Why not "besiege" Japan?

[fredleander]

But the war was fought under Rainbow-5.

Not really. Rainbow 5 was the plan that was in effect on Dec. 7th 1941. As you know, no plan survives first contact with the enemy.. ..

Fred
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[OpanaPointer]

But the war was fought under Rainbow-5.

Not really. Rainbow 5 was the plan that was in effect on Dec. 7th 1941. As you know, no plan survives first contact with the enemy.. ..

Fred
------

Quibble noted.

[mikegriffith1]

Once again, Mike, you only tell but 25% of the story.

Oh, yes, certain Japanese embassy type functionaries were talking to people in Switzerland, who then, in turn, spoke to someone else who, then, spoke to Dulles of the OSS; there was no direct contact. And, yes, still other functionaries were talking to the Vatican.

So, there’s your 25%. Also, you forgot to mention Portugal. Really, none of this is some great mystery, it’s just that your sources apparently don’t like the rest of the story as it doesn’t fit their narrative.

And don’t ever forget, the Allies were reading the Japanese mail between embassies and the homeland, even with regard to these unofficial, unsanctioned contacts; not unlike the comedy in Sweden.

But you seem to wish to pass over that none, none, of these “discussions” were with the full weight and authority of the Japanese Government speaking officially to the Swiss Government or, even, the Pope. It was only after the Japanese Government officially decided to throw in the towel, long about 10 August 1945 that any OFFICIAL, government authority to government authority, messages were exchanged.

You may wish, though I doubt it, to peruse the US analysis of these contacts. May I suggest the link below where it is quite clear, regardless of what various Japanese functionaries were saying, that the US was aware that these discussions were unsanctioned. And as for Dulles talking to Simpson and Simpson to the President at Potsdam, you may wish to scroll down to starting at the memorandum of 13 July 1945. If you read, you quickly see that the Japanese were talking to a Swedish gent, in Switzerland, who was relaying discussion through some intermediary hence to Dulles. Hardly sounds like an official approach to a US representative with authority to take any action (and Dulles did not).

https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for- ... p_0001.htm

So, no, there were no official, sanctioned, or, even, credible, discussions going on in the Vatican, Switzerland, or Portugal.

You seem to forget that bitter, hard learned, experience, from before Pearl Harbor to the intercepted messages showing what was being said being said in various arenas, had taught the powers that were in the United States that the Japanese were not to be trusted in any way, shape or form. Unsanctioned discussions, belied by the Japanese’s own message traffic, simply added fuel to that fire. Why do you think the carriers of the 2d Fast Carrier Task Force were kept off shore during the period of the Japanese surrender? And that huge flyover? All those planes were armed to the teeth.

Operations officers for the 2d Fast Carrier Task Force . . . one of them later wrote in a missive, a copy of which is in my possession, to an author researching the days of the end of the war:

“To begin I’ll account for my whereabouts in the days of your interest. I was a brand-new fighter pilot in January 1941. Based on YORKTOWN CV-5 in June ’41, I put in a year on that ship until her sinking at Midway in Jun ’42. Chased German subs in the summer and fall of ’41 then went west after 7 Dec. Flew combat in various CV raids, Mandates, New Guinea etc. More combat in Coral Sea battle and Midway. Joined a new fighter squadron, VF-11, in Aug ’42; went to Guadalcanal for more combat. Returned stateside in the summer ’43 to help train and ready up new fighter squadrons for new carriers. In Nov ’44 was sent back to combat with orders to VAdm McCain’s staff. Remained in that assignment until Nov 1945.

“My assignment in VAdm McCain’s staff was air operations assistant to Capt John S Thach who was the operations boss running Task Force 38, the main combat element of Adm W F Halsey’s Third Fleet. My main job was to write up the operations orders that assigned and apportioned air missions and tasks to several - as many as five - task groups that made up the force. I worked with Thach on many other operations related tasks some of the most important being organizing air defenses, developing fighter employment and tactics to meet the Kamikaze threat. Also, there were new usages of our attack resources, switching away from warship targets to other objectives requiring dive bombing accuracy. For example, we were busy in July off Hokkaido working over steel plants, railroad ferries and dockside facilities.

