The Army Ordnance Department plays a role in the outcome at Stalingrad.

[LachenKrieg]

Why do you call me Peter-Peter-Peter all the time? It is not a big deal and I didn't comment on it for a few replies, but now it seems to be a pattern. This is a forum, where my name shouldn't matter, only my opinion should.

Because its your handle, you are a Peter aren't you? Its also the way I write. I usually address people by their name when I am corresponding with them.

I think in early 1942 the Soviets knew that the Germans screwed up their best chance, probably their only chance to beat them. They wanted to exploit their winter victories, but the Germans could stabilize, then during the summer, Soviet overextension, minor Axis help and German reinforcements gave them another possibility to try to go on the offensive. The Soviets couldn't be 100% sure in the spring, how much power the Germans had left, but they knew that Germany was engaged in a hopeless war against the British and declared war on the Americans; thus they knew if they could stall the last German attempt to win the war in the East in 1942, then they won. The only reason why the German invasion of 1942 looks so dramatic on maps was that logically, the Germans had to hit something critical, and the Soviets assumed that the Germans are going for Moscow, as Moscow was only 250 km from Rhzev. Baku was something like 1750 km from Kharkov. The Soviets knew that distance - even with limited resistance - will blunt the edge of the German forces. They'll burn fuel, their supplies will dwindle, their limited forces will be spread and the Soviets will have time to generate enough forces to counterattack.

And that was my point Peter, YOU THINK! That is subjective. The question is, were the Russian Generals patting each other on the back in the spring of 1942 with sentiments that would agree with what you think? Because that is not the understanding I get from reading about the history. In the spring of 1942, Russia was still very much in the middle of a war in which it was desperately trying to expel an invading force. Can you provide references that represents history the way you are explaining it?

Yes, it is not.

Is that a little bit like Yeah, no? So the type of weapon system an army makes isn't part of its organization. So then what your saying is that they could have invaded Russia with just bicycles and broomsticks and it wouldn't have mattered, because they were still organized as the German army? Come on Peter,... really?

Ehm, well, for this to happen, you'll have to demonstrate that enough "long barreled" guns could be made in time, and that German industry had the capacity to produce StuGs instead of Pz IIIs. Also, you have to make a case for the better effectiveness of StuGs in all combat situations where Pz III L/Ms were concerned.

Ehm, well, I think there was a long barreled gun on every Pz III starting with the second series of the "J" model. Is that demonstration enough? Seriously Peter, after one good post, how many of these should I expect?

I guess it was easier to make StuGs than Pz IIIs, so the difference might even benefit your scenario. But why don't you make an effort and bring us numbers? Unit costs, production hours, resource quotas...

I might consider doing all that work if you can demonstrate how production hours and resource quotas add to this WI. Germany was making an ineffective weapon system called a Pz III when they could have made a much more effective weapon system with essentially the same resources. Can you tell me the production hours it took to make a Pz III, and what difference that makes? They made Pz III's at the rater they could. The WI is not claiming that they could make more Pz III chassis by switching to a 7.5 cm gun. So what difference does it make Peter?

Yes, but that statistics is irrelevant on its own. I asked you, but I'm gonna ask you again: what percentage of tanks there were T-34, and how often did a frontal armor penetration by another AFV disabled a T34?

And this is supposed to mean what? So if I told you that 67% of all T34's knocked out by Panther tanks were penetrated frontally at distances greater than 500 m, what does that add? The relevant point here Peter is that it wouldn't matter what angle a T34 comes into view if your gun is capable of penetrating it from all sides.

If you were in a Pz III L/60, you couldn't. If you were in a long barreled StuG you were not only harder to hit because of a lower profile, but you could engage the enemy from a greater distance. This was safer for the crew, burned less fuel, and on average used less ammunition to knock a T34 out.

No.

Well there's the short answer, and I certainly won't blame you for being concise! I guess I will just have to take you word for it.

Yes they were, with the results we know from history - do you actually read my comments?

Yes, have you read mine? In case you didn't get the memo Peter, the war ended partly because Germany couldn't get rid of all those T34's.

If you want to make a case that long barreled StuGs... 1. were possible, 2. could have stabilized the Eastern Front in 1942, then please do address the most fundamental issues with this concept. Let's move on from the part where you explain it over and over again that a better gun penetrates more armor and leads to more disabled enemy tanks.

Fundamental issues like how many hours it took to make a Pz III, and how this compares to the number of hours it took to make a StuG? Yeah your right Peter, its fundamental, fundamentally flawed.

[LachenKrieg]

The ability to avoid encirclement was fundamentally inhibited by the bad fuel situation of 6 army and by the weakness of 48 pz corps . The lack of fuel and the weather slowed down the assembly and movement of the mobile divisions of 6 Army so no quick intervention was possible(Stalingrad M.Kehrig DVA 1974 pp 136-137). XIV Pz corps had only 0,1 VS Otto and 0,1 Diesel on 19.11(day report 6 Army 19.11.42 RH 20-6/792 p 462) Tanks with a different calibre of gun cannot change the mobility problems due to weather and lack of fuel..

Well you wont get any argument from this end, unless of course your trying to claim that Germany was encircled from the start of the war in 1939, to its conclusion in 1945.

Yes Germany had a lot of logistical problems that were mostly linked to the extensive front line, and the vast distances they had to travel in their attempt to conquer. But weather and lack of fuel are just two reasons that an army might become encircled.

