Post
by WalterS » 03 Jan 2006 02:34
Certainly Göring is responsible in part for the Luftwaffe's failure. However, the entire german High Command lacked any strategic vision when it came to the employment of air power.
Strategic bombing, or the lack thereof, was a major failure. Although the Luftwaffe could, and did, pulverize various cities such as Warsaw, Valletta, Stalingrad, etc, it was incapable of significantly attacking the enemy's infrastructure. With the exception of the fierce air and naval battles in the MED in 1940-42, German and Italian forces were unable to significantly interdict Allied movements, and even there they eventually lost.
Allied infrastructure: communications, transportation, production, was largely left untouched by the Luftwaffe. There are a number of reasons for this not the least of which was the ineptitude of the Nazi hierarchy in taking on too many enemies at the same time. Missions were left unfinished because another enemy had to be attacked. The Luftwaffe was unable to bring certain missions to conclusion because the tasks kept changing and because resources were not made available. This is particularly true when discussing the U-boat campaign.
Because the German High Command lacked any strategic vision, the Luftwaffe was viewed principally as a tactical tool, the role of "flying artillery" in which it excelled. When called upon to do anything else, the Luftwaffe did not fare so well.
Even in areas in which it did do well, the Luftwaffe was hamstrung by ridiculous restrictions from above. During the early years of the RAF's night attacks the Luftwaffe employed "intruder" aircraft which attacked RAF bombers over their own airfields. In 1940-41, according to Max Hastings, these "intruders" had been responsible for two-thirds of the Luftwaffe's night-fighter victories. "[Luftwaffe General] Kammhuber was convinced that this promised to be the most effective means of causing casualties and chaos to the bomber offensive. Bomber Command shared his opinion." If the German "intruders" had been allowed to continue their operations, according to Hastings, the consequences for BC could have been severe.
But the "intruders" were not allowed to continue these successful operations. Why? Hitler ordered that these operations be abandoned because he "considered that only aircraft shot down over Germany were of value in convincing the German people that they were being defended." So, once again, the Luftwaffe failed to complete a mission and left the British airfields alone. Hastings believes that this was the greatest missed opportunity of the bomber war.
(See Max Hastings, "Bomber Command," pp.266-270)
Göring, as the head of the Luftwaffe, should have argued vociferously in favor of the interdiction attacks. He didn't because he was first and foremost a Nazi crony. That was his, and the Luftwaffe's, undoing.
), sure to be able to sell it nonetheless, preferred to invade Junkers' [again] area with a unauthorized Ju 88 night fighter rival. The fact that He 219 was better than its rival changes nothing - it was a case of bad management of scant resources.
Which country and area are you in?
The land of Hans Christian Andersen! Are the Tivoli gardens still as lovely as they were when I was there in 1976?