“McCain’s flagship in the summer of ’45 was SHANGRI-LA CV-38 stationed with 3 - 4 other carriers in Task Group 38.1. Stationed also in this task group was Adm Halsey’s flagship, MISSOURI BB-63.

“This juxtaposition of the Fleet and Force flagships was important in that it permitted the two admirals to ‘talk’ to one another in a private way using a shielded signal lamp or by semaphore operated by trusted signalmen under the close scrutiny of each admiral’s ‘flag lieutenant,’ whose title really means something as far back in time as our Navy goes. This digression into the world of flag signals is made to afford understanding if how readily top commanders could speak and exchange ideas with some degree of privacy. It also explains why much of this type traffic never went into communications logs unless so directed. A pity because some of it was witty, informative, revealing and, in some cases, highly pertinent to the daily events. My admiral, McCain, was free in discussing such exchanges he considered useful to us operators, but we well understood that there was much we would never know. We knew we had his confidence by his every act, but we also were aware of his obligation to maintain Halsey’s privacy where affected.

“It was from just this type of exchange that I was alerted to the impending atomic bombing of Hiroshima. We had received normal radio notification of a special exercise (?) event (?) test (?) the heavy bombers had in prospect and adjusted our activities to keep our aircraft out of the proscribed areas. As we waited for something to happen, the Flag circuit was busy but unrevealing except for queries such as, ‘heard anything unusual yet?’ Both Halsey’s and McCain’s staffs had communications intelligence cells - experts who combed the radio spectrum for anything useful. Their targets were Japanese plain language radio programs as well as military tactical traffic and simple encryptions. The ‘real-time’ aspect of their ‘take’ was most useful to 3rd Fleet and fast carriers as we were at this time in a day to day employment trying to stifle Jap air capability and level any objectives that posed a threat to the Olympic invasion operations planned for the near future.

“In hindsight I readily believe that Halsey and McCain were aware of the Manhattan effort and were thinking it was about time for a product to issue. So, with the unusual orders to keep clear of several Japanese cities they were following the radio chatter intently. Thus, contrary to what others may have written, the carrier admirals were not taken by complete surprise, at least not the ones nearest to me in Task Force 38 when ‘the balloon went up’ that day in August 1945.

“Those were perilous times. Even though the war seemed to be winding down elsewhere, it was a real and savage thing the closer we came to the Japanese home islands. The nature of our employment forced increased exposure of ships and air people to the desperate defenders. A guided missile par excellance, the Kamikaze was breaking into our defenses; we were scrambling to counteract this smart bomb and were wildly extended as we came in close. Our best defense lay in attacking Kamikaze bases where we were fairly successful, but one escapee could give us fits and fatalities. To do our job we had to stand and take it. Worst of all it looked as though the Japanese were equipped and willing to go on indefinitely. The Japanese Navy has ceased to be a military factor, so we could concentrate on softening up the enemy for the final acts of the war. But this softening, a dangerous but unglamorous affair was costly, especially in flight-leader losses.

“I mentioned the warnings and restricted area orders incident to the Hiroshima bombing. I vaguely remember similar orders, or maybe one order covering all, when the time came for Nagasaki. There were instructions issued to us to also keep clear of Kyoto, a shrine city, though for no memorable reason. Anyway, the fast carriers were not likely to go urban unless specifically ordered. The one example of that specific I clearly recall was in a CINCPAC order which forwarded intelligence on electronics plants in the Tokyo area. There were photos and descriptions of plants suitable for and best attacked with dive bomber accuracy rather than B-29 area blasting. Some familiar names: Shibaura, Hitachi, Matsushita, Toshiba, I can remember. It was my job to develop and send the objective folders with rationale out to the task groups. We do this job in good heart as these plants were producing radar and electronic controls that had been increasing our flak losses. In the end, this campaign was to be OBE, but we felt good about it.

“Army Air and fast carriers coordinated their campaigns enough to avoid interference. Our objectives were usually outside their areas and vice versa. I cannot remember any hurt feelings. I have no strong recollections of geographic restrictions being onerous. They were something like the weather - you just planned around it and eventually things would clear up. The significant differences between B-29 operations and fast carriers helped to keep interference a small factor. In the Philippines where we had to coordinate with TacAir the possibilities for friction were greater but that did not apply over Japan in the summer of ’45.

