Richard Anderson wrote: ↑16 Feb 2023 20:42
However, questioning the accuracy of accounts is not BS. Failing to acknowledge there is zero actual documentation for the "in April 1940 Hitler personally directed the Panzer III be armed with the 5cm L60 gun." And by "actual documentation" I am not referring to the ex post facto accounts of Spielberger or Guderian but to some document, any document, from the time this supposedly happened that records Hitler's order or his reaction to the supposed failure to carry it out.
You can add Chamberlain and Doyle to the people on your list of "ex post facto accounts" while you're at it. But unless you have a document, any document from the time that records Hitler never made the order, or had a reaction then you questioning something on an Internet forum doesn't make your statements accurate,... just saying.
You could always communicate with one of the authors listed above and ask what they used as a reference.
But aside from the fact a 5.0cm gun was initially requested, the German's had every reason to make it so. Tanks with bigger guns than 3.7cm were already in service by the mid 1930's. And by 1941 the German Army had obviously accepted longer gun barrels as demonstrated by the arrival of the Tiger I. But if that wasn't enough, then the German Army had already witnessed a gun barrel in action that was both bigger than 5cm, and extended beyond the front of the tank on meeting the T34.
Richard Anderson wrote: ↑16 Feb 2023 20:42
" Learning to comprehend while you read is probably all that needs to be cleared up here." Ad hominem and one you like to sling at various posters.
"He’s not just some errand boy to the assistant editor at a company called Dopey you know!?" Ad hominem and a pretty lame one too since you obviously have little notion of what work Trevor and TNDA/HERO/DMSi/TDI did.
Unfortunately Richard, I have no idea what you are talking about so what is it I should understand? You mean I am supposed to know who Trevor, TNDA/HERO/DMSi/TDI is, or what that represents, and that something I wrote has something to do with him, them, or it? It looks like the only ad hominem here is in your head, and a pretty lame one at that! Just like the last claim of mistaken identity Richard, this is all just a figment of your imagination. TMP Richard?
And BTW, pointing out that you seem unable to understand the meaning of plain English text, or that you constantly take things out of context as a form of argumentation is not an ad hominem.
Richard Anderson wrote: ↑16 Feb 2023 20:42
As in here where you quite obviously have little real idea about what I am talking about. No, I did not imply "that mobile troops as a whole turned into armoured troops" and that you think that I did demonstrates just how limited your knowledge is of this subject. And no, what I said is not out of context; you simply don't understand the context.
This is what you said:
Richard Anderson wrote: ↑10 Feb 2023 00:06
Yet again, despite that less than ringing endorsement, nothing came of it. The Schnelltruppen wanted tanks and when it became the Panzertruppen they still wanted tanks. A tank is a versatile offensive and defensive weapon, an assault gun is not.
Who are you referring to when you say "the Schnelltruppen", and what did they want? And more specifically, what does "when the Schnelltruppen became the Panzertruppen" mean? When I read that I understand you are talking about mobile (fast) troops in general, that they wanted tanks, and then you claim after they became armored troops they still wanted tanks.
The English meaning of your text is quite clear. I was simply pointing out that Schnelltruppen refers to all types of mechanized troop formations. I can read what your right hand wrote, but who knows if that is what your left-brain was actually trying to say.
Richard Anderson wrote: ↑16 Feb 2023 20:42
No I don't know what reports you are referring to, otherwise I wouldn't say I don't... Are you referring back to the experience reports from Panzer-Regiment 36 as quoted by Jentz?
Yes those would be the reports I was referring to. But where does it say the StuG was being evaluated as a possible one-to-one replacement for turreted AFV's? Admittedly, I didn't realize you were actually trying to use this to dismiss the feasibility of my WI at first. I thought the main point had to do with the abilities of the StuG itself. In case this isn't just you taking things out of context again, and you really are that confused, this is how Jentz describes the reports:
"The following combat reports reveal the tactics used by all the different types of Panzer-Abteilungen...(hint: he's including StuG's as a type here) that were thrown in to stop the Russian advance."
He then goes on to point out the replacement units included in the reports were sent in "piecemeal" out of desperation instead of in a concentrated powerful counteroffensive. Not only are these reports simply evaluating the use of mixed Panzer units, but they were made under extreme duress. And there is nothing in them that suggests the StuG failed as a tank, mostly because it wasn't being evaluated as one.
By the time these reports are made the Panther had already arrived, and so there would be no need to consider replacing Pz III production for StuG production at that point, because turreted versions of the Pz III were no longer being produced. They stopped production of Pz III's, and increased production of StuG's, why?
