The Battle of Britain.

[Gooner1]

Yeah, my fault and I apologize. ISTR that Gooner published the actual orders as given at the time, but I can't find them. But it remains moot...at 6,000 yards the 6-inch guns are practically at point blank range. And, again relating to the Army "problem" using them...the 6-inch BL Mk VII and VIII, the most common one used for coast artillery, was also used as heavy artillery by the Army in World War I and was the standard CA piece used bythe few Army batteries interwar...so they weren't completely unfamiliar with it...and the Naval gun was exactly the same piece. The actual "difference" from the weapons they already were used to simply wasn't that great.

Hi Rich,

I only found this in the war diary of 26th Armoured Brigade AKA 1st MMG Brigade AKA Brocforce and dated 3rd October 1940


3. The role of the 6" Naval guns has been laid down by the Eastern Command as:-

(a) To engage hostile vessels approaching within 3 sea miles of the coast.
(b) To prevent transports from approaching beaches suitable for landing troops and A.F.Vs and to engage them when beached so as to destroy their contents.
(c) To engage troops in boats or landing craft and A.F.Vs attempting to gain a footing on beaches.
(d) In the last event to engage targets on the beaches but the 6" guns would only be justified in engaging this type of target if there was not a single transport or landing craft afloat with enemy troops in it.

4. The role of the 4" and 3" Naval Guns will be similar to that of the 6" Naval Guns.
Usually the 6" Guns will open fire first at the largest enemy vessels. The 4" and 3" will commence firing when enemy vessels approach within about 5000 to 4000 yards, and take as their targets the largest vessels which are not already being engaged by the 6" guns.

5. The role of the Medium Howitzer and field guns is to engage vessels within their effective range.
Owing to the shortage of ammunition and to the necessity of engaging troops and A.F.Vs landing on the beaches, Medium Hows. and field guns will not normally open fire at vessels until they approach within about 2,500 yards of the beach and in any case they will fire at the smaller vessels and not at the larger ones which are already being engaged by thr 6", 4" and 3" Naval guns.

6. The role of the 12 Pdr., 6 Pdr and 3 Pdr guns which are sited primarily to bring enfilade fire along the beaches and of the 6" Mortars is to engage enemy troops, especially A.F.Vs in the process of landing, and who are trying to surmount beach obstacles.
It is important that these guns and Mortars should not open fire too soon owing to shortage of ammunition and in order not to interfere with the observation of the Med. and Fd. Artillery Fire.

7. In order to assist observation seawards, arrangements are being made to have Dan Buoys moored at intervals along the front at known ranges from the beach.

8. The ranges at which the different types of guns and hows should open fire are defined above. It is not possible to define exactly lateral zones for each Battery. As far as possible each Battery and O.P. should engage targets straight of its front seawards, and it must be remembered that if two Batteries start to range on the same target simultaneously confusion and waste of ammunition is certain to occur.

9. Location statements of all artillery in Brocforce are being issued to all units, and Unit Commanders will ensure that all Officers know the location and role of all Artillery Weapons in their Area.



Bit worrying that the 6" Mortars were actually to engage targets on the beach - especially as the beaches are mainly shingle along that stretch of coast IIRC.

[phylo_roadking]

Bit worrying that the 6" Mortars were actually to engage targets on the beach - especially as the beaches are mainly shingle along that stretch of coast IIRC.

Gooner - that's quite far to the west; at Hythe for instance the shingle/chert is banked at the top of the beaches; below that they're lovely rippling expanses of sand - stretching out to the horizon at low tide ...the only places in the eastern side of the German's intended landing areas where there is completely shingle/pebble "beach" is at inconvenient places anyway like beneath the Cliffs at Dover etc...from Dover to Dungeness we're not talking the whole stretch of beach being chert...like Dieppe

There to the east the ripply wet sand is lovely and cool on half-sober feet on a sunny day...but the chert at the top is hell on half-drunk feet trying to negotiate it afterwards!

[phylo_roadking]

5. The role of the Medium Howitzer and field guns is to engage vessels within their effective range.
Owing to the shortage of ammunition and to the necessity of engaging troops and A.F.Vs landing on the beaches, Medium Hows. and field guns will not normally open fire at vessels until they approach within about 2,500 yards of the beach and in any case they will fire at the smaller vessels and not at the larger ones which are already being engaged by thr 6", 4" and 3" Naval guns.

