An extensive list of Volkssturm-Bataillons?

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Re: An extensive list of Volkssturm-Bataillons?

Post by Germanicus » 12 Jan 2022 02:53

The Volkssturm at Aachen from

Four Hours of Fury: The Untold Story of World War II's Largest Airborne Invasion James M. Fenelon - Page 150

Capture 5.JPG
Capture 6.JPG
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Re: An extensive list of Volkssturm-Bataillons?

Post by Germanicus » 12 Jan 2022 05:12

New find Additional Information

Volkssturm-Bataillon Zellingen

The End: Germany, 1944-45 Ian Kershaw · 2011

Volkssturm-Bataillon 3/121 'Wagner'

Volkssturm-Bataillon Wustenhagen

Death Was Our Companion: The Final Days of the Third Reich Tony Le Tissier · 2021

Friekorps 'Adolf Hitler // Kampfgruppe Wichmann

The Last Nazis Perry Biddiscombe · 2004
Last edited by Germanicus on 12 Jan 2022 08:13, edited 2 times in total.

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Re: An extensive list of Volkssturm-Bataillons?

Post by Germanicus » 12 Jan 2022 06:25

A near enough full extract of the following:

Volkssturm-Bataillon 3/3/115 'Siemensstadt'


[The author is the battalion adjutant, then sole surviving officer]

The idea of recording the battalion history arose as early as 1945 during Russian captivity at Landsberg/Warthe and continued in
Kovno in 1946. The adjutant and Headquarters Company commander immediately agreed that the necessity of having a battalion history
would inevitably arise sometime in the future. There was also the feeling that comments regarding the deeds or behaviour of individuals
should be avoided, except when given from personal knowledge. All this with particular consideration for the battalion dead, whose
sacrifice deserved not to be forgotten.

Reflections on the political situation, or on the war as a whole, should be omitted and the battalion history be confined to the bare
facts, so the general situation is only mentioned when necessary for comprehension. This applies similarly to the more personal remarks,
spread sparingly.

Life in captivity offered a good opportunity to establish the battalion history while memories were still fresh and questions could
be asked to clarify points hitherto unclear.

So the first quick draft was made from the documents that the adjutant had been collecting from the beginning and which the
Headquarters Company commander could enlarge on from the diary he had kept. There was further material about the Gun Company from
Lieutenant von Gustedt, about the Heavy Company from Second Lieutenant Fleck, and also about the ' Siemensstadt' Reserve Battalion
from Company Commander Dombrowski.

It is nigh on miraculous that it was possible to save this first draft of the battalion history despite the constant frisking (body searches)
and the lack of paper, and that we were able to bring it back home.

The original draft is now in the Siemens' company archives. The transcript lay fallow for nearly two decades, being amended from time
to time by the odd contribution and systematic questioning of the few still contactable members of the battalion during the course of 1966 to
produce the present text.


On 25 September 1944 the High Command issued instructions for the raising of the Volkssturm, which would be the mustering of the
people's last resources in the defence against the overwhelming mass of Allied troops in the east and west. All men between sixteen and
sixty years of age and still reasonably capable of bearing arms and marching were grouped into companies and battalions, and taught to
shoot and trained in the latest combat methods, especially to have confidence in using the panzerfaust in engaging tanks.

In the general view, the raising of the Volkssturm came too late and without proper consideration as regards providing sufficient
weapons and equipment. It soon became apparent that equipment was completely inadequate in many instances. The haste in raising the
Volkssturm throughout Germany is exemplified by the fact that seven Volkssturm battalions were committed to the front in
East Prussia by the end of October 1944. Some battalions were even sent into action in civilian clothes and without weapons, only to be captured
immediately while detraining at their unloading points.

The Volkssturm were part of the Wehrmacht and, as such, the Volkssturm men soldiers, and subject to military law. The swearing in
was done with a special oath, similar to that of the Wehrmacht, made to the leader of the Greater German Reich.

From the beginning there was a lasting conflict between the Wehrmacht and the Party over raising and training, as well as over
who had control.

Raising was the Party's concern, training that of the Wehrmacht.

In action the Volkssturm came indisputably under the Wehrmacht.

Despite this apparently clear formulation, there were border areas, such as rationing, which caused constant difficulties.

The greatest lay in the fact that the majority of men falling within the Volkssturm category were designated 'essential workers' in the
war industry. Also the Party emphatically demanded that Volkssturm leaders should be 'staunch and reliable National Socialists' with frontline

Finally the Party asserted that the release of formerly 'essential worker' protected forces to industry from Volkssturm duty would be
the responsibility of the Volkssturm battalions themselves. This led to the 'Z-Card Action', by which, without exception, every man
eligible for the Volkssturm had to report to his designated Volkssturm unit with the possibility of release to industry by the
issue of a 'Z-Card'.

The Party believed that with 'staunch and reliable National Socialists' in command of the battalions, releases from the Volkssturm
would be conducted more in the interest of the Volkssturm than the interest of industry. For a concern like Siemens, for example,
which had only part of its production devoted to the war industry, the raising of Volkssturm units brought the positive danger that
those workers who had until then held a lesser 'essential worker' status would now be committed to military duty.

In these circumstances it was useful to have the battalion leadership drawn from Siemens, who, while legally conforming to the orders
received, would also bear in mind the interests of the firm, and so lessen friction whenever possible without a clash of conscience.

An example may explain this: on the Siemensstadt dynamo factory's production line were 200 of the latest submarine engines with the
highest possible priority.

The factory manager declared that it was absolutely impossible to release a single man from this production line, while the Party was all for
a ruthless call to anns.

The proposed and accepted commander of the 'Siemensstadt' Battalion was the director and head of the personnel department of
SAM (Siemens Apparate und Maschinen GmbH), Erich Krull, who had been a major in the First World War. The battalion adjutant was
the director of the SSW-Abteilungen Zentralen und Balmen, Dr G.A. Pourroy, a lieutenant and longtime regimental adjutant as well as
liaison officer on the staff of a general headquarters in the First World War. The battalion's company commanders also stemmed from

The battalion was assigned to Fortress Regiment 57 of Colonel Barenfanger's division in the defence of Berlin. The regimental
commander was Major Funk and his adjutant Lieutenant von Schoenebeck. The 'Siemensstadt' Battalion was allocated the number
3/115, the '3 ' denoting Gau Berlin and ' 115 ' the sequential number of the unit.

The battalion leadership took it upon themselves above all to equip the battalion up to combat standard in every detail. During the period
leading up to mobilisation and going into action, the battalion was fully equipped with clothing, weapons light and heavy, and all
necessities such as signals equipment, field kitchens and a horsedrawn supply column. The quarrels with the Gau offices in Berlin and
other establishments often bordered on the dramatically grotesque.

This was made more difficult by the relationship between Siemens and the Party, which had always been strained. The main burden of
responsibility for the 'Z-Card' allocations lay with the adjutant. Despite many difficulties, however, it proved possible to provide the
vanous factories and departments with the necessary workforce, previously categorised as ' essential workers', so that production did
not suffer anywhere. The release of personnel to Siemens went so far that eventually the battalion had to be brought up to combat strength
by taking men from Charlottenburg-Nord District. With what lack of consideration the Party enlisted the Volkssturm in Siemensstadt
with police assistance can be seen from the following anecdote.

A senior official in the SSW head office administration in Siemensstadt, Arno Bolle, was graded an 'essential worker' by the
SSW in accordance with the rules. He received a summons to the Volkssturm, but thought himself exempt because of his 'essential
worker' status. At the end of March 1945 he was arrested at his home in Siemensstadt and taken to the Army Ammunition Technical School
in Treptow, where the battalion was waiting to go into action. The adjutant, hearing a particularly loud altercation coming from down the
corridor, discovered that a court martial was already in process against Bolle. The death sentence was about to be passed and, as was then
customary, carried out without delay. Using similar declamatory language, the adjutant was able to extricate Bolle immediately from
the proceedings and have him safely escorted to the barrack gate with instructions to report back to head office. Bolle was thus able to

From those reporting for Volkssturm service from Siemensstadt and the immediate vicinity, such as Haselhorst, Gartenfeld and so on,
men and officers were selected in an extensive and arduous process, persistently disrupted by Party instructions. Having received their
surmnons to the Volkssturm, they would be allocated to the battalion.