“The account I have given here comes as that of a carrier fighter pilot in the summer of 1945 serving on the staff of CTF-38. My duty did not permit flying over hostile terrain at that time there was solace in having much to do with throwing the book at the Japs as my admiral applied his force to defeat them and end the war.

“The staff was not very large - Vice Admiral, Rear Admiral, 2 captains, 2 commanders, 5 lieutenant commanders (I was the senior of them), some 8 to 9 lieutenants, maybe 10-12 lower ranks. As far as I know one of the commanders and I are the only ones left who were career navy - he USNA ’35 and I USNA ’38. We both had about the same amount of air experience, I joined the staff in November 1944 and he - now Adm Noel A M Gayler USN (Ret) - joined in April 1945.

“TF-38 operations attending the 2 September signing of the instruments of surrender on board USS MISSOURI - For reasons of prudence it was decided to have the fast carriers remain off shore fully operational during the uncertain period of this event. A photograph I have of the ceremony signed by Adm Nimitz shows clearly the many attendees. There are all the senior officers of the TF-38 staff - McCain, Towers, Baker, Gingrich, Thach, and Hearn. At the same time there was Task Force 38 off shore operating as usual. We launched 450 of our battle proven planes to fly formation over the ceremony, over Tokyo, and back to sea. The task force in the absence of its leaders carried on. Later that wondrous day, when Noel and I had a chance to think and talk, we found ourselves abashed yet proud in the realization that our admirals had left us with the big stick, the exercise of the main military power at the scene should it have been needed. For us, two fighter pilots who had been in action from the earliest days it was a rousing way to end that fight.”

You're using a CIA link on this issue? Anyway, I'm guessing you still have not read Toland's discussion on the Japanese peace feelers. As Toland documents, it is incorrect to say they had no high-level backing and/or that no top leaders were aware of them. And you forgot to mention that after Dulles was approached about one of the peace feelers, he spoke with Henry Stimson.

Yes, we were reading the Japanese diplomatic cables, etc., and from them we knew that the emperor wanted to surrender and that the only obstacle was our demand for unconditional surrender. Our knowledge from the intercepts is powerful evidence that we did not need to nuke Japan to end the war without an invasion. As many advisers and others told Truman, all we had to do was give Japan some assurance about the emperor's status in an unconditional surrender. It is crystal clear from the record that this assurance would have destroyed the hardliners' main argument against surrender and would have made it possible for the moderates to prevail well before we used nukes.

For those who might be interested, I've uploaded an article on Truman's decision to nuke Japan.

http://miketgriffith.com/files/immoraluse.pdf

(Note: I make no money off the article. It is available free of charge. And, I do not have advertising on my website, and I get no compensation from anyone for my website.)

[OpanaPointer]

LOL

[Takao]

For those who might be interested, I've uploaded an article on Truman's decision to nuke Japan.

http://miketgriffith.com/files/immoraluse.pdf

(Note: I make no money off the article. It is available free of charge. And, I do not have advertising on my website, and I get no compensation from anyone for my website.)

Perhaps you should post more like this one...
The Greatest Hoax In American History: Japan’s Alleged Willingness to Surrender During the Final Months of World War II
https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/52502

[OpanaPointer]

The retrofitting of current knowledge to past events is just sad.

[wm]

The Potsdam Declaration (the Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender) had been announced twenty days before the surrender and it's known as a fact it delayed it by a few days at best.

[OpanaPointer]

The Potsdam Declaration (the Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender) had been announced twenty days before the surrender and it's known as a fact it delayed it by a few days at best.

Togo Shigenori's The Cause of Japan is a good read on that. Togo was 外務大臣 (Gaimu Daijin) in Dec. 1941, and again in August 1946.

