Best Allied PTO strategy?

Discussions on WW2 in the Pacific and the Sino-Japanese War.
rcocean
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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Post by rcocean » 14 Feb 2019 02:09

The best USA strategy would've been to get 100 percent behind MacArthur's thrust toward Rabaul and then on to the Philippines. With only a fraction of the shipping/men/aircraft used in the useless invasion of North Africa, Mac probably could've taken Rabaul in January 1943.

The USA could've then leap-frogged up the N.G. coast before invading Mindoro in the fall of 1943. This would've brought the Japanese fleet to a decisive battle and defeat. After taking Mindoro, the USA could've established bases and cut the Japanese off from ALL Oil and bauxite from the Southern Region. The Japanese aircraft production would've cratered. After taking Manila the next step would've been to leap-frog past Formosa to Okinawa. Once airbases were established there, Japan's defeat was certain.

Unfortunately, FDR took a "Italy First" path in 1942, and a great opportunity was lost. Later, a chance to speed up the Pacific war was also lost when Admiral King disregarded the advice of Halsey and Nimitz and insisted on attacking Saipan and Guam instead of moving forward to the Philippines.

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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Post by ChristopherPerrien » 15 Feb 2019 18:28

rcocean wrote:
14 Feb 2019 02:09
The best USA strategy would've been to get 100 percent behind MacArthur's thrust toward Rabaul and then on to the Philippines. With only a fraction of the shipping/men/aircraft used in the useless invasion of North Africa, Mac probably could've taken Rabaul in January 1943.

The USA could've then leap-frogged up the N.G. coast before invading Mindoro in the fall of 1943. This would've brought the Japanese fleet to a decisive battle and defeat. After taking Mindoro, the USA could've established bases and cut the Japanese off from ALL Oil and bauxite from the Southern Region. The Japanese aircraft production would've cratered. After taking Manila the next step would've been to leap-frog past Formosa to Okinawa. Once airbases were established there, Japan's defeat was certain.

Unfortunately, FDR took a "Italy First" path in 1942, and a great opportunity was lost. Later, a chance to speed up the Pacific war was also lost when Admiral King disregarded the advice of Halsey and Nimitz and insisted on attacking Saipan and Guam instead of moving forward to the Philippines.
Hi that rocean, i'll do a mellow reply, since I got an alert to this topic, which of course has already been done here before this topic,

As it was The Central Thrust won the Pacific war and MacArthur's "Southern Strategy " was simply an advance to nowhere, and a side-show. Besides MacArthur received more than ample support in Australia and that can be judged by seeing as he did not come back to the USA and run against FDR in the next presidential election . Realize the island hopping campaign only could go so fast as his amphibious forces took islands to allow and wait for the next airbase construction to cover the advance as it went , all the way back to the Philippines , And even with MacArthur having the largest fleet in the history of the world , still was struck battling in out the Philippines , when the Central advance had done taken Okinawa beside already having guaranteed ending the war with taking the bomber bases in the Marianas and an emergency landing strip on Iwo jima for the B-29's so we would not lose too many of them while bombing Japan into submission, besides starving them with subs.

To get into a few details of MacArthur's "island hopping" campaign , no matter what "support" , there were going to be restrictions on landing craft because there had to be a buildup for D-Day, whether it being "Round-up" in 43 or "Neptune" in 44. and the nature of the warfare in the Pacific with the coral atolls , called for LTV's which were a USMC invention and it took X amount of time to get those into full scale production so anyone could get them and of course the Marines got first dibs on the first few simply because they were their "idea" and full development of them really did not take place until seeing the results of Tarawa. After that Mac's Southern force with the later models , the island hopping campaign really 'took off' , since those LTV's could and did swim up to about 50 miles between islands, sans being carried by ships. I suggest "To Foreign Shores" for an understanding of the details and how the logistics of the southern strategy went after the 'Central Force' took Guadalcanal and the "Army' started taking islands after that and the way up to the 'Army', along with MacArthur and his PR team, re-taking the Philippines , which still was not quite done all the way by August 45. But truly, after Guadalcanal and Coral Sea and the Solomon's battles, which stopped the Japanese advance, MacArthur and his entire involvement and all the support and miliatry forces and his whole "Southern advance' were simply not needed . Nothing was needed except the advance to and taking Saipan and retaking Guam, and Iwo Jima , after that the B-29's and US subs, finished the war.

