Poland's rapid extinction rendered any French offensive in its support soon futile
This would carry a lot more weight if there was such an offensive planned. The overwhelming evidence however, is that it was not. Already by 18th May, the Chief of gen Gamelin’s Special Bureau, col Jean Louis Marie Petibon, was telling col Fraser, the British military attaché in Paris, that the main French offensive will most definitely come from “the Mediterranean region” and would not be against Germany. The benefit for Poland will be that, if successful, it will enable her to be supplied via the Mediterranean and Black Seas. Petibon was at pains to point out that this information had not been shared with the Polish military delegation then in Paris, while any action of ground forces that was contemplated would “include offensives that were well prepared and with limited objectives”.
If that wasn't clear enough, During a meeting with Lord Gort and his staff on 13 July, Gamelin is recorded as saying quite openly they have every interest in the war beginning in the East and developing only gradually. That way they would have time to put the entirety of the Franco-British forces on a military footing. Making general assurances that the French had no intention of leaving Poland “in the beginning to face Germany alone”, he sketched a vision of how the time gained by her sacrifice could be used to occupy and fortify the approaches to their own positions “should the Germans turn their forces against us”.
I concur that the use of emotive phrases such as betrayal is counterproductive because it leads away from rational analysis to anthropomorphic depiction of nations which, in turn,. leads to a the fallacious treatment of nations or states as if they were single human beings with human emotions. No offence at all intended, but the idea that Poland was 'a less sympathetic victim' because it had bullied its smaller neighbours is rather typical of that. Quite aside from exactly how Britain, France, Czechoslovakia or pretty much every other country involved in this busyness was more sympathetic than Poland, this is utterly irrelevant - Poland was an ally and that and the reasons why Poland was being courted as an ally - it certainly wasn't for its 'moral attractiveness' - are all that matter. The French government declared war on Germany in 1939 not because it was borne along by a wave of sympathy for Poland against its better judgement but because they judged it the best thing to do for France. And whether we like it or not, the word 'betrayal' (however unhelpfully) has entered general vocabulary in this context so gen De Gaulle's opinion on that too is of interest.
The fact is that Poland was being sold a dodgy bit of goods which was being served up as something better - and for good reason from the British and French perspectives. The desperate arguments that 'Poland should have read the small print' or 'should have pressed for details'. rather support the case rather than the opposite. There would have been no need for 'small print' if the offer was on the up and up, nor would there have been need to conceal information from the Polish delegations. As for Ijadw's argument that 'the Poles should have pressed for details' - what do you think they were doing? The fact is that there is little you can do if the details are not forthcoming and, in that respect, the British had almost as much luck with getting them out of the French as did the Poles.
The Poles were perfectly aware of the small print, but having opted to go down the road of cooperation with France and Britain rather than Germany, they had little option by 1939 but to 'buy' the goods and hope for the best.
As an aside, alas, such politics are not without consequence. Within a few months the French and British were, diplomatically, in a similar situation: trying to persuade a country to carry on fighting (in this case Finland), because it suited their interests. No doubt mindful of the Polish debacle, the Fins pressed very firmly for detailed commitments and getting few, very wisely chose to make peace with the Soviet Union.