The Battle of Britain.

[RichTO90]

In principle i would agree but given that part of the German plan involved the tugs casting lose their charges as they approached the beach, and trusting their fate to the drift towards the beach, you can't make your statement absolute

Regards

Andy H

That is not completely correct Andy. The plan was that each powered barge would tow an unpowered barge to shore aftr casting off from their tug. The notion that they were stupid enough to think they could just let them drift ashore appears to be a postwar misunderstanding of the plan.

Cheers!

[phylo_roadking]

Rich - FIRST of all there are two types of "coastal artillery" being talked about at once in the last two pages - positioned divisional arty....and REAL "coastal artillery" I.E. the emplaced naval rifles of all calibres - manned by the RN and as we've seen hastily cobbled-together crews of odds'n'sods from Dunkirk evacuees with no other guns to bombardiers fresh out of Basic who have just spent six weeks learning to march with the right feet in the right order and which end of their rifles to look down - that they should never need....

We've established that by September the shore batteries had all been equipped with some form of range finder and all have at least a core of reasonably experienced gunners (most of the guncrew are neccessary for the donkey work of humping propellent and projectiles). Given the overlapping and unconstrained field of fire and the probable lack of meaningful return fire, I suspect that the difference between tugs, powered barges, and unpowered barges will be moot. And any string of boats getting anywhere close to one of the twin 6-pounders mounted at Dover or further south is going to be quickly turned into matchwood.

Fundamentally it's 19+ guns with 50-100 rounds each, so 950-1,900 potential coast artillery hits.

YOU'RE the one conflating the various types together! In various posts you're lumping A/T with divisional arty with coastal guns...then jumping back to single cases without specifying which you're talking about

Please do me the favor of reading what I have written and then do the damn due diligence yourself of figuring where they and the Germans are going to be. And, while at it, please remember that the Germans will be sailing in close columns about 3.5 kilometers long into an embayment just 16.5 kilometers across.

...when they're making their final run (or push) into the last 6000 yards of their approach?

Yeah...the boogieman who sees in the dark... Do you have any idea of when the morning high tides are during September on the days that are practicable historically for the Germans (WRT weather and moonlight)? I did the due diligence in the last go around years ago - why do I have to do the wrk again for you?

Actually, yes - and the same issues with half-light and early morning Channel fog apply to the defenders trying to taget ships they have difficulty seeing as it does to the Luftwaffe. Unfortunately, the defenders will be generating frequent and regular large flashes...

That is why they are batteries. It's called gunfire control and why the individual gun positins are interconnected by telephone to a battery FCP. Or are you following dunservings riff and assuming these batteries are Napoleonic-era 32-pdr smoothbores

You see? Are you talking about RA batteries - divisional artillery - emplaced at or just behind the shore line - and yes, I'm VERY aware of their various positions - or coastal guns, when you use the term "battery"?

[LWD]

...2. Once the camoflaged shore artillery opens up - there may be no counterbattery fire from sea - but there's still the Luftwaffe about....

Given all the tasks the LW had during this battle and it's probable state at the time just how much of it would be around and in what condition?

[RichTO90]

Rich - FIRST of all there are two types of "coastal artillery" being talked about at once in the last two pages - positioned divisional arty....and REAL "coastal artillery" I.E. the emplaced naval rifles of all calibres - manned by the RN and as we've seen hastily cobbled-together crews of odds'n'sods from Dunkirk evacuees with no other guns to bombardiers fresh out of Basic who have just spent six weeks learning to march with the right feet in the right order and which end of their rifles to look down - that they should never need....

Nonsense, I've been quite clear in each case and, if you are getting confused, you can always refer to the nicely laid out lists of them I have already provided, both in this redundant thread and in the original threads. But for your benefit, I'll go ahead and put it up again, this time in full.

(snipped so as to avoid confusing Phylo any further)

BTW, apologies, I was misrecalling the twin 6's being at Dover...the Germans only have 10 6-inch, 4 18/25-pounders, and two 12-pdr 20 cwt guns to worry about there...oh, plus the 8 heavier guns. Of course, there is no way THOSE guns could ever reach any part of the 20 miles from Dover to Dungeness.

Also BTW, you do realize that the Germans are approaching from their departure ports at Rotterdam, Ostende, and Dunkirk in this case? So are sailing from ESE to WNW as they approach the beaches?

Also, also BTW, just which of those units I just gave are the "odds'n'sods from Dunkirk evacuees"? I mean aside from 1st Motor Brigade?

