Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

[paulrward]

Hello All ;

Mr. Gardner posted:

On the naval bombardment, your math is off. The four cruisers firing 60 rounds per
gun amounts to just 332.4 tons in about 30 minutes of fire (277 lbs per shell, x 60 rpg x
10 guns per cruiser x 4 cruisers).

I am going to do some math here.

First, the IJN CAs carried 120 shells per gun. ( 1200 per CA as NORMAL STOWAGE - they could carry more.

The firing cycle for the 20 cm 50 caliber was 12-15 seconds as close range, 20-30 seconds at long range.
It is likely that the Suzuyas would engage the islands at about 15,000 yards, so the firing cycle is about
20 seconds, or three rounds per minute.

Which means they would empty their guns in about 40 minutes firing at rapid fire rate. But, if they
took their time, and did a proper job of it, they could spend two hours firing all 1200 from each
cruiser.

The weight of the Japanese 20 cm AP shell was 277 lbs. The HE shell was lighter - I have seen figures
of 253 lbs, 225 lbs, and 200 lbs, from different sources. I chose to use the lightest figure, to give the
IJN the least advantage.


So, here's the Math:

4 Cruisers x 10 Guns x 120 rounds x ( I am going to stick with 200 lbs) / 2000 lbs per ton / 2 islands -

240 Tons of explosive PER ISLAND

That's less than I had initially stated, but is still about a quarter of a Kiloton of high explosive per island, and the islands are flat, and the combined total land area is about 1500 acres. This means, with 4800 shells hitting the islands, you will have :

4800 shells / 1500 acres = 3 shells per acres.


And this is JUST the four heavy cruisers. It must be remembered: Yamamoto was on board the Yamato.
He was accompanied by the Nagato and Mutsu, arguablly the three most powerful battleships in the Pacific
at that time. And, the Ise, Hyuga, Fuso, and Yamashiro were accompanying the invasion force. Their guns
would have been available for the suppression of the defenses.

Yamamoto was going to be at the invasion PERSONALLY. This operation was HIS BABY ! For the IJN officers,
FAILURE WAS NOT AN OPTION ! If they had to use all seven battleships and the four cruisers to turn the
Midway Atoll into a sandy parking lot with Naval Gunfire, they would have fired their guns until the paint
blistered off the barrels !


Now, typically about 10% of shells on a battleship are HE, the rest being AP. And IJN battleships typically
carried about 100 shells per gun. Which means that they had 10 HE shells per gun. So:

Yamato: 9 guns x 10 shells x 3200 lbs / 2000 = 144 tons
Nagato/Mutsu: 2 ships x 8 guns x 10 shells x 2000 lbs / 2000 = 160 tons
Fusos/Ises: 4 ships x 12 guns x 10 shells x 1378 lbs / 2000 = 330 tons

For a Total of 634 tons of high explosive shells, or 317 tons per island. Add the 240 tons from the
cruisers, and you have more than 550 tons per island. Thats like each island being bombed by
about 275 B-17 flying fortresses, each with a maximum bomb load. And, the bombardment would
last for hours.


Respectfully:

Paul R. Ward


One final note: If you go back to my original gunfire equation, and put in the figure of 253 lbs per HE Shell,
you get 303 tons of shells per island. My original back of the envelope calculatoin was 360 tons per
island. My bad.

[Takao]

Any body want to tell Paul, his 4 heavy cruisers are going to put exactly 43.2 tons of explosives on the islands...Not his ludicrous 240 tons(quarter of a kiloton)....43.2 tons.

You would think that anyone with decades of wargaming experience would be able to tell the difference between shell weight and bursting charge weight.

A Japanese 8-inch shell had a bursting charge of 18 pounds.

[paulrward]

Hello All :

Any body want to tell Mr. Takao that the Kill Radius of an 8" shell is 80 meters, or, in U.S. terms,
an 8" naval shell will kill anyone within a 250 foot diameter circle.

You'd think anyone would be able to take a map of the island of Midway, and start drawing 250 foot
diameter circles on it, to see how many 8" shells would be necessary to reduce the opposition to
helplessness.

And that isn't including the 14", 16", and the 18" shells. Anyone to guess about the bursting radius
of an IJN 16" HE Shell ? I have not been able to find any real data, but we can compare it to the USN
16" HC HE Shell, which can create a crater 50 feet wide and 20 feet deep. During her deployment
off Vietnam, USS New Jersey (BB-62) occasionally fired a single HC round into the jungle and so created
a helicopter landing zone 600 feet in diameter and defoliated trees for 900 feet beyond that.

