US troops in Torch were what makeup in terms of length of service.

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Re: US troops in Torch were what makeup in terms of length of service.

Post by daveshoup2MD » 12 Jan 2022 04:43

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
12 Jan 2022 04:40
Was just rereading about the German leaders miscalculations for fighting the Allies in their 1944 invasion. It appears even those veterans of the Eastern front had a rough reintroduction.
Fighting an actual motorized force with the communications and firepower (sea power, artillery, and aviation) advantages the Allies had - as compared to the Soviets - would have been eye-opening, presumably...

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Re: US troops in Torch were what makeup in terms of length of service.

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 12 Jan 2022 05:01

The eyewitness accounts of the Germans, are marked by first surprise, then after a few days or weeks pessimism, & resignation or despair.

I also am becoming aware the proportion of combat veterans among the Germans waiting in Normandy was not as high as I'd thought. A fair number had spent their war enjoying quiet France.

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Re: US troops in Torch were what makeup in terms of length of service.

Post by daveshoup2MD » 13 Jan 2022 02:29

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
12 Jan 2022 05:01
The eyewitness accounts of the Germans, are marked by first surprise, then after a few days or weeks pessimism, & resignation or despair.

I also am becoming aware the proportion of combat veterans among the Germans waiting in Normandy was not as high as I'd thought. A fair number had spent their war enjoying quiet France.
True, and even the veterans included a fair percentage of men who had been wounded in Africa, the Mediterranean, or the East, and ended up being retreaded to the field forces in France. After having been through the mill in 1939-43, presumably they were not eager to face it again - especially when it became clear what the Allies could do.

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Re: US troops in Torch were what makeup in terms of length of service.

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 13 Jan 2022 06:31

My favorite German soldiers in Normandy were those Koreans who had been passed along from the Japanese Army to the Red Army to the Germans to the Americans. Tho the fave should be the Ossies who are said to have shot the German NCO so they could surrender faster.

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Re: US troops in Torch were what makeup in terms of length of service.

Post by daveshoup2MD » 13 Jan 2022 06:51

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
13 Jan 2022 06:31
My favorite German soldiers in Normandy were those Koreans who had been passed along from the Japanese Army to the Red Army to the Germans to the Americans. Tho the fave should be the Ossies who are said to have shot the German NCO so they could surrender faster.
True. Given the reality the Allies were through the beach defenses and well inland generally by the end of the first day of the invasion, the comparison of the German coastal troops in Normandy in 1944 with the Italian coastal troops in Sicily in 1943 is not that far off...

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Re: US troops in Torch were what makeup in terms of length of service.

Post by T. A. Gardner » 13 Jan 2022 19:32

I don't know the exact proportions, but most of the troops that participated in Torch were either regular Army and reserve (volunteers / USA or USAR) or National Guard (NG), not draftees (AUS).

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Re: US troops in Torch were what makeup in terms of length of service.

Post by Richard Anderson » 13 Jan 2022 19:53

As of 1 July 1940 the United States Regular Army consisted of 13,797 officers and an enlisted strength totaling 243,095 (authorized enlisted strength had been expanded from 227,000 to 280,000 on 13 June and to 375,000 on 26 June), including the Army Air Corps. The strength of the National Guard officer corps was about 21,074 and enlisted strength was 226,837. There were also approximately 33,000 Reserve officers and 104,228 ROTC (Reserve Officers’ Training Camps) and CMTC (Citizens’ Military Training Camps) graduates in the Organized Reserve Corps. By July 1941, total strength of the Army was 1,326,577 officers and men, including the Army Air Corps. As of 31 December 1942 the U.S. Army had mobilized a total enlisted strength of 5 million men. Of that total 1,917,000 were ground combat troops, 761,000 were service troops and 1,300,000 were Army Air Forces troops – the remaining 1,022,000 were replacements, overhead and miscellaneous troops.

From 1 July 1940 through 7 December 1941, mobilization included rebalancing troops between mobilized units...activated National Guard units provided fillers for Regular Army units, while Regular Army units provided cadre, especially for battalion, regiment, and division officers and staffs.

