The Army Ordnance Department plays a role in the outcome at Stalingrad.

[Aida1]

Can you point out what you mean by StuG's and tanks didn't work out? And what would it possibly matter? So what happens if they deploy StuG's as either an attached Battalion, or as a Brigade. The relevant point is that it is a much more effective weapon system, and the net effect was they could destroy enemy armor much easier.

" Generalinspekteur der Panzertruppen 15.04.1943

Leaflet on the use of a Sturmgeschützabteilung within the Panzerregiment

1) Within some Panzer divisions it is necessary to equip a Panzerabteilung with Sturmgeschütze as an intermediary solution
2) The Panzerabteilung is equipped with 96 Sturmgeschütze
Organisation: staff 3 command tanks
staff company( recce and security platoon) 5 Sturmgeschütze
1. to 4. company kp troop 2 Sturmgeschütze each
1. to 4. platoon 5 Sturmgeschütze each
3) The Sturmgeschütze has the following advantages over a Panzer IV:
a) strong frontal armor( from april 1943 newly produced Panzer IV will have armor of the same stregth)
b) lower height and therefore a smaller target
Disadvantages are:
a) no commander cupola so lesser command and sighting ability(from december 1942 new Sturmgeschütze
have a command cupola)
b) no turret so no ability to fire in all directions
c) no machinegun that can fire in all directions. This affects the ability for close defense.
4) The performance and properties of the sturmgeschütze do not allow autonomous operations without panzer or panzergrenadiere
Its advantages make it into a tank hunter. This governs the use of the Pz Abteilung equipped with Sturmgeschütze with the Panzer regt and the Pz division.
5) Attack
a) the Sturmgeschütz Abt cannot fight like a Pz Abt autonomously within the enemy. Support and monitoring by Panzer or Panzer grenadiere will therefore always be necessary. Therefore the use in the last echelon for collaboration with the Pz grenadiere will be the rule
For this the instructions for collaboration with the infantry apply(H.Dv 200/2m AVA Die Sturmgeschütz batterie of 07.09.1942 besides the supplementary annexes)

b) Pz Abt equipped with with the Pz III and Panzer IV with thin frontal armor(50mm) can be reinforced by Sturmgeschütze comapnies or platoons for special missions(point, attack with limited objective)
The Sturmgeschütze then fight in the front

c) when meeting enemy tanks, the Sturmgescütze units are put to the front to free the other Pz Abt. for moving against flank and rear and so for the complete destruction of the enemy tanks.

d) as tank hunters the Sturmgeschütze are to be driven behind the open wings of the regt so that they can protect the flanks and support the regt when confronting enemy tanks

e) when the Pz grenadiere have to create the preconditions for the operation of the regt , for example in crossing a river, then the Sturmgeschütze can make their mission effectively easier by their fire

6) Defense
In the defense the sturmgeschütze units will, like the Pz Abt, be kept back and used for counter thrusts and counter attacks with the Pz Grenadiere .
Specifically, the Sturmgeschütze unit has the role of the tank hunter

7) Retreat
By an attack with limited objective, in collaboration with Panzer and Panzer grenadiere, the retreat from the enemy is made easier. The operation of the Sturmgeschütze units as tank hunters will be in the foreground.

Guderian"

Above are the instructions by Guderian for the use of Stug within the pzdiv. These were not always followed which lead to problems. Stugs could not operate as tanks. They were a good tank hunter and could have a role as such whitin a pz div. .

Okay, so Guderian didn't like the idea of having the Army's artillery stealing his limelight, but again, what difference does it make? None of this can change the fact that the StuG was a much better weapon system then the Pz III L60. There are also accounts of StuG batteries acting without infantry, or being used successfully with tanks. But it has no bearing on the WI. Making long barreled StuG's was a much better use of the resources Germany used to make Pz III's. That's it, that's all Aida.

It was Guderians idea to strengthen the pz div with stug as an expedient so you make no sense. Anyway, in mobile offensive and counter offensive operations, you need more tanks in the first place. Stugs could be used within a pz div for specific roles.

Try reading it again, maybe it will make more sense for you. Anyway, the StuG was used in numerous offensive and counter offensive operations. You need more tracked vehicles that could actually defeat the enemy in the first and last place. StuG's were relied on throughout the war, but especially in later stages by panzer division to fill the role of destroying enemy armor/AT guns, which was pretty much the role panzer divisions used its turreted vehicles for. I just finished reading "Stug III Brigade 191 The Buffalo Brigade"(2009) by Bruno Bork, and highly recommend it. It covers the entire war, and that unit was involved in heavy fighting in the Balkans, Greece, and especially the Eastern Front.

Germany needed stugs for a specific role. You are unwilling to see their limitations which is pointed out in the document i quoted above. For mobile offensive and counter offensive operations, you need tanks. And you cannot make it credible that your what if would significantly change the Stalingrad outcome.

[Richard Anderson]

I am shocked to find myself in total agreement with Aida1, someone whose posts I rarely read.

[Peter89]

I'm not shocked myself, but I also completely agree with him.

[LachenKrieg]

Sorry for taking so long....

No problem, I was not bating my breath.

Jentz was the technical editor to one of the citations I gave, so where are you going with this?... Nowhere?

Let me ask you the same question. You brought Spielberger as of he was the be all and end all. I brought up Jentz's contradiction of Spielberger's infallibility. So where are you going with "Jentz was the technical editor to one of the citations I gave, so where are you going with this?... Nowhere?"

I don't know about Schnellturppen requirements for tanks, but going back to the 4 reports you cited earlier, was it the first or the second report where the author (Panzertruppen) states he finds it tolerable if up to 50% of the allocated vehicles were filled with StuG's? The principle concern was fire power, and you can get a clear sense of this in just about anything ever written on the subject. What was repeated in numerous reports is that German tank crews were aware of the need for more fire power.

Yet again, despite that less than ringing endorsement, nothing came of it. The Schnelltruppen wanted tanks and when it became the Panzertruppen they still wanted tanks. A tank is a versatile offensive and defensive weapon, an assault gun is not.

BTW, those reports were two years into the campaign and a year and a half from the end of the war...you'd think if it was an acceptable solution we would have seen more Sturmgeschütz used by the Panzertruppen but we don't. I wonder why?

And the long barrel gun is the reason why the StuG became so heavily relied on until the end of the war.

So heavily relied upon by the Infanterie, not by the Panzertruppen. It continued to supply the infantry with the accompanying gun as well as gave them a useful antitank capability.

But I don't think it is so strange that StuG's weren't part of Gudarien's PanzerWaffe, because they weren't. They came under the control of a different branch in the same way the initial Panzer IV as an infantry support vehicle came under the Panzerwaffe.

Er, no, sorry but you are confused. The initial Panzer IV was not "an infantry support vehicle" and that was not why it came under the Schnelltruppen (as the Panzerwaffe was known then). It was a Panzer, the required mittlere Panzer complementing the leichte Panzer (Panzer III) in the Panzer Division. It was precisely because it was never intended as an infantry support vehicle that the Sturmgeschütz was designed for that role.

And yes, the best solution would have been for Germany to make thousands of Panther tanks to drive alongside its PzIV's, but that would be even less plausible and is not what this WI is about.

No, Germany did make "thousands of Panther tanks to drive alongside its PzIV's" so obviously while plausible - it happened after all - that was not the best solution. Perhaps a better solution was not to enter into a multi-front conflict with an immature weapons system and a partially mobilized industrial infrastructure to support it.

And what you are hiding behind are simply the historical decisions that were taken.

Not at all. I am simply asking why an entrenched bureaucracy, with an accepted doctrine and huge sunk costs would suddenly change course in such a radical manner. Why after seven years of development, success in Poland and France, and near success in BARBAROSSA, would they suddenly decide to dump the Panzer and embrace the Sturmgeschütz? Because its potential firepower was better? When armored vehicle design was and still is a series of compromise? The turreted tank - the Panzer - was then and still is the more desirable choice, even if a non-turreted tank can carry more firepower.

Why would an earlier deployment of the Panzer III with 5cm L60 change anything? The Germans were already well aware of the need for bigger guns, why else was the 7.5cm KwK/StuK/PaK 40 already in the wings?

Spielberger is the be all to end all?

Where did I say that?

This probably won’t come as a shock to you but I’m going to keep reading what people like Spielberger put out there. He’s not just some errand boy to the assistant editor at a company called Dopey you know!?

Almost every single exchange we have Richard seems like a conflict instead of us expressing our point of view mostly because you keep spewing BS. If you haven’t noticed by now,… it offends me!

Look, you suggested something that I didn’t think was accurate, so all I did was provide a couple simple quotes to support why. Spielberger was just one of the citations, and not because I think he is the be all to end all. Chamberlain and Doyle are the authors to the other citation I gave, for which Jentz is the technical editor. And according to Speilberger, Jentz contributed a number of chapters in his volume “Strumgeschutz & its Variants”. So yeah, I am wondering a little where your going with this?

Just to make myself clear, Schnelltruppen translated means motorized, or mobile troops and can also refer to motorized infantry. So in my way of thinking, Schnelltruppen still existed even after armoured troops became a thing. But back in 1937, armoured troops didn’t know what a tank was, let alone know they needed one.

And you talk of those reports you cited as if they support what you are saying when they don’t. Thats the weird part for me. You quote something like that on an internet forum claiming it means something it clearly doesn’t….?

And BTW, when you are talking about an institution the size of a military, let alone the German military of WWII, things are likely a little more complicated then what you seem to be implying. The answer to your question was probably influenced by a number of factors let alone the events that happened as the war progressed, like Allied bombers flattening what little industry Germany thought it had.

And BTW you are simply wrong, because StuG’s (Battalions/Brigades) were very welcomed additions to the Panzer Divisions, and were heavily used.

I don’t remember the posters name, but in the Panzer III “WHAT IF” you previously mentioned where the suggestion was to modify it, someone made a negative comment about tank crews and StuG crews working together. I can’t remember exactly how the poster worded it, but it struck me as being funny because I had just read about that same issue in the StuG book by Bork. The reason given in the book was quite different though, apparently tank crews would often ask StuG crews to deal with an opposing tank threat. I am assuming probably because of their “Tank Hunter” role. And it makes sense to me when I consider the fact that most tank crews on the Eastern Front were in a Pz III or worse. What could be more frightening then having to go up against an armoured opponent you know you have little-to-no-chance of defeating? The StuG book claims this point did create tension between tank crews and StuG crews though. The StuG proved itself in both offensive and defensive roles, and I am pretty confident you wouldn’t have to look too hard to find that out for yourself.