One way a more potent fighting force might have helped is to aid a quicker advance. Another way is that it helps to reduce the enemy's strength, thereby limiting its ability to encircle, or its ability to deliver the decisive blow needed to capitalize on the encirclement once its completed. A good example of this is seen in the Russian winter offensive in 1941/42. A number of German units were encircled during their retreat, but Russian forces for the most part were had been too weakened from their losses the previous summer/fall that they were unable to destroy the forces being encircled.


In the case of 6th Armee at Stalingrad, the more potent guns would have certainly been put to good use while trying to break contact with Russian, but German leadership would have also had to recognized the need to do so and given the order in good time.

6 Army had been suffering a serious lack of fuel for a long time .Which made moving its mobile divisions very difficult and slow. So a quick counterattack was not possible. Firepower is all very well but you need to be able to bring it to the enemy.

Your repeated yourself without answering the bold text, which was in answer to the issue you were raising.

You would have to explain how the russian forces used in the offensive would have been significantly attritted so the offensive would be far less successful. And that implies placing these more potent German forces you are talking about near enough to the russian ofensive forces. And there is the problem. Fuel was a major inhiting factor from the beginning of Fall Blau. Detailed logistical data of 6 Army show this major problem.
viewtopic.php?f=55&t=268007&start=210

Yes fuel was a problem for certain. I already agreed with that. But what are you going on about? Are you serious? Do me a favor and review the history on Germany's summer offensive in 1942, then come back here and tell me how many Russian forces were destroyed in that campaign. Remember that was done with a low supply of fuel as you pointed out, along with a fighting force that often required flanking maneuvers. How much fuel does that use?

At any rate Aida, it appears that the Russian forces were significantly attrtited even with a fuel shortage. The fuel shortage caused the Germans down time, which didn't help them, it hurt them. It lengthened the time it took to engage the enemy, which lead to winter, which made a big boo-boo...

But what is your point, you mean the German's won almost every armored engagement in the summer of 1942 while experiencing a severe fuel shortage, but having a more potent fighting force would had made their situation worse? Yes fuel was a problem, and increasing the time needed to conduct the campaign only made that worse.

[LachenKrieg]

And yes, the StuG was initially designed for infantry support as an assault gun. But that was when it was equipped with the short barrel 7.5 cm gun. This WI scenario is not discussing the StuG's role as an assault gun, it is discussing the up-gunned version that was put in a tank hunter role. But I would like to see your reference to the StuG being unsuccessful. My understanding is that StuG crews chalked up more tank kills than Panzer crews did. Can you provide me with your reference, because I am really interested to see what it is.

Later in the war Stugs were integrated in the pz div as an expedient to give them more armor but tanks and Stugs guns working together did not work out. The stug could certainly work as a tank hunter but within a tank division in an offensive or counter offensive role it did not work well.

Can you point out what you mean by StuG's and tanks didn't work out? And what would it possibly matter? So what happens if they deploy StuG's as either an attached Battalion, or as a Brigade. The relevant point is that it is a much more effective weapon system, and the net effect was they could destroy enemy armor much easier.

" Generalinspekteur der Panzertruppen 15.04.1943

Leaflet on the use of a Sturmgeschützabteilung within the Panzerregiment

1) Within some Panzer divisions it is necessary to equip a Panzerabteilung with Sturmgeschütze as an intermediary solution
2) The Panzerabteilung is equipped with 96 Sturmgeschütze
Organisation: staff 3 command tanks
staff company( recce and security platoon) 5 Sturmgeschütze
1. to 4. company kp troop 2 Sturmgeschütze each
1. to 4. platoon 5 Sturmgeschütze each
3) The Sturmgeschütze has the following advantages over a Panzer IV:
a) strong frontal armor( from april 1943 newly produced Panzer IV will have armor of the same stregth)
b) lower height and therefore a smaller target
Disadvantages are:
a) no commander cupola so lesser command and sighting ability(from december 1942 new Sturmgeschütze
have a command cupola)
b) no turret so no ability to fire in all directions
c) no machinegun that can fire in all directions. This affects the ability for close defense.
4) The performance and properties of the sturmgeschütze do not allow autonomous operations without panzer or panzergrenadiere
Its advantages make it into a tank hunter. This governs the use of the Pz Abteilung equipped with Sturmgeschütze with the Panzer regt and the Pz division.
5) Attack
a) the Sturmgeschütz Abt cannot fight like a Pz Abt autonomously within the enemy. Support and monitoring by Panzer or Panzer grenadiere will therefore always be necessary. Therefore the use in the last echelon for collaboration with the Pz grenadiere will be the rule
For this the instructions for collaboration with the infantry apply(H.Dv 200/2m AVA Die Sturmgeschütz batterie of 07.09.1942 besides the supplementary annexes)

b) Pz Abt equipped with with the Pz III and Panzer IV with thin frontal armor(50mm) can be reinforced by Sturmgeschütze comapnies or platoons for special missions(point, attack with limited objective)
The Sturmgeschütze then fight in the front

c) when meeting enemy tanks, the Sturmgescütze units are put to the front to free the other Pz Abt. for moving against flank and rear and so for the complete destruction of the enemy tanks.

d) as tank hunters the Sturmgeschütze are to be driven behind the open wings of the regt so that they can protect the flanks and support the regt when confronting enemy tanks

e) when the Pz grenadiere have to create the preconditions for the operation of the regt , for example in crossing a river, then the Sturmgeschütze can make their mission effectively easier by their fire

6) Defense
In the defense the sturmgeschütze units will, like the Pz Abt, be kept back and used for counter thrusts and counter attacks with the Pz Grenadiere .
Specifically, the Sturmgeschütze unit has the role of the tank hunter

7) Retreat
By an attack with limited objective, in collaboration with Panzer and Panzer grenadiere, the retreat from the enemy is made easier. The operation of the Sturmgeschütze units as tank hunters will be in the foreground.