This summons, as already described, was constantly being repeated through the Z-Card business. This went on for weeks until the
battalion at last could orovisionallv muster four rifle comoanies. iust like a Wehrmacht battalion. Out of these four rifle companies, a socalled
Headqumters Company was formed of men with infantry training taken from all the rifle platoons for this special unit, comprising, for example,
the Signals Section, the Pioneer Platoon, consisting mainly of craftsmen, and the Supply Section. Next to the Headquarters Company came
the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Rifle Companies commanded by Schneehage (Haselhorst), Treutner and Dr Weinholdt, all members and some even directors
of Siemens companies.

The first parade of the assembled battalion took place in the Evangelical Church in Siemensstadt, as there was no other suitable
place available. Here the companies were divided into platoons and sections. The Labour Front made their offtces at Schwiebertweg 25 in
Siemensstadt available, with its type-writers and telephone for the battalion orderly room. At the same time as the main battalion, a
reserve of the remaining men was formed.

To complete this description of the battalion, the Gun Company and Heavy Weapons Company must also be included. As has already been
pointed out, the battalion leadership formed a combatant unit capable of using both infantry and heavy weapons, for, as well as its infantry
weapons and heavy machine-guns, it also had mortars, rocket launchers and even a flame-thrower.

The forming of the Gun and Heavy Weapon Companies was achieved by taking specialists from among the men of the battalion, as
well as some Wehrmacht gunners. The Gun Company was established on 26 January 1945 at the Army Alnmunition Technical School in
Treptow, at first under Koch's command but later taken over by Dr Mahr at the beginning of Febtuary, still without guns, and as the
battalion's No. 4 Company. The company was then quartered in Biesdorf but moved on 11 February 1945 to Friedrichsfelde, where
they received four 152 mm Russian howitzers with ammunition, and Lieutenant-Colonel Knopf, the Sector A1tillery Commander, gave the
company the nan1e ' Bliicher'.

During the course of February 1945 the battery was joined by 50 Wehrmacht gunners, almost all youngsters. Second Lieutenant Hahn
undertook their training, but on 4 March 1945 he was transfened with 30 men to found a new battery 'Schill'. Lieutenant von Gustedt then
took over the command of the Gun Company, but in the middle of March he too was transfened to another sector to set up a new battery,
so Dr Mahr took over the 'Bliicher' Battery with Second Lieutenant Sprung as his deputy.

The battery was then given a French 220 mm mortar, which was set up in a small square in Kaulsdorf, close to the Catholic church. Even
though ammunition for the mortar was extremely limited, it substantially increased the battery's fighting strength. It should be
stressed that only at the beginning was this battery with its four Russian howitzers and its mortar a fourth company of the battalion,
for later, in order to increase the tactical fire-power, it came under the orders of Fortress Regiment 57 and the Sector Artillery Commander.

The Heavy Weapons Company was formed in similar fashion, but remained under the immediate command of the battalion. It was
formed by order of the Regiment from equal proportions ofNCOs and men taken from the 'Siemensstadt' Volkssturm Battalion, Volkssturm
Battalion 'Schunke'
, Police Battalion 'Warnholz' and Wehrmacht Battalion 'Trockels'. The company was at first commanded by
Lieutenant Schmidt and later by his deputy, Second Lieutenant Fleck. The establishment consisted of a platoon with two infantry guns and
four heavy mortars in a second platoon. Then there were three heavy machine-guns. The mortars were meant to be replaced later by rocket
launchers, but the latter failed to appear.


Battalion training began immediately after the first parade on 1 November 1944 and continued until mobilisation and preparation for
battle immediately before the fighting.

The whole conduct of the training, especially in Siemensstadt, was undertaken by the Wehrmacht. However, it must be pointed out that,
in view of the time and space limitations, this could not be thorough, and could not have been achieved had the battalion not on its own
initiative sought and found the means and material to complete, improve and bring it to a certain level. The underlying principle was
to train the battalion up to a point where it reached true combatworthiness.

The previously mentioned fate of some Volkssturm units that had been thrown into battle completely unequipped and without proper
training served as a warning. The battalion leadership also had to arouse and maintain a beJief among the troops that the battalion had
real fighting capability and was not to be offered up senselessly and without the ability to defend itself against enemy attacks. The
description of the fighting will show that this aim was achieved to a certain extent. In this the leadership knew well in advance that its
fighting ability was limited and that a way would have to be found between looking after the troops' interests and the dutiful fulfilment
of the combat tasks expected of them.

Training for the infantry companies was particularly difficult in Siemensstadt during the final months of 1944. Training could only be
conducted on workday evenings and on Sundays, as the men were still working and being employed on constructing air-raid shelters,
barricades and so on, a hard enough role without adding to it.

Gradually, however, the companies were able to begin their own training, if sometimes only in small numbers, in Siemensstadt itself or
on the old exercise grounds in Haselhorst, or the Waldsportplatz on the Rohrdamm, the old soldiers available providing the companies
with some backbone.

The SA also helped a little until the Wehrmacht at Ruhleben Barracks took over the patronage of the battalion's training in November 1944
as part of an overall plan. The commander of the Wehrmacht at Ruhleben was Major Dageforde, assisted by his training officers,
Lieutenants Kruger and Schafer. The Wehrmacht at Ruhleben also unde1took training with the necessa1y weapons.

It should also be mentioned that several-day company commanders courses were run by the Wehrmacht in Potsdam, and the SA signals
staff provided special training for the battalion's Signals Section. The latter was particularly appreciated, as the battalion depended upon
secure communications in action, and the technicalities involved in the various fields of communications required specialised training for
previously partly unqualified personnel. Volkssturm battalion commanders also received special training from the Wehrmacht at the
Grafenwohr training area in Bavaria, where our commanding officer attended a 14-day course



All military and Patty insignia were removed from the issued clothing and Volkssturm badges of rank sewn on the collars, the
commanding officer being given four stars, the adjutant and company commanders three, platoon commanders two and section leaders one.

So gradually the appearance of the battalion acquired uniformity. From the commanding officer down to the last Volkssturm man a good
and comradely spirit reigned, supported by a strong feeling of unity, making it possible to consolidate the unit in a comparatively short

The concern at the beginning about whether it would be possible to forge the battalion into an effective unit capable of certain combat or
defensive ability, bearing in mind the adverse conditions and the predominant jealousies between the Wehrmacht and the Party, had
proved exaggerated. Now with exacting duties and the feeling of all being in it together, reliant on one another to meet whatever would
come in a comradely manner, all other thoughts were precluded. In these circumstances, even a heavy daylight bombing raid, in which
the barracks and surrounding area were hit, did nothing but strengthen the feeling of unity within the battalion.

Complications continued to arise during the formation and equipping of the battalion. There was a constant turnover in the company rosters
from the Z-Card holders, and here the already mentioned topping-up of the battalion with Volkssturm men from Charlottenburg-Nord
came in.

Then the battalion medical officer, Dr Schreyer, was ordered to accelerate the physical examination of all the Volkssturm men and
weed out those unfit for duty. At the same time the whole battalion was inoculated.

Then the battalion administration had to be sorted out, not only in battallon headquarters, but also at company level for the control of
rosters, paybooks, clothing lists, and other formalities, none of which could be neglected.

But all these difficulties, demanding from all of us ever more work, patience and engagement, were finally mastered, so that, in the
circumstances, we could be content with the results. The mass swearing-in of the battalion provided a suitable ending to this phase
and the almost constant coming and going.

By 6 February our mobilisation could be said to be complete, and just in time, for on 7 February the battalion was ordered out of the
Treptow barracks to its operational area at Biesdorf. In this move to the operational area the whole unit moved as one for the frrst time,
including the field kitchens and supply wagons.

A rear party remained behind for a few days at the Army Ammunition Technical School, where on 10 February the drill hall was totally
demolished in an air raid.

As all the battalion papers, as well as those of the reserve battalion in Siemensstadt, were either lost in the fighting or had to be
destroyed, all the figures in this report have had to be estimated.

However, these estimates can be taken as reasonably accurate.


Battalion headquarters was established in the Catholic church at Kaulsdorf.