6. The role of the 12 Pdr., 6 Pdr and 3 Pdr guns which are sited primarily to bring enfilade fire along the beaches and of the 6" Mortars is to engage enemy troops, especially A.F.Vs in the process of landing, and who are trying to surmount beach obstacles.
It is important that these guns and Mortars should not open fire too soon owing to shortage of ammunition and in order not to interfere with the observation of the Med. and Fd. Artillery Fire.

Interesting. Add those comments to what we know about the 6" naval guns from Lavery etc., then it would seem that the majority of types of artillery that would be in action against the invasion fleet were regarded at the time as being short of ammunition

[Gooner1]

Gooner - that's quite far to the west; at Hythe for instance the shingle/chert is banked at the top of the beaches; below that they're lovely rippling expanses of sand - stretching out to the horizon at low tide ...the only places in the eastern side of the German's intended landing areas where there is completely shingle/pebble "beach" is at inconvenient places anyway like beneath the Cliffs at Dover etc...from Dover to Dungeness we're not talking the whole stretch of beach being chert...like Dieppe

Brocforce was defending the coast between Saldean and Bognor Regis. Dunno about further west but Brighton certainly has a shingle beach.

Interesting. Add those comments to what we know about the 6" naval guns from Lavery etc., then it would seem that the majority of types of artillery that would be in action against the invasion fleet were regarded at the time as being short of ammunition

Yes .. but we don't know what the Royal Artillery's definition of shortage of ammunition actually was do we?

[phylo_roadking]

Yes .. but we don't know what the Royal Artillery's definition of shortage of ammunition actually was do we?

Actually - that's only PARTLY relevant...

What's perhaps more important here is the DATE of those comments

and dated 3rd October 1940

Four full months after Dunkirk....and they were STILL regarded as short of ammunition...and not just the naval guns - this time, remember, the comments are ALSO being applied to divisional arty and mortars!

[RichTO90]

Yes .. but we don't know what the Royal Artillery's definition of shortage of ammunition actually was do we?

Actually - that's only PARTLY relevant...

Phylo, sorry, but Gooner's comment is completely relevent. You see, during the 2nd Quarter of 1940 a total of 196 25-pdr were produced along with 1,516,000 rounds, 3rd Quarter was 525 and 1,901,000. Now in May 395 were in the UK (including 18/25-pdr), so by the end of September there were roughly 1,116 with at least 3,417,000 rounds or 3,061 RPG. The 895 75mm supplied by the US were not quite as in good a shape, since only 1,200 RPG had been shipped with them. The status of the Medium and Heavy batteries was similar AFAICT, although many fewer near pieces of those calibers were being produced at this time. Otherwise, courtesy of Gooner, we can confirm that the 6-inch and 4-inch emergency batteries in the Rye subsector had no more than 100 RPG.

It's unclear to me from reading the material quoted by Gooner whether the "shortage of ammunition" applies to just the "6", 4" and 3" Naval guns" and "12 Pdr., 6 Pdr and 3 Pdr guns", all of which were older types where little or no new ammunition was being produced? It may be that it is including "Medium Hows. and field guns", but that simply flies in the face of what was actually produced and available. The alternative is of course they are referring to the "shortage of ammunition" with respect to the WE issue at the guns, which, like the other major powers (for an American 105mm battery it was 183 RPG and for the Germans, IIRC, it was about 125 RPG), was a fraction of what was stocked, for obvious reasons?

If so, then the important factor is the ability of the Germans to interdict the line-of-supply from depots to the gun positions. Which means the Luftwaffe again.

Cheers!

[phylo_roadking]

Phylo, sorry, but Gooner's comment is completely relevent.

...to half my point.

It's unclear to me from reading the material quoted by Gooner whether the "shortage of ammunition" applies to just the "6", 4" and 3" Naval guns" and "12 Pdr., 6 Pdr and 3 Pdr guns", all of which were older types where little or no new ammunition was being produced? It may be that it is including "Medium Hows. and field guns", but that simply flies in the face of what was actually produced and available.