Regards,

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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Post by rcocean » 15 Feb 2019 21:59

You have it completely wrong. The invasion of Saipan and Guam accomplished nothing other than the establishment of bases for the B-29s. However, the B-29 raids didn't accomplish anything until March 1945 - just before we invaded Okinawa. The Key to the Pacific War was the invasion of Leyte. This was such an important spot, the Japanese sacrificed almost their entire Fleet in order to stop it. As one Japanese Admiral put it "The loss of the Philippines meant the loss of the Oil needed to keep the fleet operational." Once Japan was cut off from Bauxite and Oil - it was doomed. Guam and Saipan didn't accomplish that. In fact, King thought of these islands as primarily a jumping off point for the invasion of Formosa. That's why all the Pacific Admirals supported MacArthur's invasion and were dubious of wasting our time going after Guam.

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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Post by Takao » 17 Feb 2019 02:32

rcocean wrote:
15 Feb 2019 21:59
You have it completely wrong. The invasion of Saipan and Guam accomplished nothing other than the establishment of bases for the B-29s. However, the B-29 raids didn't accomplish anything until March 1945 - just before we invaded Okinawa.
Completely wrong is he? I don't think so.

The loss of Saipan caused the fall of Tojo's government...Who was the leader of the Japanese government that collapsed when the Philippines fell?


rcocean wrote:
15 Feb 2019 21:59
The Key to the Pacific War was the invasion of Leyte. This was such an important spot, the Japanese sacrificed almost their entire Fleet in order to stop it.
What was that big to-do in the Marianas in '44...The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot. The Japanese literally sacrificed their entire carrier air arm in that battle.

rcocean wrote:
15 Feb 2019 21:59
As one Japanese Admiral put it "The loss of the Philippines meant the loss of the Oil needed to keep the fleet operational." Once Japan was cut off from Bauxite and Oil - it was doomed. Guam and Saipan didn't accomplish that.
Unfortunately, neither did the Philippines. The Japanese import of crude oil had already dropped precipitously before the Philippines were invaded.

rcocean wrote:
15 Feb 2019 21:59
In fact, King thought of these islands as primarily a jumping off point for the invasion of Formosa. That's why all the Pacific Admirals supported MacArthur's invasion and were dubious of wasting our time going after Guam.
The Pacific Admirals did not initially support Dugout Dug's complete capture of the entire Philippine archipelago, what the Admirals did support was the capture of a few of the Philippine Islands before moving on to Formosa/Taiwan. There were also more than a few Army Generals that supported bypassing the Philippines.

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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Post by rcocean » 21 Feb 2019 00:36

The loss of Saipan caused the fall of Tojo's government...Who was the leader of the Japanese government that collapsed when the Philippines fell?
So what? Sads for Mr. Tojo - but Japan kept on fighting. I won't even rebut the rest of your "pushback". I'm not into rhetorical arguments. And yes, Nimitz and Spruance didn't approve of Mac's "plan" to invade the "Entire Philippines" primarily because there was NEVER a "Plan" in 1944 and when MacArthur stated he was going to liberate various islands other than Leyte and Luzon - Marshall gave him the go-ahead in March 1945. One of the weirdest things is reading Morrison stating in the US naval history that "The JSC never gave MacArthur approval to liberate the entire Philippines" - except they did. You can read it in Marshall's cable to MacArthur in March 1945.

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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Post by Hanny » 21 Feb 2019 10:52

rcocean wrote:
14 Feb 2019 02:09
The best USA strategy would've been to get 100 percent behind MacArthur's thrust toward Rabaul and then on to the Philippines. With only a fraction of the shipping/men/aircraft used in the useless invasion of North Africa, Mac probably could've taken Rabaul in January 1943.

The USA could've then leap-frogged up the N.G. coast before invading Mindoro in the fall of 1943. This would've brought the Japanese fleet to a decisive battle and defeat. After taking Mindoro, the USA could've established bases and cut the Japanese off from ALL Oil and bauxite from the Southern Region. The Japanese aircraft production would've cratered. After taking Manila the next step would've been to leap-frog past Formosa to Okinawa. Once airbases were established there, Japan's defeat was certain.