Two positions were planned, the first being in open land on driedup sewage fields approximately in the middle between the north-northwest
edge of Biesdorf and Kaulsdorf and the Hellersdorfer Vorwerk (farm), where this delaying position could be manned by a platoon when
necessary. The second followed the northwestern edge of Biesdorf and Kaulsdorf to the edge of the sewage fields, roughly in line with
Honower Strasse. To our left was a Wehrmacht battalion under Lieutenant Trockels sited slightly east of Biesdorf station, and
on our right was the Police Battalion ' Warnholz' .

Barenfanger's Defence Sector 'A' was thus in the forward line of defence, which, however, had still to be constructed, and was occupied
by these three battalions with Volkssturm Battalion 3/115 'Siemensstadt' roughly east of the Wuhle stream and north of the
Kaulsdorf and Mahlsdorf S-Bahn stations.

The battalion's left flank, being comparatively open and unprotected because of the sewage fields, formed a danger point, as was
immediately realised, and the Pioneer Platoon was therefore sent to dam the Wuhle at the S-Bahn to make this left flank at least a bit
more secure.

For the rest, it was planned, as shown on the sketch, for Nos 2 and 3 Companies to occupy the forward position, with Headquarters
Company and No. l Company in reserve on the second position. The battalion command post was set up near the local rifle club in the at
least splinter-proof dugout of a former Czech camp. The companies also prepared their own command posts either in their positions or
immediately behind them. The Heavy Weapons Company deployed its heavy machine-guns and mortars partly in the defensive positions
and patily outside them in all-round defence machine-gun nests.

The division had two 20 mm flak guns with their crews set up in the anti-tank role either side of Hellersdorfer Strasse level with our
forward position.

During March an anti-tank ditch, for which the civilian population of Berlin had to provide workers from the various firms on specific
days, was dug partly between our first and second positions, and partly between our first position and the Hellersdorfer farm. Thus by
chance the Dynamowerke from Siemensstadt was engaged for several days and the battalion staff unexpectedly encountered the head of the
factory, Dr Ott, and Director Besold from the Schaltwerke (both part of Siemens-Schukertwerke AG) on the site.

The Signals Section quickly laid about 16 kilometres of telephone cable connecting the command posts and the regiment, whose
command post was located south of Kaulsdorf S-Bahn station on the road to Karlshorst. Should this telephone system fail, there was a
back-up of cyclists and runners, who had to make themselves familiar with the area by both day and night.

Telephone communications between the various staffs was never fully interrupted right up to the last day of battle. To everyone's
astonishment, the public telephone system worked without interruption even under the heaviest fire, and with patience on both
sides one could always get through in the end. For instance, on the night of 1/2 May, the battalion was able to clarify details of an
attack ordered by the regiment for the early hours of 2 May using the public telephone system.

The battalion dressing station was established in Schloss Biesdorf, and nearby were located the paymaster and quartermaster with his
supply section for the important task of keeping the battalion supplied with food and drink. The field kitchens were deployed out to the
companies, where in course of time they were dug in to provide shelter from splinters.

Next to the construction of our defences, the most important task from the middle of February to the middle of April was the constant
pursuit of training both indoors and out.

The battalion staff and company commanders moved into their command posts during the night of 20/21 April, the reconnaissance
teams were sent fotward and the Hellersdorf platoon took up its advance position.

Then at 2200 hours on 20 April Russian infantry penetrated Hellersdorf and took our platoon by surprise without a fight. Without
the support of heavy weapons, the Russians then tried to overrun our forward positions under cover of darkness, but were checked by the
reconnaissance teams lying between Hellersdorf and our lines.

At dawn on 21 April several Russian tanks with strong infantry escorts were seen in Hellersdorf forming up for an attack on
Kaulsdorf. At about 0900 hours the battalion received a message that four Russian tanks had passed through Hellersdorf, that our Nos 2 and
3 Companies were in action, and that their positions had already been partially breached. One of the first to fall here in a reconnaissance
mtsston was Company Sergeant-Major Kathner-Potthoff.

Simultaneously our second line and the northern and northeastern edges of Kaulsdorf and Mahlsdorf came under artillery and infantry
fire for the first time, with low-flying aircraft joining in the attack. The Russian tanks overcame the anti-tank ditch without difficulty,
rolling forward hesitantly out of Hellersdorf on the road to Kaulsdorf under a cloudy, rainy sky. When they came close to the two flak
positions, which tried to defend themselves with their 20 mm guns, the tanks drew apart to left and right and shot up the guns, which were
then taken by the escorting infantry.

The situation in our battalion sector was becoming uncomfortable. The right wing of No. 2 Company and the left wing of No. 3
Company were being forced back, despite resistance. At the same time strong artillery fire mixed with mortars and Stalin-organs was
falling on Biesdorf and the Wuhl-Garten convalescent home. The situation was particularly critical, as the anti-tank barrier outside our
battalion sector south of Honow had been opened at dawn that day to enable several damaged German tanks to be towed back by tanks of
other Wehrmacht units, and under cover of darkness several Russian tanks had also been able to slip through the barrier and had started
firing on the positions of our right-hand neighbour, Police Battalion 'Wamholz', partly from the rear.

The Police Battalion immediately reported the matter to the regiment, which sent four assault guns early in the morning to our
battalion with orders to support a counterattack on the foremost positions south of Hellersdorf. The counterattack with the assault
guns was led in person by our commanding officer and, with the support of some of Volkssturm Battalion 3/121 'Wagner', which was
in reserve, succeeded in regaining the positions south of Hellersdorf with comparatively few losses. The Hellersdorf farm caught fire. Our
No. 1 Company, which counterattacked from the rifle club area, destroyed three Russian tanks with panzerfausts in this action.

During the battalion's speedy counterattack, marked by the outstanding spirit of the troops, who were being able to attack
successfully for the frrst time, orders came from the regiment to withdraw to Kaulsdorf immediately. Simultaneously the battalion
received messages from our right and left flanking companies that Police Battalion 'Warnholz' on our right had vacated its positions in
Kaulsdorf and that the Russians could be seen advancing west of Biesdorf on our left. It was also reported that some of the assault guns
had been hit and rendered unroadworthy. The Wehrmacht battalion on our left bad also withdrawn. Neither of these battalions had
communicated with us during the attack on us, nor during our counterattack. Perhaps the Russian attack had come as too much of a
surprise for them. These alarming reports forced some quick decisions. The situation seemed to indicate not just a withdrawal to
Kaulsdorf as already ordered by the regiment, but even further in the circumstances.

To make sure, the adjutant went forward by bicycle, escorted by a runner, Bernhardt, to make a quick reconnaissance. He confirmed that
the battalion's position was now untenable. He could himself see how the Russian infantry were moving irresistibly south on and through
Biesdorf, and the same applied to Kausldorf. The battalion was right in the middle of a Russian pincer movement.

Upon the adjutant's return the decision had to be made to order a withdrawal to the south immediately. Meanwhile the regiment had
passed the information that an order to withdraw would follow soon, but the battalion should wait for the order to arrive. Nevertheless, the
battalion ordered the withdrawal without waiting for the direct order, which anived at 1300 hours. Preparation for withdrawal had already
been made during the adjutant's reconnaissance, and following the destruction of the heavy weapons and their ammunition, the
withdrawal could begin over the S-Bahn bridge at Kaulsdorf station, which was already under fire from the Russian infantry on the S-Bahn
on either side. Thus the battalion got out of the trap literally at the last moment, and was able to assemble south of Kaulsdorf station on
Chemnitzer Strasse and march off to Karlshorst.

Before going on to the battalion's next engagement, the actions of the Gun and Heavy Weapons Companies, as well as the Supply Section's withdrawal should be described.

Dr Mahr's Gun Company ' Blucher' had its first engagement with the enemy on 21 April, when it fired to good effect on an assembly of
tanks, vehicles and infantry observed in the Honow and Marzahn areas, as well as in Eiche, Ahrensfelde and to the north of there. When
the enemy broke through at Marzahn on the evening of 22 April, Dr Mahr withdrew his forward observation post, but during the night
received orders from the divisional commander to send it back.

However, by then the Russians had already turned Marzahn into a strongpoint and he and his men became involved in heavy fighting in
which he was killed. Second Lieutenant Sprung, the battery officer, then took over the company.

On 22 April the battery continued to provide outstanding fire support for the defence, the counterattack and the withdrawal to the
next position, but eventually it was almost cut off and the enemy came so close that that evening the ' Blucher ' Battery evacuated its
position near Friedrichsfelde after rendering the guns useless and blowing up the last fmty rounds.