YOU'RE the one conflating the various types together! In various posts you're lumping A/T with divisional arty with coastal guns...then jumping back to single cases without specifying which you're talking about

Why no, I'm afraid YOU'RE CONFLATING me with someone else...there, it's SO MUCH more true if you just capitalize it enough.

I have been quite careful since my initial post to distinguish the 19+ coastal guns from the field artillery, from the 2-pdr AT. It's not my problem if you are having difficulting keeping them straight.

...when they're making their final run (or push) into the last 6000 yards of their approach?

Er, no, the heavy guns were to engage at 6,000 yards, but the Germans were supposed to sail parallel to the beach until they closed to 1,000 yards when they would cast off the barges for the approach.

Actually, yes - and the same issues with half-light and early morning Channel fog apply to the defenders trying to taget ships they have difficulty seeing as it does to the Luftwaffe. Unfortunately, the defenders will be generating frequent and regular large flashes...

Sigh, Phylo..."half-light"? You really HAVEN'T bothered to review the possible landing dates and the tides...HAVE YOU?

And I suppose the thousands of Stukas are going to form cab ranks over the English coast?

You see? Are you talking about RA batteries - divisional artillery - emplaced at or just behind the shore line - and yes, I'm VERY aware of their various positions - or coastal guns, when you use the term "battery"?

I am? Really? Funny...you see there are these here thinggummies called the Folkestone East Battery, West Battery, and Copt Point Battery, the Ashford Battery, the Ardhallow Battery, the Tower Battery, the Redoubt Battery, and the Dungeness East Battery and West Battery. Curiously enough they seem to defy your apparent belief that coastal artillery cannot be arranged as batteries the way that field artillery can. You also appear to have the odd notion that field batteries have FDC, but the mythical coastal batteries do not?

Cheers!

Cheers!

[Andy H]

In principle i would agree but given that part of the German plan involved the tugs casting lose their charges as they approached the beach, and trusting their fate to the drift towards the beach, you can't make your statement absolute

Regards

Andy H

That is not completely correct Andy. The plan was that each powered barge would tow an unpowered barge to shore aftr casting off from their tug. The notion that they were stupid enough to think they could just let them drift ashore appears to be a postwar misunderstanding of the plan.

Cheers!

Hi Rich

If thats correct then I stand corrected.

However its my understand that the number of dumb barges greatly outnumbered those that were powered, and that some troops would be left to drift to shore-admittedly not far-but still drifting to shore. I know that not all the dumb arges were to be used in the assault phases, but even with this smaller number, the dumb barges still out numbered powered barges etc

Regards

Andy H

[phylo_roadking]

I am? Really? Funny...you see there are these here thinggummies called the Folkestone East Battery, West Battery, and Copt Point Battery, the Ashford Battery, the Ardhallow Battery, the Tower Battery, the Redoubt Battery, and the Dungeness East Battery and West Battery. Curiously enough they seem to defy your apparent belief that coastal artillery cannot be arranged as batteries the way that field artillery can. You also appear to have the odd notion that field batteries have FDC, but the mythical coastal batteries do not?

No - my point is that IF you're talking about the coastal artillery batteries as opposed to divisional artillery can you please be careful and specifically SAY so....because we've all been jumping between various discussions.

Nonsense, I've been quite clear in each case and, if you are getting confused, you can always refer to the nicely laid out lists of them I have already provided, both in this redundant thread and in the original threads. But for your benefit, I'll go ahead and put it up again, this time in full.

Excellent. Thank you.

Now - in a discussion thast's supposedly about COASTAL artillery as opposed to pre-positioned divisional arty....can I ask why you've posted up a list that actually for a new reader would FURTHER confuse anyone who hasn't read from the beginning of the thread, to whit....at the VERY least -

New Zealand Division (-) (reserve)
5 Brigade – E of Maidstone, C/A on line Dover-Folkestone
21 Bn – SE of Maidstone
22 Bn – Hollingbourne and Warren Wood
23 Bn – (Bren and Boys issued June, at WE by mid-August)
7 Brigade – N of the Maidstone-Charing Road,
Mission: To counter-attack vigorously any enemy landing in London
Division area (Sheerness-Dymechurch redoubt) especially in the area
north and north-west of Dover and Folkestone. To re-establish the line of the Royal Military Canal eastwards of Main
Street..
Concurrently with the above, to deal with any hostile airborne landings
in the area Sittingbourne-Faversham-Charing-Maidstone.
28 (Maori) Bn – Doddington
Composite (29) Bn
4 AT Company
Milforce
8 RTR – Charing (from 1 Army Tank Brigade)
C Squadron, NZ Division Cavalry – Westwell (Lt Mk VI and Carriers)
Medium MG Company
5th NZ Field Regiment
E and F Battery – 8 75mm (ex-US M1897) each
G Battery – 8 25-pdr Mk II
7th NZ AT Regiment (received new 2-pdr in August)
31st Battery
32nd Battery

Our old friends the Newzealanders....who are NOT coastal artillery and are NOT pre-positioned artillery an would be moving forward towards the coast once the invasion begins I.E. are not there to engage the actual landings??? - which IS what we're supposedly talking about at the moment?

