Um, Phylo, I mean this in the nicest way, but I was expecting a better discussion in return from you.phylo_roadking wrote:I've missed an interesting two days...
Rich, I thought you meant something more about those two dates that the subsequent discussion revealed - but I don't mean that in a bad way. Both Fleming and latterly Lavery discuss this - Lavery in much more detail; the time of the initial landings was demanded by the Heer...
Sorry, this is a quick reply since it is late and that was the best I could come up with as repartee.
Did I miss something here from you? Exactly...and impossible in that timeframe. They cannot get 1/ and 2/ to mesh. At "dawn/twilight" they are not "within a band two hours' either side of high tide" and vice versa. So face the problems you remark on.1/ the nearer to dawn/twilight, the longer the period of daylight they had to establish themselves ashore on the first day;
2/ the nearer to high tide this could be, or to within a band two hours' either side of high tide
They did? How? By changing the physics of tides? The final KM requirement was for at least a half moon and good visibility (no rain or fog) otherwise the navaigation would have been impossible with that gaggle. In the window we have:The Army won that argument...eventually.
22nd September 1940
Weather: Dull with fog in the morning. Cloud clearing during the afternoon. Some rain.
158/46 FC sorties (day/night) 60/123 Luftwaffe sorties
23rd September 1940
710/50 FC sorties 300/261 Luftwaffe sorties
24th September 1940
Weather: Early morning fog in northern France. Channel cloudy with haze in the Straits and Thames Estuary.
Last Quarter Moon
880/70 FC sorties 530/150 Luftwaffe sorties
You should have asked...I've been trying (without success) to find out details of BoB-period weather for some time
The problem is that it isn't just the Luftwaffe flying, it's also the KM sailing, which they cannot do until the 22nd at earliest. But they require at least a 7 to 10 day window to land to allow for the turnaround of the second wave - BTW, it was literally 7-10 days in the planning since they had no idea how long it would actually take.....but recently was greatly assisted in this by Patrick Bishop's BoB:Day to Day Chronology....BUT and as well as weather details per day of ops, the suprising thing I found was that very often during August and September the Luftwaffe was prepared to countenance operations in quite "marginal" weather
Yes, historically - in the circumstance of NO Sealion - they didn't fly many sorties during the putative Sealion dates in marginal weather....but looking at Bishop it could very well have been a different case IF Sealion requirements had forced them to.
Why were CC "restricted in their range"? As of 29 September they had the following operational:Lavery - being an RN "small ships" historian - spends a considerable amount of time on this.
The first problem is that they have to trigger a reaction....I.E. be observed by Coastal Command (He puts up a very useful map of Coastal's daily patrol patterns and times over the Channel, Western Approaches and North Sea in mid-1940, something I hadn't found elsewhere) And Coastal's aircraft were seemingly quite restricted in their range at that time...and their observational abilities hampered by bad weather even if they could still fly.
47 Bleinheim F
28 Bleinheim GR
Aircraft, destroyer patrols, light vessels four miles offshore, hydrophones, and radar...yep, they all could miss a few thousand vessels heading for Folkestone-Rye from Oostend-Calais and Bexhill-Brighton from Boulogne-Le Havre...after all, the Germans missed the NEPTUNE flotilla. Of course, they had no aircraft or destroyer patrols, next to no light vessels offshore, didn't try the hydrophones, and their radar was spoofed, but heck...The loss of CHL would be a major problem (snip)
1/ the German invasion groups to simply be mised, some or all of them, by the defenders for one of several reasons. It's unlikely of course that they'd ALL be missed, or even mostly missed....BUT -
2/ the last line of detection being so relatively close inshore means that in many combinations of circumstances the RN's most effective response - her destroyers - are only going to get into contact with the Sealion fleet when is already entering or has entered the minefields and is close to the coast...which means they could have simply been attacking the rearmost elements of the First Wave flotillas.
Yes, and there is an even bigger difference between Lympne, a satellite field that was NEVER permanently manned by any squadron, and the permanent fields that I gave. You may have "previously discussed" it, but not with me, and whoever you did discuss it with was wrong for not challenging your red herring....there was a difference between being "serviceable"....and being "operational"; as previously discussed, for example - Lypmne was "serviceable" in that aircraft could land and take off from there - but from the large mid-August raids until halfway through September it was "Closed" for operations, with only a skeleton ground staff and minimal (VERY) stores. Closed in the sense that 11 Group wasn't using it...couldn't use it...to position aircraft forward to the coast there.
Yes, seen it, also seen quite a few of the squadron summaries and they often simply didn't know what the cause of loss was. However, given that the Sedan Bridges were defended by the bulk of Flak-Regiment 102, so at least 36 88mm and 144 20mm from that source alone, color me unsurprised.From Richards -
The 62 Battles and 6 Bleinheims accounted for (there is a number of oddities in the squadron accounts that I haven't tried to reconcile, it's getting too late) probably lost 15 to fighters and 3 to flak, with another 19 to unknown causes...which proves little given that most of JG 52 was tasked to defend the place, from bases some 55 to 85 miles from the bridges...along with the flak...and so on. The chief improvement tthe Luftwaffe will have is that their bases will be closer to the landing beaches than they were to the Fighter Command airfields...OTOH they will also be facing considerably more enemy fighters than they did at Sedan as well.Like all good averages - the flak-vs-fighters percentages of the RAF's losses in France are prejudiced by major "single" incidents like the afternoon of 14th May, when of 71 RAF bombers which took off against German forces at Sedan, forty were brought down by fighters...as opposed to the twenty-four brought down by ground fire above in those four incidents of overwhelming ground fire Richards records.