The 3 tasks for tanks were stated as supporting infantry, taking part in a combined arms force, and combating tanks. The PzIV was the infantry support part of that equation. The Pz III was supposed to be the main battle tank with the armour penetrating weapon. And agin Richard, I find it hard to believe that you don’t know this, which makes me wonder if your entire contribution here isn’t some sort of a joke. But what ever the case may be, you can now go back to your question about why the StuG wasn’t part of the PanzerWaffe… And then ask yourself what the point of making two vehicles carrying the same gun was for? This isn’t for my benefit, because I’m not that one asking the question, you are.

So first your argument is based on the premise that they needed more tanks, now your trying to claim they made all the Panthers they needed? By my count they would have still been short had they made 1000 more than they did. And BTW, the Panther was armed with a very capable gun. Had the Germans been able to make 1 Panther for every 2 T34’s, it would have had a very noticeable effect, but thats just stating the obvious.

I would really like to have a good exchange with you Richard, but you make that proposition very hard to do. Your last comment is better though.

So why? For starters, the speed of technological development driven by the fight for survival became the order of the day. So from that perspective doctrines and sunk costs mean very little! Whats needed is you go back to the drawing board if that’s the only path to survival. Things were so vastly different in 1941 from the way they were during the Poland/France campaigns, and different yet again each year following that it made the entire experiment in warfare an outlier. What they faced in Poland, and even France was just not the same anymore by 1941, and it never would be again. The question of why any country would want to improve its wartime situation should be self evident. But it is clear by asking that you are ignorant to the serious issue this was causing.

Both volumes of Jentz’s Panzer Truppen are littered with accounts that can provide answers to your questions. We can read reports that tell how poor gun performance caused an increase use of ammunition, or how the effectiveness of armour can affect a tank crews moral. As an example, see the report on page 205 which states;

“… the absolute superiority of the Russian 26 ton and 52 ton tanks over our Pz III/IV was felt. The Russian tanks… opened fire with their 7.62 cm guns… already at a range of 1000 meters…”. “Our 5 cm guns can achieve penetrations only on vulnerable locations under very special favorable conditions at very close ranges under 50 meters. …Our Pz’s are already knocked out at a range of several hundred meters…”.

But the important effect of this is found later in the report on page 208 in the following:

“The available facts and, above all, the impression that the Russians are aware of the technical superiority of their tank force must work out in time to be detrimental to our Panzertruppen. The previous attack energy and spirit will be weakened and lost due to a feeling of inferiority. The Pz crews know that they can already be knocked out at long range… and that they can achieve only a very minimal effect… at close range.”

So an effective gun not only makes the fighting force more potent, but apparently it also affects the effectiveness and moral of the squishy parts inside the tank. Go figure!!

An earlier development of the L/60 would have pointed them in the right direction much sooner. The net effect of that outcome would have been the ability to reach a workable solution before it was too late, which BTW is what actually happened.

By starting with the 3.7 cm gun, the ordnance department was setting the tone for future tank development, and this would also feed into a false sense of security after the Poland campaign. Reading post-Poland reports, the 3.7 cm gun was seen as good based on the battle experiences at that time and place. Little did those reporting know how inadequate the 3.7 cm gun would become in just a few short months. Had the Pz IIIE started with the short barrel 5 cm so that the first gun upgrade it saw was the L/60, the post-Poland reports would have said the same thing, but the L/60 would have also been tested on the battlefield at a very important juncture of the war. The gun is good, but we need something better. Better still would have been for the PzIII to start out with the L/60, even if that meant delaying the PzIII’s approval.

I will close with this, no German WWII tank crew ever said they like/want/desire to go into battle without an effective gun. Please provide a source that shows German tank crews wanted a turret over an effective gun/weapon system. If you don’t provide me your references here following this request, I will understand that you are simply making all of this up, because if I recall what happened the last time you quoted something… the author found it bearable to have up to half of the allotment of vehicles in a Panzer-Abteilung to be StuG’s.

[LachenKrieg]

You would have to explain how the russian forces used in the offensive would have been significantly attritted so the offensive would be far less successful. And that implies placing these more potent German forces you are talking about near enough to the russian ofensive forces. And there is the problem. Fuel was a major inhiting factor from the beginning of Fall Blau. Detailed logistical data of 6 Army show this major problem.
viewtopic.php?f=55&t=268007&start=210

Yes fuel was a problem for certain. I already agreed with that. But what are you going on about? Are you serious? Do me a favor and review the history on Germany's summer offensive in 1942, then come back here and tell me how many Russian forces were destroyed in that campaign. Remember that was done with a low supply of fuel as you pointed out, along with a fighting force that often required flanking maneuvers. How much fuel does that use?

At any rate Aida, it appears that the Russian forces were significantly attrtited even with a fuel shortage. The fuel shortage caused the Germans down time, which didn't help them, it hurt them. It lengthened the time it took to engage the enemy, which lead to winter, which made a big boo-boo...

But what is your point, you mean the German's won almost every armored engagement in the summer of 1942 while experiencing a severe fuel shortage, but having a more potent fighting force would had made their situation worse? Yes fuel was a problem, and increasing the time needed to conduct the campaign only made that worse.

You posed a specific question concerning the outcome at Stalingrad and i gave you a specific answer.
Concerning the campaign of 1942 in the south in general , your WI would not significantly change matters as there were far more important factors at work. The red army not allowing itself not to be encircled anymore was a major factor which prevented decisive defeats. Going for the Caucasus without having decisively defeated the red army and the weakness of the allied armies having to hold a very long front was another major factor.
Having more firepower would be a minor detail. I would also like to point out that 6 Army regularly had to request air suppply of ammo for the 7,5 cm long guns as it suffered shortages in this type of ammo.

No actually what I did was gave an answer to a suggestion you made, but you ignored it. In answer to the new suggestion, first off I think what you meant to say was "Axis armies having to hold a very long front as another major factor". But like your fuel shortage suggestion, a more potent force is what would be needed to compensate for the very long front line. Having a less potent fighting force causes more strain on a limited fuel supply, in the same way a less potent fighting force would cause more strain on a very long front line. I would also like to say that 6 Army regularly had to request air supply of food....

You are not making sense here.You did not adress the problem that the red army evaded encirclements and for that reason was not decisiveily beaten in the summer. More firepower does not change that particularly not having more slow stugs. Only different operational decisions could have changed that and more fuel. And in order for 6 Army to do better when the red army offensive happened in november, it needed to be able to move its mobile reserves fast enough which was impossible because of the lack of fuel. And that problem was caused by the railroad problems behind it. Having more 75 mm long guns does not solve that problem, neither does it solve the other problem which is that inferior allied armies were holding long stretches of front.
And i did notice in the logistical data of 6 Army a regular lack of 7,5 cm long ammo. For more guns you need more ammo too.

Hi Aida.

I’m sorry, but I can’t say your logic make sense to me either.

Did you even read what you posted regarding the use of StuG’s? I asked you to read it again hoping that might clear up your confusion, but it seems to have only caused even more confusion. Can you please give me the source you referenced for the use of Stug’s. I just want to be sure we are on the same page in terms of context. From where did you copy that text?

But anyway, where does it say in the text you quoted that StuG’s could not be used in mobile offensive and counter offensive operations? Have you ever heard of Schnell truppen?

And BTW, motorized infantry were meant to accompany tanks as well. So this is not something specific to just the use of StuG’s. German doctrine was very much a combined arms model. What the text you quoted is outlining are ideal operational guidelines. The author’s guidelines call for StuG’s to have infantry support, and yet the reality of what actually happened was StuG units had to frequently operate independent from infantry support. And this happened before and after they were up-gunned. And all that’s happening now in 2023 is you and Richard seem to have the same reading/comprehension problem.

And none of this has any relevance to the WI anyway. Operational guidelines for the use of StuG’s has nothing to do with Germany continuing production of turreted Pz III’s, or whether they are replaced by StuG’s.

But before I get into the quote you provided, I will repeat that Panzer Divisions were Guderian’s baby. There is nothing strange for him to support the value of those Divisions. It is exactly what one would expect.

So to start, you might notice that the information collected in the questionnaires of the reports Richard quoted were likely used as the source for the document you quoted. Points 3b & 3c for example were stated, but can hardly be considered absolute truth. The StuG can fire in all direction by traversing its hull. The StuG would also be equipped with a MG for close combat requirements. Granted a turreted vehicle offers more flexibility in this regard, it could also be said that the StuG simplified communications because the entire crew is always oriented in the same direction as the targeting system. A lot of this comes down to crew training, but hull travers was usually faster than turret travers in WWII German tanks.

And if you actually read anything from this information, I am assuming it must have been points 4 and 5. As I already said, StuG units were in fact required to operate without infantry, and while these recommendations may have been the current way of thinking at the time of writing, it may also simply be how the guy in charge of tank Divisions maintained tanks as the priority in written communications. In 1943, he was not only facing problems keeping his Divisions filled, but must have quite literally been feeling the effects of an underpowered tank force and the effects that was having on his PanzerTurppen. The Pz III was the biggest contributor to that problem.

But point 5 goes on to state that StuG’s are to be used in the front as a setting force, while Pz III/IV’s flank, which was almost the only way the PzIII could be used against T34/KV tanks. And point 6 states StuG’s are to be used like tanks. So what in this information tells you that using the Pz III chassis to make a more effective weapon wouldn’t work? At best, all you could claim is that if Pz III chassis production was used to make long barrelled StuG’s, this is how they should be deployed. But I am really interested to know Aida what it is in this information that you feel supports your ill prepared counter-argument against the WI being suggested here.

Now back to making sense about Russian forces avoiding encirclement. Lets recap. Your first point was regarding a lack of fuel. And while this is very true, the way you are trying to tie it into your counter-argument is not.

First of all the WI does not have to make any special considerations for the lack of fuel, because the lack of fuel existed regardless of what Germany did with its Pz III chassis production.

Moreover, a less potent fighting force could only make the lack of fuel worse, because instead of being able to engage the enemy right in front of you from 1200 m away, you now have to drive extended distances to maneuver into a flanking position just to get a reliable shot if your in a Pz III. This takes time and poses a greater risk to the tank crew. The longer you have an Army committed to the battlefield, the more fuel and supply it will use. Just the fuel needed to deliver the increased supply will make the situation worse. And drawn out over a large number of battles and over many months, the extra fuel and supply consumed would have to be significant. So while fuel supply was a serious problem, continuing production of ineffective Pz III tanks could only add to that problem, not help or limit it.

Then you brought up the long Front line and the weak Axis forces allied with Germany that were tasked with protecting the flank. Again, a more potent fighting force over time would help reduce enemy strength, which in turn would help reduce pressure on the poorly equipped forces protecting the flanks.