Guderian"

Above are the instructions by Guderian for the use of Stug within the pzdiv. These were not always followed which lead to problems. Stugs could not operate as tanks. They were a good tank hunter and could have a role as such whitin a pz div. .

Okay, so Guderian didn't like the idea of having the Army's artillery stealing his limelight, but again, what difference does it make? None of this can change the fact that the StuG was a much better weapon system then the Pz III L60. There are also accounts of StuG batteries acting without infantry, or being used successfully with tanks. But it has no bearing on the WI. Making long barreled StuG's was a much better use of the resources Germany used to make Pz III's. That's it, that's all Aida.

[LachenKrieg]

Sorry but that is incorrect and now you appear to be conflating two different "long barrelled" guns. One is the 5cm PaK 38 L60/KwK L39 and the other is the 7.5cm Pak 40. Neither were delayed by a year...

I would like to respond Richard, but I would first have to be able to understand the point your trying to make. In which way am I combining/confusing the two guns? I think it's reasonable to expect when you contribute to an online forum that you follow along. When I go back and read most of what you contributed here, you are either reciting a boat load of pointless facts, or you seem to be off on your own tangent instead of following the point of the thread. Please explain how I am confusing two different long barrel guns, and I will try to clear things up for you AGAIN in my response.

Ah, we're back to you being annoyed by "pointless facts" again rather than understanding how they effect how you want to change history.

Why are you having a hard time understanding that in my response I was referring to the 5cm PaK 38/KwK 39 but you began going on about:

long barrelled guns" in Sturmgeschütz? As in "That was a great explanation, but the simple fact is the request for the long barrelled gun was delayed by a year. The WI is suggesting that long barrelled StuG's go into production 4 to 6 months earlier, which would have been feasible had the Ordnance Dept. acted accordingly.

You might successfully argue that the "long barrelled" 5cm gun was actually "delayed" but only if you can show that there was ever a clear intent to put such a gun that did not yet exist into the Panzer III. Spielberger is being disingenuous at best or is deliberately obscuring the reality at worst. No, the "50 mm KwK 39L/60 gun" was NOT "already available at that time" - NOT in April 1940 it wasn't. It did not exist then. It was not a thing. The PaK 38 did exist - all of 20 of them that had been accepted by the HWA. Pretending that somehow means that a Panzer III with a 5cm KwK 39 could have been in production is facile, especially when you look at the actual production record of the Panzer III, which was problematic in and of itself in every way.

There is even less evidence than that that the 7.5cm PaK/KwK 40 was delayed at all. If anything, its development and installation into an armored vehicle was done with incredible quickness as these things go but, not satisfied with that already remarkable history, you now want to make it "4 to 6 months earlier" still? Why? How? All I can see as an explanation from you as to how or why that works is hand wavium - you want it so in order to make your what if work, so it will be so.

However, the HWA did actually see a clear need for increased gun calibers before the war and ordered development of the 7.5cm PaK in 1938 - but the realities of government processes meant that the funding for that was in 1939 and two and a half years is about what could be expected for what was an entirely new and highly advanced gun - one of the reasons it was even possible to fit such a gun into the Panzer IV was its fortuitously highly compact and lightweight design.

Nor does any of that hand wavium resolve how and why the requirement of the Schnelltruppen for actual Panzer rather than Sturmgeschütz goes away or how a reduction in the total number of AFV available when the basic numbers required had yet to be met would improve things.

No we aren't back Richard, you just never left

Well apparently it's more than just Spielberger, but why don't you contact the people I cited in a previous post, which includes Spielberger and have them defend themselves here? While your at it, give Guderian a call and tell him you know he's lying because you not only bought the book, but you read it!

What evidence, you mean the evidence that your making all this up? Could it be that the reason the L60 version of the gun didn't exist because it wasn't ordered into production as requested? The request was there, the resources and know how were there, the gun even existed, and this WI is plausible.

EDIT: Learning to comprehend while you read is probably all that needs to be cleared up here. There is no confusing/mixing up two different guns in my text. The bold text quote you referred to is clearly meant to discuss the L60 which was delayed, and the long barreled gun needed in the StuG, which is the subject of this WI.

[Richard Anderson]

No we aren't back Richard, you just never left

Okay Laughing Boy, back to the ad hominem?

Well apparently it's more than just Spielberger, but why don't you contact the people I cited in a previous post, which includes Spielberger and have them defend themselves here? While your at it, give Guderian a call and tell him you know he's lying because you not only bought the book, but you read it!

Damn, heresy, I'm questioning Spielberger. Never mind that Tom Jentz demonstrated years ago that Speilberger was mostly working from Allied intelligence reports rather than original documents and got quite a bit wrong about German Panzer production.

What evidence, you mean the evidence that your making all this up? Could it be that the reason the L60 version of the gun didn't exist because it wasn't ordered into production as requested? The request was there, the resources and know how were there, the gun even existed, and this WI is plausible.

Yeah Laughing Boy, I make everything up.

EDIT: Learning to comprehend while you read is probably all that needs to be cleared up here. There is no confusing/mixing up two different guns in my text. The bold text quote you referred to is clearly meant to discuss the L60 which was delayed, and the long barreled gun needed in the StuG, which is the subject of this WI.

Okay then if we're going down the ad hominem route, maybe you need to learn how to write explicitly? Anyway, if it is the 7.5cm PaK/KwK 40 you are solely interested in then there definitely is no "delays" to correct. Glad you cleared that up.