In 1940, 18,633 were drafted for both the Army and Navy and another 923,842 in 1941, and 3,033,361 in 1942, albeit draftees from 1942 were unlikely to have been in service long enough to have deployed.

Overall, a guesstimate might be something less than 10% were Selectees, perhaps 30% were National Guard and Organized Reserves, and the reminder were Regular Army.
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Re: US troops in Torch were what makeup in terms of length of service.

Post by daveshoup2MD » 13 Jan 2022 21:13

T. A. Gardner wrote:
13 Jan 2022 19:32
I don't know the exact proportions, but most of the troops that participated in Torch were either regular Army and reserve (volunteers / USA or USAR) or National Guard (NG), not draftees (AUS).
The 1st and 3rd infantry divisions were both cadreed before TORCH, as was the 9th, even though it was only activated in 1940; so were the 1st and 2nd armored divisions. Presumably a fair number of all five divisions' RA personnel would have been subject to those orders.

None were "draftee divisions," per se, but I'd expect their personnel were pretty mixed by the time of the invasion.

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Re: US troops in Torch were what makeup in terms of length of service.

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 15 Jan 2022 20:07

Searched through my notes and could not find any reference to the numbers & ranks of the men withdrawn from a formation in 1942 to cadre another new division. A complete draft from a existing division would leave it leaderless at all levels. A 50% draft would still require extended training to return the formation to combat readiness. The number given as required to staff a new division with officers and senior NCOs is nominally 2500, but the actual requirement by TO & line number is larger. The difference seems to have been made up by other officers and NCOs coming out of the intake of new men. ie: Second Lts straight out of OCS and the basic officers course for their specialty. ie: The Field Artillery School Lts course. A second bridge would be under ranking of men filling the lowest NCO ranks. That is a PFC filling a corporals billet until promotion of he or someone else was justified. Then there would be reservists out of the large pool of Reserve officers/NROTC Rich referred to. Those went to active service in 1940 & early 1941, but not all to field units. Many went to schools as instructors, or service HQ administrating the construction and standing up of the bases/training camps & later moved from that to existing or new field formations as needed. Yet another source were men from the orphaned units created by reorganizing from the square to triangular divisions. Two Brigade HQ were eliminated creating a pool of officers & NCO for use elsewhere. Some of the excess infantry regiments were made 'Separate' regiments & continued a independent existence into 1944. Others were used wholesale as units to build new divisions. ie: The Americal Div. Yet others were dissolved to supply individuals to new & existing formations.

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Re: US troops in Torch were what makeup in terms of length of service.

Post by OpanaPointer » 15 Jan 2022 20:21

Was there a set ratio of cadre to recruits before Pearl Harbor?
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Re: US troops in Torch were what makeup in terms of length of service.

Post by daveshoup2MD » 15 Jan 2022 21:36

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
15 Jan 2022 20:07
Searched through my notes and could not find any reference to the numbers & ranks of the men withdrawn from a formation in 1942 to cadre another new division. A complete draft from a existing division would leave it leaderless at all levels. A 50% draft would still require extended training to return the formation to combat readiness. The number given as required to staff a new division with officers and senior NCOs is nominally 2500, but the actual requirement by TO & line number is larger. The difference seems to have been made up by other officers and NCOs coming out of the intake of new men. ie: Second Lts straight out of OCS and the basic officers course for their specialty. ie: The Field Artillery School Lts course. A second bridge would be under ranking of men filling the lowest NCO ranks. That is a PFC filling a corporals billet until promotion of he or someone else was justified. Then there would be reservists out of the large pool of Reserve officers/NROTC Rich referred to. Those went to active service in 1940 & early 1941, but not all to field units. Many went to schools as instructors, or service HQ administrating the construction and standing up of the bases/training camps & later moved from that to existing or new field formations as needed. Yet another source were men from the orphaned units created by reorganizing from the square to triangular divisions. Two Brigade HQ were eliminated creating a pool of officers & NCO for use elsewhere. Some of the excess infantry regiments were made 'Separate' regiments & continued a independent existence into 1944. Others were used wholesale as units to build new divisions. ie: The Americal Div. Yet others were dissolved to supply individuals to new & existing formations.
I think there's some detail in Marshall's report and in The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops and The Organization of Ground Combat Troops, which are both available on-line through the US Army MHC website. 3,000 to 4,000 may be in the ballpark, but even if it was less, that's still a fair amount of churn, along with officers and men going to other assignments (staff duty, etc.) various specialty training opportunities (OCS, volunteers for the airborne, armored force, etc.) along with illness, injury, leaves, etc.

