Best Allied PTO strategy?

Discussions on WW2 in the Pacific and the Sino-Japanese War.
HMan
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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Post by HMan » 20 Jun 2018 01:10

Takao,Takao,Takao: Mellow out.

Believe me, this subject isn't that important.
For us, this debate is not a matter of life or death.
The results of this contention will not cure cancer.

So cool it with the insults and the personal attacks.

I do have an on topic reply that responds to many
of your points. But I will not tolerate your boorish
rudeness.

Apologize for the unbelievable rudeness in your
posts. And promise to stick to the topic in the
future without viscous personal attacks.

Or else this will be my final post. Life is to short to
debate a troll who has not learned how to disagree
without being disagreeable.

aghart
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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Post by aghart » 20 Jun 2018 07:34

aghart wrote:We have the age old problem of hindsight once again. Looking at this decades later it's easy to say that the US and it's allies should have been defensive everywhere, just hold the Japanese and tie them down, and then strike in the Central Pacific and head for Japan, bypassing the Philippines altogether. Without the benefit of hindsight you have the problem of what happens if you put all your eggs in one basket and your basket dosen't work as expected? If your attacking on more than one axis and you struggle in one place you can switch your main thrust to where you are doing well. Also In war politics has a big part to play and politics and military strategy do not always sit well together. Putting hindsight to one side, then I would say that the US got it right in the PTO in WWII.
I would be interested in an expansion of your reasons for believing the Central Pacific was b





It is the unfair use of hindsight! The shortest and most direct route to Japan, Bring the war to an end with a Japanese surrender as per history, you then simply walk in and take over the area's occupied by the Japanese, just like the British did at Singapore. As I said though, without hindsight I think the US got it right.

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Takao
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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Post by Takao » 20 Jun 2018 18:39

HMan wrote:Takao,Takao,Takao: Mellow out.

Believe me, this subject isn't that important.
For us, this debate is not a matter of life or death.
The results of this contention will not cure cancer.

So cool it with the insults and the personal attacks.

I do have an on topic reply that responds to many
of your points. But I will not tolerate your boorish
rudeness.

Apologize for the unbelievable rudeness in your
posts. And promise to stick to the topic in the
future without viscous personal attacks.

Or else this will be my final post. Life is to short to
debate a troll who has not learned how to disagree
without being disagreeable.
My dear thin-skinned friend,

You have had plenty of time to refute the facts that I have posted, yet you continue not to do so. Now, you are playing the "Oh poor me" card in a continuing attempt to refrain from posting any meaningful refutation of stated fact.

If you want to pack up your toys and go home, that's entirely up to you. It doesn't matter to me. If you want to have a meaningful discussion, well, that's fine too, but please provide something more substantial than you have so far brought to the table - As you seem more intent on evading discussion rather than having one.

Apologize, for what, you lack of knowledge concerning the Pacific War? Shouldn't you be doing that?

David Thompson
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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Post by David Thompson » 25 Jul 2018 04:30

Gentlemen -- Let's drop the insulting personal remarks and get back to an informative, civil discussion.

nota
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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Post by nota » 18 Oct 2018 23:07

Sakhalin island north of japan
owned 1/2 by USSR and japan
the USA buy it for 100,000 trucks from USSR
we delivered 500k trucks to USSR
AND JAPAN AVOIDING ATTACKING USA SHIPPING FLAGGED BY THE REDS
so very possible to land troops and equipment unopposed AS LEND LEASE STUFF WAS
offer japan the same deal to keep neutral [after our troops are in place]
but they do NOT have 100k trucks we do so sorry

instant base to bomb japan with escorts
and take south 1/2 of the island
no need to island hop or naval battles except right there with port near by
short sub runs to blockade japan
even in DD DE or pt range for the north bit anyway
can we starve japan by 1943 late or 1944 early with food oil and raw materials total blockade + bombed out citys ?

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Kingfish
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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Post by Kingfish » 20 Oct 2018 14:31

nota wrote:
18 Oct 2018 23:07
AND JAPAN AVOIDING ATTACKING USA SHIPPING FLAGGED BY THE REDS
so very possible to land troops and equipment unopposed AS LEND LEASE STUFF WAS
Quick question: what does Russia gain by violating it's treaty with Japan?
What they would lose would be blindingly obvious.