I'm at a loss to see why you can't see which comment applies to which type of gun - for each type is clearly bulleted/differentiated in what he posted up...as in -

5. The role of the Medium Howitzer and field guns is to engage vessels within their effective range.
Owing to the shortage of ammunition and to the necessity of engaging troops and A.F.Vs landing on the beaches, Medium Hows. and field guns will not normally open fire at vessels until they approach within about 2,500 yards of the beach and in any case they will fire at the smaller vessels and not at the larger ones which are already being engaged by thr 6", 4" and 3" Naval guns.

6. The role of the 12 Pdr., 6 Pdr and 3 Pdr guns which are sited primarily to bring enfilade fire along the beaches and of the 6" Mortars is to engage enemy troops, especially A.F.Vs in the process of landing, and who are trying to surmount beach obstacles.
It is important that these guns and Mortars should not open fire too soon owing to shortage of ammunition and in order not to interfere with the observation of the Med. and Fd. Artillery Fire.

Couldn't be clearer - AND for the "Medium Hows. and field guns" - there's a separate comment about shortage of ammunition for EACH classification. You may have overall information at the national level - but whoever wrote that document for Eastern Command seems quite sure of the position for Eastern Command.

The alternative is of course they are referring to the "shortage of ammunition" with respect to the WE issue at the guns, which, like the other major powers (for an American 105mm battery it was 183 RPG and for the Germans, IIRC, it was about 125 RPG), was a fraction of what was stocked, for obvious reasons?

Actually - there's ANOTHER option; the local shortage MAY be because of where stocks had been prepositioned Don't forget it wasn't until September that the Army COS very reluctantly even BEGAN to let go of the idea that the invasion was more likely to come on the EAST Coast....Norfolk/Essex!

Also, for the naval pieces - remember they were shared out among ALL the "defended ports" and probable invasion locations...so obviously their munitions were too

[RichTO90]

I'm at a loss to see why you can't see which comment applies to which type of gun - for each type is clearly bulleted/differentiated in what he posted up...as in -

Phylo, I'm afraid I've reached the point where I think you are being deliberately contrary and obnoxious. If you want to be a snot I am equally capable of reciprocating. Or, more likely, simply dumping you into the ignore bin to save wasting more of my time.

Actually - there's ANOTHER option; the local shortage MAY be because of where stocks had been prepositioned Don't forget it wasn't until September that the Army COS very reluctantly even BEGAN to let go of the idea that the invasion was more likely to come on the EAST Coast....Norfolk/Essex!

New one on me. If the Army COS did not believe the invasion was to come on the east coast then where did he suppose it was to come? The west coast? Or are you trying to say that the COS was fixated only on the Norfolk and Kent Coast?

See, clear as mud, the lot of you...

Also, for the naval pieces - remember they were shared out among ALL the "defended ports" and probable invasion locations...so obviously their munitions were too

Thank you for sharing the bleeding obvious.

So then, you think that the Field batteries were short even their WE allotments of ammunition? That the ammunition was so dumped that a mere 225 RPG (IIRC) could not even be allocated out of over 3,000 available? And that no ASP could be provided for Southern Command? Gee, the British COS and his logistics people must have been even bigger dolts than I ever suspected?

[phylo_roadking]

New one on me. If the Army COS did not believe the invasion was to come on the east coast then where did he suppose it was to come? The west coast? Or are you trying to say that the COS was fixated only on the Norfolk and Kent Coast?

The East Coast north of London is not the south-east coast I.E. Kent etc. Are you not aware of the quite long history through the summer of 1940 of the Chiefs of Staff holding onto the possibility of an invasion between the Thames Estuary and the Wash rather than the Kent/Sussex coast?

Thank you for sharing the bleeding obvious.

To you, to me, to Gooner to Dunserving - maybe. Not necessarily to everyone parachuting into this thread from, say, Google.

So then, you think that the Field batteries were short even their WE allotments of ammunition?

No, I don't believe you'll find me saying that in any thread I've posted. What I HAVE said is that whoever wrote that document for Eastern Command thought the various classifcations of artillery were "short of ammunition" - hence the comments in his document.