YOU'RE the one getting shirty at times with others about what THEY'RE doing in your eyes....so why are YOU bringing even more extraneous data to a particular part of the discussion rather than trying to clear the air???

Now, exactly HOW much of that "full" list disappears - given the two (only) criteria we're talking about at this point?

[RichTO90]

No - my point is that IF you're talking about the coastal artillery batteries as opposed to divisional artillery can you please be careful and specifically SAY so....because we've all been jumping between various discussions.

Phylo, I have been careful, it's you who are not being careful in reading what I wrote...or i looking prior to leaping.

Excellent. Thank you.

You're welcome, but...

Now - in a discussion thast's supposedly about COASTAL artillery as opposed to pre-positioned divisional arty....can I ask why you've posted up a list that actually for a new reader would FURTHER confuse anyone who hasn't read from the beginning of the thread, to whit....at the VERY least -

(snip)

Our old friends the Newzealanders....who are NOT coastal artillery and are NOT pre-positioned artillery an would be moving forward towards the coast once the invasion begins I.E. are not there to engage the actual landings??? - which IS what we're supposedly talking about at the moment?

Thank you for providing such an excellent example of you not bothering to read what I actually wrote...and that after thanking me so nicely for having written it.

What I just WROTE was:

"Nonsense, I've been quite clear in each case and, if you are getting confused, you can always refer to the nicely laid out lists of them I have already provided, both in this redundant thread and in the original threads. But for your benefit, I'll go ahead and put it up again, this time in full."

In other words, you may think this thread, titled "The Battle of Britain" is only about 19+ coastal guns between Folkestone and Dungeness...but I think it's a bit more wide-ranging a discussion than that.

YOU'RE the one getting shirty at times with others about what THEY'RE doing in your eyes....so why are YOU bringing even more extraneous data to a particular part of the discussion rather than trying to clear the air???

Now, exactly HOW much of that "full" list disappears - given the two (only) criteria we're talking about at this point?

I'm getting shirty? You seem to be the one getting into high dudgeon about being the ultimate arbiter of what gets discussed and when it gets discussed? Who died and named you God? And how is it "extraneous data" when it all relates directly to where your German "narrow front" landing is supposed to arrive at? You seem to be arguing that they will waltz ashore behind cab ranks of Stukas and the blazing guns of the Schleswig-Holstein against little or no opposition.

BTW, where again are all those "odds'n'sods from Dunkirk evacuees"? I mean aside from 1st Motor Brigade?

Also BTW, you do realize that the Germans are approaching from their departure ports at Rotterdam, Ostende, and Dunkirk in this case? So are sailing from ESE to WNW as they approach the beaches?

Also, also BTW, of course, there is no way the 8 heavy guns at Dover could ever reach any part of the 20 miles from Dover to Dungeness...right?

You need to look at the tide tables for 21-24 September BTW...and also need to think about why those days are important.

[RichTO90]

However its my understand that the number of dumb barges greatly outnumbered those that were powered, and that some troops would be left to drift to shore-admittedly not far-but still drifting to shore. I know that not all the dumb arges were to be used in the assault phases, but even with this smaller number, the dumb barges still out numbered powered barges etc

Regards

Andy H

Pretty close...and that is true, the unpowered barges outnumbered the powered ones. The idea though was that the tugs would return to the transport steamers that would be hauling the extra unpowered barges and that when loaded the tugs would haul them close to shore for the second tide landing, by which point it was hoped that the powered barges would be free again and so could help shepard them in to shore. If that didn't hold true then the tugs would apparently bite the bullet and help run them aground...the drifting about hopefully bit was only for the last extremity.

When you come right down to it there are so many holes in the German planning that calling it "improvisation" is probably being kind. Really about their only hope would be if a significant number of Tauchpanzer were able to get ashore and operational.