IMO, you have to be doing this on purpose because no one could possibly raise such an asinine argument, especially someone claiming to be an authority on all things WWII Germany.
Also, a large number of the Panzer divisions had formations of non-turreted AFV either as an organic part of the division, or attached. Most of these vehicles served in tank-hunter roles. And regardless of whether the assault gun/TD units were part of a panzer division, or the infantry division it was fighting beside, all assets from both divisions were committed to battle according to need. And the WI did not suggest all tanks be replaced with StuG's. It suggests Germany should have abandoned turreted versions of the Pz III several months earlier then it actually did.
Richard Anderson wrote: ↑16 Feb 2023 20:42
No, I implied no such thing, however, if you would like to quote me where I did supposedly imply such a thing, then perhaps I will point out where your lack of understanding of how things worked is tripping you up.
Here it is again:
Richard Anderson wrote: ↑10 Feb 2023 00:06
Yet again, despite that less than ringing endorsement, nothing came of it. The Schnelltruppen wanted tanks and when it became the Panzertruppen they still wanted tanks.
So just remind me, who were the schnelltruppen again? Because as I said, you seem to be implying the troops themselves knew what they wanted, and even after they were reclassified into another organization they still knew what they wanted.
The impression I am left with on reading that is according to you it worked similar to the way someone orders what they want from a menu. In addition to the fake experiment you created, you are trying to place the feasibility of the WI in question by suggesting the people using the tanks didn't want StuG's. How lame is that Richard?
So apparently yes, you did imply such a thing, but the WI doesn't rely on fake experiments, or your notion of what tank crews wanted.
Richard Anderson wrote: ↑16 Feb 2023 20:42
Sigh...so are you implying that because the nascent Panzer formations were initially equipped and trained with MG-armed tanks they weren't tanks? Or that to train on a "tank" required the trainees to train on a tank armed with a certain size gun? BTW, no, they were not "training" vehicles.
No, I am implying that training on Pz I's equipped only with MG's would hardly prepare the trainee for the experience he would have on meeting a T34, or that he would be happy going into combat without an effective gun as long as he had a turret.
What I am implying is those trainees were simply not equipped to form an opinion on the importance of the gun at that point, but anyone interested can read what surviving tank crews actually thought after facing T34's in books like Jentz's Panzer Truppen.... Sigh.
Richard Anderson wrote: ↑16 Feb 2023 20:42
You have a very mechanistic notion of what effectiveness is. And a very odd idea of how things would work out if your WI was followed.
There is nothing odd about wanting to take the best course of action in a desperate situation.
Making the Pz III L/60 after Germany had full knowledge of what they were up against was a waste of resources. Had they made StuG's instead while waiting for the Panther to arrive, they could have improved their situation noticeably.
Not only would they have been able to eliminate more enemy armor/experienced tank crews in the period before the Panther arrived, they would have also likely had a higher number of vehicles with effective weapons still operational when it arrived.
The Panther arrived as the German Army was essentially transitioning into full retreat. That is like putting a band-aid on a gunshot wound, and that is putting it mildly because the Panther was rushed into action out of sheer desperation. The outcome of the war at that point was for all intents and purposes nearly decided. In other words, it was too late to be saved by a turret!
Richard Anderson wrote: ↑16 Feb 2023 20:42
I'm getting less and less interested if your ignorance results in you getting offended. The purpose of a counterfactual is to develop understanding of why things happened the way they did, not for you to get your ego stroked over what a brilliant idea you had that no one ever was ever smart enough to come up with.
Yes, that is one possible outcome to a counterfactual. The counterfactual may also illuminate a plausible alternate history, which is the case here.
But I think you are hitting the nail on your own head in this regard. You can't raise an argument big enough to stroke your own ego, so you have to resort to projecting that on others.
Luckily for the rest of the free world, the Ordnance department set a tone for Germany's AFV production that would have long lasting effects, and which would end up haunting them until the end of the war.
It would have been much more productive to resolve the tank armament issue in pre-war Germany than having to deal with it after the war started. Worst-case scenario is that Germany wouldn't be ready to invade Poland in September 1939. Best-case scenario is that its divisions would have reached a higher level of mechanization before war started, and Germany wouldn't have wasted as many resources making weapons with an effective shelf life of little more than a year.