Phylo, I'm afraid I've reached the point where I think you are being deliberately contrary and obnoxious. If you want to be a snot I am equally capable of reciprocating. Or, more likely, simply dumping you into the ignore bin to save wasting more of my time.

Rich - as Andy said, there's absolutely no need for that attitude. As you can see from Gooner's quoted document there's no reason at all to be unclear about what the author believed when he wrote it. The author says -

"The role of the Medium Howitzer and field guns is to engage vessels within their effective range. Owing to the shortage of ammunition and to the necessity of engaging troops and A.F.Vs landing on the beaches, Medium Hows. and field guns will not normally open fire at vessels until they approach within about 2,500 yards of the beach...

That may not have been the case nationally - but it was the case in Eastern Command, and...

I only found this in the war diary of 26th Armoured Brigade AKA 1st MMG Brigade AKA Brocforce and dated 3rd October 1940

3. The role of the 6" Naval guns has been laid down by the Eastern Command as:-

...whoever wrote that document for Brocforce is using information/directions/reasons for same cascaded from above. Whatever they knew - Eastern Command was issuing standing orders for artillery based on it.

[RichTO90]

The East Coast north of London is not the south-east coast I.E. Kent etc. Are you not aware of the quite long history through the summer of 1940 of the Chiefs of Staff holding onto the possibility of an invasion between the Thames Estuary and the Wash rather than the Kent/Sussex coast?

Um, precisely? So are you saying that all the ammunition available was dumped to support Eastern Command, because the CIGS was too stupid to twig to the vulnerability of Southeastern Command until months after the fall of France? If so, then why are they remarking on ammunition shortages in Eastern Command? Did they put all the ammunition in Ireland for safekeeping?

To you, to me, to Gooner to Dunserving - maybe. Not necessarily to everyone parachuting into this thread from, say, Google.

After reading some of your posts they might be forgiven if they think the Germans could have seized Britain using a leaky boat rowed by Dolfie and his cleaning lady.

No, I don't believe you'll find me saying that in any thread I've posted. What I HAVE said is that whoever wrote that document for Eastern Command thought the various classifcations of artillery were "short of ammunition" - hence the comments in his document.

You still haven't twigged to ALL the various problems with your assumptions yet have you? Phylo, why would Eastern Command be issuing documents to Brocforce in October? Given that Brocforce had not been part of Eastern Command since about 23 June when XII Corps was formed, including it, and assigned to Southeastern Command? I'm not sure if Gooner can check the original, but was that missive from Eastern Command dated 3 October or was that when it was filed in the Brocforce War Diary? Furthermore, those conditions do likely apply to the situation as of 10-23 June, when Brocforce was part of Eastern Command. For example, as late as 5 July in Southeastern Command the three Field regiments of 1 London Division were mishmash of types:

64 Field Regiment RA (Richborough) (strength as of 5 July)
two 13-pdr
eight 4.5-inch howitzer
four 25-pdr
90 Field Regiment RA (St Nicholas) (strength as of 5 July)
two 13-pdr
four 18-pdr
four 25-pdr
four 4.5-inch howitzer
113 Field Regiment RA (Whitstable) (strength as of 5 July)
two 18-pdr
four 4.5inch howitzer

Furthermore it was noted that each had just 80 RPG and that practice firing was forbidden to conserve ammunition. But by 15 October its companion in XII Corps, 45 Wessex Division's three Field regiments were:

55 Field Regiment RA
14 75mm
six 4.5-inch howitzer
four 25-pdr
96 Field Regiment RA
12 75mm
six 4.5-inch howitzer
four 25-pdr
142 Field Regiment RA
10 75mm
eight 4.5-inch howitzer

If you like you can continue to believe that with an average of 3,061 RPG the batteries assigned to the most threatened areas of the coast weren't even at their WE allotments of ammunition and that no provision had been made for depots to support those areas, but I think that it is straining credulity to think that even British staffs were that miserably incompetent?

Rich - as Andy said, there's absolutely no need for that attitude. As you can see from Gooner's quoted document there's no reason at all to be unclear about what the author believed when he wrote it.

No attitude Phylo - you're being needlessly obnoxious just because I find the documentation unclear...and before you bothered to find out WHY I was so confused.