[phylo_roadking]

In other words, you may think this thread, titled "The Battle of Britain" is only about 19+ coastal guns between Folkestone and Dungeness...but I think it's a bit more wide-ranging a discussion than that.

Yes it of course is - but we're discussing various individual bits at any given time. I DO know what the thread is about - I've been here from the start, unlike your good self who parchuted in halfway through and made a song and dance about NOT bothering reading back LOL

Thank you for providing such an excellent example of you not bothering to read what I actually wrote...and that after thanking me so nicely for having written it.

I KNOW what you wrote and ahy you wrote it....but the point is there's a LARGE aount of data in that "full list" that is entirely superfluous to the particular discussion on hands regarding artillery at this point. We all know you have the data - perhaps it would be better if you tailored it to what we...or even YOU...are discussing at any given point?

I'm getting shirty? You seem to be the one getting into high dudgeon about being the ultimate arbiter of what gets discussed and when it gets discussed? Who died and named you God?

Rich, if you're discussing one particular aspect at any given time discuss that aspect and bring in material about that aspect. I'm not being arbiter of ANYTHING - but if you're talking about "coastal artillery" of whatever definition, why /i][/b]bring in a list crammed with NON-coastal artillery?

BTW, where again are all those "odds'n'sods from Dunkirk evacuees"? I mean aside from 1st Motor Brigade?

I thought YOU might have remembered...after all YOU drew our attention back to it very specifically...

From Gooner's material on coastal artillery...again...

The third problem was the provision of officers and men to man and serve the emergency batteries. The first to be installed were manned by the Royal Navy and Royal Marines but it was soon obvious that the Fleet could not spare the large number of men required so it was decided that the batteries should be taken over by Coast Artillery. The sources from which Coast Artillery could produce trained coast-gunners were slight, in fact there were only the Territorial regiments already on duty at the major ports and the staff and recruits under training at the Coast Artillery Training Unit at Plymouth. G.H.Q. Home Forces finally laid down that the personnel for the Emergency Batteries should be provided as follows:-
(a) Officers: by posting from the Territorial Coast Artillery regiments at the major ports and by calling up officers of the “Officers Emergency Reserve” and the “Territorial Army Reserve”.
(b) Senior N.C.O.s: by posting from the Coast Artillery Traning Unit.
(c) Junior N.C.O.s: by posting from the Territorial Coast Artillery regiments at the major ports.
(d) Search-light Personnel: by posting from the School of Electric Lights at Gosport.
(e) Specialists: from recruits under training at the Coast Artillery Training Unit.
(f) The main Body of Gunners:-
(i) from Medium and heavy Regiments which have returned from Dunkirk having lost their guns.
(ii) from Recruits who had done one month’s basic training at any R.A. training uni.

...who although experienced RA gunners would have been as "all at sea" (sic) as search light personnel, recruits with a month's Basic,etc....when it came to using NAVAL rangefiners etc. - as we know.

Also, also BTW, of course, there is no way the 8 heavy guns at Dover could ever reach any part of the 20 miles from Dover to Dungeness...right?

When I was talking about the 6,000 yard range limit I WAS talking about those naval guns that due to camoflaging, shortage of ammunition, lack of the above-mentioned (again) training etc. were limited to opening fire at 6,000 yards. None of which prohibiting factors would I believe affect the RN-manned heavy guns at Dover.

[RichTO90]

Yes it of course is - but we're discussing various individual bits at any given time. I DO know what the thread is about - I've been here from the start, unlike your good self who parchuted in halfway through and made a song and dance about NOT bothering reading back LOL

Um, no, I scanned the earlier stuff and wondered why anyone thought something more was being added to a discussion that had already gone through about a dozen threads and a few hundred pages on Sealion...as the last few pages have again demonstrated.

I KNOW what you wrote and ahy you wrote it....but the point is there's a LARGE aount of data in that "full list" that is entirely superfluous to the particular discussion on hands regarding artillery at this point. We all know you have the data - perhaps it would be better if you tailored it to what we...or even YOU...are discussing at any given point?

I WAS...but YOU were obviously getting confused...if the information is so confusing to you I have a simple solution - I'll delete it.

Rich, if you're discussing one particular aspect at any given time discuss that aspect and bring in material about that aspect. I'm not being arbiter of ANYTHING - but if you're talking about "coastal artillery" of whatever definition, why /i][/b]bring in a list crammed with NON-coastal artillery?

Er, I thought you just said you WEREN'T trying to be the arbiter of anything?

