Why not "besiege" Japan?

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi hselassi,

Of course the colonial powers cared about the millions of Asians in their empires, if only because they were economic assets.

It might interest you to know that, while the British made differential decisions that had much to do with the severity of the Bengal Famine in 1943, they also developed the Bengal Famine Mix. While this was originally intended to help their Indian subjects recover from starvation, it was also used to help the inmates of Dachau recover.

Finally, if the British were completely insensitive to the well being and needs of their Raj subjects, how was it that there were approximately three times as many inhabitants of the sub-continent when the British left as there had been when they had established themselves two centuries earlier?

There is much British rule in India has to answer for, but let's not exaggerate this.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Rob Stuart]

One thing I have always wondered about, if there was no atomic bomb, why not just besiege Japan?

They did besiege Japan - and it worked. By the end of July 1945 the Japanese merchant marine was almost entirely sunk or disabled, Japan's harbours were blocked by mines which could not be cleared, the ferries between the home islands were being destroyed, etc. If there had been no atomic bomb, then Hiroshima and Nagasaki would have been destroyed by conventional bombing, as Tokyo was. I grant you that the shock of realizing that the US had a weapon as powerful as an atomic bomb would be absent, but the Soviets would still have entered the war, and their entry was probably as important as the atomic bombings, given that the Japanese had been hoping to use the Soviets as intermediaries in coming to a negotiated end to the war with the Allies. That was pretty much the last hope for avoiding unconditional surrender, and the Soviet entry into the war pulled that rug well and truly out from under them.

It very possible that even in the absence of the two atomic bombings the Japanese may well have surrendered in August 1945. However, in the event that they didn't, the Allies were not going to just starve them out. From their point of view, that was likely to take far too long. The Allies did not simply want to win, they wanted to win as quickly as they could. The blockade of Japan was seen as an aid to invasion not a replacement for it. I would remind you that, in Europe, even people who thought Germany could have been defeated by heavy bombers alone foresaw a need for landing an army to liberate Western Europe and occupy Germany.

[OpanaPointer]

The Japanese never had hopes of gaining a Soviet intermediary. The ambassadors made request after request for instructions on this and didn't get anything to work with from the Gaimushō.

[Rob Stuart]

The Japanese never had hopes of gaining a Soviet intermediary. The ambassadors made request after request for instructions on this and didn't get anything to work with from the Gaimushō.

I think that your second sentence is correct, but I'm not sure about your first. If you mean that "Tokyo wanted to enlist Moscow as an intermediary but there was never any chance that this was going to happen", then I would agree. Is this what you mean?

[OpanaPointer]

The Japanese never had hopes of gaining a Soviet intermediary. The ambassadors made request after request for instructions on this and didn't get anything to work with from the Gaimushō.

I think that your second sentence is correct, but I'm not sure about your first. If you mean that "Tokyo wanted to enlist Moscow as an intermediary but there was never any chance that this was going to happen", then I would agree. Is this what you mean?

No, I meant that they never thought it was at all likely that Moscow would be an intermediary.

[LineDoggie]

As opposed to a million men dying by the thousands and shooting 12 year olds charging them with bamboo spears (that is Downfall in a nutshell)? I think I favor sitting around waiting to slaughter whatever death ride the remnants of the IJN is planning while bombing them into the stone age. As far as "Wouldn't work," why not (obviously it would not be tried per the political reasons stated earlier), name me a supportable siege in history that has not succeeded (even non-supportable sieges like Caesar in Gaul sometimes work) as long as the political will existed to carry them through.

Not the Hundred years war and no one ever besieged a nation the size of Japan

UK was financially on its last legs in 45 and manpower wise was used up
USA was also running out of men and the we could not afford to keep 29 army divisions 6 marine divisions and the fleets for a decade sitting outside Japanese range waiting for them to get bored and surrender. The men wanted to go home (My father for one had been in uniform since 1940 and already had been to North Africa, Sicily, Normandy, North West Europe and Germany. And now his division was slated to invade japan).

The government wanted the war to end and quickly

[hselassi]

no one ever besieged a nation the size of Japan

Actually, we did for a couple of months, I am saying we should have planned to do it for two years rather than embark on Downfall.

UK was financially on its last legs in 45 and manpower wise was used up
USA was also running out of men and the we could not afford to keep 29 army divisions 6 marine divisions and the fleets for a decade sitting outside Japanese range waiting for them to get bored and surrender. The men wanted to go home (My father for one had been in uniform since 1940 and already had been to North Africa, Sicily, Normandy, North West Europe and Germany. And now his division was slated to invade japan).

The government wanted the war to end and quickly

As stated above, you are correct that political calculations forced Downfall and its accompanying bloodshed, but the siege would not be a decade sitting around, but two years of bombing and shelling (actually about a year and a half from VE day). The Japanese knew we planned to invade and were gambling on our political aversion to loss of life (they even expected to get nuked four more times in '45/46) to get us to cut them a favorable deal. The entry of the Soviets in the war ended that calculation since loss of life was not an issue for Stalin, so, with or without nukes, the Japanese would have surrendered to the W Allies by Sept 45 at the latest to keep the Soviets away. My original question, already answered (political and electoral calculations), was why not plan continue the siege until '47 (as stated previously, that would be the point of societal collapse) and remove the hope of a glorious (and costly for the W Allies) final campaign for the Japanese High Command, rather than go with Downfall and the hope of a favorable settlement.