Even if it meant initially putting fake guns in all the Pz III's produced up to and including 1938, they would have been much better off. That would have not only afforded them the time to resolve concerns with gun barrel length, but it would have made the early Pz III's more relevant on the battlefield.
The end result could have been in addition to the first 70 from 1938, the 200 made in 1939 would then also be armed with the 5cm L/42, followed by the L/60 in 1940. Even if that meant the L/60 upgrade was delayed a little, it would have given Germany a much stronger foothold on the battlefield that was about to unfold, and put it more in front of the curve instead of chasing it.
Richard Anderson wrote: ↑16 Feb 2023 20:42
So now you're walking back your notion that German factories being flattened could have impacted production decisions in 1940?...
Idiotic path? No I wasn't walking anything back! The intended EFFECTS of bombing were meant to decrease production, but I never said it AFFECTED a decision in 1941.
It's now 2023, so I have the luxury of using hindsight. My initial reference to Germany's limited production capacity was in connection to an underlying point in the WI, and not a specific date.
While Germany's limited production capacity should have been self-evident to all those concerned, the detrimental effects of wasting valuable resources to make ineffective weapons would have been less obvious without prior knowledge those weapons would be rendered ineffective in such a short time. Germany could have supported its war effort much better had it used the limited resources it did have to make effective weapons while it still could. This fact would certainly become more obvious after the war starts, and air-raid sirens start sounding.
Richard Anderson wrote: ↑16 Feb 2023 20:42
Even though I corrected you once on your false claim that I said the Sturmgeschütz weren't successful you're deciding to repeat it? In some circles that is what is called a "lie". They were unsuccessful in replacing Panzer in the Panzer Division even though the experiment was tried in three divisions it was not carried through with and Hitler's all important directive was quietly ignored.
I have already addressed this above, but the only one lying here is you. There was no experiment to see if StuG's could replace tanks, not at least in reference to the reports you cited from Jentz. There was an ad hoc evaluation of mixed panzer units in an effort to find what would work best to stem the Russian advance. The StuG F-G proved to be a very effective weapon system.
You also said in an earlier post that it would be a stretch to think an L/60 equipped Pz III could change anything during Barbarossa, and I think nothing demonstrates the fundamental flaw in your reasoning better. For this to be true, there would have to be no difference in combat value between the two 5cm guns, when we know for a fact there is. And your assumption would also have to claim that out of all the engagements during Barbarossa, tank crews never found themselves in a situation where they could have used the increased penetrating power of the L/60.
Panzer crews reporting poor gun performance of the Pz III during and after Barbarossa is a general theme in almost any section the tank is discussed in Jentz.
Consider the Russian counter-offensive after Moscow. Red Army forces also struggled with men and material, so much so they were incapable of destroying the greatly weakened German units even after near encirclement. The state the two Army's were in at that point is obviously the result of the war they both waged and endured. It is hard to imagine how the Red Army would be in a better state if Germany had a more potent fighting force.
One could argue that there is at least some truth to the notion that the German Army was superior in training and tactics considering the poor performance of Red Army forces when it should have had better access to logistical support, and it didn't have tens of thousands of soldiers/partisans operating in its rear areas to further disrupt it.
But if Germany had L/60 equipped Pz III's at the start of Barbarossa, it could only have had a worsening effect on the state of Red Army forces by the time Barbarossa concluded. A similar effect would have been seen with the increased firepower the StuG F-G brings, and it would be a stretch to claim otherwise.
Richard Anderson wrote: ↑16 Feb 2023 20:42
Sorry but the lack of depth in your knowledge and reading is becoming evident again. Guderian did not "make" the Panzer divisions nor were they his. As Chief of Staff of In 6 from 1 October 1931 to 14 October 1935 he was directly involved in the organizational and equipment planning of the nascent divisions but Oswald Lutz, Werner Kempf, Friedrich Paulus, Adolf von Schell, and many others also had influence.
You forgot to mention blitzgrieg, the guest list at his wedding reception, and that in 1938 Hitler appointed his General der Panzertruppen as the Chief of Schnelletruppen. Dammit, there is that Schnell thingy again Richard!
Richard Anderson wrote: ↑16 Feb 2023 20:42
Sorry but your lack of understanding is not my problem. You are conflating StuG as Heerestruppen supporting infantry formations with Panzer formations as an arm of decision. An understanding of how and why they actually worked is kind of important.
Ja, mein Herr Kommandant.
I'm gonna go out on a limb here and say the people responsible for committing German forces into combat during WWII probably had a pretty good idea of how and why things worked.