Now you are suggesting that because the Red Army avoided encirclement, my WI must now address the problem of an unbeaten enemy. Okay so lets start from there. How does having a less potent fighting force make the situation better then it would be under the WI? In other words, how would a more potent fighting force not improve the situation?

So if we look at June 30th when 6 Army joined in the offensive, it met tough resistance and having stalled, was unable to reach its objective for 2 days. In that fighting, 23 Pz in particular was reported as suffering heavy losses. So what was 23 Pz strength? According to Forczyk (Stalingrad 1942-43 (1)), the 23 Pz had 138 armoured vehicles at the start of the offensive, of which 34 were Pz III Lg, and 10 were Pz IV Lg barrel. The rest were short barrelled PzIII/IV, and Pz II’s.

That makes just 7% of its tank force capable of penetrating a T34’s frontal armour. That doesn’t seem a little low to you?

The 3 Pz was slightly better off with just 40 and 12 Pz III/IV Lg barrel tanks respectively. But neither the 23 Pz, or the 3 Pz were able to break through. What actually makes it through first were the infantry Divisions of 8 Army Corps and their tank destroyers, which had..., you guessed it, potent guns. Go figure right?

Then after the breakthrough, the tank hunters of those infantry units were able to repulse a counter-attack by the 13th tank Corps. Clearly the 23 Pz, having just 7% of its tank force being capable of effectively dealing with enemy tanks at long range, it was not only unable to breach enemy defenses to reach its objective, but having stalled out it suffered heavy losses. If 23 Pz would have had 138 long barrel 7.5 cm guns for example, logic dictates that the increased striking force would have allowed it to fair much better. Increasing the chance of making a rapid breakthrough would also significantly increase the chance of encircling the enemy. Speed is often an important element of encircling an enemy force. Oh and BTW, having a shortage of ammunition is not an argument to explain why a better gun isn't better. Maybe part of the solution Aida could have been for Germany to stop making the ineffective 5 cm ammunition right after it stopped making the ineffective 5 cm gun.

Oh and BTW, what does slow StuG’s mean? They had the same speed capabilities as a Pz III. So now its your turn to address the fact that your counter-argument has no supporting logic. All this WI is suggesting is that WWII Germany use the resources it had to make more effective weapons to improve its situation. The WI scenario would potentially help limit supply shortages by decreasing the time it takes to complete offensive maneuvers, contribute to further weakening enemy forces and the threat it poses, as well as improve Germany’s chances of winning the battlefield objectives.

[LachenKrieg]

IMO it was the diversion of forces that was the problem... not what kind of armor got diverted. From the original post question that is.

dgfred, thanks for your reply.

Yes good point, the guy at the top does seem to make all sorts of errors. But how do you pick which one had the most effect? Yes dividing his forces proved to be fatal. But so was his decision to commit to a multi-front war, which apparently went against his own rule not to. And what about his decision to enter Stalingrad? According to Forczyk, the original plan for summer 1942 was to bring stalingrad’s industrial complex within artillery range while continuing on to secure oil in the south, not to get bogged down in a full-blown street fight. IMO, all of these attached events combined are what resulted in the history as we know it. But this WI isn’t meant to address all of these errors in judgment. It simply calls for a change in two main points in order to affect an alternate history. The first being the efficient use of resources to produce more effective weapons systems, and the other was for Germany’s leadership to show enough common sense to be able to recognize the warning signs in good time that were clearly visible.

[Peter89]

Sorry for taking so long....

No problem, I was not bating my breath.

Jentz was the technical editor to one of the citations I gave, so where are you going with this?... Nowhere?

Let me ask you the same question. You brought Spielberger as of he was the be all and end all. I brought up Jentz's contradiction of Spielberger's infallibility. So where are you going with "Jentz was the technical editor to one of the citations I gave, so where are you going with this?... Nowhere?"

I don't know about Schnellturppen requirements for tanks, but going back to the 4 reports you cited earlier, was it the first or the second report where the author (Panzertruppen) states he finds it tolerable if up to 50% of the allocated vehicles were filled with StuG's? The principle concern was fire power, and you can get a clear sense of this in just about anything ever written on the subject. What was repeated in numerous reports is that German tank crews were aware of the need for more fire power.

Yet again, despite that less than ringing endorsement, nothing came of it. The Schnelltruppen wanted tanks and when it became the Panzertruppen they still wanted tanks. A tank is a versatile offensive and defensive weapon, an assault gun is not.

BTW, those reports were two years into the campaign and a year and a half from the end of the war...you'd think if it was an acceptable solution we would have seen more Sturmgeschütz used by the Panzertruppen but we don't. I wonder why?

And the long barrel gun is the reason why the StuG became so heavily relied on until the end of the war.

So heavily relied upon by the Infanterie, not by the Panzertruppen. It continued to supply the infantry with the accompanying gun as well as gave them a useful antitank capability.

But I don't think it is so strange that StuG's weren't part of Gudarien's PanzerWaffe, because they weren't. They came under the control of a different branch in the same way the initial Panzer IV as an infantry support vehicle came under the Panzerwaffe.

Er, no, sorry but you are confused. The initial Panzer IV was not "an infantry support vehicle" and that was not why it came under the Schnelltruppen (as the Panzerwaffe was known then). It was a Panzer, the required mittlere Panzer complementing the leichte Panzer (Panzer III) in the Panzer Division. It was precisely because it was never intended as an infantry support vehicle that the Sturmgeschütz was designed for that role.

And yes, the best solution would have been for Germany to make thousands of Panther tanks to drive alongside its PzIV's, but that would be even less plausible and is not what this WI is about.

No, Germany did make "thousands of Panther tanks to drive alongside its PzIV's" so obviously while plausible - it happened after all - that was not the best solution. Perhaps a better solution was not to enter into a multi-front conflict with an immature weapons system and a partially mobilized industrial infrastructure to support it.

And what you are hiding behind are simply the historical decisions that were taken.

Not at all. I am simply asking why an entrenched bureaucracy, with an accepted doctrine and huge sunk costs would suddenly change course in such a radical manner. Why after seven years of development, success in Poland and France, and near success in BARBAROSSA, would they suddenly decide to dump the Panzer and embrace the Sturmgeschütz? Because its potential firepower was better? When armored vehicle design was and still is a series of compromise? The turreted tank - the Panzer - was then and still is the more desirable choice, even if a non-turreted tank can carry more firepower.

Why would an earlier deployment of the Panzer III with 5cm L60 change anything? The Germans were already well aware of the need for bigger guns, why else was the 7.5cm KwK/StuK/PaK 40 already in the wings?

Spielberger is the be all to end all?

Where did I say that?

This probably won’t come as a shock to you but I’m going to keep reading what people like Spielberger put out there. He’s not just some errand boy to the assistant editor at a company called Dopey you know!?

Almost every single exchange we have Richard seems like a conflict instead of us expressing our point of view mostly because you keep spewing BS. If you haven’t noticed by now,… it offends me!

Look, you suggested something that I didn’t think was accurate, so all I did was provide a couple simple quotes to support why. Spielberger was just one of the citations, and not because I think he is the be all to end all. Chamberlain and Doyle are the authors to the other citation I gave, for which Jentz is the technical editor. And according to Speilberger, Jentz contributed a number of chapters in his volume “Strumgeschutz & its Variants”. So yeah, I am wondering a little where your going with this?

Just to make myself clear, Schnelltruppen translated means motorized, or mobile troops and can also refer to motorized infantry. So in my way of thinking, Schnelltruppen still existed even after armoured troops became a thing. But back in 1937, armoured troops didn’t know what a tank was, let alone know they needed one.

And you talk of those reports you cited as if they support what you are saying when they don’t. Thats the weird part for me. You quote something like that on an internet forum claiming it means something it clearly doesn’t….?

And BTW, when you are talking about an institution the size of a military, let alone the German military of WWII, things are likely a little more complicated then what you seem to be implying. The answer to your question was probably influenced by a number of factors let alone the events that happened as the war progressed, like Allied bombers flattening what little industry Germany thought it had.

And BTW you are simply wrong, because StuG’s (Battalions/Brigades) were very welcomed additions to the Panzer Divisions, and were heavily used.

I don’t remember the posters name, but in the Panzer III “WHAT IF” you previously mentioned where the suggestion was to modify it, someone made a negative comment about tank crews and StuG crews working together. I can’t remember exactly how the poster worded it, but it struck me as being funny because I had just read about that same issue in the StuG book by Bork. The reason given in the book was quite different though, apparently tank crews would often ask StuG crews to deal with an opposing tank threat. I am assuming probably because of their “Tank Hunter” role. And it makes sense to me when I consider the fact that most tank crews on the Eastern Front were in a Pz III or worse. What could be more frightening then having to go up against an armoured opponent you know you have little-to-no-chance of defeating? The StuG book claims this point did create tension between tank crews and StuG crews though. The StuG proved itself in both offensive and defensive roles, and I am pretty confident you wouldn’t have to look too hard to find that out for yourself.

The 3 tasks for tanks were stated as supporting infantry, taking part in a combined arms force, and combating tanks. The PzIV was the infantry support part of that equation. The Pz III was supposed to be the main battle tank with the armour penetrating weapon. And agin Richard, I find it hard to believe that you don’t know this, which makes me wonder if your entire contribution here isn’t some sort of a joke. But what ever the case may be, you can now go back to your question about why the StuG wasn’t part of the PanzerWaffe… And then ask yourself what the point of making two vehicles carrying the same gun was for? This isn’t for my benefit, because I’m not that one asking the question, you are.

So first your argument is based on the premise that they needed more tanks, now your trying to claim they made all the Panthers they needed? By my count they would have still been short had they made 1000 more than they did. And BTW, the Panther was armed with a very capable gun. Had the Germans been able to make 1 Panther for every 2 T34’s, it would have had a very noticeable effect, but thats just stating the obvious.

I would really like to have a good exchange with you Richard, but you make that proposition very hard to do. Your last comment is better though.

So why? For starters, the speed of technological development driven by the fight for survival became the order of the day. So from that perspective doctrines and sunk costs mean very little! Whats needed is you go back to the drawing board if that’s the only path to survival. Things were so vastly different in 1941 from the way they were during the Poland/France campaigns, and different yet again each year following that it made the entire experiment in warfare an outlier. What they faced in Poland, and even France was just not the same anymore by 1941, and it never would be again. The question of why any country would want to improve its wartime situation should be self evident. But it is clear by asking that you are ignorant to the serious issue this was causing.