The author says -

You're starting to repeat yourself...and still missing the point (points...just why is 21-24 September critical?)

That may not have been the case nationally - but it was the case in Eastern Command, and...

Exactly...and is the document dated 3rd October or is that the date it was stuck into the War Diary of Brocforce, which had not been a part of Eastern Command for about two months by that date?

...whoever wrote that document for Brocforce is using information/directions/reasons for same cascaded from above. Whatever they knew - Eastern Command was issuing standing orders for artillery based on it.

Yes, cheerfully ignore what the actual availability of ammunition and artillery pieces are so that Dolfie can make his triumphant landing on...what date would that be?

Cheers!

[phylo_roadking]

For example, as late as 5 July in Southeastern Command the three Field regiments of 1 London Division were mishmash of types:

64 Field Regiment RA (Richborough) (strength as of 5 July)
two 13-pdr
eight 4.5-inch howitzer
four 25-pdr
90 Field Regiment RA (St Nicholas) (strength as of 5 July)
two 13-pdr
four 18-pdr
four 25-pdr
four 4.5-inch howitzer
113 Field Regiment RA (Whitstable) (strength as of 5 July)
two 18-pdr
four 4.5inch howitzer

Furthermore it was noted that each had just 80 RPG and that practice firing was forbidden to conserve ammunition. But by 15 October its companion in XII Corps, 45 Wessex Division's three Field regiments were:

55 Field Regiment RA
14 75mm
six 4.5-inch howitzer
four 25-pdr
96 Field Regiment RA
12 75mm
six 4.5-inch howitzer
four 25-pdr
142 Field Regiment RA
10 75mm
eight 4.5-inch howitzer

That's a technique for determining changes across time that's a bit dubious - don't compare the SAME unit at two different times...Mid June and Early October....but compare the states of two different divisions?

Leaving aside the state of 45 Div...what was the mix in 1st (London) Div on or around that date in October compared to what you posted up for mid June?

So are you saying that all the ammunition available was dumped to support Eastern Command, because the CIGS was too stupid to twig to the vulnerability of Southeastern Command until months after the fall of France?

No - that it was depoted the length of the country as each Command's needs could be anticipated given particular sets of circumstances.

If so, then why are they remarking on ammunition shortages in Eastern Command?

It's not CIGS remarking on ammunition shortages in Eastern Command - it's Eastern Command is remarking on ammunition shortages in Eastern Command.

If you like you can continue to believe that with an average of 3,061 RPG the batteries assigned to the most threatened areas of the coast weren't even at their WE allotments of ammunition

That's twice now you've tried to put those words in my mouth; I'm still hoping to see you indicate where in this thread you've seen me say that.

[RichTO90]

No - obviously groundbased AA inside the bridgehead would be Army.

A couple of clarifications. The "groundbased AA" of XII AK slated for the landing between Folkestone and New Romney was II./Luftwaffe-Flak-Regiment 14, a gemischte Abteilung, so roughly 12 88mm and 35 20mm. Heeresgruppe A in total had just five Abteilungen assigned. In contrast, the Flak units allocated to support Heeresgruppe A in the French Campaign included 10 gemischte and three leichte Abteilungen in three regiments. Heersegruppe B had the same. In each case, the Albert Canal and the Sedan bridges, effectively a full regiment was committed to their defense...roughly four times what could be landed - if it could be landed - to defend the beachhead in England. Furthermore, it is unclear how much the Flak was responsibvle for the RAF losses in France, although they probably inflicted about one-third the losses if the Belgian experience attacking the Albert Bridges are any indication (of 9 Battles three were lost to Flak, two to German interceptors, and two to friendly fire).

Cheers!

[RichTO90]

So in effect Sealion taking place pre-supposes TWO air superiority battles -

1/ the one BEFORE the invasion can be ordered, what we know as the Battle of Britain -

2/ the one AFTER the invasion is actioned, with air superiority already achieved by the LW or else the Sealion order would never be given. This second air battle is the RAF atempting to get it back again to allow bombers to attack the beachead.

Action 1...requires Eleven Group to experience a higer degree of attrition by the revised (again) tactics of the LW in the few days before historically they turned on London; high enough to force Dowding to pull them back to Eleven Group's fields north of London or into Twelve Group. IIRC ops were historically halted out of Manston for some days.