Mr. Takao: F= M A

Take 200 lbs of steel and filler, accellerate it to Mach 3, and calculate how much Ek ( Kinetic Energy ) it has.
It will surprise you.


But, hey, every body ! All the emplacements on Midway are protected by Sand Bags, and covered by
Camoflage Nets.......


Respectfully ;

Paul R. Ward

[Takao]

Hello All :

Any body want to tell Mr. Takao that the Kill Radius of an 8" shell is 80 meters, or, in U.S. terms,
an 8" naval shell will kill anyone within a 250 foot diameter circle.

You'd think anyone would be able to take a map of the island of Midway, and start drawing 250 foot
diameter circles on it, to see how many 8" shells would be necessary to reduce the opposition to
helplessness.

And that isn't including the 14", 16", and the 18" shells. Anyone to guess about the bursting radius
of an IJN 16" HE Shell ? I have not been able to find any real data, but we can compare it to the USN
16" HC HE Shell, which can create a crater 50 feet wide and 20 feet deep. During her deployment
off Vietnam, USS New Jersey (BB-62) occasionally fired a single HC round into the jungle and so created
a helicopter landing zone 600 feet in diameter and defoliated trees for 900 feet beyond that.

Mr. Takao: F= M A

Take 200 lbs of steel and filler, accellerate it to Mach 3, and calculate how much Ek ( Kinetic Energy ) it has.
It will surprise you.


But, hey, every body ! All the emplacements on Midway are protected by Sand Bags, and covered by
Camoflage Nets.......


Respectfully ;

Paul R. Ward

Wonder why the Japanese 8" shells performed so poorly in the Guadalcanal bombardments then.

[T. A. Gardner]

The wargame fantasy continues... I guess...

First, Japanese cruisers can't magically carry more ammunition than they were designed for. The only way that could possibly happen is they are loaded on deck or somewhere besides the magazines. Their Class A Cruisers (the 8" gun ones) were tight designs.



Next, Japanese doctrine was for cruisers to provide gunfire support in amphibious assaults. The IJA, in particular, but the IJN too put little faith in naval gunfire as a means to destroy enemy positions in such an assault. See for example Historical Review of Landing Operations of the Japanese Forces US Army 1952

Then there's absolutely ZERO way a Japanese ship is going to fire off its entire load of ammunition in NGFS. Isn't happening. The IJN had no means of doing stores and ammunition transfer at sea. So, firing off the entire load of ammo means the ship is left defenseless if enemy vessels should show up. It's likely that only about 20 to 30% of the ammunition aboard would be expended.
As an example of this, on 14 Nov 1942 the cruisers Suzuya, Maya, Chokai, and Kinugasa fired 989 shells on Henderson field representing about 20% of their full ammunition load out. They bombarded the field for over an hour. Henderson field was operational the very next day and sent planes to attack the cruisers, sinking Kinugasa and damaging Maya and Chokai. So, for all those shells, they IJN failed to close the airfield or destroy the aircraft parked around it.

The rate of fire of the Japanese 20cm guns on these cruisers is limited to 3 rpm by shell hoist speed. There is no ready ammunition in the turret so that's the max ROF. I used 2 rpm as it's likely the crew could sustain that without wearing themselves out.

All of that means my calculation is pretty close to what Japanese doctrine would produce. The battleships wouldn't be used for NGFS, but instead held ready for if US battleships showed up (eg., as a "Covering Force"). Again, that was the Japanese plan and doctrine at the time of Midway. And, no the IJN isn't going to have some epiphany and "improvise" their entire assault against Midway using tactics and doctrine that runs entirely counter to everything they trained for and had been doing for decades. That might happen in some fantasy version wargame or another, but not in reality.

Oh, by the by, the cruisers Mogami and Mikuma suffered a collision as they were headed into Midway--during the battle--to actually bombard it (due to trying to avoid torpedoes from the US submarine Tambor, and both were removed from that operation as a result of the ensuing damage and ordered to return to Japan for repairs...

Of course, some other ship(s) might be substituted, but they won't be battleships... Maybe a destroyer squadron is run in for some shell fire? Anyway, the bombardment might last 30 to 45 minutes as the ships fire in the dark, then the assault starts at dawn after the transports anchored offshore in the early morning darkness. THAT would follow Japanese doctrine and tactics, not some wargamer's fantasy.