Both volumes of Jentz’s Panzer Truppen are littered with accounts that can provide answers to your questions. We can read reports that tell how poor gun performance caused an increase use of ammunition, or how the effectiveness of armour can affect a tank crews moral. As an example, see the report on page 205 which states;

“… the absolute superiority of the Russian 26 ton and 52 ton tanks over our Pz III/IV was felt. The Russian tanks… opened fire with their 7.62 cm guns… already at a range of 1000 meters…”. “Our 5 cm guns can achieve penetrations only on vulnerable locations under very special favorable conditions at very close ranges under 50 meters. …Our Pz’s are already knocked out at a range of several hundred meters…”.

But the important effect of this is found later in the report on page 208 in the following:

“The available facts and, above all, the impression that the Russians are aware of the technical superiority of their tank force must work out in time to be detrimental to our Panzertruppen. The previous attack energy and spirit will be weakened and lost due to a feeling of inferiority. The Pz crews know that they can already be knocked out at long range… and that they can achieve only a very minimal effect… at close range.”

So an effective gun not only makes the fighting force more potent, but apparently it also affects the effectiveness and moral of the squishy parts inside the tank. Go figure!!

An earlier development of the L/60 would have pointed them in the right direction much sooner. The net effect of that outcome would have been the ability to reach a workable solution before it was too late, which BTW is what actually happened.

By starting with the 3.7 cm gun, the ordnance department was setting the tone for future tank development, and this would also feed into a false sense of security after the Poland campaign. Reading post-Poland reports, the 3.7 cm gun was seen as good based on the battle experiences at that time and place. Little did those reporting know how inadequate the 3.7 cm gun would become in just a few short months. Had the Pz IIIE started with the short barrel 5 cm so that the first gun upgrade it saw was the L/60, the post-Poland reports would have said the same thing, but the L/60 would have also been tested on the battlefield at a very important juncture of the war. The gun is good, but we need something better. Better still would have been for the PzIII to start out with the L/60, even if that meant delaying the PzIII’s approval.

I will close with this, no German WWII tank crew ever said they like/want/desire to go into battle without an effective gun. Please provide a source that shows German tank crews wanted a turret over an effective gun/weapon system. If you don’t provide me your references here following this request, I will understand that you are simply making all of this up, because if I recall what happened the last time you quoted something… the author found it bearable to have up to half of the allotment of vehicles in a Panzer-Abteilung to be StuG’s.

I think I get your point now. You've read mission reports about how the low performance of the German AFV guns affected the combat experiences of certain German troops. Then you probably thought, what if we remove these negative effects, how would that add to the combat performance of the German troops? And you arrived to the conclusion that it might have affected the outcome of the entire Eastern Front.

I guess you simply need to change your focus and put what you've read at Jentz into context. Of course mission reports are not going to talk about the big picture, the production, the maintenance, the statistical analysis of large operations and such. You probably need to read a lot about these contexts of the war if you are to claim that an entire theatre might be different as a result of your WI.

Or alternatively, you can narrow down the effects of your WI claiming that "what if the Germans had better guns in this or that engagement - they might have won it with them". Otherwise you have to address the big picture and make a connection between the level of the mission reports and that of strategy.

[PunctuationHorror]

After 6 pages mostly dealing with anything else but the proposed topic, I will go back to the opening post:

Pz III is up-gunned with the 5.0 cm L/60 in 1940 before the start of operation Barbarossa.

Ok. Let's assume just that. For whatever reason, let's just call it divine intervention, Barbarossa starts with those upgunned Pz III tanks.

Little reminder for all those gymnasts here who do not understand the meaning of 'What if': It's all phantasy. An experiment of thought.

Basic questions are:
How much better is the 'new' 50mm L60 compared to the 'old' 50mm and 37mm gun in Pz III?
What is the impact?
Can we quantify it? If we can quantify it, we have the prerequisites to be able to make statements about the impact. At all.

Maybe a very rough starting point for modeling would be something along:
An average Pz III gunner with 50mm L60 needs x rounds to kill an enemy tank.
An average Pz III gunner with 50mm Lwhatever needs y rounds to kill an enemy tank.
An average Pz III gunner with 37mm Lwhatever needs z rounds to kill an enemy tank.
Therefore, an average Pz III with 50mm L60 could kill 30%, 50%, 100%, 200%, ... more enemy tanks than an average Pz III without 50mm L60 gun.

Then extrapolate this on all Pz III and their kills in OTL (real data needed). That's how you get a guess for this What if scenario.

Then refine it, step by step.

What would this mean for survivability? For tactics? For advance? For defense? For the enemy? ... ... ...

-----------------
Next point:

all Pz III chassis produced after September 1941 are utilized for what is to become the long barrel StuG III.

Now it is 75mm L48 against 50mm L60. How many more (or less) enemy tanks, vehicles, .... can be knocked out with 75mm L48 compared to 50mm L60?

How many StuG can be produced in this What if? Wow many more than Pz III in OTL? What will be the ratio of OTL Pz III vs What if StuG? 1:1, 1:1.1, 1:1.2, ... ?
StuG is turretless. Turretless means that it needs more time to aim which means a longer time between spotting and engaging an enemy. This means a higher chance to get killed.
Stug has no machine gunner in the hull which translates to a diminished survivability and has no extra radio operator which reduces coordination and cooperation with other tanks/stugs/AFVs. Which again translates into a diminished survivability.
However, long Stug has a lower silhouette and bigger range. And a 75mm grenade transports more explosives than a 50mm grenade, so it could be more effective against soft targets.

Need to include all this to get a somewhat correct assessment.

<something something Fall Blau, splitting forces, Heeresgruppe A, B, Stalingrad, Caucasus, ... >

Maybe later when we have numbers to work with. Without those numbers it is worthless squabble sans method and significance.


However, I think 'What if Barbarossa starts with Pz III 50mm L60?' is kind of the wrong question. A better question would be: What if the German Army Armaments Bureau Bastards decide in 1935 to order their Pz III with 75mm L40,8 gun. The gun they wanted (and got delivered) in the Bussing halftrack Panzerjager prototypes. See 'German Half Track Vehicles' by Spielberger.
Then they'll start Barbarossa with Pz III 75mm L40,8 and certanly can upgun them to 75mm L42, L48, ... L60 (btw why did this length not exist?).

You really have to wrap your head around this: GAABB did request a 75mm AT gun for an AT halftrack as early as 1934/35 (!) while giving orders for a 37mm AT gun for their future main tank model, specifically intended for AT role. Bureaucratic schizophrenia at its best - or, more likely - GAABB actually worked for the armaments industry. Sales will be higher if the equipment you sell becomes obsolete faster. Why sell once, if you can sell several times? xP

[LachenKrieg]

Sorry for taking so long....

No problem, I was not bating my breath.

Jentz was the technical editor to one of the citations I gave, so where are you going with this?... Nowhere?

Let me ask you the same question. You brought Spielberger as of he was the be all and end all. I brought up Jentz's contradiction of Spielberger's infallibility. So where are you going with "Jentz was the technical editor to one of the citations I gave, so where are you going with this?... Nowhere?"

I don't know about Schnellturppen requirements for tanks, but going back to the 4 reports you cited earlier, was it the first or the second report where the author (Panzertruppen) states he finds it tolerable if up to 50% of the allocated vehicles were filled with StuG's? The principle concern was fire power, and you can get a clear sense of this in just about anything ever written on the subject. What was repeated in numerous reports is that German tank crews were aware of the need for more fire power.

Yet again, despite that less than ringing endorsement, nothing came of it. The Schnelltruppen wanted tanks and when it became the Panzertruppen they still wanted tanks. A tank is a versatile offensive and defensive weapon, an assault gun is not.

BTW, those reports were two years into the campaign and a year and a half from the end of the war...you'd think if it was an acceptable solution we would have seen more Sturmgeschütz used by the Panzertruppen but we don't. I wonder why?

And the long barrel gun is the reason why the StuG became so heavily relied on until the end of the war.

So heavily relied upon by the Infanterie, not by the Panzertruppen. It continued to supply the infantry with the accompanying gun as well as gave them a useful antitank capability.

But I don't think it is so strange that StuG's weren't part of Gudarien's PanzerWaffe, because they weren't. They came under the control of a different branch in the same way the initial Panzer IV as an infantry support vehicle came under the Panzerwaffe.

Er, no, sorry but you are confused. The initial Panzer IV was not "an infantry support vehicle" and that was not why it came under the Schnelltruppen (as the Panzerwaffe was known then). It was a Panzer, the required mittlere Panzer complementing the leichte Panzer (Panzer III) in the Panzer Division. It was precisely because it was never intended as an infantry support vehicle that the Sturmgeschütz was designed for that role.

And yes, the best solution would have been for Germany to make thousands of Panther tanks to drive alongside its PzIV's, but that would be even less plausible and is not what this WI is about.

No, Germany did make "thousands of Panther tanks to drive alongside its PzIV's" so obviously while plausible - it happened after all - that was not the best solution. Perhaps a better solution was not to enter into a multi-front conflict with an immature weapons system and a partially mobilized industrial infrastructure to support it.

And what you are hiding behind are simply the historical decisions that were taken.

Not at all. I am simply asking why an entrenched bureaucracy, with an accepted doctrine and huge sunk costs would suddenly change course in such a radical manner. Why after seven years of development, success in Poland and France, and near success in BARBAROSSA, would they suddenly decide to dump the Panzer and embrace the Sturmgeschütz? Because its potential firepower was better? When armored vehicle design was and still is a series of compromise? The turreted tank - the Panzer - was then and still is the more desirable choice, even if a non-turreted tank can carry more firepower.

Why would an earlier deployment of the Panzer III with 5cm L60 change anything? The Germans were already well aware of the need for bigger guns, why else was the 7.5cm KwK/StuK/PaK 40 already in the wings?

Spielberger is the be all to end all?

Where did I say that?

This probably won’t come as a shock to you but I’m going to keep reading what people like Spielberger put out there. He’s not just some errand boy to the assistant editor at a company called Dopey you know!?

Almost every single exchange we have Richard seems like a conflict instead of us expressing our point of view mostly because you keep spewing BS. If you haven’t noticed by now,… it offends me!

Look, you suggested something that I didn’t think was accurate, so all I did was provide a couple simple quotes to support why. Spielberger was just one of the citations, and not because I think he is the be all to end all. Chamberlain and Doyle are the authors to the other citation I gave, for which Jentz is the technical editor. And according to Speilberger, Jentz contributed a number of chapters in his volume “Strumgeschutz & its Variants”. So yeah, I am wondering a little where your going with this?

Just to make myself clear, Schnelltruppen translated means motorized, or mobile troops and can also refer to motorized infantry. So in my way of thinking, Schnelltruppen still existed even after armoured troops became a thing. But back in 1937, armoured troops didn’t know what a tank was, let alone know they needed one.

And you talk of those reports you cited as if they support what you are saying when they don’t. Thats the weird part for me. You quote something like that on an internet forum claiming it means something it clearly doesn’t….?