Do you think while you're at it could you clear up why the Schnelltruppen would decide to drop their requirement for tanks and accept assault guns as substitutes? Explain why if it was such a popular and simple solution, they only ever converted three divisions to such an organization? Why if the organization was so acceptable did it only appear in three battalions - one in each of those divisions? Why was it that only two of the companies in each of those battalions were so equipped?

[Aida1]

Well you wont get any argument from this end, unless of course your trying to claim that Germany was encircled from the start of the war in 1939, to its conclusion in 1945.

Yes Germany had a lot of logistical problems that were mostly linked to the extensive front line, and the vast distances they had to travel in their attempt to conquer. But weather and lack of fuel are just two reasons that an army might become encircled.

One way a more potent fighting force might have helped is to aid a quicker advance. Another way is that it helps to reduce the enemy's strength, thereby limiting its ability to encircle, or its ability to deliver the decisive blow needed to capitalize on the encirclement once its completed. A good example of this is seen in the Russian winter offensive in 1941/42. A number of German units were encircled during their retreat, but Russian forces for the most part were had been too weakened from their losses the previous summer/fall that they were unable to destroy the forces being encircled.


In the case of 6th Armee at Stalingrad, the more potent guns would have certainly been put to good use while trying to break contact with Russian, but German leadership would have also had to recognized the need to do so and given the order in good time.

6 Army had been suffering a serious lack of fuel for a long time .Which made moving its mobile divisions very difficult and slow. So a quick counterattack was not possible. Firepower is all very well but you need to be able to bring it to the enemy.

Your repeated yourself without answering the bold text, which was in answer to the issue you were raising.

You would have to explain how the russian forces used in the offensive would have been significantly attritted so the offensive would be far less successful. And that implies placing these more potent German forces you are talking about near enough to the russian ofensive forces. And there is the problem. Fuel was a major inhiting factor from the beginning of Fall Blau. Detailed logistical data of 6 Army show this major problem.
viewtopic.php?f=55&t=268007&start=210

Yes fuel was a problem for certain. I already agreed with that. But what are you going on about? Are you serious? Do me a favor and review the history on Germany's summer offensive in 1942, then come back here and tell me how many Russian forces were destroyed in that campaign. Remember that was done with a low supply of fuel as you pointed out, along with a fighting force that often required flanking maneuvers. How much fuel does that use?

At any rate Aida, it appears that the Russian forces were significantly attrtited even with a fuel shortage. The fuel shortage caused the Germans down time, which didn't help them, it hurt them. It lengthened the time it took to engage the enemy, which lead to winter, which made a big boo-boo...

But what is your point, you mean the German's won almost every armored engagement in the summer of 1942 while experiencing a severe fuel shortage, but having a more potent fighting force would had made their situation worse? Yes fuel was a problem, and increasing the time needed to conduct the campaign only made that worse.

You posed a specific question concerning the outcome at Stalingrad and i gave you a specific answer.
Concerning the campaign of 1942 in the south in general , your WI would not significantly change matters as there were far more important factors at work. The red army not allowing itself not to be encircled anymore was a major factor which prevented decisive defeats. Going for the Caucasus without having decisively defeated the red army and the weakness of the allied armies having to hold a very long front was another major factor.
Having more firepower would be a minor detail. I would also like to point out that 6 Army regularly had to request air suppply of ammo for the 7,5 cm long guns as it suffered shortages in this type of ammo.

[Aida1]

And yes, the StuG was initially designed for infantry support as an assault gun. But that was when it was equipped with the short barrel 7.5 cm gun. This WI scenario is not discussing the StuG's role as an assault gun, it is discussing the up-gunned version that was put in a tank hunter role. But I would like to see your reference to the StuG being unsuccessful. My understanding is that StuG crews chalked up more tank kills than Panzer crews did. Can you provide me with your reference, because I am really interested to see what it is.

Later in the war Stugs were integrated in the pz div as an expedient to give them more armor but tanks and Stugs guns working together did not work out. The stug could certainly work as a tank hunter but within a tank division in an offensive or counter offensive role it did not work well.

Can you point out what you mean by StuG's and tanks didn't work out? And what would it possibly matter? So what happens if they deploy StuG's as either an attached Battalion, or as a Brigade. The relevant point is that it is a much more effective weapon system, and the net effect was they could destroy enemy armor much easier.

" Generalinspekteur der Panzertruppen 15.04.1943

Leaflet on the use of a Sturmgeschützabteilung within the Panzerregiment

1) Within some Panzer divisions it is necessary to equip a Panzerabteilung with Sturmgeschütze as an intermediary solution
2) The Panzerabteilung is equipped with 96 Sturmgeschütze
Organisation: staff 3 command tanks
staff company( recce and security platoon) 5 Sturmgeschütze
1. to 4. company kp troop 2 Sturmgeschütze each
1. to 4. platoon 5 Sturmgeschütze each
3) The Sturmgeschütze has the following advantages over a Panzer IV:
a) strong frontal armor( from april 1943 newly produced Panzer IV will have armor of the same stregth)
b) lower height and therefore a smaller target
Disadvantages are:
a) no commander cupola so lesser command and sighting ability(from december 1942 new Sturmgeschütze
have a command cupola)
b) no turret so no ability to fire in all directions
c) no machinegun that can fire in all directions. This affects the ability for close defense.
4) The performance and properties of the sturmgeschütze do not allow autonomous operations without panzer or panzergrenadiere
Its advantages make it into a tank hunter. This governs the use of the Pz Abteilung equipped with Sturmgeschütze with the Panzer regt and the Pz division.
5) Attack
a) the Sturmgeschütz Abt cannot fight like a Pz Abt autonomously within the enemy. Support and monitoring by Panzer or Panzer grenadiere will therefore always be necessary. Therefore the use in the last echelon for collaboration with the Pz grenadiere will be the rule
For this the instructions for collaboration with the infantry apply(H.Dv 200/2m AVA Die Sturmgeschütz batterie of 07.09.1942 besides the supplementary annexes)

b) Pz Abt equipped with with the Pz III and Panzer IV with thin frontal armor(50mm) can be reinforced by Sturmgeschütze comapnies or platoons for special missions(point, attack with limited objective)
The Sturmgeschütze then fight in the front

c) when meeting enemy tanks, the Sturmgescütze units are put to the front to free the other Pz Abt. for moving against flank and rear and so for the complete destruction of the enemy tanks.

