De Gaulle and French betrayal of Poland in Semptember 1939

[ljadw]

Every one knew what Hitler wanted and what he would do and as long as this was not endangering one's interests and as long as he did it peacefully, there was no reason to intervene .
After Munich, it was obvious that Czechia would become a German satellite, one way or another and this was no reason to intervene ,unless he used force, something the woke would use as an argument for war .

[ljadw]

That the US intervened against Iraq despite no treaty obligation is a non sequitur against "states do not fight for alliances."

If the Soviets had attacked Poland in 1923, France would have helped Poland but wouldn't send an army to Warsaw through Germany for the simple reason the Franco-Polish alliance didn't require it.

1 The only way for France to help Poland was to send an army through Warsaw and if the Franco-Polish alliance did not require it in 1923 ,why would it require it in 1939 ?
2 Intelligent statesmen do not fight for alliances but for their interests : France had an alliance with Russia before 1914 but did not fight when Germany attacked Russia .

[ljadw]

Gamelin was a politician who had become French chief of staff by giving meaningless promises to the other politicians .

In the French armyn, politicians don't become commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces Gamelin was a very talented officer, he was chief of staff of Joffre at the beginning of WWI and played a role in the miracle of the Marne in september 1914.

the fact he rose - like any other military chief in any country - by political support doesn't change that fact.

and your delusions about the role polan d could have to 'protect France' (from what , since France wasn't threatened) is comical. Same for WWI where France had to mobilize because its ally Russia was threatened.

The miracle of the Marne is an invention ... by journalists of course .
After WW 1 Gamelin was sent in exile as head of a military mission in Brazil.
In 1935 Gamelin became French chief of staff for political reasons only. In 1931 there were de facto 2 chiefs of staff (Weygand and Gamelin ) because the politicians did not trust Weygand who was a royalist and had nothing only contempt for the politicians .
The fact that you don't know that Gamelin was the man of the Radical Party indicates that your knowledge about politics in the Third Republic is much lacking .

[ljadw]

The point is the French made and executed a plan to use the Poles as a human shield protecting their military and political designs.

no the point is the Poles believing that France's fate was at stake, threatened by germany and needed mighty Poland protection.

Hitler had renunced Alsace-Lorraine so there was n't any territorial dispute between the country, ad therefor, no real reason for France to enter in war. they gave this warranty over Poland in order to give a clear signal to Hitler. After Munich, he tought that was just empty word and so they had to declare a war they didn't want, neither were prepared for. That's all.

The fact that there was no territorial dispute between both countries,does not mean that there was no reason for France to declare war : this reason was the woke mentality of the French politicians and of those in the media who directed the French public opinion .

[ljadw]

I doubt that the Poles believed this

They didn't believe that then but believe that today. Because it is true.

What was less laudable was his deeply cynical outlook on the strategic plight in which Poland would find itself in the event of this war. Gamelin knew that Polish resistance could do no more than succumb bravely. Nor did he think there was anything that France and Britain would be able to do, militarily, to make a significant impact on a German-Polish outcome.
But, as has been shown, he passed over the chance to spell this out to Polish leaders during the meetings in May with Kasprzycki.
In accompanying this guidance with the promise of major offensive action after the seventeenth day of French mobilization, against western Germany, Gamelin was, however, committing a deceit.
This was none the more excusable just because the British were party to it — their chiefs of staff having concurred during the Anglo-French military conversations in April and early May that Poland's defeat was not an eventuality that the western powers would be able to prevent but one that they would undo through final Allied victory in the war.
The Republic in Danger: General Maurice Gamelin and the Politics of French Defence by Martin S. Alexander

Why do you use again a woke historian ?
There was no deceit,and even if there was one, why would this be wrong ? Gamelin was French chief of staff,the Polish interests were subordinate to the French ones .
For political reasons Gamelin promised an offensive,but not a major offensive as Alexander is claiming . Gamelin promised an offensive with the majority of his available forces .Which is a totally empty promise .And the Poles knew it,but did not care,because they were convinced that Hitler would not attack.
Gamelin did not know at the moment of his promise,how many divisions would be available, only that it would be more than one .
Gamelin did also not specify the word ''majority '': if it was an absolute majority ,it would be 50% + 0,0001 % of his available forces .If it was a relative majority, it could be one division .
And for once, Gamelin did what he promised : the small forces he used were the majority of those that were available .
To prove that Gamelin lied, one has to prove that he was withholding from the Saar offensive forces that were available during this offensive .

[gebhk]

Hi OscarTango

In the French armyn, politicians don't become commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces

That, I am afraid, is simply not true. You do not become the head of a large organisation without considerable politcal acumen and clout, regardless of your professional skills and qualifications; this is especially true of a position like head of a nation's, any nation's, armed forces which has enormous political ramifications - indeed is predominantly political in nature. So much so that in many countries (including modern France, incidentally) having a military background is not necessary for this role as it is part of the responsibilities of the President - an elected, or otherwise, politician.

Otherwise the wheels on this particular bus keep going round and round (having mercifully stopped for a while) but we are getting no wiser about the subject of the thread than we were after the one and only relevant post - that is the one by Loic on page 8 of this 16-page tapeworm as we would call it in Poland.

[wm]

For political reasons Gamelin promised an offensive,but not a major offensive as Alexander is claiming . Gamelin promised an offensive with the majority of his available forces .Which is a totally empty promise .And the Poles knew it,but did not care,because they were convinced that Hitler would not attack.

Now you have a great opportunity to prove all your assertions above with facts.