The 220 mm mortar was first used against the Russian advance on 22 April, firing five shells, half its ammunition, on targets south of
Honow. That afternoon it was blown up just as the Russians were about to break into Kaulsdorf and Mahlsdorf.

Second Lieutenant Sprung then reported back with the remainder of his men to the artillery commander at the Zoo flak-tower. The battery
received three new heavy howitzers with their ammunition and deployed at Schloss Bellevue, with forward observation posts on the
tall Karstadt building and near Alexanderplatz, from where it supported the Barenfanger Division by firing at identified targets from
the map. Once the ammunition had run out, the guns were blown up and the 'Blucher' Battery became involved as infantry in the fighting
in the city centre, where it survived until the end of the fighting on 2 May.

Like the 'Blucher ' Battery at Friedrichsfelde and the mortar at Kaulsdorf, the Heavy Weapons Company located near the Catholic
church was also involved in the fighting on 21 and 22 April with its two infantry guns and mortars, supporting the defensive action and
the counterattack, and when the mass of enemy tanks and infantry units appeared on the road from Alt Landsberg at dawn on 22 April in
the divisional sector, the first shots of the infantry guns roared over the battalion positions. The three machine-gun nests also played their
part, firing everything they had at identified targets, and were especially helpful in the counterattack of the morning of 22 April. The
gun and mortar crews fired on the Alt Landsberg/Neuenhagen road junction and other targets, quickly adjusting to the corrections and
change of targets passed down from the company.

The approximately four-kilometre-long field telephone cable to the forward observation posts was soon shot through, and the emergency
radio back-up failed to work as all that could be heard were Russian voices on the allocated frequencies. However, by constantly repairing
the telephone cable, observed fire could be maintained successfully until the area was vacated. The last rounds were fired at point-blank
range and then, for lack of transport, the guns, mortars and heavy machine-guns were blown up in accordance with orders.

Under the command of Lieutenant Schmidt, and with his company officer, Second Lieutenant Fleck, the company made its way back
along the roads from Kaulsdorf at noon on 22 April, crossed the railway lines either side of Kaulsdotf S-Bahn station and rejoined the
battalion marching south. The men were then shared out among the rifle companies. Lieutenant Schrnidt received another assignment
from the division, and Second Lieutenant Fleck became a welcome addition to the battalion's officers in the forthcoming fighting.

Meanwhile the Supply Section under Quartermaster Kruger had been made ready to move on 20 April, following receipt of the codeword 'Zahlmeister'. Warm food was distributed from the field kitchens again on 21 Apri l, and no one would have believed that this
would be the last hot meal they would get for a long time.

On the morning of 22 April, despite the already lively firing on Biesdorf and constant low-flying attacks, Kriiger, brave and
resourceful, collected rations for the battalion from the Wehrmacht supply depot in Friedrichsfelde. After many long disputes, the
battalion was at last free from the Party's supply system and subject to the better-supplied Wehrmacht. However, the Wehrmacht supply
depot in Friedrichsfelde was already under enemy fire, and men and horses were being wounded. Supply Section escort Nietbalk got a
shell splinter in his leg that severed his main artery, but Kriiger used his belt as a tourniquet and Nietbalk survived.

Then Kruger brazenly returned to the Party supply depot to see what he could get. The foreman there refused him at first, but gave in
when his depot came under fire, and Kriiger left with a full wagonload.

The situation was now quite clear to him, for he could hear the ever-increasing sounds of fighting coming from the battalion sector.
Havin sta ed overni ht with the Gun Corn an at Friedrichsfelde, in accordance with earlier orders, he took his laden wagon along with
the wounded and made his way to the assembly point at the Olympic Stadium. The battalion emerged from its baptism of fire and marched
away south towards Karlshorst from Kaulsdorf S-Bahn station.


The battalion's new position was in the buildings on the west side of Samariter Strasse facing east with our left flank curled back on the
corner with Dolziger Strasse, and the right flank on Frankfurter Allee. Attack was expected from the east with the main thrust coming along
Rigaer Strasse. The battalion command post was set up in No. 32 Samariter Strasse. The troops deployed themselves in the buildings
and cellar with firing position from windows and hallways.

There was some lively traffic on Frankfurter Allee moving from east to west, mainly tanks and trucks. Movement on the side streets
was rendered impossible by Russian snipers in the rooftops.


No direct Russian attack occurred during the night of 24/25 April, but at dawn on 25 April heavy firing began from Frankfurter Allee
down Samariter Strasse, and soon the first aimed shots were hitting the upper storeys of the command post building.

About 0800 hours new orders to withdraw arrived from the regiment. At this point the artillery and tank fire had increased to such
an extent along the westward-running streets from the direction of the Frankfurter Allee S-Bahn station that it was only possible to move out
using an underground route via the air raid shelters. The assembly point was Baltenplatz. It was a creepy route through the cellars, where
the inhabitants were sheltering, going through one breached wall to another in the general direction of Weidenweg and Baltenplatz, while
looking for a place above ground where we could reassemble. Some of our men, however, found their way above ground.


It was relatively quiet at fust, but by dawn on 25 Aptil the Russians began attacking from the buildings opposite and from Weidenweg and
Lowestrasse, which opened on to Richthofenstrasse, coupled with lively Russian air activity from the direction of Frankfurter Allee and
Friedrichshain. They started shelling the buildings and laying down an almost continuous mortar bombardment on the rear of the
buildings up to the edge of the cemetery. Simultaneously Russian scouts started trying to infiltrate from across Richthofenstrasse, while
shells were landing on the buildings on both sides of the street, and those in Weidenweg and Lowestrasse caught fire, giving a ghostly
aspect to the night of 25/26 April.

Time and time again the buildings on Richthofenstrasse had to be cleared of the bold Russian scouts, sometimes by Volkssturm and
other times by Wehrmacht or police units. It would even happen that while the anxious inhabitants sat in the cellars between the defenders,
Russians would be cavorting about upstairs, and we would try to shoot them through the ceilings or up the stairwells. The main
defence, however, was conducted from the upper storeys with the inhabitants wandering around, concerned about their goods and
chattels. The defence of Richthofenstrasse was comparatively easy as the narrow foreground was illuminated by the burning buildings,
especially in the centre opposite Lowestrasse.

From the German side only two guns fired occasionally from what seemed to be the Friedrichshain flak-tower, sending tracer towards the
Russian rear.

A macabre incident occurred when a cow and its calf appeared from the brightly lit Lowestrasse in the middle of an exchange of fire
from either side of the street. They trotted calmly up to the middle of Richthofenstrasse, whereupon both sides stopped firing for a few
minutes, then turned round and moved off slowly back the way they had come.

It was comparatively dark at the small well on the corner of Friedenstrasse and Pallisadenstrasse, as the buildings around it were
not on fire. The city's water mains had been destroyed, and here at night a ghostly hustle and bustle occured as the local inhabitants, our
own and Russian troops collected water without interfering with each other. It was dangerous, because there was always the possibility that
Russians, perhaps disguised, would sneak into our defences this way, and one could never be sure that the inhabitants would not reveal too
much about our positions.

Between 0800 and 0900 hours on 26 April there was an especially fierce Russian bombardment by heavy mortars, hitting the buildings
above as well as the cemetery behind, and so dense that practically every metre was hit. However, no attack by Russian infantry followed.

At noon on 26 April there was another Russian break-in to No. 27. A counterattack by a team led by Captain Sobotta, who had
meanwhile joined the group on Richthofenstrasse, and some men of our own battalion managed to throw the Russians back across the
street. Then there was a lull for a short while before the Russians attacked again, developing into a fight in which panzerfausts and hand
grenades were used.

Early in the afternoon, during a lull in the shelling and infantry fighting, a group of three figures was seen approaching Richthofenstrasse
across the cemetery from the Friedrichshain. It was Lieutenant Trockels coming from the regiment with two heavily laden
orderlies. As he came close, Trockels gave a friendly wave from the cemetery. He brought with him the news that at last Wenck's Army's
spearheads, which everyone had been talking about, had reached Potsdam on their way to the relief of Berlin, and that strong armoured
units were following.