And BTW, when you are talking about an institution the size of a military, let alone the German military of WWII, things are likely a little more complicated then what you seem to be implying. The answer to your question was probably influenced by a number of factors let alone the events that happened as the war progressed, like Allied bombers flattening what little industry Germany thought it had.

And BTW you are simply wrong, because StuG’s (Battalions/Brigades) were very welcomed additions to the Panzer Divisions, and were heavily used.

I don’t remember the posters name, but in the Panzer III “WHAT IF” you previously mentioned where the suggestion was to modify it, someone made a negative comment about tank crews and StuG crews working together. I can’t remember exactly how the poster worded it, but it struck me as being funny because I had just read about that same issue in the StuG book by Bork. The reason given in the book was quite different though, apparently tank crews would often ask StuG crews to deal with an opposing tank threat. I am assuming probably because of their “Tank Hunter” role. And it makes sense to me when I consider the fact that most tank crews on the Eastern Front were in a Pz III or worse. What could be more frightening then having to go up against an armoured opponent you know you have little-to-no-chance of defeating? The StuG book claims this point did create tension between tank crews and StuG crews though. The StuG proved itself in both offensive and defensive roles, and I am pretty confident you wouldn’t have to look too hard to find that out for yourself.

The 3 tasks for tanks were stated as supporting infantry, taking part in a combined arms force, and combating tanks. The PzIV was the infantry support part of that equation. The Pz III was supposed to be the main battle tank with the armour penetrating weapon. And agin Richard, I find it hard to believe that you don’t know this, which makes me wonder if your entire contribution here isn’t some sort of a joke. But what ever the case may be, you can now go back to your question about why the StuG wasn’t part of the PanzerWaffe… And then ask yourself what the point of making two vehicles carrying the same gun was for? This isn’t for my benefit, because I’m not that one asking the question, you are.

So first your argument is based on the premise that they needed more tanks, now your trying to claim they made all the Panthers they needed? By my count they would have still been short had they made 1000 more than they did. And BTW, the Panther was armed with a very capable gun. Had the Germans been able to make 1 Panther for every 2 T34’s, it would have had a very noticeable effect, but thats just stating the obvious.

I would really like to have a good exchange with you Richard, but you make that proposition very hard to do. Your last comment is better though.

So why? For starters, the speed of technological development driven by the fight for survival became the order of the day. So from that perspective doctrines and sunk costs mean very little! Whats needed is you go back to the drawing board if that’s the only path to survival. Things were so vastly different in 1941 from the way they were during the Poland/France campaigns, and different yet again each year following that it made the entire experiment in warfare an outlier. What they faced in Poland, and even France was just not the same anymore by 1941, and it never would be again. The question of why any country would want to improve its wartime situation should be self evident. But it is clear by asking that you are ignorant to the serious issue this was causing.

Both volumes of Jentz’s Panzer Truppen are littered with accounts that can provide answers to your questions. We can read reports that tell how poor gun performance caused an increase use of ammunition, or how the effectiveness of armour can affect a tank crews moral. As an example, see the report on page 205 which states;

“… the absolute superiority of the Russian 26 ton and 52 ton tanks over our Pz III/IV was felt. The Russian tanks… opened fire with their 7.62 cm guns… already at a range of 1000 meters…”. “Our 5 cm guns can achieve penetrations only on vulnerable locations under very special favorable conditions at very close ranges under 50 meters. …Our Pz’s are already knocked out at a range of several hundred meters…”.

But the important effect of this is found later in the report on page 208 in the following:

“The available facts and, above all, the impression that the Russians are aware of the technical superiority of their tank force must work out in time to be detrimental to our Panzertruppen. The previous attack energy and spirit will be weakened and lost due to a feeling of inferiority. The Pz crews know that they can already be knocked out at long range… and that they can achieve only a very minimal effect… at close range.”

So an effective gun not only makes the fighting force more potent, but apparently it also affects the effectiveness and moral of the squishy parts inside the tank. Go figure!!

An earlier development of the L/60 would have pointed them in the right direction much sooner. The net effect of that outcome would have been the ability to reach a workable solution before it was too late, which BTW is what actually happened.

By starting with the 3.7 cm gun, the ordnance department was setting the tone for future tank development, and this would also feed into a false sense of security after the Poland campaign. Reading post-Poland reports, the 3.7 cm gun was seen as good based on the battle experiences at that time and place. Little did those reporting know how inadequate the 3.7 cm gun would become in just a few short months. Had the Pz IIIE started with the short barrel 5 cm so that the first gun upgrade it saw was the L/60, the post-Poland reports would have said the same thing, but the L/60 would have also been tested on the battlefield at a very important juncture of the war. The gun is good, but we need something better. Better still would have been for the PzIII to start out with the L/60, even if that meant delaying the PzIII’s approval.

I will close with this, no German WWII tank crew ever said they like/want/desire to go into battle without an effective gun. Please provide a source that shows German tank crews wanted a turret over an effective gun/weapon system. If you don’t provide me your references here following this request, I will understand that you are simply making all of this up, because if I recall what happened the last time you quoted something… the author found it bearable to have up to half of the allotment of vehicles in a Panzer-Abteilung to be StuG’s.

I think I get your point now. You've read mission reports about how the low performance of the German AFV guns affected the combat experiences of certain German troops. Then you probably thought, what if we remove these negative effects, how would that add to the combat performance of the German troops? And you arrived to the conclusion that it might have affected the outcome of the entire Eastern Front.

I guess you simply need to change your focus and put what you've read at Jentz into context. Of course mission reports are not going to talk about the big picture, the production, the maintenance, the statistical analysis of large operations and such. You probably need to read a lot about these contexts of the war if you are to claim that an entire theatre might be different as a result of your WI.

Or alternatively, you can narrow down the effects of your WI claiming that "what if the Germans had better guns in this or that engagement - they might have won it with them". Otherwise you have to address the big picture and make a connection between the level of the mission reports and that of strategy.

No sadly Peter it appears you still haven't gotten my point at all.

The above posts are simply in response to what Richard and Aida's counter-arguments were, some of which was based on misquoted information, or poorly constructed claims. And on that point, I think both you and Aida have also got the problem inverted here because I am still waiting for a credible counter-argument to the WI.

But speaking of focus, maybe try adjusting your own lens because the main point here seems to be flying right over your head. The exampled battle I gave was simply to demonstrate a point, but its obvious the negative effects an under powered attacking force has on the outcome of not just a single battle, but of all the battles that make up a war are being grossly underestimated in your argument. Just because a battle was won, or a single objective to a campaign was made doesn't mean there were no negative effects. You still have to ask "AT WHAT COST?"

The big picture here is that changing from a weaker fighting force to a much stronger fighting force will affect all the points you raised like production, logistics, maintenance, and, and because it will have an effect on all the input variables that go into defining them. Take the attrition rate of experienced tank crews as an example. As a single factor, I am hoping we can at least agree on its significance in terms of the ability to wage war. Manpower with experience right?

It should be more than obvious to anyone interested that the effectiveness of a tanks gun would have to somehow be connected to the attrition rate of its crew. Sending a tank crew into armored battle without an effective weapon system would be analogous to sending them into a lions den with nothing but their bare hands. The expected losses in this analogy should be obvious. Give the men a bow-and-arrow, and the expected losses should be significantly reduced. Give them handguns, and losses should be nil. The point being the weapon system used should be equal to, or exceed the capabilities of the anticipated threat.

The German Army relied on superior battlefield tactics to overcome a numerically superior, more potent fighting force (T34/KV). And while this may have appeared to be working on the surface during early stages, attrition would reveal the error in this thinking during later periods of the war as German losses mounted and Russian production capacity continued to climb. Maintaining production of the Pz III/IV chassis was important for Germany because more than anything it needed to keep its numbers up. But using the Pz III/IV chassis to make effective weapon systems out of the limited resources Germany had was just as important, if not more so.

German forces proved they could advance the front line, so the problem wasn't winning battles per se, it was more the men and material costs it took to do so. As a WI, we can never be fully satisfied, but if we consider the battles won and the amount of territory taken with the number of under powered weapons used in a lot of those battles, logic dictates that a more potent striking force could have only improved on their successes, not made it worse.

Other factors that would be a force multiplier to the better gun scenario are the other associated advantages of German tanks. Those being mainly vision, communication, and the resulting improved situational awareness. Combining the effects of improved situational awareness with the effects of a more powerful gun can have devastating effects, and again could only help improve the situation, not make it worse.

The improved situation of the WI however does not imply that Germany could have won the war, because I don't believe there was anyway for that to happen given the multi-front war that took place. But an improved situation would have most likely resulted in a front line that look different by the end of 1941, and again in 1942. It is possible for example that German forces could have reached Stalingrad sooner, making its capture a possibility. More specifically, the WI proposes that Germany would have likely been able to avoid the encirclement at Stalingrad and the total collapse of the Eastern Front that followed.

[Aida1]

Yes fuel was a problem for certain. I already agreed with that. But what are you going on about? Are you serious? Do me a favor and review the history on Germany's summer offensive in 1942, then come back here and tell me how many Russian forces were destroyed in that campaign. Remember that was done with a low supply of fuel as you pointed out, along with a fighting force that often required flanking maneuvers. How much fuel does that use?

At any rate Aida, it appears that the Russian forces were significantly attrtited even with a fuel shortage. The fuel shortage caused the Germans down time, which didn't help them, it hurt them. It lengthened the time it took to engage the enemy, which lead to winter, which made a big boo-boo...

But what is your point, you mean the German's won almost every armored engagement in the summer of 1942 while experiencing a severe fuel shortage, but having a more potent fighting force would had made their situation worse? Yes fuel was a problem, and increasing the time needed to conduct the campaign only made that worse.

You posed a specific question concerning the outcome at Stalingrad and i gave you a specific answer.
Concerning the campaign of 1942 in the south in general , your WI would not significantly change matters as there were far more important factors at work. The red army not allowing itself not to be encircled anymore was a major factor which prevented decisive defeats. Going for the Caucasus without having decisively defeated the red army and the weakness of the allied armies having to hold a very long front was another major factor.
Having more firepower would be a minor detail. I would also like to point out that 6 Army regularly had to request air suppply of ammo for the 7,5 cm long guns as it suffered shortages in this type of ammo.

No actually what I did was gave an answer to a suggestion you made, but you ignored it. In answer to the new suggestion, first off I think what you meant to say was "Axis armies having to hold a very long front as another major factor". But like your fuel shortage suggestion, a more potent force is what would be needed to compensate for the very long front line. Having a less potent fighting force causes more strain on a limited fuel supply, in the same way a less potent fighting force would cause more strain on a very long front line. I would also like to say that 6 Army regularly had to request air supply of food....