In a very general sense, I agree the "regulars" were a quantity that made their presence known in any unit, especially early in the 1942 campaigns, but with (for example) the 1st Infantry Division, with a TO&E strength of ~14,000, sustaining ~19,000 casualties over the course of the war, it's hard to see that remaining a factor - other than simply starting off with a strong cadre in 1940 and a certain esprit de corps - over the course of the conflict.

Same for the 3rd, which sustained some 25,000.

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Re: US troops in Torch were what makeup in terms of length of service.

Post by daveshoup2MD » 15 Jan 2022 21:39

OpanaPointer wrote:
15 Jan 2022 20:21
Was there a set ratio of cadre to recruits before Pearl Harbor?
For the Army, above, but I think the Marines actually did a 50/50 split in some cases, at least early on. Same may have held true in some smaller Army units, as well, I suppose.

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Re: US troops in Torch were what makeup in terms of length of service.

Post by Richard Anderson » 16 Jan 2022 02:04

OpanaPointer wrote:
15 Jan 2022 20:21
Was there a set ratio of cadre to recruits before Pearl Harbor?
Not before Pearl Harbor, because no divisions were mobilized prior to then. The National Guard was Federalized and the Regular Army was brought up to strength, but mobilization of new divisions did not begin until after. During that period insofar as I can tell,there was little cross-pollenization between the RA and the NG, although both drew partly on the draft as fillers.

Afterwards, the process was supposed to be:

The newly nominated CG and his personal staff of 12 officers arrived at the mobilization station to begin planning at least 37 days prior to the division constitution.

30 days prior to constitution, the cadre arrived, theoretically as of March 1942 it contained 172 officers and 1,190 enlisted men, who formed a skeleton division structure, typically all the regimental and battalion commanders and most of their officer and enlisted staff, as well as critical specialist enlisted slots. In September 1942, the cadre was increased to 216 officers and 1,460 enlisted men.

On constitution day theoretically 452 mostly newly minted OCS officers and 13,425 enlisted draftees arrived, but in practice they arrived over the course of three to four weeks.

Complicating things, the typical division also produced a cadre for a mobilization division six months after constitution, which officers and men had to be replaced as well.

That of course is for the Infantry Division, the process was similar, but the numbers of personnel were different for the Armored Division.
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Re: US troops in Torch were what makeup in terms of length of service.

Post by daveshoup2MD » 16 Jan 2022 04:27

Richard Anderson wrote:
16 Jan 2022 02:04
OpanaPointer wrote:
15 Jan 2022 20:21
Was there a set ratio of cadre to recruits before Pearl Harbor?
Not before Pearl Harbor, because no divisions were mobilized prior to then. The National Guard was Federalized and the Regular Army was brought up to strength, but mobilization of new divisions did not begin until after. During that period insofar as I can tell,there was little cross-pollenization between the RA and the NG, although both drew partly on the draft as fillers.

Afterwards, the process was supposed to be:

The newly nominated CG and his personal staff of 12 officers arrived at the mobilization station to begin planning at least 37 days prior to the division constitution.

30 days prior to constitution, the cadre arrived, theoretically as of March 1942 it contained 172 officers and 1,190 enlisted men, who formed a skeleton division structure, typically all the regimental and battalion commanders and most of their officer and enlisted staff, as well as critical specialist enlisted slots. In September 1942, the cadre was increased to 216 officers and 1,460 enlisted men.