[R Leonard]

Mike -

You have to stop pretending we are all un-read dolts. You only tell about 25 to 40 percent of the story every time you post. And your website, which I've seen, as a counterpoint source is by far worse than your implied criticism of the the CIAs posting of actual period document texts, it is, in fact, a joke. Tell us the whole story, 100%, supported by actual documentation (which some of us have been trying to show you), not just the pieces parts and opinions you like which permeate your regurgitations of the Hiroshima Cult's nonsense.

And just to make you feel better, surprise, I have read Toland, he's right over there on the shelf . . . I suggest you read him again, in the entirety rather than depend on some other cultist's "it's in Toland" before you try to scare the unwary, dare I say, the unread, with demands they take up a 877 page tome (at least that's the length of my 1970 edition). I especially recommend starting on page 741 to the bitter end. Toland makes a point of writing how the peace efforts were unsanctioned and unauthorized . . . sorry if that does not fit your story. And more tellingly he says on page 756:

"While these scattered efforts went on, the Japanese militarists completed their final plans for suicidal defense of the homeland- Operation Decision (KETSU-GO). More than ten thousand planes - most of the them hastily converted trainers - had been collected. Two thirds of these would be thrown into the battle for Kyushu; the rest would be reserved to repel any landing near Tokyo. In the face of the bloody lessons of Tarawa and Saipan, the plan was to crush the Americans on the beaches with fifty-three infantry divisions and twenty-five brigades - a total of 2,350,000 troops. These would be backed by almost 4,000,0000 Army and Navy civilian employees, a special garrison force of 250,000, and a 28,000,000 civilian militia. This last mammoth force would evolve from the national volunteer military service law for men from fifteen to sixty and women from seventeen to forty-five which had been unanimously passed at the final Diet session. The military spokesmen, whose impressive testimony had ensured passage of the bill, later showed Suzuki and his cabinet a display of the weapons that would be used by the volunteers: muzzle loading rifles and bamboo sticks cut into spears stacked beside bows and arrows from feudal times.

Oh yeah, they were chomping at the bit to surrender . . . guess you missed that part . . . have YOU read Toland?

[OpanaPointer]

I used to use a sharpie to remove citations to Toland when I was grading papers.

[mikegriffith1]

Some people continue to claim that the Japanese peace feelers were all meaningless low-level approaches with no high-level support. There is an enormous amount of scholarship that refutes this claim. I will summarize some of the facts documented in that scholarship.

-- In April 1945, none other than Mamoru Shigemitsu, Japan’s Foreign Minister at the
time, approached the Swedish minister to Japan and asked if Sweden would be willing
to mediate a surrender agreement with the U.S. Now, I would say that a peace feeler done by Japan’s Foreign Minister was both official and very high level.

Shigemitsu’s effort did not succeed, but that was only because his successor, Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, believed that a more powerful intermediary should be approached. Togo did not object to the approach on principle, but only to the proposed intermediary. Togo suggested that the Soviets be approached to mediate a surrender with the U.S.

-- Another peace feeler was carried out in Berne, Switzerland, by Yoshiro Fujimura, the Japanese naval attache in Berne, and had the backing of Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, the Navy Minister; General Shuichi Miyazaki, the Chief of Operations; and Admiral Sokichi Takagi, who even offered to fly to Switzerland to open formal negotiations. On May 3, three months before Hiroshima, Dr. Heck, the German intermediary in the approach, was informed by the office of Allen Dulles that the U.S. State Department had authorized direct negotiations with the Fujimura group. Allen Dulles was the head of the OSS office in Switzerland and had numerous high connections, including in the White House.

Fujimura contacted the Navy Ministry and made them aware of his negotiations with the Dulles people. On May 23, the Navy Ministry sent Fujimura a reply, signed by the Navy Minister: the ministry advised him to be cautious but did *not* shut down the approach.

Yonai then informed Foreign Minister Togo of the negotiations, and Togo authorized Yonai to have the Fujimura group explore the Dulles proposal more thoroughly.

So the claim that the approach to Dulles was some meaningless low-level effort that had no backing in Tokyo is demonstrably incorrect. The hardliners eventually succeeded in killing the Fujimura approach to Dulles, but it was not a meaningless effort with no high-level support.

