German Tank Losses In Normandy

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Post by Qvist » 07 May 2002 14:55

Hello Darrin

Some thoughts: I'll take a look at that when I have the chance. With Verpflegungsstärke, relevance apparently usually depends on level. For divisions at least, there is rarely much difference between and Iststärke. Not really surprised about the differences in the divisional slice, considering the personnel weakness of many German formations in the West in 44. Also, with the differences in infrastructure and distances between France and Russia, the much higher proportion of static units in France, not mention the complete lack of any operations prior to the invasion, I would presume that a proportionately larger logistics and support apparatus was required in the east.


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Hey Guys, I'm really enjoying this one...

Post by Fridolin » 07 May 2002 18:54

... when you finish with Zetterlin's Normandy, will you please dissect Glantz's 'Mars' and compare Glantz's and Zetterlin's 'Kursk'... please... :?

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Post by Fridolin » 08 May 2002 01:10

Hi Qvist, Timo, Cristoph, Darrin

I have taken the trouble to print the whole lot to read it confortably and to be able to check Zetterling's book, and all I can say now is:

-I retract my previous post. It now seems to me that it is not really possible or profitable to discuss any matter in Darrin's actual terms.

-I have found Timo and specially Qvist incredibly patient, calm even when exasperated. My congratulations; I possibly could not have been so patient with Darrin's inconsistencies and vagaries. Qvist: my full respect.

For Darrin: To start with, as you recognize your 'incredibly bad spelling, writing and typing', a good starting point could be trying to write every single word; then checking before posting, and finally -and obviously- trying to get place names right. If not, it just looks as if you did not know anything, not only about Normandy, but even basic geography.
Then, before launching a discussion, a good starting point could be to try to build a coherent picture of what you try to say, then structuring your argument without jumping from one point to another, and then using the available secondary literature to defend your points instead of continuously saying 'I imagine'. That is called speculation, and has nothing to do with research or even criticism.
Darrin, I really believe you have not understood what Zetterling says, you do not understand the difference between TOE's and realities in the German Army by 1944; you do not grasp the inherent strenghts of US Army organization and logistics by that date, and you refuse to be caught in a structured discussion. Jumping from one point to another and dropping vagaries might look brilliant at school, but will not work with people who have a vast and deep pool of knowledge, such as Timo, Qvist and Cristoph. All of us can learn a lot from them, if only we are prepared to listen. Please, believe me I'm writing this with the best of intentions.
Very best regards.

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Interesting conversation!!

Post by Wolfkin » 26 May 2002 18:15

Very interesting conversation!!

One thing that I think is being missed by Darrin in regards to logistics, is the shortage of trucks and trains. When supply is stated as a problem, they do not mean that there wasn't any supplies, they mean the supplies could not get to them.

The logistical apparatus in Normandy was in a shambles. The railroads and trains were being bombed to atoms by the Allied Air Forces. Transport routes were being bombed. Even if they had the fuel and ammo, how would they get it to the Divisions? You need trucks to transport stuff from the trains to the units.

There were not enough trucks and trains to adequately supply the German Forces in Normandy. That was the problem, not that there wasn't any supplies, there was supplies, just no way to get it to the units.


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