(It later transpired that the spearheads amounted to a solitary lightly armoured personnel carrier that reached Potsdam long after the Russians
had occupied the town in strength, only to be immediately shot up and burned out. However, we believed the lieutenant in the command post,
for in such a situation one clutches at any straw.)

The food that Lieutenant Trockels had brought with hiln, plenty of bread and butter, as well as the highly prized cigarettes, was most

Late that afternoon came the orders from regiment for the battalion to pull out of Richthofenstrasse and move to the Lowen-Bohmisch
Brewery. The battalion 's withdrawal at dusk went unnoticed by the enemy. The buildings were now burning fiercely and lightened the
way through the smashed cemetery, whose westetn boundary wall proved exceedingly difficult to cross for our exhausted men with their
packs and weapons.

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Re: An extensive list of Volkssturm-Bataillons?

Post by Germanicus » 12 Jan 2022 06:43

Part 2

Volkssturm-Bataillon 3/3/115 'Siemensstadt'


[The author is the battalion adjutant, then sole surviving officer]

We reached the brewery at dawn on 27 April, only to be given counter-orders to return to Richthofenstrasse and reoccupy the buildings.
These orders, however, as the regiment could see from the state of the troops, were impossible to execute.


Then suddenly at 1400 hours on 25 April the Russians made a strong infantry attack on the Volkspark from the west and south, using
machine-guns. The engineers and the tank company withdrew, even though a reconnaissance as far as the Saatwinkler Damm by
Dombrowski 's company found no sign of the enemy. Then the Russians started firing with mortars, and fighting broke out on the
Rohrdamm on the corner with Dihlmannstrasse, as well as on Schuckertplatz, at the Catholic church and on Nonnendamm Allee.

26 April, where Kruger reported to the supply depot there. Kruger handed over his loaded wagons and immediately sought, together with the
battalion's Paymaster Scharf, who had attached himself to him, to reach Siemensstadt via Fürstenbrunner Weg and report to the Reserve
Battalion. As previously related, this was impossible as the fighting was already over and by 26 April there were no longer any German
troops left in Siemensstadt.

The orders that Krüger and Scharf received from a command post near the Fürstenbrunner Bridge were to go to Haselhorst. This only
shows the extent of confusion that reigned, with no one knowing where the front lines were, for Haselhorst had long since been
occupied by the Russians. So Krüger and Scharf made their way back to the Olympic Stadium, which they found abandoned, including the
supply depot.

A second attempt to reach Siemensstadt also failed. The little unit, which apart from Krüger and Scharf consisted only of the two wagon
drivers, now sought to make its way through to the west and, by chance, came across the command post of the 'Wüstenhagen'
Volkssturm Battalion, another Siemens unit
, and were happy to be taken on.

On 28 April Krüger was given the task of finding rations for the battalion. However, this proved impossible even after nightfall,
because the whole area was under heavy shellfire. Confusion was made even worse by the number of Wehrmacht and Volkssturm units
in the process of either withdrawing or disbanding. A Wehrmacht officer told Krüger that 20 Russian tanks had broken through from the
west and that further resistance without specific orders was pointless.

Nevertheless, Krüger reported back to the 'Wüstenhagen' battalion staff and was ordered to find rations for the battalion next day, 29
April, but again was unable to do so. He found somewhere to sleep for the night and discovered next morning that the battalion command
post had been abandoned, and no one knew where it had gone.

The section remained undecided, wandering around Charlottenburg until they met up with elements of an SS division seeking to break out
to the west via Spandau and Staaken. Again there was talk of Wenck's Army approaching Berlin from the west. Mixed with Wehrmacht and
Volkssturm, this group reached as far as Ketzin, halfway between Spandau and Brandenburg, when Krüger was injured by a shell
splinter, and was captured in an improvised dressing station at the Etzin farm. On 13 May the Russians moved the wounded from Etzin
to the Reserve Field Hospital on Pappelallee in Potsdam, from where he was released on 26 June and was able to rejoin his family in
Siemensstadt next day.


The leading elements of the big stream of mixed units, including the remains of Volkssturm Battalion 3/115, had reached about level
with the elevated Sch6nhauser Allee S-Bahn station when the first Russian resistance was encountered. Rifle and machine-gun fire ripped
into the ranks, followed by an exceptionally heavy mortar bombardment, the bombs bursting atnong the struts and supports of the elevated
railway with increased explosive effect. The results were devastating. Within seconds some 30 to 50 dead and wounded were strewn across
the street. It was a miracle that none of the remaining members of the battalion were hit.

Everyone scattered, seeking shelter in the surrounding buildings and side streets. The battalion stayed together and were taken in by a
friendly tailor, who, despite his own distress, immediately sought to give everyone something to eat and something warm to drink.

It was now obvious to everyone that there was no longer any chance of breaking out to the north from Schonhauser Allee, for the
Russians were sweeping the street with rifle and machine-gun fire.

A group from the Parachute Officers School under Captain Schweikart hied to make their way northwards by way of the cellars
and breached walls in the buildings on the right-hand side of Schonhauser Allee, but were soon forced to give up because of the
strength of the Russian fire.

As it became full morning on 2 May, it became clear that this was the end. The mortar bombardment on the elevated railway was the last
targeted fire the battalion experienced.

The next few hours passed in an odd way. Rumours that the capitulation of Berlin was already in effect grew stronger and stronger, especially
from the local inhabitants, who were better informed from their domestic radio sets than the troops were, and more and more white cloths appeared in the windows as symbols of surrender.

The adjutant tried to get some positive information from an officer of the regimental staff on Schonhauser Allee, and came across
Lieutenant von Schoenbeck, the regimental adjutant, who only knew that it seemed to be the end. So the last members of the battalion were
given their discharge and sent homewards in civilian clothes and without their weapons. Everywhere one saw groups and individuals
on foot and on bicycles, once even on a motorcycle, heading towards the centre of Berlin and then westwards, hoping to get out of the trap.
Except when destiny and the necessary luck combined, most of these attempts failed.

As getting through to Siemensstadt was impossible, the commanding officer, adjutant and Company Commander Gebhardt decided to report
to the nearest prisoner collecting point. The commanding officer and adjutant, as inseparable as ever, took the hard road alone after
discarding their weapons, while Gebhardt and some of the men looked for a prisoner collecting point separately. This caution was important,
as the Russians could still have opened fire on a formed-up unit.

One cannot describe how difficult it was going over to the Russians with our hands up.

During the period described, 26 members of the battalion were awarded the Iron Cross Second Class by order of the regiment, nine of
whom, including the battalion commander, the author and all the company commanders, went on to be awarded the Iron Cross First
Class. For Dr Pourroy, this was a repeat of his performance in the First World War.

Death Was Our Companion: The Final Days of the Third Reich Tony Le Tissier · 2021
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Re: An extensive list of Volkssturm-Bataillons?

Post by Germanicus » 12 Jan 2022 07:39




The Volkssturm Organization

Translated and digested at the Command and General Staff School from a German article by Herbert Hahn in
Völkischer Beobachter 25 November 1944.

THE Volksstunn [People's Army] is growing, battalion by battalion, throughout all the districts of the Reich, and some of its units are already in contact with the enemy in the threatened areas of the frontiers. Such a rapid growth of the organization is the more astonishing since in this instance we are dealing not with an expansion of the W ehnnacht by means of cut-and-dried methods, but rather with the creation of a unique combat organization.

In the organization of the Volkssturm we were faced with the problem of getting men under arms as quickly as possible, of keeping
them at their essential tasks in civilian life up to the moment of direct local threat by the enemy, of giving them military training,
and of combining them into military organizations at the same time. It is this that gives the Volkssturm its unique double character. It has
both an economic and a military task, and its center of gravity may be placed either on the one side or the other according to whether one emphasizes its defense duties or its extraneous functions. The Fiihrer's decree concerning the organization of the German Volkssturm, therefore, places training, equipment, armament, and combat employment in the hands of the commander of the Replacement Army (Ersatzheer), and
political leadership and organizational structure in the hands of the Party. The Party controls the Volkssturm through Gauleiters
and small district leaders (Kreisleiter) who are responsible in their districts "for the command, conscription, establishment, and
organization of the German Volkssturm."