We know that on June 4, two months before Hiroshima, Truman received a report on this peace feeler. The report stated that the Fujimura people “particularly stress” the need to maintain the emperor in any surrender in order “to avoid Communism and chaos.” The report added that Fujimura had emphasized the fact that Japan could no longer supply herself with “essential foodstuffs,” i.e., the people were beginning to starve.

On June 22, Truman received another memo on the Fujimura-Dulles peace talks. The memo advised him that “Fujimura insists that the Japanese, before surrendering, would require assurances that the Emperor would be retained.”

So Truman knew, long before Hiroshima, that the only real obstacle to a surrender was his refusal to assure the Japanese that the emperor would not be deposed if they surrendered.

-- The second peace feeler in Switzerland involved General Seigo Okamoto, the Japanese military attache in Berne, and two Japanese officials at the International Bank of Settlements in Basel. Not only was Okamoto a general and the head of the Japanese attache office in Berne, he was a close friend of General Yoshijiru Omezu’s, the Japanese Army Chief of Staff. This feeler also involved Per Jacobsson, a Swiss bank director. This was not Jacobsson’s first involvement with back-door peace negotiations: he had persuaded De Valera to negotiate with the British in 1935.

This approach was made to Gero Gaevernitz, Dulles’s second-in-command, and to Dulles himself. Gaevernitz was no stranger to back-door negotiations either: he had recently masterminded the surrender of all German forces in Italy.

When Jacobsson met with Dulles and Gaevernitz, he told them that the Japanese moderates were doing their best to bring about a surrender but that the Allied demand for unconditional surrender was greatly helping the hardliners. Jacobsson further told Dulles that the only real Japanese condition for surrender was that the emperor not be deposed. Following this meeting, Dulles placed a call to Potsdam.

We also know that on July 13, nearly a month before Hiroshima, Dulles sent a message about his contact with Jacobsson to Potsdam in which he advised that it had been indicated to him that “the only condition on which Japan would insist with respect to surrender would be some consideration for the Japanese Imperial family.”

William Donovan, the head of the OSS, sent a follow-up message to Truman on July 16 about the Dulles-Jacobsson meeting and stated that Jacobsson advised that Japanese officials had stressed only two conditions for surrender, namely, that the emperor be retained and that there be the “possibility” of retaining the Meiji Constitution.

-- Furthermore, Emperor Hirohito himself authorized the effort to get the Soviets to mediate a surrender with the U.S., and Truman was aware of this fact from Foreign Minister Togo’s July 12 cable. Hirohito even wanted to send Prince Konoye to Moscow as a special envoy to get the Soviets to mediate a surrender deal with the U.S. I’d say that a peace feeler pushed by the Foreign Minister and strongly backed by Emperor Hirohito was about as substantial, official, and high ranking as you could get.

These peace feelers, and others, are discussed in detail by John Toland in The Rising Sun, by Lester Brooks in Behind Japan’s Surrender, and by Gar Alperovitz in The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb.

Incidentally, the U.S. State Department’s Office of the Historian website includes an article on the Japanese peace feelers, and it documents that American high officials were aware of these efforts:

The contents of certain of these papers [Japanese messages and memos about the peace feelers] were known to United States officials in Washington, however, as early as July 13 (see Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries(New York, 1951), page 74; cf. pages 75–76) and information on Japanese peace maneuvers was received by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson at Babelsberg on July 16 (see volume II, document No. 1236, footnote 4). It has also been determined that a series of messages of Japanese origin on this subject was received by the United States Delegation during the course of the Berlin Conference and that these messages were circulated at Babelsberg to some members of the President’s party. Furthermore, in a conference on January 24, 1956, between Truman and members of his staff and Department of State historians, Truman supplied the information that he was familiar with the contents of the first Japanese peace feeler (i. e., the proposal contained in document No. 582) before Stalin mentioned it to him at Babelsberg (see volume II, page 87) and that he was familiar with the contents of the second Japanese peace feeler (i. e., the approach reported in document No. 1234) before Stalin brought it to the attention of Truman and Attlee at the Tenth Plenary Meeting of the Berlin Conference on July 28 (see volume II, page 460).