You are not making sense here.You did not adress the problem that the red army evaded encirclements and for that reason was not decisiveily beaten in the summer. More firepower does not change that particularly not having more slow stugs. Only different operational decisions could have changed that and more fuel. And in order for 6 Army to do better when the red army offensive happened in november, it needed to be able to move its mobile reserves fast enough which was impossible because of the lack of fuel. And that problem was caused by the railroad problems behind it. Having more 75 mm long guns does not solve that problem, neither does it solve the other problem which is that inferior allied armies were holding long stretches of front.
And i did notice in the logistical data of 6 Army a regular lack of 7,5 cm long ammo. For more guns you need more ammo too.

Hi Aida.

I’m sorry, but I can’t say your logic make sense to me either.

Did you even read what you posted regarding the use of StuG’s? I asked you to read it again hoping that might clear up your confusion, but it seems to have only caused even more confusion. Can you please give me the source you referenced for the use of Stug’s. I just want to be sure we are on the same page in terms of context. From where did you copy that text?

But anyway, where does it say in the text you quoted that StuG’s could not be used in mobile offensive and counter offensive operations? Have you ever heard of Schnell truppen?

And BTW, motorized infantry were meant to accompany tanks as well. So this is not something specific to just the use of StuG’s. German doctrine was very much a combined arms model. What the text you quoted is outlining are ideal operational guidelines. The author’s guidelines call for StuG’s to have infantry support, and yet the reality of what actually happened was StuG units had to frequently operate independent from infantry support. And this happened before and after they were up-gunned. And all that’s happening now in 2023 is you and Richard seem to have the same reading/comprehension problem.

And none of this has any relevance to the WI anyway. Operational guidelines for the use of StuG’s has nothing to do with Germany continuing production of turreted Pz III’s, or whether they are replaced by StuG’s.

But before I get into the quote you provided, I will repeat that Panzer Divisions were Guderian’s baby. There is nothing strange for him to support the value of those Divisions. It is exactly what one would expect.

So to start, you might notice that the information collected in the questionnaires of the reports Richard quoted were likely used as the source for the document you quoted. Points 3b & 3c for example were stated, but can hardly be considered absolute truth. The StuG can fire in all direction by traversing its hull. The StuG would also be equipped with a MG for close combat requirements. Granted a turreted vehicle offers more flexibility in this regard, it could also be said that the StuG simplified communications because the entire crew is always oriented in the same direction as the targeting system. A lot of this comes down to crew training, but hull travers was usually faster than turret travers in WWII German tanks.

And if you actually read anything from this information, I am assuming it must have been points 4 and 5. As I already said, StuG units were in fact required to operate without infantry, and while these recommendations may have been the current way of thinking at the time of writing, it may also simply be how the guy in charge of tank Divisions maintained tanks as the priority in written communications. In 1943, he was not only facing problems keeping his Divisions filled, but must have quite literally been feeling the effects of an underpowered tank force and the effects that was having on his PanzerTurppen. The Pz III was the biggest contributor to that problem.

But point 5 goes on to state that StuG’s are to be used in the front as a setting force, while Pz III/IV’s flank, which was almost the only way the PzIII could be used against T34/KV tanks. And point 6 states StuG’s are to be used like tanks. So what in this information tells you that using the Pz III chassis to make a more effective weapon wouldn’t work? At best, all you could claim is that if Pz III chassis production was used to make long barrelled StuG’s, this is how they should be deployed. But I am really interested to know Aida what it is in this information that you feel supports your ill prepared counter-argument against the WI being suggested here.

Now back to making sense about Russian forces avoiding encirclement. Lets recap. Your first point was regarding a lack of fuel. And while this is very true, the way you are trying to tie it into your counter-argument is not.

First of all the WI does not have to make any special considerations for the lack of fuel, because the lack of fuel existed regardless of what Germany did with its Pz III chassis production.

Moreover, a less potent fighting force could only make the lack of fuel worse, because instead of being able to engage the enemy right in front of you from 1200 m away, you now have to drive extended distances to maneuver into a flanking position just to get a reliable shot if your in a Pz III. This takes time and poses a greater risk to the tank crew. The longer you have an Army committed to the battlefield, the more fuel and supply it will use. Just the fuel needed to deliver the increased supply will make the situation worse. And drawn out over a large number of battles and over many months, the extra fuel and supply consumed would have to be significant. So while fuel supply was a serious problem, continuing production of ineffective Pz III tanks could only add to that problem, not help or limit it.

Then you brought up the long Front line and the weak Axis forces allied with Germany that were tasked with protecting the flank. Again, a more potent fighting force over time would help reduce enemy strength, which in turn would help reduce pressure on the poorly equipped forces protecting the flanks.

Now you are suggesting that because the Red Army avoided encirclement, my WI must now address the problem of an unbeaten enemy. Okay so lets start from there. How does having a less potent fighting force make the situation better then it would be under the WI? In other words, how would a more potent fighting force not improve the situation?

So if we look at June 30th when 6 Army joined in the offensive, it met tough resistance and having stalled, was unable to reach its objective for 2 days. In that fighting, 23 Pz in particular was reported as suffering heavy losses. So what was 23 Pz strength? According to Forczyk (Stalingrad 1942-43 (1)), the 23 Pz had 138 armoured vehicles at the start of the offensive, of which 34 were Pz III Lg, and 10 were Pz IV Lg barrel. The rest were short barrelled PzIII/IV, and Pz II’s.

That makes just 7% of its tank force capable of penetrating a T34’s frontal armour. That doesn’t seem a little low to you?

The 3 Pz was slightly better off with just 40 and 12 Pz III/IV Lg barrel tanks respectively. But neither the 23 Pz, or the 3 Pz were able to break through. What actually makes it through first were the infantry Divisions of 8 Army Corps and their tank destroyers, which had..., you guessed it, potent guns. Go figure right?

Then after the breakthrough, the tank hunters of those infantry units were able to repulse a counter-attack by the 13th tank Corps. Clearly the 23 Pz, having just 7% of its tank force being capable of effectively dealing with enemy tanks at long range, it was not only unable to breach enemy defenses to reach its objective, but having stalled out it suffered heavy losses. If 23 Pz would have had 138 long barrel 7.5 cm guns for example, logic dictates that the increased striking force would have allowed it to fair much better. Increasing the chance of making a rapid breakthrough would also significantly increase the chance of encircling the enemy. Speed is often an important element of encircling an enemy force. Oh and BTW, having a shortage of ammunition is not an argument to explain why a better gun isn't better. Maybe part of the solution Aida could have been for Germany to stop making the ineffective 5 cm ammunition right after it stopped making the ineffective 5 cm gun.

Oh and BTW, what does slow StuG’s mean? They had the same speed capabilities as a Pz III. So now its your turn to address the fact that your counter-argument has no supporting logic. All this WI is suggesting is that WWII Germany use the resources it had to make more effective weapons to improve its situation. The WI scenario would potentially help limit supply shortages by decreasing the time it takes to complete offensive maneuvers, contribute to further weakening enemy forces and the threat it poses, as well as improve Germany’s chances of winning the battlefield objectives.

In 1943 Guderian decided to strenghten the pz div. Given some pz div a sturmgeschützabteilung was an intermediate solution while waiting for more tank production. Guderians guideline tells pzdiv how to use the Sturmgeschützabteilung. Reflects that Sturmgeschüze are esentially an assult gun and a tankhunter.
In 1942 there is no way Germany would have decided to replace any type of tank in a pzdiv by Sturmgeschütze, or adding them .Pz div needed more tanks.
You cannot make it stick that in your WI the german army would be able suddenly to encircle large red army forces in the summer of 1942. Different operational decisions would be needed to achieve that and better logistics.
Your WI cannot make the Rumanian armies on the flanks of 6 Army stronger and better supplied. The weak 48 Pz corps in the path of the russian offensivedoes not suddenly become stronger. 6 Army still does not have the fuel to quickly move its mobile divisions.

[Aida1]

The improved situation of the WI however does not imply that Germany could have won the war, because I don't believe there was anyway for that to happen given the multi-front war that took place. But an improved situation would have most likely resulted in a front line that look different by the end of 1941, and again in 1942. It is possible for example that German forces could have reached Stalingrad sooner, making its capture a possibility. More specifically, the WI proposes that Germany would have likely been able to avoid the encirclement at Stalingrad and the total collapse of the Eastern Front that followed.

You would be hart put to work out a detailed scenario where 6 Army does not get encircled because that has nothing to do with a lack of firepower in the pzdiv.

[Aida1]

IMO it was the diversion of forces that was the problem... not what kind of armor got diverted. From the original post question that is.

dgfred, thanks for your reply.

Yes good point, the guy at the top does seem to make all sorts of errors. But how do you pick which one had the most effect? Yes dividing his forces proved to be fatal. But so was his decision to commit to a multi-front war, which apparently went against his own rule not to. And what about his decision to enter Stalingrad? According to Forczyk, the original plan for summer 1942 was to bring stalingrad’s industrial complex within artillery range while continuing on to secure oil in the south, not to get bogged down in a full-blown street fight. IMO, all of these attached events combined are what resulted in the history as we know it. But this WI isn’t meant to address all of these errors in judgment. It simply calls for a change in two main points in order to affect an alternate history. The first being the efficient use of resources to produce more effective weapons systems, and the other was for Germany’s leadership to show enough common sense to be able to recognize the warning signs in good time that were clearly visible.

Your Wi does not adress the reasons for the failure of Fall Blau. And even less the encirclement of 6 Army.

[LachenKrieg]

After 6 pages mostly dealing with anything else but the proposed topic, I will go back to the opening post:

Pz III is up-gunned with the 5.0 cm L/60 in 1940 before the start of operation Barbarossa.

Ok. Let's assume just that. For whatever reason, let's just call it divine intervention, Barbarossa starts with those upgunned Pz III tanks.

Little reminder for all those gymnasts here who do not understand the meaning of 'What if': It's all phantasy. An experiment of thought.

Basic questions are:
How much better is the 'new' 50mm L60 compared to the 'old' 50mm and 37mm gun in Pz III?
What is the impact?
Can we quantify it? If we can quantify it, we have the prerequisites to be able to make statements about the impact. At all.

Maybe a very rough starting point for modeling would be something along:
An average Pz III gunner with 50mm L60 needs x rounds to kill an enemy tank.
An average Pz III gunner with 50mm Lwhatever needs y rounds to kill an enemy tank.
An average Pz III gunner with 37mm Lwhatever needs z rounds to kill an enemy tank.
Therefore, an average Pz III with 50mm L60 could kill 30%, 50%, 100%, 200%, ... more enemy tanks than an average Pz III without 50mm L60 gun.