Unfortunately, FDR took a "Italy First" path in 1942, and a great opportunity was lost. Later, a chance to speed up the Pacific war was also lost when Admiral King disregarded the advice of Halsey and Nimitz and insisted on attacking Saipan and Guam instead of moving forward to the Philippines.
Not the place for what ifs, thats a different forum.
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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Post by Truckman » 21 Feb 2019 14:43

Hanny wrote:
21 Feb 2019 10:52
Not the place for what ifs, thats a different forum.
Just my opinion of course, but I don't think any historical strategy can be analyzed without taking into account other strategies which might have been considered at the same time... :idea: ...Ben

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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Post by Hanny » 21 Feb 2019 14:49

Truckman wrote:
21 Feb 2019 14:43
Hanny wrote:
21 Feb 2019 10:52
Not the place for what ifs, thats a different forum.
Just my opinion of course, but I don't think any historical strategy can be analyzed without taking into account other strategies which might have been considered at the same time... :idea: ...Ben
I agree, i was highlighting for him his hypocrisy in anther thread, post 160 viewtopic.php?f=33&t=236536


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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Post by LineDoggie » 19 May 2020 21:18

HMan wrote:
12 Apr 2018 01:30
In your view, what was the best Allied PTO strategy and why?

Was it:

A) The historic 2 prong drive in SW and Central Pacific
B) SW Pacific only
C) Central Pacific only

or

D) another strategy


Also, how did the historic strategy get developed? Most accounts I have
seen have been short, saying it was a product of Army / Navy compromises.

At least 2 sources I have seen give another story for at least certain points in time.

http://www.history.army.mil/books/70-7_21.htm

says that the Luzon Versus Formosa was more a Wash. DC vs. field COs in the PTO.



There was a conference in Jan. 1944 between Nimitz, Halsey, and MacArthur
representatives.

Strategic planning for coalition warfare, 1943-1944 by Maurice Matloff p. 455-57

had: "Most surprising feature was the general feeling that greater
emphasis should be placed upon naval / amphib ops along the New Guinea
axis to the Philippines rather than those across the Central Pacific."

So it implies that the USN COs in the PTO supported SW Pacific drive only,
at least at that point.
Too Vague not a one size fits all

SWPA
NPA
SPCPA

all very different circumstances
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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Post by Takao » 20 May 2020 03:52

One of HMan's rare bits of semi-coherent thought.
Rather contradictory, eh?

For first statement, per link, subs sunk 24 JMS ships in Jan. '43.
This before any major bases were captured. So more subs should
have strangled Japan faster.

For second statement, 1944 had almost double the losses of any
previous year and 1945 had just about the same losses as 1943.

Evidence for statement is non-existent.
Actually. It is not contradictory. But, your statement that more subs would have strangled Japan faster is.

For instance, Germany had more subs in 1943, than she did in in 1940. Yet, she only sank roughly the same number of ships. Just because you have More of "X" does not guarantee that you will also have more of "Y".

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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Post by David Thompson » 20 May 2020 04:25

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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Post by Takao » 20 May 2020 12:22

HMan,

2 years ago, I went on, at length and in detail, about US procurement & construction of submarines, US carriers inability to attack Japan's merchant shipping in the early years of the Pacific war, and Germany's construction of some 1,700 submarines that would be mostly useless in the Pacific(lack of range).

So...
How do you propose to increase US submarine construction?

How do you propose to handle the training of the many new crews?

How do you propose to increase torpedo construction?

How do you propose to safely use US carriers to get at Japanese merchant shipping?


Lot's of questions still no answers...

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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Post by LineDoggie » 22 May 2020 02:19

A point to be made is Torpedos were not the only ship killing weapon US Subs had.

Mines

http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WAMUS_Mine_Success.pdf
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Takao
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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Post by Takao » 22 May 2020 23:58

LineDoggie wrote:
22 May 2020 02:19
A point to be made is Torpedos were not the only ship killing weapon US Subs had.

Mines

http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WAMUS_Mine_Success.pdf
Problem is that JANAC credits only 5 ships of not quite 19,000 tons to submarine laid mines. Even adding another 10 or 20 ships to the good, does not drastically alter the fact the submarine mines achieved very little towards overall merchant sinkings. The major deployer of minefields that achieved the vast majority of mine-related sinkings was aircraft.

Further, the US did not really have a minelaying submarine class like the Germans & Japanese.

US submarines also had deck guns, the underpowered 3-inch & the overpowered 4-inch(shells often went completely through a merchant without detonating). It would be towards the end of the war that the perfect 5-inch/25 was available in quantity.

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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 09 Jun 2020 18:33

So far this discussion has moved along without consideration of logistics. Specifically the cost in precious cargo ships. Comparing the days per ton delivered a cargo ship is tied up suggests the SPac offensive is a undesireable option.

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