d) as tank hunters the Sturmgeschütze are to be driven behind the open wings of the regt so that they can protect the flanks and support the regt when confronting enemy tanks

e) when the Pz grenadiere have to create the preconditions for the operation of the regt , for example in crossing a river, then the Sturmgeschütze can make their mission effectively easier by their fire

6) Defense
In the defense the sturmgeschütze units will, like the Pz Abt, be kept back and used for counter thrusts and counter attacks with the Pz Grenadiere .
Specifically, the Sturmgeschütze unit has the role of the tank hunter

7) Retreat
By an attack with limited objective, in collaboration with Panzer and Panzer grenadiere, the retreat from the enemy is made easier. The operation of the Sturmgeschütze units as tank hunters will be in the foreground.

Guderian"

Above are the instructions by Guderian for the use of Stug within the pzdiv. These were not always followed which lead to problems. Stugs could not operate as tanks. They were a good tank hunter and could have a role as such whitin a pz div. .

Okay, so Guderian didn't like the idea of having the Army's artillery stealing his limelight, but again, what difference does it make? None of this can change the fact that the StuG was a much better weapon system then the Pz III L60. There are also accounts of StuG batteries acting without infantry, or being used successfully with tanks. But it has no bearing on the WI. Making long barreled StuG's was a much better use of the resources Germany used to make Pz III's. That's it, that's all Aida.

It was Guderians idea to strengthen the pz div with stug as an expedient so you make no sense. Anyway, in mobile offensive and counter offensive operations, you need more tanks in the first place. Stugs could be used within a pz div for specific roles.

[Richard Anderson]

The idea that the Panzer III did not have a "long-barreled" 5cm KwK in April 1941 because "Hitler's orders were ignored" and that if his orders hadn't been "ignored" there would have been X-number more Panzer III with "long barrelled" 5cm gun by X-date misses the rather important fact that production of the 5cm KwK 38 L42 was what had been authorized and funded and its delays were caused by very real manufacturing problems. On 1 January 1941, Panzer III 5cm production was at 15 percent because the MIAG plant was having difficulties completing tanks and it was noted that StuG (gep.Sfl.f.Stm.Gesch) production was at only 38 percent of plan. By 1 February 1941, Panzer III 5cm production was still only at 28 percent of plan and as late as 18 February 1941, output of the 5cm PaK 38 and the 5cm KwK were at 22 percent of plan due to material shortfalls, specifically of "composite materials" (i.e. special alloys), a lack of die cut parts due to the cutting machine breaking, as well as shortfalls in pressed steel parts.

So a failure/lack of materials and machine tools rather than a failure to follow Hitler's infallible directions.

[dgfred]

IMO it was the diversion of forces that was the problem... not what kind of armor got diverted. From the original post question that is.

[Richard Anderson]

I should have gone back and looked at the Speer Schnell Berichte from January 1945, which sheds some light on the subject of "long barrelled" guns. The figure of 15 completed 7.5cm PaK 40 in February 1942 from NARA T78- R146, F516 Überblick über den Rüstungsstand des Heeres, Dezember 1943 as quoted in Lexikon der Wehrmacht was actually the figure for acceptances by HWA for delivery to HZA, which is incomplete and incorrect in some cases. Unfortunately, it only covers 1941-1945 but has a number of interesting things in it.

The first 7.5cm "long barreled" guns accepted were not in February 1942, they were in 1941 - 120 of them, the first few as early as June-July but probably most at the end of November and in December. But they weren't PaK 40, oddly enough they were KwK 40 - i.e. there was no carriage (gun carriages were a pain for all ordnance designers and this one was especially troublesome since they tried to pare its weight to the minimum). The first PaK 40 were completed in February 1942 as guns with carriages but many then were used almost immediately in self-propelled mountings. Überblick über den Rüstungsstand des Heeres accounted for 2,256 PaK 40 in 1942 of which at least 776 and possibly as many as 1,007 ended up on Panzer II, Panzer 38(t), FCM, H35, and Lorraine chassis as emergency Panzerjäger (Sfl). Another 804 were completed as StuK 40 for the Sturmartillerie beginning in March.

So when were the first KwK 40 installed in a Panzer IV...in March 1942. So around two months were "lost" but to what? Foot dragging? No, completing and testing the redesign of the Panzer IV turret and hull ammunition stowage.

[LachenKrieg]

No we aren't back Richard, you just never left

Okay Laughing Boy, back to the ad hominem?

Well apparently it's more than just Spielberger, but why don't you contact the people I cited in a previous post, which includes Spielberger and have them defend themselves here? While your at it, give Guderian a call and tell him you know he's lying because you not only bought the book, but you read it!

Damn, heresy, I'm questioning Spielberger. Never mind that Tom Jentz demonstrated years ago that Speilberger was mostly working from Allied intelligence reports rather than original documents and got quite a bit wrong about German Panzer production.