[ljadw]

All this is denying the truth which is that US wanted an unconditional surrender. not peace negotiations, something Japan knew very well ,Japan knew that it was in no position to issue demands : a conditional surrender was out of the question, and Japan knew it , it also knew that it had lost and that there was only one option : to surrender at the mercy of the allies.
Japan refused to do it and has only itself to blame .
The allies had demanded unconditional surrender from Germany and got it , it was out of the question that Japan could expect a more lenient treatment .

[OpanaPointer]

And the Gaimudiajin never gave their ambassadors anything to work with. It was like they were telling their people in foreign countries to keep trying while telling the military "we're not trying to surrender!" This is quite clear from the Magic intercepts.

[paulrward]

Hello All ;

The Original Poster on this thread, Mr hselassi , asked the theoretical question:

One thing I have always wondered about, if there was no atomic bomb, why not just besiege Japan?

Well, on the morning of July 17th, 1945, there WAS an atomic Bomb, and the United States posessed it. This means that the U.S had FIVE viable options for dealing with Japan:


1. Drop the Big One -- Begin dropping Atomic Bombs on Japan unitl the Emperor either ran out of courage or ran out of Japanese.

2. Invasion - Impose a Naval Blockade on Japan, continue the Conventional Bombing Campaign, and then carry out a gruesome, bloody and destructive Invasion of Japan.

3. Blockade and Bombardment - Impose a Naval Blockade on Japan, continue the Conventional Bombing Campaign, and wait until starvation and death from the air cause the Emperor to either run out of courage or run out of Japanese.

4. Just Blockade - Impose a Naval Blockade on Japan, without the Conventional Bombing Campaign, and hope that starvation could force a surrender.
........or........
5. Let Joe Do It ! - Allow the Russians to invade Japan, and let Stalin know that, as long as he was willing to do the heavy lifting, whatever hellish nightmares he wanted to inflict on the Japanese were just FINE with the government of the United States .


On the other hand, for the Japanese, the options were fewer:

1. Surrender - Agree to the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, surrender unconditionally, and supinely accept the humiliation of defeat and the overthrow of their government and their tradtions, as well as being forced to witness the utter ignomy of foreign occupation of their country.

2. Fight to the Death - Fight on while being Naval Blockaded and Bombed, and then fight to the death when they were ultimately invaded. This has the advantage of allowing the leadership of Japan to avoid having to witness all of the above results of Japanese Option 1, but has the slight drawback that nearly every single Japanese will be...... dead......

3. Stall for time. Instruct the Military to continue to build up what defenses are possible under the circumstances of a crippling blockade and a devastating air bombardment, and at the same time dangle peace feelers in front of the Allies in the hopes that the Allies will, by some miracle, either accept them, or hold off on the Invasion for a sufficient period of time that the United States and Great Britain get bored and go do something else.


Now, here's the problem: For the Japanese, Options (2) and (3) ONLY work if there is NO Atomic Bomb. If there IS an Atomic Bomb, then there is no need for a Blockade or an Invasion, and defeating Japan becomes the simple matter of enriching Plutonium, machining it into spheres, and then Truckin' 'em out to Tinian ! Under these conditions, the Japanese can stall all they want. After all, the big cost of the A Bomb was the development and the industrial plant to make them. Once the U.S. had those, they could just turn them out like big, spherical orange sausages, and let the Japanese have one or two a week until they ran out of Japanese.


Despite all the talk of back channel diplomatic offers, decoded messages, and Imperial Cabinet maneuvering, it came down to this:

1. The Japanese Were Stalling. They were refusing to Surrender.

2. The United States developed THE BOMB. They told Japan they had THE BOMB , and ordered the Japanese to Surrender.

3. The Japanese continued to Stall

4. The United States DROPPED THE BOMB on Japan !

5. Japan continued to Stall.

6. The United States Dropped a SECOND BOMB on Japan !

7. Japan SURRENDERED.




So, again, " Why not Besiege Japan ? " Very simply, because the U.S. didn't have to, and they didn't want to.....


Respectfully :

Paul R. Ward

[OpanaPointer]

For people who just jumped in, a siege would have been deadlier to the Japanese population than anything else. They were already "chewing dirt and eating grass", and the very young and the very old were dying from starvation. It would get worse the longer the war went on.