The WI is suggesting that StuG's be produced in place of Pz III's. It is not suggesting Germany should have replaced all of its tanks with StuG's. Germany would still have tanks in the same divisions, just fewer Pz III's.
Having a larger number of more effective weapons would give them more tactical options, not less. They could have for example reallocated more of the long barreled Pz IV's for the 1942 summer offensive and replaced them with long barreled StuG's since the two Army groups remaining in the North were to basically hold defensive positions. And they could have also afforded to commit more complete Assault Gun/TD units for the summer offensive than they did.
Richard Anderson wrote: ↑16 Feb 2023 20:42
Added to an order of battle in whatever way needed? Really? So it is actually irrelevant how the units are organized and trained? The doctrine in place is irrelevant? Fascinating.
Nothing has to change in the organization and training in this WI.
Richard Anderson wrote: ↑16 Feb 2023 20:42
It would be really neat if you would actually quote me where I ever said "the troops themselves decided on tanks". Otherwise again I'm afraid I have to call that a simple lie. At least this time you did correct your fib about me saying Sturmgeschütz were unsuccessful.
Richard Anderson wrote: ↑10 Feb 2023 00:06
Yet again, despite that less than ringing endorsement, nothing came of it. The Schnelltruppen wanted tanks and when it became the Panzertruppen they still wanted tanks.
Neat!
Richard Anderson wrote: ↑10 Feb 2023 00:06
BTW, there is an old adage that absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. Aside from the simple fact you have been given the evidence of what the assessment was of using Sturmgeschütz as a Panzer substitute in the only three divisions that ever did so, there is the simple evidence that those were the only divisions that did so and that Hitler's direct orders were never followed in the matter. Then there is the matter of what Guderian did when he did finally take over "his" Pamzertruppen, which was a backdoor attempt at increasing the number of Panzer in the division by ending the experiment with adding a Panzer-Abteilung in the Infanterie-Division (mot) and replacing those with Sturmgeschütz.
OMG Richard, really! Blah blah blah.... experiment... blah blah... What experiment?
I don't need to because history already has. The StuG proved itself to be a very effective weapon system, and it was produced in increasing numbers as the war progressed because of this fact. The Pz III on the other hand was phased out because of its low combat value. This is so well documented in so many different sources that only a fool would attempt to disprove it.
The serious issue of supply chains and logistical support has been repeatedly brought up in this thread, but what surprises me most is how no one considers how the Pz III added to that problem.
Because of its low combat effectiveness, fielding large numbers only sped up the loss of experienced tank crews, and consumed large amounts of fuel and ammunition while confronting a superior enemy. Another report you might want to read on page 230 in Jentz Vol. 1 describes the combat experience of P-R 203, and the report that follows on pages 231-2. As a short-term remedy to the desperate situation German Panzer units found themselves in, they had to use up to 3 tanks to combat a single T34. That would not be the case had the Pz III been on an equal footing.
You could also read the report from 17. P-D on page 43 in Jentz Vol. 2. To quote a part from that report:
"During battles this winter, excellent experiences were obtained with StuG-Abt. Because of their high mobility and firepower, they were employed and directed utilizing the same principles used for Panzers. They were superior to the panzers with regard to mobility... When available, StuG's should be included within the companies as a first wave. When StuG's aren't available, use Pz.Kpfw.IVs."
So not only are you inventing an experiment that never took place, but your interpretation of simple English text is simply not accurate.
To demonstrate how limitations of the Pz III degraded German abilities in actual battle, read Forczyk's first volume on Stalingrad. In it, he describes the "desperate stand" that took place near "collective farm No. 2".
If that battle group had Pz IV's/StuG's, it would have been able to defend the objective without having to sacrifice its 88mm Flak guns by engaging the Russian tanks head-on from a greater distance. And the scenario German losses due to ineffective weapons would have been repeated throughout the entire war.
Richard Anderson wrote: ↑10 Feb 2023 00:06
You truly worship Heinz don't you? I'm afraid to ask how you feel about Manstein.
Oh that's rich Dick!
I appreciate some of the German ingenuity that went into their AFV's, but that is where it ends.
The WI I raised obviously requires that my argument be in support of furthering Germany's war effort, but don't let the little stuff confuse you.
I just think its funny because after all of the efforts Germany put in to sneaking around behind the treaty of Versailles, it was in-fighting and counterproductive efforts of the Nazi's themselves that would end up playing a major role in spoiling all their plans.
I even have it on my laptop 