What evidence, you mean the evidence that your making all this up? Could it be that the reason the L60 version of the gun didn't exist because it wasn't ordered into production as requested? The request was there, the resources and know how were there, the gun even existed, and this WI is plausible.

Yeah Laughing Boy, I make everything up.

EDIT: Learning to comprehend while you read is probably all that needs to be cleared up here. There is no confusing/mixing up two different guns in my text. The bold text quote you referred to is clearly meant to discuss the L60 which was delayed, and the long barreled gun needed in the StuG, which is the subject of this WI.

Okay then if we're going down the ad hominem route, maybe you need to learn how to write explicitly? Anyway, if it is the 7.5cm PaK/KwK 40 you are solely interested in then there definitely is no "delays" to correct. Glad you cleared that up.

Do you think while you're at it could you clear up why the Schnelltruppen would decide to drop their requirement for tanks and accept assault guns as substitutes? Explain why if it was such a popular and simple solution, they only ever converted three divisions to such an organization? Why if the organization was so acceptable did it only appear in three battalions - one in each of those divisions? Why was it that only two of the companies in each of those battalions were so equipped?

Sorry for taking so long....

Jentz was the technical editor to one of the citations I gave, so where are you going with this?... Nowhere?

I don't know about Schnellturppen requirements for tanks, but going back to the 4 reports you cited earlier, was it the first or the second report where the author (Panzertruppen) states he finds it tolerable if up to 50% of the allocated vehicles were filled with StuG's? The principle concern was fire power, and you can get a clear sense of this in just about anything ever written on the subject. What was repeated in numerous reports is that German tank crews were aware of the need for more fire power. And the long barrel gun is the reason why the StuG became so heavily relied on until the end of the war.

But I don't think it is so strange that StuG's weren't part of Gudarien's PanzerWaffe, because they weren't. They came under the control of a different branch in the same way the initial Panzer IV as an infantry support vehicle came under the Panzerwaffe. And yes, the best solution would have been for Germany to make thousands of Panther tanks to drive alongside its PzIV's, but that would be even less plausible and is not what this WI is about. The WI is saying that almost the only feasible solution they had was to use the Pz III chassis it was able to make for long barreled StuG's. And your response seems to be that because armored tank divisions preferred turreted vehicles, the best solution was to stay with the Pz III, which by 1942 could barely be considered a light tank. That makes no sense to me.

And what you are hiding behind are simply the historical decisions that were taken. The fact that one outcome is the product of the historical decision that caused it doesn't mean another outcome wasn't possible under a different decision. We are not talking about Germany landing a man on the moon in 1939. That would not be plausible. We are talking about Germany making a cannon, which they had already been doing for some time by 1939. The decision to standardize the armament of Germany's main battle tank with the infantry gun of the day for example had an outcome. That decision was then followed by the decision to go with the short barrel 5.0 cm gun, which was simply another time sink that would have negative consequences for Germany's war effort. And I didn't say the 7.5 cm gun was delayed in the same way the L/60 was. The WI suggested that had Germany taken the right decisions so that the L/60 was ready for Barbarossa, then it would have applied more pressure to reach the solution they would ultimately come to sooner, because the battlefield experiences of the Panzer Turppen would have been essentially the same with the L/60. They would have come to the same conclusions that they needed more fire power.

[LachenKrieg]

6 Army had been suffering a serious lack of fuel for a long time .Which made moving its mobile divisions very difficult and slow. So a quick counterattack was not possible. Firepower is all very well but you need to be able to bring it to the enemy.

Your repeated yourself without answering the bold text, which was in answer to the issue you were raising.

You would have to explain how the russian forces used in the offensive would have been significantly attritted so the offensive would be far less successful. And that implies placing these more potent German forces you are talking about near enough to the russian ofensive forces. And there is the problem. Fuel was a major inhiting factor from the beginning of Fall Blau. Detailed logistical data of 6 Army show this major problem.
viewtopic.php?f=55&t=268007&start=210

Yes fuel was a problem for certain. I already agreed with that. But what are you going on about? Are you serious? Do me a favor and review the history on Germany's summer offensive in 1942, then come back here and tell me how many Russian forces were destroyed in that campaign. Remember that was done with a low supply of fuel as you pointed out, along with a fighting force that often required flanking maneuvers. How much fuel does that use?

At any rate Aida, it appears that the Russian forces were significantly attrtited even with a fuel shortage. The fuel shortage caused the Germans down time, which didn't help them, it hurt them. It lengthened the time it took to engage the enemy, which lead to winter, which made a big boo-boo...

But what is your point, you mean the German's won almost every armored engagement in the summer of 1942 while experiencing a severe fuel shortage, but having a more potent fighting force would had made their situation worse? Yes fuel was a problem, and increasing the time needed to conduct the campaign only made that worse.

You posed a specific question concerning the outcome at Stalingrad and i gave you a specific answer.
Concerning the campaign of 1942 in the south in general , your WI would not significantly change matters as there were far more important factors at work. The red army not allowing itself not to be encircled anymore was a major factor which prevented decisive defeats. Going for the Caucasus without having decisively defeated the red army and the weakness of the allied armies having to hold a very long front was another major factor.
Having more firepower would be a minor detail. I would also like to point out that 6 Army regularly had to request air suppply of ammo for the 7,5 cm long guns as it suffered shortages in this type of ammo.