I thought YOU might have remembered...after all YOU drew our attention back to it very specifically...
(i) from Medium and heavy Regiments which have returned from Dunkirk having lost their guns.
(ii) from Recruits who had done one month’s basic training at any R.A. training uni.

Sigh, I see, now you want me to tell you which regiments those were too?

...who although experienced RA gunners would have been as "all at sea" (sic) as search light personnel, recruits with a month's Basic,etc....when it came to using NAVAL rangefiners etc. - as we know.

Fortunately AFAIK UNLIKE the US Coast Artillery, the British Field Artillery, Coastal Artillery, and Naval Artillery all used the same methods of FC. So would you care to illuminate us all with just how the Barr and Stroud rangefinders used by the RN differed so mysteriously in their operation from the Barr and Stround rangefinders used by the RA? Or how a RN degree of elevation or deflection differed so markedly from one used by the RA?

The equipment was different to them...when they first began working with them 8 to 12 weeks earlier.

When I was talking about the 6,000 yard range limit I WAS talking about those naval guns that due to camoflaging, shortage of ammunition, lack of the above-mentioned (again) training etc. were limited to opening fire at 6,000 yards. None of which prohibiting factors would I believe affect the RN-manned heavy guns at Dover.

Thenyou remain confused Phylo. Those guns were ORDERED to limit their fire to 6,000 yards, but you are ASSUMING that was "due to camoflaging, shortage of ammunition, lack of the above-mentioned (again) training etc"...

Cheers!

[phylo_roadking]

Sigh, I see, now you want me to tell you which regiments those were too?

See what I meant about the attitude?
Rich - you asked me a simple question...

BTW, where again are all those "odds'n'sods from Dunkirk evacuees"?

So I answered you...

(i) from Medium and heavy Regiments which have returned from Dunkirk having lost their guns.

So why the really stupid comment??? Absolutely noone in this thread has expressed an interest in what regiments they came from, just where some of them would be going TO - the RA-manned naval guns.

Thenyou remain confused Phylo. Those guns were ORDERED to limit their fire to 6,000 yards, but you are ASSUMING that was "due to camoflaging, shortage of ammunition, lack of the above-mentioned (again) training etc"...

Rich - and to think that YOU posted up "Thank you for providing such an excellent example of you not bothering to read what I actually wrote..." I'll cut and paste a second time what I typed out of Lavery some time ago...http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 5#p1485499

"Instructions were issued to hold fire until the enemy was within 6000 yards, or less in fog. This would allow for the hasty training of personnel, it would keep the battery concealed until the last moment, and it would be at a stage when the enemy had little sea room for manouver."

Fortunately AFAIK UNLIKE the US Coast Artillery, the British Field Artillery, Coastal Artillery, and Naval Artillery all used the same methods of FC. So would you care to illuminate us all with just how the Barr and Stroud rangefinders used by the RN differed so mysteriously in their operation from the Barr and Stround rangefinders used by the RA? Or how a RN degree of elevation or deflection differed so markedly from one used by the RA?

Actually - I don't need to - just to note that whatever the differences were -

"Aiming and fire control systems were of the naval type and parties had to be sent round to train the Army to use them"

...and as I said -

"Instructions were issued to hold fire until the enemy was within 6000 yards, or less in fog. This would allow for the hasty training of personnel..."

What the differences were doesn't matter - what DOES matter is that they were different enough to require them being shown how to use them, AND an order limiting their range was issued because of the limitations of this hasty training

[Andy H]

Hey Phylo & Rich

I have the utmost respect for your inherent knowledge about a wide range of subjects and enjoy reading your posts.

Equally I love a heathly debate but I dont like point scoring, sniping or making snide remarks aimed at each other. Your here to inform and impart to others, and though tempting to post a qucik quip, let the reader decide on the veracity of your arguement. In my opinion it spoils the flow of information when members get embroiled in a who said what discussions.

Regards to you both

Andy H

PS: Don't post a repsonse to this post in this thread. If you feel you must respond then PM me, but given that this was a friendly nudge to mature and intelligent members i don't expect any-Now where's that fingers crossed emoticon

[RichTO90]

See what I meant about the attitude?

Okay, I'll drop the attitud eif you will. What do you BELIEVE TO BE TRUE Phylo? Not, what do you chose to argue this go around, but what do you believe to be true? You see, this thread was never about Sealion or whether or not British lorries could drive on British roads, it was about Graeme asking if the Germans could win the battle of Britain. So how did it become a what if about Sealion?

Rich - you asked me a simple question...
So I answered you...
(i) from Medium and heavy Regiments which have returned from Dunkirk having lost their guns.