[Richard Anderson]

Anybody want to tell paulrward that Betio Atoll is flat, and the combined [sic] total land area is 381 acres? That the five fire support groups of TG53.4 included three battleships, two heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, and nine destroyers pummeled those 381 acres for three hours? That on 19 November alone, carrier-based air dropped 69 tons of bombs on Betio, which was joined by 250 tons of HC projectiles fired from CRUDIV 5 (Pensacola, Salt Lake City, Chester), mostly 8-inch? That Pensacola alone fire 600 rounds? That on 20 November, BB Maryland alone expended 349 rounds of 16-inch/45 HC, 71 of 5-inch/51 Common and 508 rounds of 5-inch/51 HC at Betio (I'm ignoring the 5-inch/25 AA fired as airbursts, since they were judged useless).

This means, just with the "shells" [sic] from Maryland and Pensacola, you will have :

1528 "shells" [sic] / 381 acres = 4.01 "shells" [sic] per acres [sic].

So for the 600 rounds of 8-inch HC that was actually 260 pounds each filled or 21.34 pounds each explosive charge. Or 409 pounds of projectile (or 33.61 pounds of HE) per acre.

Anyway, let's look at the entire expenditure of TF 53.4 on 20-23 November (again ignoring the 5-inch/38 and 5-inch/25 AA - 19,255 rounds)...

740 round of 16-inch HC at 1,900 pounds weight or 153.6 pounds HE each = 1,406,000/113,664
590 rounds of 14-inch HC at 1,275 pounds weight or 104.21 pounds HE each = 752,250/61,484
810 rounds of 8-inch HC at 260 pounds weight or 21.34 pounds HE each = 210,600/17,285
2,360 rounds of 6-inch HC at 105 pounds weight or 13.2 pounds HE each = 247,800/31,152
1,220 rounds of 5-inch/51 HC at 50 pounds weight or 3.65 pounds HE each = 61,100/4,453

So that works out to 1,339 tons of weight or 114 tons of explosive. 3.5 tons of weight per acre or 0.3 tons of explosive per acre. And, gee, all that keeno kinetic energy. The poor Japanese on Betio must have been vaporized.

[paulrward]

Hello All :

Mr. Takao and Mr. Gardner seem to be forgetting that the IJN Bombardments of Guadalcanal were
conducted AT NIGHT, essentially firing in the blind, with no Aircraft Spotting. In addition, the
four IJN CAs that Mr. Gardner mentions had sailed into ' Injun Country ' = they were in waters
that in daylight were controlled by the USN and it's air power - IJN doctrine was to have a
standard mix of 90% AP to 10% HE rounds. As it was, they fired about 25 rounds per gun,
which means that they probably were loaded ' Heavy ' with HE for the Bombardment Mission.

Now, the four CAs that were sent to Midway were sent SPECIFICALLY to Bombard Midway -
and they probably were almost entirely loaded with HE - After all, they had the rest of the
IJN fleet to cover them, and if they did run into trouble, they could simply turn away and run,
using their 34 knot speed to outrun any USN cruisers they ran into. My guess is that they were
loaded entirely with HE, for this one mission.

Then there's absolutely ZERO way a Japanese ship is going to fire off its entire
load of ammunition in NGFS

Mr. Gardner, If I am Admiral Yamamoto, and I order you to do something, you WILL DO IT ! Or,
I will relieve you of your duties, and have you stripped of your commission in disgrace. IS THAT
CLEAR, MR. GARDNER ?

Mr. Gardner, during WWI, an American Colonel was ordered by his commanding General to take
a French town, and his orders were to take the town, or " Bring me a List of FIVE THOUSAND
CASUALTIES ! " The Colonel saluted, and told the General that, if the town were not taken, the
Colonel's name would be at the head of the casualty list !

Mr. Gardner, if I am an Admiral who has assigned a Cruiser Division to carry out a bombardment,
and has equipped the ships with the ammunition to do so, then I would expect the Admiral
commanding those ships to carry out his orders. Or, I would relieve him of command, and find
a better officer. AND I WOULDN'T GIVE A DAMN ABOUT ' DOCTRINE '.

As Lord Nelson said, ' Any Fool can obey Orders ! "


Now, as for the Battleship Gunfire, Each Battleship is carrying 10 % HE to 90 % AP. And, the standard
loadout for IJN Battleships was 100 rounds per gun. So, it isn't unreasonable to expect that they would
be willing to expend ALL their HE on Midway ! They would still have 90 % of their ammunition, in the form
of AP rounds, to deal with the Non Existant USN Battleships your fantasy has conjured up !

THAT would follow Japanese doctrine and tactics, not some wargamer's fantasy.