On constitution day theoretically 452 mostly newly minted OCS officers and 13,425 enlisted draftees arrived, but in practice they arrived over the course of three to four weeks.

Complicating things, the typical division also produced a cadre for a mobilization division six months after constitution, which officers and men had to be replaced as well.

That of course is for the Infantry Division, the process was similar, but the numbers of personnel were different for the Armored Division.
Depends on one's definition of "mobilization," but Stanton lists the following divisions being "activated" as such in 1939-41, all before Pearl Harbor:

4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 25th infantry divisions (he lists the 24th as "re-designated" from the Hawaiian Division); 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th Armored (Stanton lists the 1st as "re-designated" from the 7th Cavalry Brigade); and 2nd Cavalry Division. By my count, that's at least four divisions (3-5th armored and the 2nd Cavalry) that would have needed cadre; likewise, given the size of the interwar brigade headquarters (presumably akin to a wartime brigade HHC?), even those newly "activated" divisions of 1939-41 would have needed a lot of additional personnel to get to the level of cadre laid out above.

Now presumably the infantry divisions could and did all draw upon the corresponding interwar infantry brigades, but there were only 12 of those in CONUS, and the 1-6th brigades were assigned to the 1st-3rd divisions, respectively, with the remaining six being "available" to provide cadre for (presumably) the 4th-9th divisions; the 21st and 22nd brigades were in Hawaii and presumably were absorbed by the 24th and 25th divisions; same for the 23rd Brigade in the PI.

The 2nd Armored Division had continuity with the "Provisional Tank Brigade" but the next two armored divisions were formed with cadres from the 1st and 2nd armored divisions, and the 5th's cadre came from the 4th Armored Division.

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Re: US troops in Torch were what makeup in terms of length of service.

Post by Richard Anderson » 16 Jan 2022 07:50

daveshoup2MD wrote:
16 Jan 2022 04:27
Depends on one's definition of "mobilization," but Stanton lists the following divisions being "activated" as such in 1939-41, all before Pearl Harbor:

4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 25th infantry divisions (he lists the 24th as "re-designated" from the Hawaiian Division); 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th Armored (Stanton lists the 1st as "re-designated" from the 7th Cavalry Brigade); and 2nd Cavalry Division. By my count, that's at least four divisions (3-5th armored and the 2nd Cavalry) that would have needed cadre; likewise, given the size of the interwar brigade headquarters (presumably akin to a wartime brigade HHC?), even those newly "activated" divisions of 1939-41 would have needed a lot of additional personnel to get to the level of cadre laid out above.
Why yes, as I said, before Pearl Harbor. As of the end of the fiscal year, 30 June 1941, the active US Army consisted of the 1st-9th Infantry Division, all of which had reorganized as "triangular", and the 18 Federalized National Guard Divisions, all of which were still "square". Then there was the Hawaiian Division, the Philippine Division, and the Canal Zone, which never had reached the division status envisaged in the 1921 National Defense Act. There was also the 1st and 2d Cavalry Division, and then the newly created Armored Force with the 1st-5th Armored Division. It is how they were mobilized that is interesting.

Through September 1939, only the 1st, 2d, 3d, Hawaiian, 1st Cav, and Philippine division HQ were active, and only the 1st Division's assigned units were all active. Each of the others had units that were either designated Regular Army Inactive - they periodically were activated with OR personnel, usually for the annual wargames season - or were partly active and partly inactive, or wholly inactive. For example, in the 3d Division, its 3d Ammunition Train was inactive, while the 9th FA HQ was inactive, its 1st Battalion was active, its 2d Battalion was activated 1 May 1939, and its 3d Battalion was inactive. On 1 October 1940, when the division was triangularized, the active personnel of the 1st and 2d Battalion were consolidated to form the 9th FA Battalion.

The 4th-9th and 2d Cav divisions were considerably different. All of them consisted, more or less, as an RAI HQ with a single active brigade and all other units either RAI, partly active and partly inactive, or inactive.