No actually what I did was gave an answer to a suggestion you made, but you ignored it. In answer to the new suggestion, first off I think what you meant to say was "Axis armies having to hold a very long front as another major factor". But like your fuel shortage suggestion, a more potent force is what would be needed to compensate for the very long front line. Having a less potent fighting force causes more strain on a limited fuel supply, in the same way a less potent fighting force would cause more strain on a very long front line. I would also like to say that 6 Army regularly had to request air supply of food....

[LachenKrieg]

Later in the war Stugs were integrated in the pz div as an expedient to give them more armor but tanks and Stugs guns working together did not work out. The stug could certainly work as a tank hunter but within a tank division in an offensive or counter offensive role it did not work well.

Can you point out what you mean by StuG's and tanks didn't work out? And what would it possibly matter? So what happens if they deploy StuG's as either an attached Battalion, or as a Brigade. The relevant point is that it is a much more effective weapon system, and the net effect was they could destroy enemy armor much easier.

" Generalinspekteur der Panzertruppen 15.04.1943

Leaflet on the use of a Sturmgeschützabteilung within the Panzerregiment

1) Within some Panzer divisions it is necessary to equip a Panzerabteilung with Sturmgeschütze as an intermediary solution
2) The Panzerabteilung is equipped with 96 Sturmgeschütze
Organisation: staff 3 command tanks
staff company( recce and security platoon) 5 Sturmgeschütze
1. to 4. company kp troop 2 Sturmgeschütze each
1. to 4. platoon 5 Sturmgeschütze each
3) The Sturmgeschütze has the following advantages over a Panzer IV:
a) strong frontal armor( from april 1943 newly produced Panzer IV will have armor of the same stregth)
b) lower height and therefore a smaller target
Disadvantages are:
a) no commander cupola so lesser command and sighting ability(from december 1942 new Sturmgeschütze
have a command cupola)
b) no turret so no ability to fire in all directions
c) no machinegun that can fire in all directions. This affects the ability for close defense.
4) The performance and properties of the sturmgeschütze do not allow autonomous operations without panzer or panzergrenadiere
Its advantages make it into a tank hunter. This governs the use of the Pz Abteilung equipped with Sturmgeschütze with the Panzer regt and the Pz division.
5) Attack
a) the Sturmgeschütz Abt cannot fight like a Pz Abt autonomously within the enemy. Support and monitoring by Panzer or Panzer grenadiere will therefore always be necessary. Therefore the use in the last echelon for collaboration with the Pz grenadiere will be the rule
For this the instructions for collaboration with the infantry apply(H.Dv 200/2m AVA Die Sturmgeschütz batterie of 07.09.1942 besides the supplementary annexes)

b) Pz Abt equipped with with the Pz III and Panzer IV with thin frontal armor(50mm) can be reinforced by Sturmgeschütze comapnies or platoons for special missions(point, attack with limited objective)
The Sturmgeschütze then fight in the front

c) when meeting enemy tanks, the Sturmgescütze units are put to the front to free the other Pz Abt. for moving against flank and rear and so for the complete destruction of the enemy tanks.

d) as tank hunters the Sturmgeschütze are to be driven behind the open wings of the regt so that they can protect the flanks and support the regt when confronting enemy tanks

e) when the Pz grenadiere have to create the preconditions for the operation of the regt , for example in crossing a river, then the Sturmgeschütze can make their mission effectively easier by their fire

6) Defense
In the defense the sturmgeschütze units will, like the Pz Abt, be kept back and used for counter thrusts and counter attacks with the Pz Grenadiere .
Specifically, the Sturmgeschütze unit has the role of the tank hunter

7) Retreat
By an attack with limited objective, in collaboration with Panzer and Panzer grenadiere, the retreat from the enemy is made easier. The operation of the Sturmgeschütze units as tank hunters will be in the foreground.

Guderian"

Above are the instructions by Guderian for the use of Stug within the pzdiv. These were not always followed which lead to problems. Stugs could not operate as tanks. They were a good tank hunter and could have a role as such whitin a pz div. .

Okay, so Guderian didn't like the idea of having the Army's artillery stealing his limelight, but again, what difference does it make? None of this can change the fact that the StuG was a much better weapon system then the Pz III L60. There are also accounts of StuG batteries acting without infantry, or being used successfully with tanks. But it has no bearing on the WI. Making long barreled StuG's was a much better use of the resources Germany used to make Pz III's. That's it, that's all Aida.

It was Guderians idea to strengthen the pz div with stug as an expedient so you make no sense. Anyway, in mobile offensive and counter offensive operations, you need more tanks in the first place. Stugs could be used within a pz div for specific roles.

Try reading it again, maybe it will make more sense for you. Anyway, the StuG was used in numerous offensive and counter offensive operations. You need more tracked vehicles that could actually defeat the enemy in the first and last place. StuG's were relied on throughout the war, but especially in later stages by panzer division to fill the role of destroying enemy armor/AT guns, which was pretty much the role panzer divisions used its turreted vehicles for. I just finished reading "Stug III Brigade 191 The Buffalo Brigade"(2009) by Bruno Bork, and highly recommend it. It covers the entire war, and that unit was involved in heavy fighting in the Balkans, Greece, and especially the Eastern Front.

[Richard Anderson]

Sorry for taking so long....

No problem, I was not bating my breath.

Jentz was the technical editor to one of the citations I gave, so where are you going with this?... Nowhere?

Let me ask you the same question. You brought Spielberger as of he was the be all and end all. I brought up Jentz's contradiction of Spielberger's infallibility. So where are you going with "Jentz was the technical editor to one of the citations I gave, so where are you going with this?... Nowhere?"