THE JAPANESE DOCTRINE ! THE JAPANESE DOCTRINE !

Mr. Gardner, for 20 years, the IJN Doctrine was to attack the Philippines, and then wait for the USN to
try to cross the Pacific, and, after wasting attacks by Submarines, Carrier Aircraft, and Destroyer Squadrons
equipped with long range torpedoes, the IJN Battleships and Heavy Cruisers would attack the slow, clumsy,
exhausted and damaged USN Battlefleet in a replay of Tsushima. This Doctrine was called Kantei Kessen,
or Decisive Battle, and was based on Taikan Kyohō Shugi, or Great Ships - Great Guns.

Then, in 1940, Admiral Yamamoto single handedly forced a change in Doctrine. And this led to the attack
on Pearl Harbor, and all of the subsequent IJN actions in the first part of 1942 were based on the Aircraft
Carrier.

The USN had the same Doctrine as the IJN - it was called Plan Orange, and relied on the Big Guns of the
USN Battle Line to defeat a numerically inferior IJN Battle Fleet. But, after Pearl Harbor, in less than
a week, the Battle Doctrine developed over the preceeding 20 years at the Naval War College was
abandoned, and the USN went to war with Aircraft Carriers.

In the summer of 1942, if Admiral Yamamoto decided to change the Doctrine, and use the Battleships
for Gun Fire Support Missions, THE DOCTRINE WOULD CHANGE. INSTANTLY.

Finally, I am including a JPEG. Study it at your leisure.

Respectfully ;

Paul R. Ward

MIDWAY SHELLFIRE.jpg

[paulrward]

Hello All ;

Mr. Richard Anderson: You have been repeatedly warned about mocking people's user names
on this Forum. Apparently, you do not have the maturity or the common courtesy to address
other members of this forum by their chosen user names, instead mocking their chosen
usernames like an obnoxious child.

I have been a member of this Forum for over 15 years. Since you joined it 6 years ago, you
have done nothing but display a childish rudeness to anyone who disagrees with you. It is
one thing to present facts to refute another member's postings. It is quite another to mock,
insult, and denigrate them.

I am now publicly asking the Moderators of this Forum: why do they tolerate this form of
incivility ? I have always referred to the other members of this Forum by their chosen
Usernames, and have added the honorific ' Mr ' as a form of courtesy. Mr. Anderson does not
seem to be able to appreciate this fact.

Tell me, Mr. Anderson: Since you seem to want to refer to me as ' Mr. Respectful ' , would you
have any objection, in the future, to my referring to you as ' Little Dick ' ? I am asking you this
question with all due respect and courtesy. Please let me know if this is satisfactory to you. I will
abide by your decision, as long as YOU maintain the level of courtesy that is expected of the Adults
who populate this Forum.


Moving on the the matter at hand:

The poor Japanese on Betio must have been vaporized.

No, They were overwhelmed by shellfire, bombardment, and superior numbers, and
THEY WERE ALL KILLED ! ( Well, 96.98 % of them, anyway.... )

At Midway, the Japanese have Warships for shellfire, aircraft for bombing, and
superior numbers.. AND ALL THE U. S. MARINES WILL BE KILLED ! ( Or, after suffering about
20 % casualties, they will drop their 1903 Springfields, and surrender........)


Respectfully:

Paul R. Ward

[Takao]

Richard joined 6 years ago???

Hint - He has been on for much longer than that.

Fairly certain he was also here when this was the Third Reich Forum many moons ago.

[Richard Anderson]

Come see the awesome power of the Almighty Eight Inches!

BTW, no, the "Kill Radius" [sic] of an 8-inch projectile is not a "250 foot diameter circle". For one thing, high explosive projectiles do not explode in a circle. Instead, the force of the explosion is affected by the kinetic energy component of the projectile, whether it is an artillery projectile, a mortar round, a aerial bomb, or a rocket warhead.

For example, given a ground burst and an artillery projectile impacting at a 30 degree angle to the ground, the fragment pattern tends to resemble a bird in flight. Forward of the line of fire, casualty causing fragments extend in a narrow ellipse from the point of impact - for around 50 to 60 feet in the case of a 8-inch, but about double the distance to the rear of the point of impact in an ellipse about half again as large. Two wing-shaped fragment patterns extend perpendicular from the point of impact and can extend as much as 100 feet to either side. Again, the larger mass of fragments ejected are behind the point of impact.