As soon as the Japanese find out the US is using flagged vessels to support an occupation of North Sakhalin it would immediately impose a naval blockade and invasion- one that the US had no capability of resisting.
The gods do not deduct from a man's allotted span the hours spent in fishing.
~Babylonian Proverb

Carl Schwamberger
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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 28 Oct 2018 20:12

Kingfish wrote:
20 Oct 2018 14:31
... blockade and invasion- one that the US had no capability of resisting.
& neither did the Red Army. All this does is get the Siberian supply route from the US closed for several years.

Felix C
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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Post by Felix C » 30 Oct 2018 17:40

The SW Pacific drive did attrition a great deal of Japanese airpower away from the central campaign. I recall reading how Japanese Air Groups were sucked towards Rabaul as a never ending machine consumed those sent there. USN ships being more vulnerable than the US airfields it may have been a positive to do both campaigns. To this lay person, it does seem as if the central camp. made more sense if Japan was the goal and the SW approach if the Phillippines were the goal.

Perhaps an invasion of Japan proper requires such a huge floating logistical train. I visualize a Pacific Normandy but with Britain being replaced by 1000s of ships that it was not foreseen in 1943 (after the Japanese driven out of G.) 1944 (reduction of Rabaul).

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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 30 Dec 2018 02:05

Felix C wrote:
09 Jun 2018 01:02
Concerning the Central Pacific. Assuming CVs were the key, how many could be rendered serviceable to cancel or postpone an offensive? Fortunately no Japanese submarine or patrol bomber was able to score against the fleet carriers as in earlier in the war.
Takao wrote:
09 Jun 2018 01:40
Felix C wrote:Concerning the Central Pacific. Assuming CVs were the key, how many could be rendered serviceable to cancel or postpone an offensive? Fortunately no Japanese submarine or patrol bomber was able to score against the fleet carriers as in earlier in the war.
It would probably vary from invasion to invasion.

For the Gilbert's invasion, there were 6 fleet carriers, 6 light carriers, 8 CVEs, and 12 battleships.

So, several would likely have to be sunk to scrub an invasion.
In this Gilberts campaign one CVE, the Liscombe Bay, was lost with 800 crew. Since the campaign was not canceled I guess that loss was not catastrophic.

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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 30 Dec 2018 02:44

I've not pursued the numbers in depth, but back of the envelope calculations indicate the Central Pacfic campaign from the Autumn of 1943 to the securing of Okinawa in mid 1945 was cheaper than the S Pacific campaign. The latter I count as from early 1943 to the securing of Luzon in 1945. Thats roughly six to eight months longer than the Central Pacific campaign. From the Philippines a distant blockade of Japan can be maintained, and some heavy bombing done, but if you want to increase the pressure you still need to acquire Okinawa or somewhere close as a forward air and naval base. That adds more months if only a S Pac approach is used.

I am not counting the 1942 Guadalcanal battles as part of S Pac as those were more of a Japanese choice forced on the US & Australian Ally.

A second point is the days per ton a cargo ship is tied up making the round trip to deliver. OTL delivering to S Pac was a average 90 day round trip, say 720,000 ton-days for a 8,000 ton capacity cargo ship. To the Marianas it looks like a 60 day round trip, or 480,000 ton-days for the same 8000 ton load of ice cream machines or pin up calendars. I need to measure this out more precisely, but suspect that a circuitous route from the east coast to S Pac, then the Philippines, & finally to Okinawa, would put this comparison in shipping requirement off the chart. Fuel requirements to transfer warships and returning them to the US or Hawaii would be large as well for this Greater Circle route.

In the late Spring of 1942 MacArthur arrived in Australia & sent messages to Washington claiming that with just one good US Army division he could clean up the S Pac & return to the Philippines in a few months. By the time he returned to the PI that division had expanded to the 6th & 8th US Armies, with the equivalent of a Australian Army mopping up in Macs rear. War Plan Orange in the 1930s contemplated about 250,000 Army and Marines for a Central Pacific offensive endgame. The 10th Army on Okinawa & adjacent islands fielded a bit more than that with tactical air forces and support echelons are included..
Felix C wrote:
30 Oct 2018 17:40
The SW Pacific drive did attrition a great deal of Japanese airpower away from the central campaign. I recall reading how Japanese Air Groups were sucked towards Rabaul as a never ending machine consumed those sent there.
This is a important point. It was not practical for the US to launch the Cent Pac offensive until late summer 1943. Without the 1943 S Pac offensives the Japanese presumably have more aircraft and ships, and trained air crew. That effect extends on into 1944 & 45 as well. Of course the Cent Pac offensive is more powerful without a S Pac offensive.