[ljadw]

Poland was convinced/convinced itself that Hitler was bluffing.
Why ? Because Poland knew that the only one who could prevent a German attack /save Poland if there was still such an attack was the USSR and that Hitler needed a deal with Stalin to attack . As every one was convinced/convinced himself that this was excluded, the consequence was : no German attack .A German attack had to be excluded,because if Germany won,Hitler would be in Warsaw,if Germany lost, Stalin would be in Warsaw .Hitler lost and the result was that Poland lost almost the half of its territory and became for more than 40 years a Russian satellite .The hostility between Germany and the USSR was the only thing that could prevent a German invasion .
France, OTOH,could not prevent a German attack,neither could it save Poland if it was attacked .FYI (source :forces en présence le 03 Septembre 1939 ),France had the following number of divisions in September 1939 in France and North Africa . :
81 infantry divisions and 3 light divisions .
NO armoured divisions .
Of these divisions 12 were stationed on the Alps and 13 in North Africa .
Only 56 ID remained on the front of the NE .
A lot of them were still not operational.
An other number was tied at the border with Belgium .
Only a few were available for the Sar Offensive .
It was totally excluded that these few divisions could break through the West Wall ,march to Berlin and arrive at Berlin before the defeat of Poland .
On the German side there were at the western borders from the North Sea to Switzerland 34 divisions and a OKW reserve of 12 divisions .
The Polish military,who were not stupid, knew the French weakness and knew that they could not expect a real help from France .Gamelin told Poland : if you are attacked by Germany, I will start an offensive, but I can't /I refuse to say with how many divisions .
The French had even not enough forces to protect their long border with Belgium .They had only 56 divisions to defend a front from Dunkirk to the border with Italy .
Besides : even with more forces,France had no serious reason to risk the death of hundreds of thousand soldiers to aid a country that was far away, that was very weak and which survival was not needed for the survival of Poland .
There were only 3 big military powers on the continent : Germany,the USSR and France .Poland was not one of them .Neither was Britain .
The talks ,assurances (diplomatic and military),treaties between Britain ,France and Poland were nothing else than Keeping up Appearances, nothing more than bluff.

[wm]

Poland was convinced/convinced itself that Hitler was bluffing.

From where does this one come from? What bluff anyway, and when?

It has nothing to do with the subject at hand - that Gamelin tried to make sure the Poles would sacrifice themselves and gain time for France by promising them pie in the sky.

[ljadw]

Hitler could only attack Poland if he had a deal with Stalin and everyone was convinced that this was impossible . Thus Germany was bluffing .
And Gamelin did not try to make sure the Poles would sacrifice themselves and gain time for France by promising them pie in the sky,because in the Spring of 1939 when a Polish delegation arrived in France, Poland was not in danger .

[ljadw]

If there was a war,the West could not save Poland .
But,there was maybe a possibility to prevent a war.But the West did not propose it to Poland and Poland did not ask it from the West .
The possibility was to send a British and a French force to Warsaw ( battalion /brigade ) to indicate to Hitler that an attack on Poland would result in war with the West .
But Poland did not ask it,the West did not propose it ,because no one believed that there would be a German attack .And when the Ribbentrop/Molotov treaty became public,war was certain,thus there was no longer a need to dissuade Hitler .

[gebhk]

Poland was convinced/convinced itself that Hitler was bluffing.

Aside from the habitual fallacy of assuming a country is a person, any actual evidence of this beyond your assumptions?

Complete off-top, but since we have over 15 pages of off-top here anyway, I don't feel too guilty about it. Ijadw's imagination brings to mind an old Polish joke (so old, Captain De Gaulle may have heard it so, on reflection, it's probably less of an offtop than most ): God sends Saint Peter on a fact finding mission to Europe. St Peter is debriefed on his return:
God: What are the French doing?
SP: They are afraid and they arm.
God: And the Germans?
SP: They too are afraid and they arm.
God: The Russians, the Brits?
SP: Same
God And what about the Poles?
SP: Oh, they are not afraid and they do not arm.
God: Oh c..p, relying on me again, I suppose.....

[ljadw]

As long as Hitler had no deal with Stalin, he could not attack Poland and thus he was bluffing .

[Linkagain]

Western View of The Pact
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File ... ast%3F.jpg

Poland Agony
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File ... n_1939.jpg

Western Europe views of the The results of the pact ex post facto
https://www.bing.com/images/search?view ... t=0&sim=11

https://www.bing.com/images/search?view ... ajaxserp=0

[ljadw]

And about the Polish opinion of France :
Beck told the following to Noël ( French ambassador in Poland ) :
'' Nous ne nous faisons aucune illusion;nous savons bien que notre alliance avec vous est unilatérale;si vous étiez attaqué par l'Allemagne,la Pologne marcherait á votre aide,parce que ce serait son intêret ;mais la réciproque n'est pas vraie.Nous n'oublions pas les campagnes faites en France sur le théme : nous ne nous battrons pas pour le Corridor .''
Translation :
'' We have no illusion at all;we know that our alliance with you is unilateral.If you were attacked by Germany,we would fight to help you,because it would be in our interest .But the opposite is not true .We do not forget the campaigns in France with as subject :we will not fight for the Corridor .''
Source : Le Mystere Gamelin ,by Pierre Goyet .
The Poles did not trust France,thus they had no reason to accuse the French of betrayal .
And, what Beck said about the Polish intention to aid France if this was attacked by Germany (possibility which would not happen ), this is not true: the Polish alliance was also unilateral (as is so with most alliances ): Poland allied with France to have a French aid if it was attacked by Germany or the USSR . Not to help France . And France allied with Poland,to have the aid of Poland if it was attacked by Germany . Not to help Poland .