Yes, there is a chance of a fragment impact between the ellipses, but it is much less likely. At 20 feet from the point of burst there would be about 1,860 effective fragments...about 0.370 per square foot. At 200 feet there would be about 1,260 effective fragments and about 0.0025 per square foot.

Nor is a fragment hit a "kill". It is a casualty. Size, weight, number of fragments and where they impact tend to determine of they kill or wound.

Never mind that all only works for exposed personnel in the open.

[Richard Anderson]

Richard joined 6 years ago???

Hint - He has been on for much longer than that.

Fairly certain he was also here when this was the Third Reich Forum many moons ago.

The first post I can find was 5 January 2004, under RichTO90. I don't now recall if that was my first or simply the earliest the forum software can find. In 2015 I got locked out of my RichTO90 login and had to establish a new one as Richard Anderson.

I don't recall if it was still TRF when I joined. I came over here from Feldgrau at the recommendation of a poster there.

[T. A. Gardner]

Hello All :

Mr. Takao and Mr. Gardner seem to be forgetting that the IJN Bombardments of Guadalcanal were
conducted AT NIGHT, essentially firing in the blind, with no Aircraft Spotting. In addition, the
four IJN CAs that Mr. Gardner mentions had sailed into ' Injun Country ' = they were in waters
that in daylight were controlled by the USN and it's air power - IJN doctrine was to have a
standard mix of 90% AP to 10% HE rounds. As it was, they fired about 25 rounds per gun,
which means that they probably were loaded ' Heavy ' with HE for the Bombardment Mission.

Now, the four CAs that were sent to Midway were sent SPECIFICALLY to Bombard Midway -
and they probably were almost entirely loaded with HE - After all, they had the rest of the
IJN fleet to cover them, and if they did run into trouble, they could simply turn away and run,
using their 34 knot speed to outrun any USN cruisers they ran into. My guess is that they were
loaded entirely with HE, for this one mission.

Your "guess" would be wrong. They would have had 20 to 25% of their ammunition load dedicated to NGFS. First, Japanese doctrine and thinking was naval gunfire is largely ineffective against defending troops in an amphibious assault. That would be their mindset going into this. Not some fantasy about it obliterating everything, but based on their experience from the Sino-Russian war forward. In China, the Japanese made a number of amphibious assaults and they based what they would do at Midway on what they knew and learned from what they did in China.

Then there's absolutely ZERO way a Japanese ship is going to fire off its entire
load of ammunition in NGFS

Mr. Gardner, If I am Admiral Yamamoto, and I order you to do something, you WILL DO IT ! Or,
I will relieve you of your duties, and have you stripped of your commission in disgrace. IS THAT
CLEAR, MR. GARDNER ?

Mr. Gardner, during WWI, an American Colonel was ordered by his commanding General to take
a French town, and his orders were to take the town, or " Bring me a List of FIVE THOUSAND
CASUALTIES ! " The Colonel saluted, and told the General that, if the town were not taken, the
Colonel's name would be at the head of the casualty list !

Mr. Gardner, if I am an Admiral who has assigned a Cruiser Division to carry out a bombardment,
and has equipped the ships with the ammunition to do so, then I would expect the Admiral
commanding those ships to carry out his orders. Or, I would relieve him of command, and find
a better officer. AND I WOULDN'T GIVE A DAMN ABOUT ' DOCTRINE '.

As Lord Nelson said, ' Any Fool can obey Orders ! "

This is just a psychologist's fallacy coupled to an historian's fallacy where you project your thinking and what you would do onto those who were there and then say in essence, They'd have done this because I would have done this and it would have worked!

Now, as for the Battleship Gunfire, Each Battleship is carrying 10 % HE to 90 % AP. And, the standard
loadout for IJN Battleships was 100 rounds per gun. So, it isn't unreasonable to expect that they would
be willing to expend ALL their HE on Midway ! They would still have 90 % of their ammunition, in the form
of AP rounds, to deal with the Non Existant USN Battleships your fantasy has conjured up !

THAT would follow Japanese doctrine and tactics, not some wargamer's fantasy.

No, it doesn't. It throws everything the IJN had trained and learned out the window. It assumes that somehow, the commanders present would suddenly do something that all their years of training and institutional learning ran completely contrary to. It's another fallacy like the last. It's saying in effect, Gee, all our decades of learning, doctrine, and training were completely wrong! We should do something we've never done or tried in the middle of a battle we're already winning because it will work so much better than everything we successfully have done many times before won't work this time!

THE JAPANESE DOCTRINE ! THE JAPANESE DOCTRINE !