For all those, "mobilization" was activation and reorganization of existing units that were brought up to strength with draftees. Insofar as I can tell, few to none of the Federalized NG personnel mobilized were used to fill up activated RA units prior to 7 December 1941, because there was always the very real threat that if Congress failed to extend their term of Federal service, they would all disappear. So the activated and reorganized divisions of the RA were not cadred from other units, they were filled up with draftees and to a lesser extent volunteers as the size of the RA enlisted was also expanded.

Similarly, the NG, which was understrength, saw a major influx of draftees in 1940 and 1941, as well as some RA and OR personnel. Fundamentally, the cadre system for mobilization I spoke of was that to organize and train the OR (and later AUS) divisions after 7 December 1941 and was more or less laid out by February 1942.

BTW, the 24th and 25th Division (none of the divisions became "Infantry Divisions" until 20 May 1942 when they were formally redesignated as such), were both created by reorganizing the Hawaiian Division, in October 1941.

As I mentioned earlier, the Armored Force was different still. The 1st Armored Division was created from the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized) and the 2d Armored Division from the 1st Tank Brigade (Provisional) in June 1940. Until they took in large drafts of draftees they were quite small, the entire Force as of 15 August 1940 was around 7,200 O&EM. For example, the 2d Armored Division, under the command of Major General Charles L Scott, when activated only had 99 officers and 2,202 enlisted men of its nominal 11,200 man strength under the proposed TO&E. Of the three armored regiments assigned to the division, only the 66th (Light) approached its authorized strength in men and equipment. The 67th Armored (Medium) effectively consisted of two under strength companies equipped with two-dozen medium tanks; mostly obsolete T4 and T4E3 with a few of the already obsolescent “new” T5/M2 and M2A1 Medium Tanks. For all that, the 67th was at least better off than the 68th Armored (Light), which existed almost solely on paper. By 30 June 1941 there was 41,200 of an authorized strength of 47,000 in the Armored Force, including the four NG GHQ Tank Battalions and eleven RA GHQ Tank Battalions.

However, "cadre" in the Armored Force was internal. the 1st and 2d Armored Division cadred the 3rd and 4th, and the 3rd and 4th cadred the 5th. In 1942, the 6th Armored was cadred from the 1st and 2d, the 7th was cadred from the 3d and 5th, but the 8th was actually created with a cadre from the 5th to train cadre for later divisions and provided them to the 9-14th and 20th. That role of the 8th ended 15 March 1943 and the 16th was actually cadred from the 4th (officers) and 20th (EM). Interestingly, the 20th was originally intended to train cadre for the 15th, 17th, 18th, and 19th, but they were never activated.
Now presumably the infantry divisions could and did all draw upon the corresponding interwar infantry brigades, but there were only 12 of those in CONUS, and the 1-6th brigades were assigned to the 1st-3rd divisions, respectively, with the remaining six being "available" to provide cadre for (presumably) the 4th-9th divisions; the 21st and 22nd brigades were in Hawaii and presumably were absorbed by the 24th and 25th divisions; same for the 23rd Brigade in the PI.
The active interwar Infantry Brigade HQ&HQ Companies interwar in the Z/I were the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, 10th, 12th, 14th, 16th, and 18th. The RAI ones were the 7th, 9th, 11th, 13th, 15th, and 17th. The 19th, 20th, and 24th were inactive. Yes, the 21st and 22d were active in Hawaii, but were disbanded 1 October 1941 and personnel transferred to the 24th and 25th Division. The 23d was active with the Philippine Division and lost there.

BTW, the Infantry Brigade HQ&HQ Company was small, just 71 O&EM at full war strength. Interwar, they were probably lucky of they had half that.
The 2nd Armored Division had continuity with the "Provisional Tank Brigade" but the next two armored divisions were formed with cadres from the 1st and 2nd armored divisions, and the 5th's cadre came from the 4th Armored Division.
That is correct, except the 5th drew cadre from both the 3d and 4th.
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