mean a longer fire. Experience in the Pacific & Mediterranian taught that the last thirty to sixty minutes of the fires should be as intense and large a volume as possible. The object at this point is not the destruction of the physical defense, but to stun the defenders. That happened on Utah beach, due to the bomber strike hitting on traget. On Omaha Beach the bomber strike missed leaving only a grossly inadaquate naval gunfire attack to to support the assualt.

[JonS]

Operational and stratigic suprise are a different matter, but I doubt starting the preperatory fires a hour earlier would make any difference there.

Probably not, but it wouldn't have made the fireplan any more effective either, since the ships would have been firing into the dark

The OVERLORD fireplan was a compromise that was trying to balance a whole bunch of conflicting requirements. If the Allies hadn't cared about getting a second tide on D-Day, or using bombers, or cratering the beach, or knocking down their own a/c, or landing near dawn, or landing at a particular part of the tide cycle, or any of a host of other considerations, then the fireplan might have been a lot more effective.

Re: book recommendations; I sugggest D'Este (Decision in Normandy) or Hastings (Overlord) as both being pretty good general primers, and they both have the advantage of covering the whole campaign rather than just that bit east or west of some arbitrary line, or before/after some arbitrary date. If you've not read anything else on OVERLORD then their overall merits far outweigh the flaws both books have.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Probably not, but it wouldn't have made the fireplan any more effective either, since the ships would have been firing into the dark

There are several techniques for getting around a lack of daylight. Beacons for navigation fixes and illumination projectiles from aircraft or guns. The Japanese used both for their several attacks on henderson Field on Guadacannal in 1942. The USN had trained with those techniques as far back as the 1920s. In June 1944 radar was also used for navigation and target location when plotting shore bombardment. In the actual attack after daylight many of the targets were "suspected" defense positions, others were difficult to identify due to the morning haze and smoke/dust raised by the hits. Even in daylight naval gun fires onto shore targets depend a lot on refrence points rather than a direct sight on the target point. At X thousand yards it is really difficult to spot that camoflaged embrasure that was picked from a air photo under better visability conditions. So you are firing on refrence points very often.

Judging from the eyewitness accounts of the Germans I've turned up so far, starting the preperatory fires around 05:00 would have caught many of the defenders outside the bunkers. Some were still moving into the area, working partys were moving about, and company commanders had started rotating men to the breakfast line. They describe a fast scramble into cover as the morning twilight revealed the ships.

The OVERLORD fireplan was a compromise that was trying to balance a whole bunch of conflicting requirements. If the Allies hadn't cared about getting a second tide on D-Day, or using bombers, or cratering the beach, or knocking down their own a/c, or landing near dawn, or landing at a particular part of the tide cycle, or any of a host of other considerations, then the fireplan might have been a lot more effective.

Still if you dont change any of those items a better result could still be had by doubling the NGF time to an hour and increasing the intensity of the fires. Why that was not done may have had something to do with the inexperience of Bradley & some key 1st Army staff, and perhaps with the ability of the naval commanders to provide the ships.

Re: book recommendations; I sugggest D'Este (Decision in Normandy) or Hastings (Overlord) as both being pretty good general primers, and they both have the advantage of covering the whole campaign rather than just that bit east or west of some arbitrary line, or before/after some arbitrary date. If you've not read anything else on OVERLORD then their overall merits far outweigh the flaws both books have.

It also helps if you studied the subject professionally a bit, tho I dont hold the lack of it against anyone

[Delta Tank]

Carl and all,
I will cast aspersions on the US Navy, they should of sent more capital ships for the initial phase of the bombardment, and if you believe what D'Este wrote in his book "Decision in Normandy", the US Navy was not going to send any battleships! The bombardment plan relied almost entirely on the Army Air Forces to bomb the beach fortifications, field fortifications. Now it worked over on Utah, but the unit that bombed Utah flew parallel to the beach and all the bombs landed on the Germans and not cows, they also flew below the clouds so they could actually see the target area. The units that bombed Omaha Beach, flew perpendicular to the beach, above the clouds and they dropped their bombs by using dead reckoning, that's right by azimuth and a stop watch!!! All of this is explained in the two books by Balkoski.
Mike

[Carl Schwamberger]

Balikowski covers what happened during the two airstrikes fairly well. There is of course more to it. A couple years ago I cross checked Dolittle & Bradley's auto bios on this event & the use of the 8th AF for tactical & operational air support. My take is neither Bradley or Dolittles staff were effectively communicating with each other. Neither Bradley or his subordinates understood the techinical problems the 8th AF had to deal with in executing the several tactical airstrikes in the Normandy campaign. On the 8th AF side they did not grasp what the US 1st Army really needed & were attempting to execute what they thought 1st Army wanted. I suspect that with a bit better planning with 1st Army 9th AF could have handled the entire bomber support thing more effectively alone, leaving the 8th to do what it did better elsewhere.

[JonS]

My understanding of the differences between UTAH and OMAHA (and G,J,S) was that the USAAF bomber streams for all five beaches had to fly basically N-S (or S-N?) in order to deconflict*. Happily for UTAH, that meant that they were flying // to the coast, but all the others were -|

Also since UTAH was added last they got what firesupport was left over, which in this case meant the mediums and lights of 9th A/F, rather than the heavies of 8th A/F. The mdms and lts could and did fly low, while the heavies stayed up where they felt they belonged. So UTAH got lucky in two respects - the conformation of the ground, and the allocation of a/c best able to exploit that conformation.

Concur with Carl that miscommunication didn't help. OTOH I believe 9th A/F was pretty well tapped out with the tasks they had on the morning of D-Day - they certainly couldn't have handled all five beaches. Remember, there were an awful lot more hys available in England than there were mdms and lts.

Jon

* the USAAF conducted the immediate pre-H bombing for all five beaches, while the RAF in turn did the overnight bombing of hy coastal btys on/around all five beaches (incl Pointe du Hoc)