So why the really stupid comment??? Absolutely noone in this thread has expressed an interest in what regiments they came from, just where some of them would be going TO - the RA-manned naval guns.

Like most questions I ask like this it's because the reality doesn't seem to track exactly with the abbreviated ex post facto comments in the history. In this case, the primary source, organizationally, for the Coast Artillery Regiments formed to man those guns were created by the conversion of 13 named county regiments into the initial 25 CA Regiments (TA) formed in July (another 5 were created in September by the conversion of 4 more in September and then 4 more in 1941 by the conversion of the last 2 in 1941). The three Super Heavy Regiments RA in France returned to man...guess what? Super heavy guns, railroad guns and 9.2-inch pieces. The three Heavy Regiments RA in France? One was used for personnel and placed in suspended animation and two remained as part of Home Forces. The 13 Medium Regiments all remained as part of Home Forces and I can confirm that at least one of them, 69 Medium, was simply re-equipped as a Medium Regiment.

So, anyway, by September we have 157 Emergency CA batteries formed and the personnel of 13 county Heavy Regiments and one Super Heavy Regiment definitely manning them...about 5,600 trained gunners, and possibly some personnel drawn from 12 other regiments. Call it 7,000-odd trained personnel to man 157 batteries...45 trained men per battery. Men who knew the "business" of serving heavy guns - the grunt work part of it anyway...and enough trained NCOs and Officers as well. Which leaves the "technical" part of teaching them the intricacies of the actual pieces. By all accounts it isn't rocket science and doesn't require years of training...for CA work it was mostly dry firing...the important part was done in survey, knowing the range was paramount and with a slow moving target? Remeber, the figures I gave were for a medium-size target manuevering - but the Germans can't manuever.

Rich - and to think that YOU posted up "Thank you for providing such an excellent example of you not bothering to read what I actually wrote..." I'll cut and paste a second time what I typed out of Lavery some time ago...

"Instructions were issued to hold fire until the enemy was within 6000 yards, or less in fog. This would allow for the hasty training of personnel, it would keep the battery concealed until the last moment, and it would be at a stage when the enemy had little sea room for manouver."

Yeah, my fault and I apologize. ISTR that Gooner published the actual orders as given at the time, but I can't find them. But it remains moot...at 6,000 yards the 6-inch guns are practically at point blank range. And, again relating to the Army "problem" using them...the 6-inch BL Mk VII and VIII, the most common one used for coast artillery, was also used as heavy artillery by the Army in World War I and was the standard CA piece used bythe few Army batteries interwar...so they weren't completely unfamiliar with it...and the Naval gun was exactly the same piece. The actual "difference" from the weapons they already were used to simply wasn't that great.

Actually - I don't need to - just to note that whatever the differences were -

"Aiming and fire control systems were of the naval type and parties had to be sent round to train the Army to use them"

Sure. We differ on the gravity we attach to that...or perhaps on our belief about how trainable the average Britsh Army gunner was?

What the differences were doesn't matter - what DOES matter is that they were different enough to require them being shown how to use them, AND an order limiting their range was issued because of the limitations of this hasty training

The problem is though, the "range limitation" order was probably an advantage.

So, anyway, whatever happened to the original question in this thread? I can't find an answer - and I HAVE looked? So how do those 130-odd operational Stukas suddenly become the boogieman for the coast batteries anyway?

So here's a challenge for you...explain to me how they get to the point where arguing about the capabilities of the Coast Artillery gunners is important?

And you still haven't twigged to why 21-24 September is so important yet have you?

Cheers!

[RichTO90]

So, anyway, whatever happened to the original question in this thread? I can't find an answer - and I HAVE looked? So how do those 130-odd operational Stukas suddenly become the boogieman for the coast batteries anyway?

To follow up...and to start the ball rolling on something concrete, Fighter Command operational strength during the 31 days of August averaged 702 aircraft. In September that decreased slightly to 687 aircraft. But... during the 14-day period of the attack on the sector airfields of 11 Group, 24 August-6 September, average strength actually rose to 714. But that was the strategy that was supposedly going to break Fighter Command?

So what's the solution that allows Sealion to kick off and thus enables the RA Coast Artillery Gunners to show their stuff?

Cheers!

[Gooner1]

. the defenders will be generating frequent and regular large flashes...

You got that bit right at least

The Emergency Coastal Defence Battery at Aldburgh from this really excellent website.

http://www.walberswickww2.co.uk/emergen ... l-defence/