Intended FJ role in Sealion

[Richard Anderson]

Now, I searched through Pissin's work and that's exactly what happened (No wonder, as a towing Ju 52 was approximately 20 km/h slower than one carrying FJs.):

The invasion plan was frustrated by the necessity (determined by the lack of airfield space) of assembling the freight glider squadrons and the paratrooper squadrons at the same fields. As a result, the slower freight glider squadrons, which were supposed to land on the island as an advance force, did not arrive until after the paratroopers.

p. 223

Indeed, the lack of forethought on that point is indicative of the hasty and lack of planning done for MERKUR. To me it is even more interesting that after going to the trouble of expanding the LLSR so it could bring in fully armed troops in the initial wave, they did not provide enough gliders and tugs to bring in anything other than the Stab and I. Every other "gliderman" of the LLSR came in by parachute and only the western and center assault groups had any glider assault troops, which left the assault to be done by paratroopers armed with pistols and knives, who were busy searching for weapons canisters - the huge hole in Luftwaffe parachute assault doctrine.

It seems that the distribution was the following. The 53 gliders were to be towed by the I. Gruppe of Luftlandegeschwader 1, 29 went to the Combat Group West and 24 to the Combat Group Center. (Plus 9-10 gliders were freight gliders, assigned to transport communication devices and stab personnel, not participating in the air assault.)

Yep, as I previously mentioned. The real question here is did Pissin count the cargo gliders used to bring in the elements of the 7. Fliegerdivision HQ along with the ten he counted for Stab/LLSR or are they extra? I suspect the former and that there were only 63 gliders operational of the 69-72 available.

It would be interesting to know whether the Ju 52s of I. Gruppe of Luftlandegeschwader 1 carried Fallschirmjägers on the first assault or not, because then we'll have our answer.

I suspect they did, but also that they were supplemented by Ju 52 of Gruppe 40. and/or Gruppe 105., since I doubt that I./LLG 1 had 63 operational Ju 52.

[Knouterer]

To return to Sealion for a moment: Akte 1348, unfortunately damaged, contains info about the role of the 22nd (airlanding) division.
https://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/de/ ... rid/zoom/1

As in Holland, the plan was that the division would be brought across when suitable landing fields were secured. At the end of September, the division moved to the region Laon-Maubeuge, in the vicinity of the airfields where the 7. Fliegerdivision would start from. The division was apparently still organised and equipped as a standard infantry division, meaning that vehicles, guns and horses not suitable for air transport would have to be left behind. The Erdstaffel included 7,165 officers and men, 4,797 horses and 963 vehicles, so the air-landed force (fliegende Staffel) would be about 10,000 strong (at most).
Generalleutnant Graf von Sponeck, who had commanded the division in May, wrote a lengthy evaluation of the operations in Holland, analysing the problems:
Lack of intelligence. Old aerial photographs; recent ones would have shown field fortifications and AA gun positions. Insufficient air support. Direct radio contact between the troops on the ground and bombers/fighters not possible.

On the 18th of October, the division came under command of V. Army Corps, meaning, presumably, that the airlanding plans were off the table for the time being.

[Peter89]

To return to Sealion for a moment: Akte 1348, unfortunately damaged, contains info about the role of the 22nd (airlanding) division.
https://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/de/ ... rid/zoom/1

As in Holland, the plan was that the division would be brought across when suitable landing fields were secured. At the end of September, the division moved to the region Laon-Maubeuge, in the vicinity of the airfields where the 7. Fliegerdivision would start from. The division was apparently still organised and equipped as a standard infantry division, meaning that vehicles, guns and horses not suitable for air transport would have to be left behind. The Erdstaffel included 7,165 officers and men, 4,797 horses and 963 vehicles, so the air-landed force (fliegende Staffel) would be about 10,000 strong (at most).
Generalleutnant Graf von Sponeck, who had commanded the division in May, wrote a lengthy evaluation of the operations in Holland, analysing the problems:
Lack of intelligence. Old aerial photographs; recent ones would have shown field fortifications and AA gun positions. Insufficient air support. Direct radio contact between the troops on the ground and bombers/fighters not possible.

On the 18th of October, the division came under command of V. Army Corps, meaning, presumably, that the airlanding plans were off the table for the time being.

The equipment was not such a huge problem for airlift. There was a wide selection of guns and vehicles that could be transported via Ju 52s not to mention the few four engine transports.