[Takao]

1947?

Should be 1948-49, as was estimated by US planners. Starvation deaths were not expected to begin until late-46 or mid-47, before becoming widespread in 1948. Before, hopefully, Japan threw in the towel.

That was the main problem with the blockade, it offered no guarantee of Japan's surrender in a timely fashion. Much the same was said about the bombing campaign. Only Invasion was seen as reliably bringing about a Japanese surrender.

[OpanaPointer]

A siege, for any other purpose than prolonging the war and increasing deaths, was not going to happen.

[hselassi]

1947?

Should be 1948-49, as was estimated by US planners. Starvation deaths were not expected to begin until late-46 or mid-47, before becoming widespread in 1948. Before, hopefully, Japan threw in the towel.

That was the main problem with the blockade, it offered no guarantee of Japan's surrender in a timely fashion. Much the same was said about the bombing campaign. Only Invasion was seen as reliably bringing about a Japanese surrender.

Actually, do you have a source for that?

The only source I ever found for the siege scenario was an essay in one of the British history magazines (I don't remember which one) that did an A-bomb special in 2005. There it listed the expected results of the then current siege operations, Downfall, and the A-bombs. The siege had a death toll of around 30% (including post surrender irrecoverables) and societal collapse in late '47, but it did not go into specifics or sources.

It would be nice to see something meatier.

[Takao]

1947?

Should be 1948-49, as was estimated by US planners. Starvation deaths were not expected to begin until late-46 or mid-47, before becoming widespread in 1948. Before, hopefully, Japan threw in the towel.

That was the main problem with the blockade, it offered no guarantee of Japan's surrender in a timely fashion. Much the same was said about the bombing campaign. Only Invasion was seen as reliably bringing about a Japanese surrender.

Actually, do you have a source for that?

The only source I ever found for the siege scenario was an essay in one of the British history magazines (I don't remember which one) that did an A-bomb special in 2005. There it listed the expected results of the then current siege operations, Downfall, and the A-bombs. The siege had a death toll of around 30% (including post surrender irrecoverables) and societal collapse in late '47, but it did not go into specifics or sources.

It would be nice to see something meatier.

A great many of the books that discuss the decision to drop the Atomic Bomb on Japan delve into a blockade of Japan, and we have discussed a blockade of Japan many times on this forum - usually in threads about the decision to drop Atom Bombs on Japan. I cannot say that I have seen one book dedicated to a blockade of Japan though.

This article does call into question the impending starvation of Japan.
journals.wichita.edu/index.php/ff/article/viewFile/62/69

Another good read would be "Defeating Japan: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Strategy in the Pacific War" by Charles F. Brower.

[ROLAND1369]

Aside from the doubtful outcome of the siege concept. Japanes soldiers were already in the starvation mode and dying in significent numbers, on the bypassed islands, without any sign of surrender. This siege concept ignores the human and economic element on the Allied side. Both the civilian populace and the soldiers were tired of war. There had already been small scale mutinys ion the allied camp and the allies, particularly the English, were short of both money and replacement soldiers. The US was also running short of enthusiasm due to increased casualty rat of the battle of the bulge. I would forsee severe morale problems in political, homefront, and the military should the war have lasted untill 1948-49. I have severe doubts even the US would have been able to retain 6 million men under arms that long.

[Laurence Strong]

Probably because people were sick and tired after 5 years of global war and wanted to finish it.............might seem a little simplistic....but think about it......



Cheers
Larry

[bladerunner69]

Personally, I would rather like this besiege scenario than the historical one

Japan was finished
- all cities / industries crumbing under Allied bombs
- the oilfields were cut from Japan once the US invaded the Philippines and once US subs fixed their dud torpedoes issues
- the Russian were about to spank har don the Japanese in China

It would have saved the world from the horror of the A-bomb which probably killed half a million civilian taking into account the effects of the radiation. what a crime !

On the other hand, the Japanese command were may be ready to fight to the last man. How many people would have died ?
May be killing Tojo and other leaders of the dictatorship with a commando would be enough to get a surrender or a coup ?

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi bladerunner,

I very much doubt that it would have saved the world from the A Bomb, just Hiroshima and Nagasaki. For example, only a few years later, MacArthur wanted to use it against the Chinese after they entered Korea.

Nor, I suspect, would not using it have saved Japanese lives under either the invasion or siege scenarios.

And how do you explain to all the Allied soldiers fighting the Japanese why they should be put at further risk to save Japanese lives?

The A Bomb was horrible, but it was perhaps the "least worst" option available - certainly for Allied servicemen and very possibly for the Japanese.

Cheers,

Sid.