They also participate, in accordance with this authority, in the selection of leaders, for whom the basic requirements are military
ability, determination, and loyalty to the Ftihrer; good example in all matters pertaining to war and life in general; adaptability
to Spartan simplicity; honesty in making reports; and freedom from the propensity to magnify, minimize, or remain silent in matters of

The defense of the homeland is a matter which concerns the entire nation. For this reason, the Volkssturm, in each of its units,
is representative of the nation in its entirety. The necessity for leaving the men who are to be trained in their civilian occupations permits
of no other form of organization than one based on the regional organization of the National Socialist German Workers Party· [Nazi Party].
Hence, in organizing the groups, platoons, companies, and battalions, the unity of the "blocks," "cells," community groups, and districts is
preserved as far as possible.

There is no adoption of organized units from the various branches of the Party, Party organizations, or other groups; neither are there any
special white-collar groups or groups made up exclusively of men of certain vocations. This, however does not apply to fixed personnel of
railway lines or of municipal transportation systems, or men employed on interior waterways or in the waterways administration service.

Th~ main problem, the double aspect of which makes the authority of Gauleiters and small· district leaders (Kreisleiter) indispensable,
is without any doubt that of obtaining both a complete defense effort from the German nation and at the same time the contfquation of
essential tasks in connection with food service,· transportation, communications, .and leadership in general, with as little interference as
possible. This consideration of the vocational activities of the Volks~turm soldiers, which cannot be entirely : neglected even when the men
are called into combat duty, has resulted in the establishment of several categories of conscription, depending both on physical fitness
and vocational dispensability.

As regards fitness, naturally the most rigid standards must be observed. Limited service men find employment in security and guard duty.
In doubtful cases, a physician selected by the district leader makes the decision.

The sixteen to nineteen-year-old youths are also inducted in a special draft. Since they are members of the Hitler Jugend and would
naturally go next into the Wehrmacht, a more severe course of training is given them.

The degree of vocational dispensability is decided by the Party officials in accordance with reports from the individual's district board. The employment of Party political leaders in the Volkssturm is on a scale which will assure success with respect to command and leadership under all conditions and in the most threatening of situations.

The various conscription categories do not differ so much in thoroughness of training or in equipment as in type and distribution of
tasks and time of combat employment.

The German Volkssturm has no large staff or service of supplies, and in as much as it is emploJed in locally restricted tasks or in battalion
strength at most along with regular Wehrmacht units, it does not form its own field divisions. There exists, therefore, besides the Volkssturm
soldier, only group, platoon, company, and battalion leaders who are identified by from one to four silver stars on their collar ornament.
Wherever Party, W ehrmacht, or other uniforms are worn, former service grade insignia are to be removed in the Volkssturm service.
The battalion receives a flag which is carried in combat. It bears the number of the district (Kreis or Gau) on a black background.

Main emphasis in training is laid on firing, close combat of tanks, camoufiage, demolition by the use of explosives, and the building of obstacles.
This training is given at least once a week, usually several hours on Sunday. In the matter of equipment (at least temporarily), the members of
the Volkssturm will to a large extent be dependent on makeshift means and means of their own procuring. In addition to all uniforms
and equipment in the possession of the Party, private articles of clothing and equipment which are not used at the present time by their owners
will be commandeered. The idea is not so ·much that of a general requisition of these articles as that of voluntary, neighborly help with the character of a house-to-house collection.

The German Volkssturm does without some of the organizations that are indispensable in larger military units and which tie up considerable
forces and keep them from actual combat duty. It limits its own medical services to that of companies and battalions. From time to time,
"physicians in charge" in the Reich's district organizations conscript physicians and other medical personnel and are responsible for the health
of the Volkssturm. Doctors who are liable for service in the Volkssturm are employed in the medical service only. There is a doctor for every
battalion and a medical noncommissioned officer for every company.

The German Red Cross has charge of the equipment and medical supplies, along the lines commonly followed in the case of the regular troops.
When engaged in combat with Wehrmacht units, Volkssturm soldiers are also cared for by army physicians.

During the period of training, the Volkssturm soldier provides his own food or is subject to the usual rationing. In case of training in camps for
more than three days, in order to avoid double apportionment of food a "Leave of Absence Certificate for Community Camp" is to be obtained
from the local Food Office. In combat duty, the Volkssturm units are fed with the troop units under which they are fighting.

In case of a period of training' lasting for several days, compensation for the civilian task in which' the man is engaged is continued,
and time lost does not have to be made up. Service in the German Volkssturm is a service of honor of the highest order, in which speculations relative to material advantages or losses are entirely out of place.

In case of accidents while in the service or disability incurred in combat, there exists provision for assistance to families and other dependents
and for social and vocational security. ... pC1cgA0yuq

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Re: An extensive list of Volkssturm-Bataillons?

Post by Germanicus » 12 Jan 2022 07:57

Joseph Goebbels: Life and Death - Page 284 T. Thacker

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Re: An extensive list of Volkssturm-Bataillons?

Post by Germanicus » 12 Jan 2022 08:29

Volkssturm-Bataillon Posen 1

Of the planned 24 Volkssturm-Bataillones only one was actually formed for Festung Posen!!

Hitler's Fortresses in the East: The Sieges of Ternopol', Kovel', Poznan and Breslau, 1944–1945 by Alexey Isaev

Volkssturm-Bataillon 605 Prag

Materials and Documents 1960 ... frontcover

Volkssturm-Bataillon 38/477

The Last Roll Call: The 29th Infantry Division Victorious, 1945 Joseph Balkoski
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Re: An extensive list of Volkssturm-Bataillons?

Post by Germanicus » 12 Jan 2022 10:30


By Antonio J. Munoz - Axis Europa Books

In October, 1944 the Wehrmannschafts-Regiment Untersteiermark, along with the thousands of Selbstschutz were incorporated into the German Volkssturm. They performed garrison and anti-partisan duty and followed the German withdrawal into Austria in late April, 1945.

At its height, the Wehrmannschafts-Regiment Untersteiermark contained around 6,000 men split up into five combat battalions and some
minor training companies and posts.

In 1944, when the Regiment was absorbed into the Volkssturm, its five battalions, named "Sued", "Nord", "Ost'', "West", and "Mitte ", were
redesignated in sequential order by Roman numerals: I, II, III, IV, & V

All able bodied ethnic German males between the ages of 17-45 were required to serve with the Defense Militia Regiment Lower Styria.
Later, this age limit was expanded include youngsters as young as 15 and 16, and men as old as 60, but this did not occur until late 1944
when the entire male population was called up for the Volkssturm.

Later, when the Wehrmannschaft was inducted into the German Volkssturm in October, 1944 they were given helmets with the Styrian lion,
sword, & swastika stenciled on the left side of the helmet.

Capture bb.JPG

Chef der Zivilverwaltung-Gebiet Untersteiermark (CdZ) [Chief of Civil Administration-Command]

CdZ-Gebiet Untersteiermark

Kreise in der Untersteiermark [Stand 1. 1. 1945]

Stadtkreis Marburg an der Drau
Landkreis Marburg an der Drau
Kreis Cilli
Kreis Oberradkersburg
Kreis Pettau
Kreis Rann
Kreis Trifail


OstmarkMapDEU.png ... steiermark
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Re: An extensive list of Volkssturm-Bataillons?

Post by Germanicus » 12 Jan 2022 23:49

Berlin 1945 Luca Stefano Cristini · 2021

A. TELTOW CANAL AT KLEIN-MACHNOV Lieutenant von Reuss, Commander of a Platoon of the Volkssturm-Kompanie Klein-Machnow

Preparations for the defense of the Teltow Canal included the construction of fortifications along the northern bank of the canal
and the organization of a squad for the demolition of bridges. A combat trench was dug at varying distances from the canal, and
machine gun positions were placed every 5-600 yards. Each position was connected with a shelter through a communication

The trenches were partially on marshy ground, which made troop movement difficult. A machine gun emplacement built of concrete
blocks was constructed in the grounds of an asbestos factory. There were no artillery emplacements in the rear, although two
anti-aircraft guns had been placed behind us along with a rocket launcher.

The only complete unit that was in this sector was Volkssturm-Kompanie Klein-Machnow, which had been joined by some
Wehrmacht stragglers. The platoon was armed with only one machine gun of Czech production, which jammed at every volley, plus
there was a mixture of rifles of various foreign origin including some Italian "Balilla" rifles.