Then extrapolate this on all Pz III and their kills in OTL (real data needed). That's how you get a guess for this What if scenario.

Then refine it, step by step.

What would this mean for survivability? For tactics? For advance? For defense? For the enemy? ... ... ...

-----------------
Next point:

all Pz III chassis produced after September 1941 are utilized for what is to become the long barrel StuG III.

Now it is 75mm L48 against 50mm L60. How many more (or less) enemy tanks, vehicles, .... can be knocked out with 75mm L48 compared to 50mm L60?

How many StuG can be produced in this What if? Wow many more than Pz III in OTL? What will be the ratio of OTL Pz III vs What if StuG? 1:1, 1:1.1, 1:1.2, ... ?
StuG is turretless. Turretless means that it needs more time to aim which means a longer time between spotting and engaging an enemy. This means a higher chance to get killed.
Stug has no machine gunner in the hull which translates to a diminished survivability and has no extra radio operator which reduces coordination and cooperation with other tanks/stugs/AFVs. Which again translates into a diminished survivability.
However, long Stug has a lower silhouette and bigger range. And a 75mm grenade transports more explosives than a 50mm grenade, so it could be more effective against soft targets.

Need to include all this to get a somewhat correct assessment.

<something something Fall Blau, splitting forces, Heeresgruppe A, B, Stalingrad, Caucasus, ... >

Maybe later when we have numbers to work with. Without those numbers it is worthless squabble sans method and significance.


However, I think 'What if Barbarossa starts with Pz III 50mm L60?' is kind of the wrong question. A better question would be: What if the German Army Armaments Bureau Bastards decide in 1935 to order their Pz III with 75mm L40,8 gun. The gun they wanted (and got delivered) in the Bussing halftrack Panzerjager prototypes. See 'German Half Track Vehicles' by Spielberger.
Then they'll start Barbarossa with Pz III 75mm L40,8 and certanly can upgun them to 75mm L42, L48, ... L60 (btw why did this length not exist?).

You really have to wrap your head around this: GAABB did request a 75mm AT gun for an AT halftrack as early as 1934/35 (!) while giving orders for a 37mm AT gun for their future main tank model, specifically intended for AT role. Bureaucratic schizophrenia at its best - or, more likely - GAABB actually worked for the armaments industry. Sales will be higher if the equipment you sell becomes obsolete faster. Why sell once, if you can sell several times? xP

Hey Punctuationhorror,

So you start your post with "divine intervention", and then end it with the 75mm L40. I think what you have punctuated is the horror of the difference a decision makes. But I like your better question and hope you make a WI out of it.

To your basic questions, I understand your request for adding substance with numbers to the WI but it doesn't matter how much better the L/60 is because it can't penetrate a T34 frontally from any distance.

The impact/outcome is it can't penetrate from the front.

The quantification is zero frontal penetrations with no impact outcome.

A T34 crew could defeat a Pz III crew regardless of direction the Pz III was traveling in, or which way it was facing. And it could do this from greater distances. This was not a luxury a Pz III offered its crew. This fact dictates that Pz III crews had to work much harder to stay alive and make kills when facing T34/KV tanks. That is probably not the impact your looking for though. For Pz III crews with short barrel guns, the situation was even worse. And any extrapolation would be skewed because German crews were able to defeat T34's with inferior guns using better command and control. So no thanks to the gun in full. You can add to that the scenarios where T34 crews seem to panic and turn to reveal their backside when faced with focused fire.

The 7.5 L/48 can penetrate the frontal armour of a T34, the 5 L/60 can't. I don't see what your expecting to find from this comparison?

Divine intervention called for the L/48 to arrive 4 to 6 months earlier, so something like 2000+ Pz III chassis would be used to make long barreled StuG's.

Some of your comments about the StuG being turretless are subjective, like the amount of time to target. This is going to largely depend on the situation on the battlefield, and crew experience. Regardless of the fact that it has no turret, the StuG has reportedly destroyed a large number of enemy forces, and was proven to be a very successful weapon system. Not having a turret doesn't seem to be an issue. And the point being that a StuG L/48 is a more capable weapon system than a Pz III L/60 with a turret. The StuG had a radio, and communication was not a problem as far as I know. If you have a reference that suggests otherwise I would like to see it. More effective against soft targets yes, but the point being it was more effective against hard targets at greater distances.

If you have a source showing the Pak 40 mounted in the Pz III turret, please share. But for this WI, the right question is as stated in the WI.

[HP]

Some of your comments about the StuG being turretless are subjective, like the amount of time to target. This is going to largely depend on the situation on the battlefield, and crew experience. Regardless of the fact that it has no turret, the StuG has reportedly destroyed a large number of enemy forces, and was proven to be a very successful weapon system. Not having a turret doesn't seem to be an issue.

WWII users with first hand experience seem to have thought otherwise - e.g. Germany, SU et al. US even preferred thinly armoured revolving turrets instead of fixed mounting in their TD's (e.g. M18, M36 etc.). After WWII there was only one experiment with turretless MBT (Swedish Stridsvagn).

I guess we should ditch all the historical evidence just because a forum poster says so.

Edit: US also had a combined hull/turret gun system, M3 Lee/Grant. It had a 76mm gun in the hull and 37mm gun in the turret. Perhaps it tells something that US designs dropped the hull gun in future developments instead of dropping the gun in the turret (e.g. M4), even if it was easier to mount the larger caliber gun without a turret.

[Richard Anderson]

Spielberger is the be all to end all?

Where did I say that?

You seemed upset that I questioned his accuracy.

This probably won’t come as a shock to you but I’m going to keep reading what people like Spielberger put out there. He’s not just some errand boy to the assistant editor at a company called Dopey you know!?

This probably won't come as a shock to you but I have a low tolerance for ad hominem.

Almost every single exchange we have Richard seems like a conflict instead of us expressing our point of view mostly because you keep spewing BS. If you haven’t noticed by now,… it offends me!

What BS have I spewed? Insofar as I can tell I have been stating facts and periodically questioning your understanding of those facts.

Look, you suggested something that I didn’t think was accurate, so all I did was provide a couple simple quotes to support why. Spielberger was just one of the citations, and not because I think he is the be all to end all. Chamberlain and Doyle are the authors to the other citation I gave, for which Jentz is the technical editor. And according to Speilberger, Jentz contributed a number of chapters in his volume “Strumgeschutz & its Variants”. So yeah, I am wondering a little where your going with this?

The original quote you took from Spielberger was:

"When the Russian T-34 and KV tanks appeared at the start of the Russian campaign in 1941, the weakness of the German tank armament was quickly revealed to its fullest extent. This would not have been necessary if the Army Weapons Office had followed the instructions issued personally by Hitler in 1940 and installed the 50 mm KwK 39L/60 gun, which was already available at that time. In the Pz III, the 37mm KwK was actually replaced only by the 50mm KwK L/42, a decision that led to unfortunate results and caused serious disagreements between Hitler and the Army Weapons Office."

You seem affronted that I questioned the veracity of Spielberger's claim. I simply pointed out that Spielberger compressed timelines in that quote and made some statements that have never been documented fully. Did Hitler personally issue an order in 1940 to install the "50 mm KwK39L/60 gun" in the Panzer III? I have never seen any documentation that proves that. How did Spielberger get the notion that the KwK 39 "was already available at that time"? It simply wasn't. Four PaK 38 were accepted by the HWA in March 1940 but that is not the KwK 39.

There is plenty of evidence that early wartime experience did cause a rapid reevaluation of the effectiveness of the 3.7cm KwK L46.5 in the Panzer III. As early as 4 June, In 6 recorded that the OB des Heeres, i.e. Generaloberst Walther von Brauchitsch, had requested acceleration of the program to fit a 5cm KwK in the Pz III. There does not appear to be a record of exactly when Brauchitsch made that request (probably a day or so earlier in reaction to experience in France) or when exactly the program referred to was initiated but since Krupp completed design drawings for the installation the next day it is likely it had been in the works for at least a few months. However, the 5cm gun in question was the 5cm L42 derivative of the PaK 37 not the PaK 38. Although there was some discussion about installing the 5cm L60 in the Panzer III it was decided not to, because the stricture restricting the length of the barrel had not been rescinded by the HWA, while it is also possible to infer it was not pursued because the redesign of the turret front plate and mantlet was already proving problematic (the original desire was to use the same gun mount to simplify the transition but that proved impractical).

You might imagine that if Hitler had given a direct order to begin mounting a 5cm L60 gun in the Pz III someone might have commented on it at the time rather than later but that doesn't seem to have happened. It's kind of like how you might suppose that if the Sturmgeschütz was so widely acceptable as a one-for-one substitute for a Panzer that it would have been substituted earlier than spring 1943 and would have been substituted in more than three Panzer regiments and that more than 44 per regiment would have been substituted.

Just to make myself clear, Schnelltruppen translated means motorized, or mobile troops and can also refer to motorized infantry. So in my way of thinking, Schnelltruppen still existed even after armoured troops became a thing. But back in 1937, armoured troops didn’t know what a tank was, let alone know they needed one.

If you really want to be clear you would not imply the Schnelle Truppen were motorized - the correct translation in context is indeed "mobile" or even more simply "fast" troops, since it initially included the Reiterei. It did include infantry, originally differentiated from the Infanterie by giving them the designation of Schützen, as wall as the Panzerjäger, Aufklärung (including Kradschützen), and of course the Panzer Truppen but not the Artillerie or Pionier, which remained as part of their original inspectorates but did begin to change designations, Panzer-Pionier in in November 1940 and Panzer-Artillerie in February 1942, before the Schnelle Truppen were redesignated as Panzer Truppen on April Fool's Day 1943.

Given that Panzer-Regiment 1 was created on 1 October 1935 from the already extant Kampfwagen-Regiment 2, which had existed since 1 October 1934 and that by August 1935 when the first division-scale tests of the new divisions began some 300 Panzer I had been issued, the notion that the "armoured troops didn’t know what a tank was, let alone know they needed one" two years later is an odd one to say the least.

In fact, the basic requirements for tank design went back to 29 December 1933.

And you talk of those reports you cited as if they support what you are saying when they don’t. Thats the weird part for me. You quote something like that on an internet forum claiming it means something it clearly doesn’t….?

What reports are those?

And BTW, when you are talking about an institution the size of a military, let alone the German military of WWII, things are likely a little more complicated then what you seem to be implying. The answer to your question was probably influenced by a number of factors let alone the events that happened as the war progressed, like Allied bombers flattening what little industry Germany thought it had.