I don't know about Schnellturppen requirements for tanks, but going back to the 4 reports you cited earlier, was it the first or the second report where the author (Panzertruppen) states he finds it tolerable if up to 50% of the allocated vehicles were filled with StuG's? The principle concern was fire power, and you can get a clear sense of this in just about anything ever written on the subject. What was repeated in numerous reports is that German tank crews were aware of the need for more fire power.

Yet again, despite that less than ringing endorsement, nothing came of it. The Schnelltruppen wanted tanks and when it became the Panzertruppen they still wanted tanks. A tank is a versatile offensive and defensive weapon, an assault gun is not.

BTW, those reports were two years into the campaign and a year and a half from the end of the war...you'd think if it was an acceptable solution we would have seen more Sturmgeschütz used by the Panzertruppen but we don't. I wonder why?

And the long barrel gun is the reason why the StuG became so heavily relied on until the end of the war.

So heavily relied upon by the Infanterie, not by the Panzertruppen. It continued to supply the infantry with the accompanying gun as well as gave them a useful antitank capability.

But I don't think it is so strange that StuG's weren't part of Gudarien's PanzerWaffe, because they weren't. They came under the control of a different branch in the same way the initial Panzer IV as an infantry support vehicle came under the Panzerwaffe.

Er, no, sorry but you are confused. The initial Panzer IV was not "an infantry support vehicle" and that was not why it came under the Schnelltruppen (as the Panzerwaffe was known then). It was a Panzer, the required mittlere Panzer complementing the leichte Panzer (Panzer III) in the Panzer Division. It was precisely because it was never intended as an infantry support vehicle that the Sturmgeschütz was designed for that role.

And yes, the best solution would have been for Germany to make thousands of Panther tanks to drive alongside its PzIV's, but that would be even less plausible and is not what this WI is about.

No, Germany did make "thousands of Panther tanks to drive alongside its PzIV's" so obviously while plausible - it happened after all - that was not the best solution. Perhaps a better solution was not to enter into a multi-front conflict with an immature weapons system and a partially mobilized industrial infrastructure to support it.

And what you are hiding behind are simply the historical decisions that were taken.

Not at all. I am simply asking why an entrenched bureaucracy, with an accepted doctrine and huge sunk costs would suddenly change course in such a radical manner. Why after seven years of development, success in Poland and France, and near success in BARBAROSSA, would they suddenly decide to dump the Panzer and embrace the Sturmgeschütz? Because its potential firepower was better? When armored vehicle design was and still is a series of compromise? The turreted tank - the Panzer - was then and still is the more desirable choice, even if a non-turreted tank can carry more firepower.

Why would an earlier deployment of the Panzer III with 5cm L60 change anything? The Germans were already well aware of the need for bigger guns, why else was the 7.5cm KwK/StuK/PaK 40 already in the wings?

[Aida1]

Your repeated yourself without answering the bold text, which was in answer to the issue you were raising.

You would have to explain how the russian forces used in the offensive would have been significantly attritted so the offensive would be far less successful. And that implies placing these more potent German forces you are talking about near enough to the russian ofensive forces. And there is the problem. Fuel was a major inhiting factor from the beginning of Fall Blau. Detailed logistical data of 6 Army show this major problem.
viewtopic.php?f=55&t=268007&start=210

Yes fuel was a problem for certain. I already agreed with that. But what are you going on about? Are you serious? Do me a favor and review the history on Germany's summer offensive in 1942, then come back here and tell me how many Russian forces were destroyed in that campaign. Remember that was done with a low supply of fuel as you pointed out, along with a fighting force that often required flanking maneuvers. How much fuel does that use?

At any rate Aida, it appears that the Russian forces were significantly attrtited even with a fuel shortage. The fuel shortage caused the Germans down time, which didn't help them, it hurt them. It lengthened the time it took to engage the enemy, which lead to winter, which made a big boo-boo...

But what is your point, you mean the German's won almost every armored engagement in the summer of 1942 while experiencing a severe fuel shortage, but having a more potent fighting force would had made their situation worse? Yes fuel was a problem, and increasing the time needed to conduct the campaign only made that worse.

You posed a specific question concerning the outcome at Stalingrad and i gave you a specific answer.
Concerning the campaign of 1942 in the south in general , your WI would not significantly change matters as there were far more important factors at work. The red army not allowing itself not to be encircled anymore was a major factor which prevented decisive defeats. Going for the Caucasus without having decisively defeated the red army and the weakness of the allied armies having to hold a very long front was another major factor.
Having more firepower would be a minor detail. I would also like to point out that 6 Army regularly had to request air suppply of ammo for the 7,5 cm long guns as it suffered shortages in this type of ammo.

No actually what I did was gave an answer to a suggestion you made, but you ignored it. In answer to the new suggestion, first off I think what you meant to say was "Axis armies having to hold a very long front as another major factor". But like your fuel shortage suggestion, a more potent force is what would be needed to compensate for the very long front line. Having a less potent fighting force causes more strain on a limited fuel supply, in the same way a less potent fighting force would cause more strain on a very long front line. I would also like to say that 6 Army regularly had to request air supply of food....

You are not making sense here.You did not adress the problem that the red army evaded encirclements and for that reason was not decisiveily beaten in the summer. More firepower does not change that particularly not having more slow stugs. Only different operational decisions could have changed that and more fuel. And in order for 6 Army to do better when the red army offensive happened in november, it needed to be able to move its mobile reserves fast enough which was impossible because of the lack of fuel. And that problem was caused by the railroad problems behind it. Having more 75 mm long guns does not solve that problem, neither does it solve the other problem which is that inferior allied armies were holding long stretches of front.
And i did notice in the logistical data of 6 Army a regular lack of 7,5 cm long ammo. For more guns you need more ammo too.