Of further interest, and mentioned later in the same report, is that the evening after the first encounter with the enemy, the Platoon
adjacent to that of the writer withdrew to spend the night in their quarters, and reappeared the following morning. Since the Soviets
attacked weakly in this sector, the Volkssturm was able to hold out for two days.


The military value of the city railroad circuit lay in its ability to draw a clear line of defense. The fortifications built here were
generally similar to those built on the outer perimeter, however, due to the hard terrain, it had not been possible to prepare a
continuous line of trenches. The position consisted mainly of individual or three to four man defensive positions. Plans had been
prepared to fortify the roads behind the positions, but this was to be done on a means available basis and on individual initiative.

These preparations are well described in the report of Heinrich Bath, commander of a Volkssturm Battalion:

The Volkssturm Battalion, organized in the Charlottenburg-West area, was to serve as a reserve for another Volkssturm battalion
that was deployed along the city's railway line. Forward fortifications had been built between the roads behind the Forward Battalion,
and the Reserve Battalion had a strength of 800 men but lacked weapons and tools, especially entrenchment tools, and many of the men
did not have adequate clothing. The Battalion was placed under the command of the General Headquarters of the Party of the First
District, whose headquarters was in Wittemberg-Platz. At the same time the Battalion was also under the orders of the Military
Headquarters responsible for the sector, and this situation often created confusion in orders.

First, fixed and mobile anti-tank obstacles had been constructed. The main crossing points in the Battalion's sector had been
provided with fixed concrete obstacles, and a mobile section, in the center of the road, allowed cars and other vehicles to pass. At
night, traffic was suspended and the passages were closed as darkness fell and were always closely guarded. The side streets
were completely blocked by fixed obstacles that prevented the passage of vehicles and left only a small side passage for pedestrians.
These obstacles, about twelve barricades up to three meters hjgh, were replaced by steel beams and girders planted in the streets and
covered by piles of rubble.

Machine gun positions were set up on high floors to cover the road. In the cellars, slits were opened on the street to create
positions from which the Panzerfaust could attack the Soviet tanks. In addition, the cellars were transformed into shelters and
connected to each other through openings in the walls so that troops and supplies could be moved under cover. Sniper posts
were created in the roofs as well as paths for the passage of men. Because of the intense construction work, combat training was
almost completely ignored, although readings of propaganda material were made to boost morale.

Shortly before the battle the Battalion received a hundred rifles. During the fight, only about sixty men remained on the line, and
the rest returned to their homes. Along the city's railroad line, many interior defense line and crossing positions were constructed in
this manner, although the extent of the work depended largely on the expertise of the commander responsible for the construction.
Works of this kind within a large city would have permitted a strong defense, provided the troops destined to fight were determined
to fight. In Berlin, some positions were tenaciously defended while others were occupied by the Soviets with virtually no fighting.

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Re: An extensive list of Volkssturm-Bataillons?

Post by Germanicus » 13 Jan 2022 00:20

Battle of Memel

The defense of the port of Memel constitutes the first engagement of Volkssturm units on the eastern front; at the cost of heavy losses,
these units, composed of civilians equipped with armbands, managed to repel small Soviet thrusts towards the city.

Volkssturm-Bataillon Hartung (1., 2., 3. companies c. 350 men Kustenhilfswehr)
Volkssturm-Bataillon Roller (arrived 11th December 1944 on Kurische Nehrung - c. 370 men)
Volkssturm-Bataillon Schulze (1., 2., 3., 4. arrived 16th December 1944 on Kurische Nehrung - c. 500 men. A 5. company formed on January)
Volkssturm-Bataillon Grau (Projected on 5th November and 5 companies (1. to 4. & 5. reserve company, respectively Barning, Jahn,
Boisen, Lange & Riesel - 5 companies arrived 17th December 1944). It seems to be renamed as Volkssturm-Bataillon 25/1 Sudau
(on 7th January 1945)

Standschützen-Bataillones Reichsgau Tirol-Vorarlberg

The name Volkssturm was intended to be binding for all units, but the Gauleiter of the Reichsgau Tirol-Vorarlberg Franz Hofer caused the
Gau's Volkssturmbataillone to be called the Standschützenbataillons internally in the Gau , and even gave them their own diamond-shaped
sleeve insignia with a Tyrolean eagle on the swastika and the inscription "Standschützen Battalion (location)".

Furthermore, the Freikorps Sauerland of the Gau Westfalen-Süd was integrated into the Volkssturm in October 1944 and kept its
designation and badge there.

Freikorps Adolf Hitler

The Freikorps Adolf Hitler was a combat unit of the Volkssturm set up in Germany towards the end of the Second World War .

On March 28, 1945, Adolf Hitler decreed the establishment of the association named after him (decree on establishment, see BA-ZNS/WA 11g).
As Reich Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels informed the Gauleiter of the NSDAP in a letter on March 30, this should be made up of
"activists of the movement, volunteers from the Volkssturm and volunteers from the Werkschar" and by Robert Ley , the Reich Organization
Leader of the NSDAP and leader of the German Labor Front, to be commanded; each Gau should set up a „Gauschwarm“ of 1000 men.

The candidates for the Freikorps should be politically trained in the spirit of the NSDAP and have basic military training.
The refusal to register as a volunteer on the grounds that the volunteer was unavailable in the administration was not permissible
due to the urgent war situation. Each volunteer is to be provided with a food ration for three days.

The „Gauschwarm“, which were divided into „Kreisschwärme“ and „Einzelschwärme“, were to be set up at the military training areas of the Wehrmacht in the Gau. The uniform should consist of sweatpants, uniform jacket, cap, camouflage suit and armband with the inscription
"Freikorps Adolf Hitler", the armament of assault rifles, Panzerfäusten and hand grenades. Bicycles should give them some mobility.

The units were subordinated to the army for use and also supplied by it. The units were designated by the Wehrmacht as Panzerjagdkommandos
or Panzerjagdverbände.

Units of the Freikorps "Adolf Hitler" such as the Panzerjagdverband „Döberitz“ („Gauschwarm Berlin“) and the Panzerjagdverband „Munster“
fought until the capitulation as part of the 12th Army west of Berlin .

On some occasions, members of the Volkssturm showed tremendous courage and a determined will to resist, more so even than soldiers in the Wehrmacht. The Volkssturm battalion 25/235 for instance, started out with 400 men but fought on until there were only 10 men remaining.
Fighting at Küstrin between 30 January to 29 March 1945, militia units made up mostly of the Volkssturm resisted for nearly two months.
Losses were upwards of 60 percent for the Volkssturm at Kolberg, roughly 1900 of them died at Breslau, and during the Battle of Königsberg (Kaliningrad), another 2400 members of the Volkssturm were killed. At other times along the western front particularly, Volkssturm troops
would cast their arms aside and disappear into the chaos. Youthful ardor and fanaticism among Hitler Youth members fighting with the
Volkssturm or an insatiable sense of duty from old men proved tragic sometimes. An example shared by historian Stephen Fritz is instructive
in this case:

In one representative village just north of Bad Windsheim, the Herbolzheim Volkssturm unit, with its customary composition of elderly men and young boys under the influence of a few regular army soldiers, foolishly declared the town a fortress and laid mines in the streets. As American troops approached in midmorning on April 12, shots from the village rang out. Angered, the Americans commenced a two-hour artillery barrage complemented by aerial attacks that gutted the town with incendiary and high-explosive bombs. With their village engulfed in flames, the civilian inhabitants, mostly the elderly, women, and children, fled in search of shelter to the surrounding fields, all the while under American fire.

Not every Volkssturm unit was suicidal or apocalyptic in outlook as the war drew closer to its end. Many of them lost their enthusiasm for the
fight when it became clear that the Allies had won, prompting them to lay down their weapons and surrender – they also feared being captured
by Allied forces and tortured or executed as partisans. Duty to their communities and sparing them from horrors like at Bad Windsheim
also played a part in their capitulation, as did self-preservation.