Mr. Gardner, for 20 years, the IJN Doctrine was to attack the Philippines, and then wait for the USN to
try to cross the Pacific, and, after wasting attacks by Submarines, Carrier Aircraft, and Destroyer Squadrons
equipped with long range torpedoes, the IJN Battleships and Heavy Cruisers would attack the slow, clumsy,
exhausted and damaged USN Battlefleet in a replay of Tsushima. This Doctrine was called Kantei Kessen,
or Decisive Battle, and was based on Taikan Kyohō Shugi, or Great Ships - Great Guns.

Then, in 1940, Admiral Yamamoto single handedly forced a change in Doctrine. And this led to the attack
on Pearl Harbor, and all of the subsequent IJN actions in the first part of 1942 were based on the Aircraft
Carrier.

Wrong again. The Japanese were focused on China and Russia as their biggest enemies up until the late 1930's when it became obvious that the US, Britain, and the Dutch were going to wreck their economy. Suddenly a new set of planning was necessary, one that mostly the IJN wanted, and the IJA only agreed to because of economic reasons as the IJA was still mostly focused on China and Russia.
Pearl Harbor was almost an afterthought to Japanese planning. The whole operation and training for it consisted of the last few months just before the operation occurred. That was only because FDR continued to keep the US battlefleet at Pearl. Had it been withdrawn to the West Coast as the USN wanted, the operation would have never happened at all.

The USN had the same Doctrine as the IJN - it was called Plan Orange, and relied on the Big Guns of the
USN Battle Line to defeat a numerically inferior IJN Battle Fleet. But, after Pearl Harbor, in less than
a week, the Battle Doctrine developed over the preceeding 20 years at the Naval War College was
abandoned, and the USN went to war with Aircraft Carriers.

This is the 'coffee table book' version. The USN was far smarter than that. The plan called for a methodical advance across the Pacific setting up advanced bases to operate from as they went. The first such base was Guadalcanal / Tulagi. The next, Funafuti atoll. After that it was Eniwetok, the Ulithi.
If your version was true, the USN would have committed Pye's battleline of 8 US battleships (TF 1) to the Midway operation in hopes of a gun duel. But that didn't happen. And, it wasn't because of Pearl Harbor, it was because of years of Naval War College analysis and actual naval training operations each year.

In the summer of 1942, if Admiral Yamamoto decided to change the Doctrine, and use the Battleships
for Gun Fire Support Missions, THE DOCTRINE WOULD CHANGE. INSTANTLY.

Devine fallacy. God-like thinking coupled with wishing. That didn't happen.

Finally, I am including a JPEG. Study it at your leisure.

Respectfully ;

Paul R. Ward


MIDWAY SHELLFIRE.jpg

What an absurd joke that map is.

First, 8" shells are nowhere near as effective as you make them out to be. They won't land in some precise pattern as you show. Nor will the Japanese cruisers be able to deliver them in so precise a pattern.
Aside from all that, the Japanese would be firing on Midway in the dark as they would be supporting a dawn landing that again is Japanese doctrine for amphibious assaults.
I have no idea what the tide at Midway would be as the landing commenced, but then the Japanese didn't either. At Tarawa, the US tried to predict this accurately but due to poor information was unable to do so accurately. At least they considered it, unlike the Japanese...

It's clear from comparisons of other naval bombardments that the Japanese one at Midway would have been relatively to near totally ineffective against the defenders.

[Richard Anderson]

Betio was captured because naval gunfire killed all the Japanese. Who would have thought?

In fact, the naval gunfire support at Betio was almost completely ineffective due to inexperience and overconfidence. The heavy guns did succeed in temporarily silencing the Japanese shore batteries, but did no significant damage to the beach defenses. Direct hits on troop shelters did little more than force the Japanese to dig out the sand blocking exits. There is zero evidence that any of the beach gun or beach machine gun positions were in any way seriously damage or even silenced. Note the extraordinary number of ricochets was commented on by participants, caused by firing high-velocity ordnance at low-lying sand islands...in at least a couple of cases the battleship firing threatened to impact vessels in gunfire support areas on the opposite side of the island because of it.

[Takao]

Hello All :

Mr. Takao and Mr. Gardner seem to be forgetting that the IJN Bombardments of Guadalcanal were
conducted AT NIGHT, essentially firing in the blind, with no Aircraft Spotting.

Mr. Ward is forgetting that Sentai 7 was under orders to conduct a bombardment of Midway AT NIGHT.

Perhaps, Mr. Ward has assassinated Yamamoto and not told us.