Sorry but oddly enough I suspect it is you rather than me that is indulging an a reduction ab adsurdam. Indeed, things were considerably more complicated than you appear to be aware of. For example, what tank industry was being flattened by Allied bombers and when such that it influenced whether or not StyG were substituted for Panzers? Or influenced which gun was selected for the Panzer III in spring 1940 or 1941?

And BTW you are simply wrong, because StuG’s (Battalions/Brigades) were very welcomed additions to the Panzer Divisions, and were heavily used.

Are you talking about the attachment of the Sturmgeschütz Batterien and Abteilungen (later Brigaden) to Panzer divisions now? Sturmgeschütz-Batterie 640 was attached to Infanterie-Regiment Großdeutschland (mot) when it was organized for the French campaign and remained with it as the regiment expanded to a division but that was rather a special case. Sturmgeschütz-Batterie 660 was attached to 3. Infanterie-Division (mot) for the assault on Holland. However, it seems only two of the 17 Batterien and Abteilungen committed to BARBAROSSA were assigned to Armee-Korps (mot) and in most cases were employed as support for the Infanterie-Division (mot) of those corps.

That was the primary role of the Sturmgeschütz Batterien and Abteilungen as a corps asset, most frequently with an Armee-Korps to support the Infanterie divisions and with the Armee-Korps (mot) as a support for the Infanterie-Division (mot), which had no organic Panzer-Abteilungen until Pz-Abtl 116, 129, and 160 were created in the spring of 1942 specifically as armor for the 16., 29., and 60. Infanterie-Division (mot). However, they were not equipped with Sturmgeschütz. Rather they were the first units to receive the Panzer III lang.

It wasn't until over a year later, in summer/fall 1943, that the StuG became a distinct part of the Schnelle Truppen when they replaced the tanks in the Panzer-Abteilung of the Infanterie-Division (mot) and were redesignated as Panzer-Sturmgeschütz Abteilungen in the redesignated Panzergrenadier-Division.

I don’t remember the posters name, but in the Panzer III “WHAT IF” you previously mentioned where the suggestion was to modify it, someone made a negative comment about tank crews and StuG crews working together. I can’t remember exactly how the poster worded it, but it struck me as being funny because I had just read about that same issue in the StuG book by Bork. The reason given in the book was quite different though, apparently tank crews would often ask StuG crews to deal with an opposing tank threat. I am assuming probably because of their “Tank Hunter” role. And it makes sense to me when I consider the fact that most tank crews on the Eastern Front were in a Pz III or worse. What could be more frightening then having to go up against an armoured opponent you know you have little-to-no-chance of defeating? The StuG book claims this point did create tension between tank crews and StuG crews though. The StuG proved itself in both offensive and defensive roles, and I am pretty confident you wouldn’t have to look too hard to find that out for yourself.

Oddly enough, no it is hard to find that out. Bork's StuG-Abteilung 191 on 22 June 1941 was attached to III. Arme-Korps (mot). On 24 June 1942 it was attached to VII. Armee-Korps, which was attached to the Second Rumanian Army. And on 7 July 1943 it was OKH reserve as part of 17. AOK. The StuG Batterien and Abteilungen/Brigaden were Heerestruppen and usually attached to corps to support infantry divisions, it was their primary purpose. In the Armee-Korps (mot) that later were renamed Panzer-Korps they normally were attached to support the infantry divisions of the corps, whether they were motorized or not.

The 3 tasks for tanks were stated as supporting infantry, taking part in a combined arms force, and combating tanks. The PzIV was the infantry support part of that equation. The Pz III was supposed to be the main battle tank with the armour penetrating weapon.

Sorry, but repeating incorrect information does not suddenly make it correct.

And agin Richard, I find it hard to believe that you don’t know this, which makes me wonder if your entire contribution here isn’t some sort of a joke.

And agin Laughing Boy, I find it hard to believe that you don't know that the Panzer III was intended to equipment the leichte Panzer-Kompanie of the Panzer-Abteilung, paired with the Panzer IV in the mittlere Panzer-Kompanie of the Panzer-Abteilung. Or that the Panzer-Regiment was intended to operate as the primary maneuver force of the division, in the early years of the war typically operating with the divisional Kradschützen-Batallion. The Schützen Brigade/Regiment (depending on the division) and Panzerjäger Abteilung were the firm base from which the Panzer maneuvered. That changed as the war went on and as the Kradschützen ditched their motorcycles and became either part of the Aufklärungs-Abteilung or another Schützen Abteilung and the Schützenpanzerwagen was introduced as an armored infantry carrier...but until the major change to divisional organization in 1943 it remained habitual for a detached leichte Panzer-Kompanie to have a mittlere Panzer-Zug attached because the Panzer IV was intended to be the support vehicle for the maneuver of the Panzer III not as the "infantry support part of the equation".

But what ever the case may be, you can now go back to your question about why the StuG wasn’t part of the PanzerWaffe… And then ask yourself what the point of making two vehicles carrying the same gun was for? This isn’t for my benefit, because I’m not that one asking the question, you are.

But I did not ask that question, so I find no need to respond to your red herring. The question(s) I have been asking are:

Why would an entrenched bureaucracy, with an accepted doctrine and huge sunk costs, suddenly change course in such a radical manner. Why after seven years of development, success in Poland and France, and near success in BARBAROSSA, would they suddenly decide to dump the Panzer and embrace the Sturmgeschütz as its replacement?

And if the StuG was so successful as a Panzer substitute, why wasn't the organization expanded throughout the Panzerwaffe but instead only was followed in one battalion in three Panzer Regiments and even there only outfitted two of four companies in the battalion?

Oh, and here's another question. Why if Hitler directed that 100 StuG per month be allocated as replacements in Panzer divisions was that decree only followed for those three divisions? After the allocations to those three divisions in May-June 1944 - roughly 140 vehicles - no more were so allocated until November 1944. Were they ignoring Hitler's orders?

So first your argument is based on the premise that they needed more tanks, now your trying to claim they made all the Panthers they needed? By my count they would have still been short had they made 1000 more than they did. And BTW, the Panther was armed with a very capable gun. Had the Germans been able to make 1 Panther for every 2 T34’s, it would have had a very noticeable effect, but thats just stating the obvious.

Sorry but you are confused. I never claimed anything of the sort. I was responding to your statement that it was implausible for the Germans to make "thousands of Panther tanks to drive alongside its PzIV's", which is simply silly on your part. The Germans did in fact make "thousands of Panther tanks to drive alongside its PzIV's". That there were not enough of them whatever the shortfall was is irrelevant to that simple fact.

I would really like to have a good exchange with you Richard, but you make that proposition very hard to do. Your last comment is better though.

I would as well but your habit of slipping into ad hominem, raising red herrings, and disparaging my knowledge base on this subject is irritating to say the least. BTW, which "last comment" do you mean? I

So why? For starters, the speed of technological development driven by the fight for survival became the order of the day. So from that perspective doctrines and sunk costs mean very little! Whats needed is you go back to the drawing board if that’s the only path to survival. Things were so vastly different in 1941 from the way they were during the Poland/France campaigns, and different yet again each year following that it made the entire experiment in warfare an outlier. What they faced in Poland, and even France was just not the same anymore by 1941, and it never would be again. The question of why any country would want to improve its wartime situation should be self evident. But it is clear by asking that you are ignorant to the serious issue this was causing.

Well, yes, of course but are you really clear that the "fight for survival" actually began when BARBAROSSA failed? The vast difference became apparent arguably around 4 September 1941 when OKH assessed the strength of the Ostheer and found that of 3,387 starting Panzer, 702 were total losses and 1,099 were in repair, and that only around 89 replacements had arrived. By the end of the year, 2,656 were recorded lost and only 501 replacements had arrived. That is what put the fight for survival to the forefront...at least with regards to armored vehicles; the losses of motor vehicles and extraordinary ammunition consumption were equally as terrifying.

(snip) So an effective gun not only makes the fighting force more potent, but apparently it also affects the effectiveness and moral of the squishy parts inside the tank. Go figure!!

And yet nevertheless the Panzertruppen went once more into the breach with what were still mostly inferior weapons in the spring of 1942 and smashed the Soviets again.

An earlier development of the L/60 would have pointed them in the right direction much sooner. The net effect of that outcome would have been the ability to reach a workable solution before it was too late, which BTW is what actually happened.

I'm afraid I don't see how? What "workable solution" is that? They rushed as many 7.5cm guns onto chassis as possible in the spring of 1942 but they didn't have enough chassis to put them on. There is the real problem.

By starting with the 3.7 cm gun, the ordnance department was setting the tone for future tank development, and this would also feed into a false sense of security after the Poland campaign. Reading post-Poland reports, the 3.7 cm gun was seen as good based on the battle experiences at that time and place. Little did those reporting know how inadequate the 3.7 cm gun would become in just a few short months. Had the Pz IIIE started with the short barrel 5 cm so that the first gun upgrade it saw was the L/60, the post-Poland reports would have said the same thing, but the L/60 would have also been tested on the battlefield at a very important juncture of the war. The gun is good, but we need something better. Better still would have been for the PzIII to start out with the L/60, even if that meant delaying the PzIII’s approval.

Again, I'm confused. You keep waffling back and forth on the 5cm L60 - first its no good against the Soviet tanks and then its good, albeit needs to be better. The decision to replace the 3.7cm with the 5cm gun in the Panzer III was made sometime between 10 May and 4 June 1940 at the latest. Isn't just as possible that if they had gone into Poland and France with the 5cm L42 they would have been happy with it...since that in fact the gun they decided to go with?

BTW, it wouldn't have delayed approval of the Panzer III...that was prewar. By 6 December 1938 orders for the Panzer III totaled 2,595.

I will close with this, no German WWII tank crew ever said they like/want/desire to go into battle without an effective gun. Please provide a source that shows German tank crews wanted a turret over an effective gun/weapon system.

I would amend that to say that no WWII tank crew ever said they like/want to go into battle without an effective gun. Why should I provide a source for something I never said? I said that by German doctrine the Panzer and the Sturmgeschütz were two different things. The evidence is that they persisted in that doctrine throughout the war, despite various experiments with replacing the Panzer with Sturmgeschütz or Jadpanzer but did not persist with it, except in three Panzer divisions, where two of the eight Panzer Kompanien were equipped with Sturmgeschütz.

BTW, you do realize that military organizations are not run from the bottom up?

If you don’t provide me your references here following this request, I will understand that you are simply making all of this up, because if I recall what happened the last time you quoted something… the author found it bearable to have up to half of the allotment of vehicles in a Panzer-Abteilung to be StuG’s.

Perhaps in turn you can provide me for your references that claim the Panzer IV was an infantry support vehicle or that will tell how many more of the peak of the 283-odd Panzer-Kompanien than the 6 identified were equipped with Sturmgeschütz?