On the Western Front

The Volkssturmänner the Western Front did in the whole show less biting than their peers of the Ostfront . Their mission was also somewhat
different since the Volkssturm also had to supply crews to the Westwall positions , thus freeing Wehrmacht fortress units which could thus be reassigned to the Volksgrenadieredivisionen , the "people's divisions" of lightly manned infantry. He also had to contribute to the construction of complementary positions and the erection of anti-tank obstacles. Thus, during the siege of Metz by the IIIhe American Army, a battalion of Volkssturmmänner, numbering about 400 men, was integrated into the defensive system of the city. Given the urgency of the situation,
decisions were made very quickly. The decree of September 25, 1944 calling for the mass levy of men aged 16 to 60 came into effect on
October 19, 1944, in the territories annexed by the Reich . In the CdZ-Gebiet Lothringen, the institution of the Deutscher Volkssturm was
applicable two days later, i.e. the 21st of October. The SA-Gruppenführer Caspary was commissioned to immediately raise 12 battalions in the
Gau Westmark .

Under the authority of Vollrath Lübbe , these battalions were particularly strengthen the 462 th Volks-Grenadier-Division engaged since
September in the battle of Metz . The incorporation of the Volkssturm Metz took place at the Bayern-Kasern in Metz, from 1st November 1944.
This battalion consisted mainly of former police officers and 14-18 veterans over the age of 45, but also young people from the Hitlerjugend under the age of 18, and refractory army German. The combat capacity of this battalion having been considered by the German command as nil and
its loyalty very reduced, the men of the Volkssturm Metz were placed under the authority of a Major of the Ordnungspolizei and relegated to maintenance tasks. order and passive defense 15 . The Flak battery crews in particular were replaced in Metzby members of the Hitler Youth
and the Volkssturmmänner In reality, the disorderly appearance of the Volkssturm battalions was not a factor that raised civilian morale,
but rather starkly showed the desperate military situation of Nazi Germany.

But if the motivation of the Volkssturmmanner on the Western front was rather lukewarm, their resistance was far from being purely
symbolic, as John Russell relates in his book No Triumphant Procession (see Bibliography) retracing the Anglo-Canadian operations in the
North of Germany.


Richard J. Evans , who reported that 175,000 Volkssturm members died fighting the professional armies of the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. Evans figures are based on members listed on the card, which were officially reported as killed, but Martin Sorge notes that this figure does not include the 30,000 listed as missing or presumed dead from a report of 1963.

Volkssturm Amrum one of the North Frisian Islands on the German North Sea coast, south of Sylt and west of Föhr. It is part of the Nordfriesland district in the federal state of Schleswig-Holstein and has approximately 2,300 inhabitants.

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Re: An extensive list of Volkssturm-Bataillons?

Post by Germanicus » 14 Jan 2022 07:43

Schwedt an der Oder

Volkssturm-Bataillon 16/67 Bad Freienwalde
Volkssturm-Bataillon 16/85 Falkenberg
Volkssturm-Bataillon 16/83 Eberswalde
Volkssturm-Bataillon 16/121
Volkssturm-Bataillon 16/123 Bralitz // Volkssturm-Bataillon "Oderrand"

Broschüre „Oderland ist abgebrannt – Die Kämpfe am Oderstrom vom Januar bis April 1945 von Schwedt bis nach Zehden und den umliegenden Ortschaften. Zeitzeugen berichten. Zusammengestellt anhand von Orginalbelegen von Kurt Speer, Celle“, o.J., S. 79 ... m-gesucht/

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Re: An extensive list of Volkssturm-Bataillons?

Post by Germanicus » 14 Jan 2022 07:53

Mainfänkische Volkssturm

The Volkssturm battalions coming from Franken (Bayreuth, Franken, Mainfranken) were deployed together with 7 other battalions in the Frankfurt/Oder – Landsberg/Warthe – Küstrin area and were largely destroyed there around January 31st.

However, the original Volkssturm-Bataillon 134 was not used, but the party districts formed from all the Volkssturmbataillones in the
respective Gau so-called "zbV battalions, which were preferably equipped with German weapons. The Bayreuth battalion had the number
"Volkssturm Battalion zbV 2/1", which Unfortunately, I do not have the number of the Mainfranken battalion.

These associations are mentioned in:

Seidler, Franz W.: German Volkssturm. The last contingent 1944/45. Munich 1989 p. 329 f.

There is a detailed essay about the Bayreuth battalion:

Steffel, G.: The tragedy of the Volkssturm battalion zbV 2/1 Bayreuth. In: Archive for the History of Upper Franconia Volume 69,
Bayreuth 1989, p. 303 ff

Volkssturm-Bataillon 2/134

This Bayreuth battalion was surrounded by Soviet troops on January 31, 1945 near Zielenzig east of Frankfurt/Oder and largely destroyed.

When the Volkssturm were loaded in Würzburg in January 1945, they were dismissed by Gauleiter Hellmuth. He overheard the Gauleiter
saying to someone "... we have no interest in these people coming back..."!!!

Volkssturm-Bataillon 15 Mainfranken

In 1995, the historical association in Frankfurt/Oder published a bulletin that also dealt with the deployment of the Volkssturm battalions. ... furt-oder/

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Re: An extensive list of Volkssturm-Bataillons?

Post by Germanicus » 14 Jan 2022 07:58

Volkssturm-Bataillon Ahaus 1944-45

Volkssturm Battalion in Ahaus. The companies came from Lipperland, Höxter, Wiedenbrück and Münster. The battalion was to prepare reception positions for the Wehrmacht in a section between Ahaus and Stadtlohn (21 km).

Below are two titles that also deal with the Volkssturm in Westmünsterland and events in Ahaus and Stadtlohn in the spring of 1945:

Vogt, Adolf
Der Westfalenwall - Phantom oder Festungslinie ?
Eine Studie zur Reichsverteidigung
Westmünsterland - Quellen und Studien, Band 9
Vreden 1999
ISBN 3-927851-97-1

1945 - Kriegsende und Neubeginn im Westmünsterland,
zusammengestellt und bearbeitet von Johannes Stinner
Westmünsterland - Quellen und Studien, Band 5
Vreden 1995
ISBN 3-927851-78-1

Both titles are out of print at the Landeskundliches Institut Westmünsterland, but can easily be obtained through the interlibrary loan of your city library. The second title mentioned is 480 pages long and contains a great deal of information about the Volkssturm in the region in question. ... s-1944-45/

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Re: An extensive list of Volkssturm-Bataillons?

Post by Germanicus » 14 Jan 2022 08:06

34 Reichsgau Thüringen, Volkssturm-Bataillon Nordhausen/Harz, number unknown.

Installation site:
Nordhausen/Harz, Street: Neumarkt.

Time of installation:
Autumn 1944

ccording to the 'Lexikon der Wehrmacht', this applies to those born between 1884 and 1900 and the 16-year-old Hitler Youth born in 1928/1929.

Unit Leader:
Btl.-Kdr.: Hauptmann d. R. Sigurd Rudloff (born 1891), from April 3, 1945 after injury school board Dr. Koch also Combat Commander Nordhausen.

Urban area of ​​Nordhausen, Rüdigsdorfer Schweiz, Harzpforte Ilfeld.

Special features / note:

By order of General der SS Hans Kammler on April 6, 1945, defense of Nordhausen, Harzpforte.

With the invasion of the 3rd US tank army on April 10, 1945 at the V-weapon armament factory Mittelwerk Dora and handover of the city of Nordhausen on April 11, 1945 by city commander Hauptmann d. R. Sigurd Rudloff informally dissolved.


Dipl.-Ing.Jost-Dieter Rudloff, in "Das Nordhäuser Geschichtenbuch, Erinnerungen an die Meyenburgstrasse.".,S.180 ff.;

Jürgen Möller, "Die Eroberung der unterirdischen Raketenfabrik im April 1945 und die Besetzung von Nordhausen", S. 33 ff. ... ordhausen/

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Re: An extensive list of Volkssturm-Bataillons?

Post by Germanicus » 14 Jan 2022 08:10

Volkssturm-Bataillon Mueller

Anfang November 1944

Btl.-Kdr. Mueller


Besonderheiten / Vermerk:
FPN 26062 (10.11.1944-Kriegsende) zugewiesen am 21.03.1945 / aufgestellt zur 4 Kompanien


Stab - Fpn 26062 A
1. Kompanie - Fpn 26062 B
2. Kompanie - Fpn 26062 C
3. Kompanie - Fpn 26062 D
4. Kompanie - Fpn 26062 E

Am 21.03.1945 Stab II u. 4.-7. Kompanie Regiment 5 Division Bärwalde.

Februar 1945 im Raum Tempelburg ... n-mueller/

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