So, there may be a significant saving if the S Pac offensives are reduced to diversions and holding actions from Jan 1943. How significant I can say at this date.

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Takao
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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Post by Takao » 30 Dec 2018 19:53

Well, the USS Liscombe Bay was also sunk shortly after the islands had been declared secured.
So, the carriers would need to be sunk before this "theoretical" Japanese island fell.

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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 31 Dec 2018 08:02

To digress; The CVE were fairly vulnerable to torpedoes. Had the hit on the Liscombe Bay been made on one of the new Essex class would there be any reasonable chance of sinking the CV?

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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Post by ChristopherPerrien » 31 Dec 2018 17:56

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
31 Dec 2018 08:02
To digress; The CVE were fairly vulnerable to torpedoes. Had the hit on the Liscombe Bay been made on one of the new Essex class would there be any reasonable chance of sinking the CV?
Hi Carl,
I would say no.

The USS Wasp(15ktons) 50% larger than the Liscompe Bay(10K) tons took 3 IJN sub torps and did not "explode. (Using greatly rounded wt figs for size and all though this post so dont get too "specific" on me). The Wasp like the Lis B had no side armor or torp protection but just that larger size was a form of protection aginst the reach of the blast of a IJN sub torp.
Then you get to the Essex(27Ktons) which were even bigger than the Yorktowns(25K ton) (of which the Wasp was a sawed- off sister). The Essexes like the preceeding Yorktowns all had side and torp protection, plus the increased size ,which is a form of both spaced protection and mass aginst a torp explosion , I don't see a singular sub torp hit taking one down. the yorktowns took sevral IJN air torp but no sub torps , and sub torps larger which was why I mentioned the Wasp in this respect.

Also of not The Liscome Bay had deck of armed aircraft a hanger deck of armed aircraft and took a torp hit near the bomb mag. But those CVE's could only 20 knots whereas essex could do 30kts+ . The Liscombe was with 2 other CVE's and i'll assumed a lighter screen. I don't think an IJN sub would get near enoguh to a more neavily defended Essex cv group and plus those moving at 30 knots , I doubt an IJN gets as nice a shot at them to hit them(if at all) in bomb mag in the first.

Greater size of the Essex works in all kinds of ways , more crew more DC, watertight compartmentalization, redundant systems ,greater space between vital space like magazine to side of ship ,side armor, magazine armor, and greater dampening effect. So I don't see an IJN sinking one with just one lucky hit at the luckiest time . i suppose anything is possible, but Essex were designed to "take a hit" and were big enough to take one , besides being able to dodge them. i don't think the Liscombe bay had any of these.

Hi all , just driving by

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Takao
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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Post by Takao » 01 Jan 2019 16:58

Well, the Yorktown took 2 submarine torpedoes at Midway, but that was on top of the two aerial torpedoes, plus the bomb hits, and unrepaired damage from the Coral Sea battle.

For the Liscombe Bay, the fueled and armed aircraft were of little consequence...it was the torpedo hit that detonated the bomb magazine and disintegrated the aft 1/3rd of the CVE that killed her.

The Liscombe Bay's task group was protected by 7 destroyers, fleet carrier task groups had 9 or more. What mattered here was that 2 destroyers had been sent off leaving only 5 destroyers protecting the task group. Hull was sent to pick up some down aviators and Franks was sent to investigate a floating light dropped by Japanese aircraft.

Speed was not much of a factor simply because fleet carriers rarely traveled at their maximum speed unless conducting air operations, under attack, or in pursuit of enemy forces. You see running at top speed would quickly drain the DDs fuel tanks dry, thus necessitating frequent slow downs for refuelling, where the task group would be moving much slower.

Further, protection and damage control of the carriers had improved to a much greater extent than earlier in the war, and fuel-air detonations, like those that sank the Lexington, Shokaku, and Taiho, would be greatly reduced on the Essex class.

Thus, the probability that an Essex would be sunk by one torpedo would be very remote at best.

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Re: Best Allied PTO strategy?

Post by ChristopherPerrien » 03 Jan 2019 15:58

Right on the Yorktown, wasn't thinking of its eventual end for some reason. And those IJN sub torps, arguably, did not sink her either. That she was still floating the next day , even after being abandoned the second time , and with all the earlier damage, implies that an IJN sub simply could not sink of them given an operable and crewed condition. A 5 inch shell hit below the waterline could sink an abandon hulk given time.

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