In addition, the
four IJN CAs that Mr. Gardner mentions had sailed into ' Injun Country ' = they were in waters
that in daylight were controlled by the USN and it's air power - IJN doctrine was to have a
standard mix of 90% AP to 10% HE rounds. As it was, they fired about 25 rounds per gun,
which means that they probably were loaded ' Heavy ' with HE for the Bombardment Mission.

Now, the four CAs that were sent to Midway were sent SPECIFICALLY to Bombard Midway -
and they probably were almost entirely loaded with HE - After all, they had the rest of the
IJN fleet to cover them, and if they did run into trouble, they could simply turn away and run,
using their 34 knot speed to outrun any USN cruisers they ran into. My guess is that they were
loaded entirely with HE, for this one mission.

I'm guessing you are wrong. The rest of the fleet was not near Sentai 7. Yamamoto's big guns were how many hundreds of miles away?

Mr. Gardner, If I am Admiral Yamamoto, and I order you to do something, you WILL DO IT ! Or,
I will relieve you of your duties, and have you stripped of your commission in disgrace. IS THAT
CLEAR, MR. GARDNER ?

Odd. When Yamamoto was given an order that he did not like, he threw a tantrum, and threatened to quit until he got his way.
Yamamoto was never any good at following orders.

Perhaps Mr. Ward believes himself to be Captain Queeg.

Mr. Gardner, during WWI, an American Colonel was ordered by his commanding General to take
a French town, and his orders were to take the town, or " Bring me a List of FIVE THOUSAND
CASUALTIES ! " The Colonel saluted, and told the General that, if the town were not taken, the
Colonel's name would be at the head of the casualty list !

Worked out well for ole' Benito didn't it.

Mr. Gardner, if I am an Admiral who has assigned a Cruiser Division to carry out a bombardment,
and has equipped the ships with the ammunition to do so, then I would expect the Admiral
commanding those ships to carry out his orders. Or, I would relieve him of command, and find
a better officer. AND I WOULDN'T GIVE A DAMN ABOUT ' DOCTRINE '.

Problem was the Japanese never did this...They ran out of bombardment shells and kept firing AP when they ran out, causing less damage then they should have..

Full loadouts of the proper type of shells is OK for fantasyland Axis & Allies wargames...While reality is a somewhat harsher mistress.

Now, as for the Battleship Gunfire, Each Battleship is carrying 10 % HE to 90 % AP. And, the standard
loadout for IJN Battleships was 100 rounds per gun. So, it isn't unreasonable to expect that they would
be willing to expend ALL their HE on Midway ! They would still have 90 % of their ammunition, in the form
of AP rounds, to deal with the Non Existant USN Battleships your fantasy has conjured up !

Much of their AP too.

THE JAPANESE DOCTRINE ! THE JAPANESE DOCTRINE !

Mr. Gardner, for 20 years, the IJN Doctrine was to attack the Philippines, and then wait for the USN to
try to cross the Pacific, and, after wasting attacks by Submarines, Carrier Aircraft, and Destroyer Squadrons
equipped with long range torpedoes, the IJN Battleships and Heavy Cruisers would attack the slow, clumsy,
exhausted and damaged USN Battlefleet in a replay of Tsushima. This Doctrine was called Kantei Kessen,
or Decisive Battle, and was based on Taikan Kyohō Shugi, or Great Ships - Great Guns.

Then, in 1940, Admiral Yamamoto single handedly forced a change in Doctrine. And this led to the attack
on Pearl Harbor, and all of the subsequent IJN actions in the first part of 1942 were based on the Aircraft
Carrier.

Yet, Yamamoto rode in to battle...On a battleship.
Yamamoto had his HQ aboard Hotel Yamato, than later, Hotel Musashi.

The USN had the same Doctrine as the IJN - it was called Plan Orange, and relied on the Big Guns of the
USN Battle Line to defeat a numerically inferior IJN Battle Fleet. But, after Pearl Harbor, in less than
a week, the Battle Doctrine developed over the preceeding 20 years at the Naval War College was
abandoned, and the USN went to war with Aircraft Carriers.

War plans are now battle doctrine? Do tell.

In the summer of 1942, if Admiral Yamamoto decided to change the Doctrine, and use the Battleships
for Gun Fire Support Missions, THE DOCTRINE WOULD CHANGE. INSTANTLY.

Or not.

Finally, I am including a JPEG. Study it at your leisure.

Respectfully ;

Paul R. Ward


MIDWAY SHELLFIRE.jpg

Wow! How do your Japanese get the shells to be placed so specifically? Laser guidance? GPS? Drones?

