aghart wrote: ↑
19 Jan 2022 23:46
daveshoup2MD wrote: ↑
19 Jan 2022 22:27
Fatboy Coxy wrote: ↑
19 Jan 2022 18:52
Given the strategy daveshoup2MD is advocating, I'm surprised we didn't just fold up and ask for a peace treaty after Dunkirk, oh wait, with Hindsight we know we will win, so push on boys!
Stop it Fatboy, your beginning to sound churlish!
oh yeah, sorry
No, because the Germans could never cross the Channel - by sea or air - in the necessary strength to force a decision, in 1940 or thereafter.
However, in 1941, the Japanese could most definitely secure air and sea supremacy in the South China Sea, and points south, as they most clearly did in 1941-42. The point being made here is that with a little more realism and lot less misplaced confidence, the British could have saved resources that would have been much more useful to the Allied cause elsewhere in roughly the same period, and afterwards.
Again, the point is not to die gallantly, riding into the Valley of Death with pennons fluttering (so to speak); it is, as a fairly well-regarded combat commander once said, to "make the other poor dumb bastard die for his country."
If only the powers that be had your gift of hindsight. They could have left the UK almost bereft of troops from November 1940 onwards. Sent the lot to Malaya knowing what the Japanese were going to do and when they were going to do it. Except of course even the Japanese did not know what course of action they would take until mid 1941 and the Russian threat receded. I suppose we should have turned the other cheek when Argentina invaded the Falklands, after all, we never stood a chance go getting the Islands back?
Amazingly enough - as stated before - the British powers that be demonstrated exactly
these abilities to not reinforce exposed outposts in 1940 in the Channel Islands and the British positions in northern China (and in fact, actually evacuated
troops from China before the situation turned to shit); they also managed to recognize the realities of the situation - in terms of the impact of Axis airpower, especially - in Norway, France, and British Somaliland in 1940, and Greece, Crete, and Burma in 1941, and evacuated their personnel, if not their equipment, as well.
So, it's not hindsight, is it?
Yet they shoveled the equivalent of two reinforced infantry divisions, plus a couple of separate brigades, and two-fifths of the fast capital ships they had after Hood
was lost, into a sack in southeast Asia because ... why, exactly?
They thought less of the Japanese than they thought of the Germans, obviously.