AFAICT this is your POD? The problem is that you don't actually show how it is possible for the Germans. For example you mention Manston...during the height of the attack on the airfields (24 August - 8 September) it was unserviceable on 24, 25, 29, and 30 August, 1 September (night ops only), and 8 September. So 6 of 16 days in which the Luftwaffe was making a maximum effort to suppress it. The other airfields u/s during the period were:

24 Aug - North Weald, Abbotsinch and Hartlepool unserviceable by night
28 Aug - Rochford unserviceable during hours of darkness. Serviceable for single aircraft by day with care.
29 Aug - Rochford temporarily unserviceable owing to delayed-action bombs.
30 Aug - Biggin Hill
31 Aug - Hornchurch is unserviceable by night
1 Sep - Hawkinge, Rochford and Lympne are unserviceable by night
2 Sep - Biggin Hill day landing lanes available only
3 Sep - North Weald, Biggin Hill unserviceable during hours of darkness
4 Sep - Abbotsinch and Hartlepool unserviceable by night
5 Sep - Biggin Hill, Abbotsinch and Hartlepool unserviceable by night
7 Sep - Rochford unserviceable
8 Sep - Hawkinge and Biggin Hill unserviceable

So in terms of daylight operations, during the 16 days of the airfield offensive 12 airfields days of operations were lost or interrupted during daylight hours...

Do you have something better to account for how you think 11 Group will be forced to withdraw? Operational capabilities of the 11 Group squadrons on 9 September perhaps? Or some indication that the losses were in fact unsustainable for 11 Group...without the corollary being true - that they would also be unsustainable for the Luftwaffe? It's true that during the period the Luftwaffe suffered fewer fighter "losses" than the RAF, 273 to 335, but they also lost 158 other aircraft in operations against England.

Cheers!

[RichTO90]

That's a technique for determining changes across time that's a bit dubious - don't compare the SAME unit at two different times...Mid June and Early October....but compare the states of two different divisions?

Um, two different divisions in the same corps, assigned to the same command, and adjacent to each other on one of the vulnerable areas of the British coast. How is that more dubious than a document from a command filed in the War Diary of a unit that had not been under its command for eight weeks? I'm just as suspicious of the potential pitfalls in that.

Leaving aside the state of 45 Div...what was the mix in 1st (London) Div on or around that date in October compared to what you posted up for mid June?

A very good question...or, what was 1st London Division's states as of 15 October? I'll see what I can do here, but I think Gooner may be the best source for that info since he's been collecting that stuff.

No - that it was depoted the length of the country as each Command's needs could be anticipated given particular sets of circumstances.

I must have misunderstood you then when you said that "there's ANOTHER option; the local shortage MAY be because of where stocks had been prepositioned Don't forget it wasn't until September that the Army COS very reluctantly even BEGAN to let go of the idea that the invasion was more likely to come on the EAST Coast....Norfolk/Essex!" I was taking you to mean that everything had been dumped behind Eastern Command?

It's not CIGS remarking on ammunition shortages in Eastern Command - it's Eastern Command is remarking on ammunition shortages in Eastern Command.

Yes...and it may be on 3 October, although that seems extraordinary given that by that time about another half-million rounds had been produced, but only another 200-odd 25-pdrs? I really need to dig out exactly what the allotment was supposed to be - I recall 225 RPG. I am just trying to fathom why there should be a shortage by October - early July yes.

That's twice now you've tried to put those words in my mouth; I'm still hoping to see you indicate where in this thread you've seen me say that.

No, and if you feel like I have I apologize...I just would like you to state where you think they might have gone? And why you would suppose that with all those rounds laying about the normal allotments of the regiments in the field would not have been filled? Frankly, given what I know about how the British artillery maintained their ammo supply, it seems unlikely?

[RichTO90]

A very good question...or, what was 1st London Division's states as of 15 October? I'll see what I can do here, but I think Gooner may be the best source for that info since he's been collecting that stuff.

No luck, all I was able to find was that 64 Field did receive 75mm during the period, which would fit with the other regiments of 45 Division.

Cheers!