AND AT NIGHT TOO!

[paulrward]

Hello All :

To Mr. T.A.Gardner, Mr. Richard Anderson, and Mr. Takao :

As I write this, I find myself very sad.

In a career that lasted nearly four decades, I was a Chemist and Engineer working in the Electronics
and Semiconductor Industries in California's legendary Silicon Valley. The companies I worked at
were at the cutting edge of technologies that changed the entire world we live in today. In a real
sense, i had a hand in building the world of the 21st Century. The Computer Chip, the Personal
Computer, the Cell Phone, the Internet, all were pioneered literally in my neighborhood.

As an Engineer, I had to be a Problem Solver. Each day I went to work, there were new problems
to solve, new obstacles to be overcome, and new mountains to climb. A 40 hour week was when
I was on vacation - 60 hour weeks, with 12, 14, even 24 hour days were commonplace.

And, to be successful, I had to be Innovative. Imaginative. Inventive. I had to come up with new
ways to solve the problems that had no solution. I couldn't say to the VP of Operations that a
process problem could not be solved, I HAD TO COME UP WITH A SOLUTON ! NOW ! AHORA !

If I had ever said, " This problem has never been solved before, so it can't be solved. " , I would have
very quickly found myself out on the street looking for a new job. And, working at Fortune 500
companies, it was VERY profitable. By the time I was 30, I had gone from poverty to owning my own
Condo, driving a Porsche to work each day, and flying my own aircraft on weekends. Those of us who
lived in the Silicon Valley in the 70s, 80s, and 90s were like the Navigators and Conquistadors of the
15th and 16th Centuries - we blazed new trails into the unknown, and brought back untold wealth,
not in the form of Gold, or Silver, or Slaves, ot Ivory, but in terms of Science, Technology, and Inventions
that made the lives of the Human Race richer, brighter, and more exciting.


Yesterday, I watched Elon Musk send another Rocket into space. He orbited a load of satellites, and
landed the Booster and Payload Shrouds, and by doing so, made Space Flight so inexpensive that it
is revolutionizing the world. And, as I write this, he is building a Starship to take us to Mars.
At the same time, NASA has once again delayed the launch of it's SLS booster, which is nothing but
parts from old Space Shuttles cobbled together into a Use Once and Throw Away rocket. No
innovation, no creative thought. Just Bureaucrats doing their jobs to keep their jobs....


And that is why I am sad. Because when I read the postings you gentlemen make on this Forum,
it reminds me of the failure of NASA.

Mr. Gardner, Mr. Anderson, Mr Takao: When I read your postings on this Forum, it is obvious that
the three of you are well educated, well read, and well informed. But, in none of your postings is
there ever any really creative thought. You do the equivalent of Cutting and Pasting material
from books, reports, documents, and historical records, but there is never any imagination. No
innovative thinking. No inventiveness.

When faced with the problems and challenges that historical figures faced, you never seem to be
able to come up with solutions to those problems. or a way to overcome those challenges. As
a person who was a Professional Problem Solver, I have found it strange, and somewhat inexplicable.


Perhaps it is from Education. I was trained in the Sciences and Mathematics. All of my classes were
endless series of Problems that had to be correctly solved. But, I did take some classes in the Liberal
Arts, such as History, the Arts, and Philosophy, and these classes were nothing but reading the text,
listening to the lecture, and then repeating the information on tests. No creativity was required.
And, in fact, it seemed to be discouraged. Perhaps that is the answer.


In 1968, at the funeral of his brother Robert, Theodore Kennedy eulogized him in this way: " Some
Men see the World the Way It Is, and Ask Why ? My Brother saw the World the Way it Could Be, and
Asked, ' Why Not ? ' "

It appears to me that you three " See the World the Way it Was, and say, That Is The Only Way It
Could Have Ever Been ! " And that, to me, is very sad.


I have lived my professional career, and indeed my life, accepting new ideas and embracing change.
I came from a broken family, and spent years suffering from illness and poverty. I never had the
ability to afford the education I wanted. And I had to work harder for everything I achieved. But,
If I had not believed that the world could be changed, I would never have had as bright a life as I have
lived.


And, Mr. Gardner, Mr. Anderson, Mr. Takao, that is why I am sad. Because, by embracing the concept
of " WHAT IF I MADE MY DREAMS INTO REALITY ? ", I have been able to live the life of my dreams.


Respectfully :

Paul R. Ward

Pitts E Ticket.jpg