Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

[Huszar666]

China & Russia do seem to enjoy the "western way of life." However, the disagree over "western POLITICAL way of life - Those in power want to remain in power.

I mean that kind of Western Way of Life the US tried to export for the last at least two decades. And is still trying to push on others.
No, Russia and China lead a "western way of life", they have a thin drapping of it. Mostly consuming stuff. The population - save a minimal inner city minority - does not care about democracy, gay rights, minority rights, free press, rule of law, they care about living their lives, as their parents and grandparents did.
If you leave the inner cities and suburbia even in the West, you will observe a declination of "western way of life". Even today.

For the 1890s, 1900s, 1910s, and 1920s Japanese, they were perfectly happy living the "western way of life", they were not slaves to white masters and were the only independent and powerful country in the Far East, with no loss of face.

There WAS quite a backlash even in the 19th century because of the westernisation. And for all that time till Hiroshima, the "Westerners" looked at the Japanese and they saw backwards little yellow people.
A lot of good will was squandered between 1894 and 1941.

You can not look down on people long before there will be a backlash.

[Eugen Pinak]

As far as I remember, the Japanese didn't have 500kg (i.e. 1100pdr) bombs, only 250 and 800kg ones.

No, IJN did had 500-kg bombs.

[Takao]

Hello All :

Mr Takao stated :

#297 by Takao » 09 Jul 2022 13:03

Well, yes Japan pretty much did need to defeat the US. Specifically, before US
industrial roduction could come into play.

Japan could not set up a perimeter - The Pacific was far to vast for that, as very
few of the island chains were in mutually supporting positions. Coupled with the
fact that US industrial might allowed the US to attack along two different axis,
while the Japanese industrial capacity was hard pressed to support one axis of
attack.

Japan did not lose the war at Midway, but during the Solomons Campaign. Japan
lost four carriers at Midway, but not that many aircrew.

What Mr. Takao is repeating is the Doctrine of USN Invinciblity in WW2. The IJN could NOT
have won, the USN could NOT have lost, and that is because GOD SAYS SO !!!!!!

What he is forgetting is that, in the week leading up to the Battle of Midway, and on June 4th itself, the
Midway Defense Force made screw up after screw up. They blew up half their Avgas supply. They reserved
the B-17s for useless high altitude airstrikes against shipping instead of using them for long range recon.
The Midway Fighters were wiped out in one engagement, and the mixed force of Army, Navy, and Marine
Torpedo and Dive Bombers on Midway got badly hammered by the IJN, and inflicted no damage.

Then, the USN carriers sent their strikes off in uncoordinated gaggles, the Torpedo Squadrons going without
fighter escort to be slaughtered, Stanhope Ring getting two squadrons of SBDs and half a squadron of F4Fs
lost, with some of them ditching in the Pacific and the rest stuck for hours on Midway.

At about !0:15, the United States had lost roughly 75 aircraft, and had inflicted ZERO DAMAGE on the
IJN Carrier Force. Then the Dive bombers from the Yorktown hit the Soryu, and the two squadrons of
SBDs from the Enterprise got the Akagi and Kaga.


But, Mr. Takao, What if that had never happened. No UFOs, No Alien Space Bats, No Secret Weapons.
Just a different turn of events, due to ONE Decision, made in the heat of the moment by an inexperienced
young Air Group Commander who was under great stress.

Mr. Takao, at 10:15, the USN was NOT poised to make and Incredible Victory, it was NOT about to write
A Glorious Page In Our History, it was NOT about to perform the Miracle at Midway. It was, in fact,
the USN was


" ONE FINAL F^(# - UP AWAY FROM DEFEAT ! "


Mr. Takao, WHAT IF McCLUSKY TURNED SOUTH ?

He never finds Nagumo. Akagi and Kaga are NOT bombed. McClusky heads for Midway and gasoline, and
finds himself stuck there for hours, just like Stanhope Ring. And while he is desperately trying to get his
SBDs refueled, Akagi launches her strike at 10:30, Hiryu dodges the last of the TBDs and launches at 11:05,
and pokey old Kaga gets its planes in the air at 11:15.

All three groups head for the USN carrier that has been spotted, and while they are in the air, the other
two carriers are also spotted and reported to Nagumo, who notifies the outgoing IJN airstrike. The two
squadrons of B5Ns and one squadron of D3As divide into three groups, and with their fighter escort chopping
through the F4Fs over the USN carriers, the airstrike is carried out with quick precision. The damaged
Yorktown is knocked out. and both the Hornet and Enterprise are left dead in the water, on fire and flooding.

As the IJN strike is outbound, the aircraft from the Midway strike are refueled, and starting at Noon, they
also leave the carriers, totalling some 30 dive bombers and 10 torpedo bombers, with fighter escort. They
have no trouble locating the three burning USN carriers, and all suffer fatal damage in this second strike.

With no further interference from the USN, the IJN spends June 5th pounding Midway with Bombers
and Gunfire, and the attack, which enters via the Seward Roads and hits on the beaches Welles Harbor,
takes Sand Island on the 6th and Eastern Island on the 7th.


The Subsequent victories by the IJN, in which the last three USN fast carriers and six Escort Carriers
were defeated in August and September in the Battle for Johnston Island and the Battle for Hawaii, spelled
the end of USN power in the Pacific. The Japanese imposed a naval blockade on Hawaii, which depended
for imports from the mainland for 80 % of it's foodstuffs, and by the beginning of November, the Japanese
began to occupy the Hawaiian chain, one island every week . Oahu fell on the first anniversary of the
attack on Pearl Harbor.

The Japanese quickly moved to fortify the islands, with the help of the nearly 40 % of the population
who were ethnic Japanese. The naval installations, airfields, and barracks were quickly repaired, and
Hawaii became Japan's Bastion in the Pacific. The USN was still nearly a year from having enough
carriers to challenge the IJN, and with the ongoing failures of the USN submarine force, there was
simply no way for the United States to continue fighting, especially when the Japanese began to
publicly offer to have Peace Talks, using Switzerland as their intermediary.

Any naval strategist who could read a map understood that, with the IJN in posession of Hawaii, there
was simply no way for the USN, even if it was rebuilt, to project power into the Pacific. And to defeat
the IJN at Hawaii, the USN would have to sail over 2500 miles from the West Coast, and engage the
IJN naval aviators using ' green ' pilots and trainee crews with un tested ships .

Even Franklin Roosevelt wasn't that stupid. In early March, 1943, he instructs the American Ambassador
to Switzerland to approach the Japanese about an Armistace, which is a face saving way of admitting
defeat. The Japanese are magnanimous. All prisoners are returned, the Philippines are to be granted
their independence on schedule, and free trade is to be re-established between the two nations. Japan
keeps it's conquests, and the Greater East Asian Co Prosperity Sphere is a reality. Chiang Kai Shek is
doomed, and he knows it.

With no more Pacific War, and nothing to show for a year of fighting but defeats and disasters, the
American People are sick of fighting. There is no Torch, no Husky, and no OverLord. Aid to Britain
and Russia goes back to being Lend Lease and Cash and Carry, with the British and Russians supplying
the ships.

And, with no War, there is no way to continue military research projects with potentially monumental
costs. The office in Manhattan is shut down, and the Physicists return to their Universities....


Mr. Takao, I give you a new Hollywood Motion Picture :

" MIDWAY : ONE FINAL F^(# - UP AWAY FROM DEFEAT ! "


Respectfully :

Paul R. Ward

Typical and unimaginative.

One side uses dice marked only with "20"s and the other side uses dice marked only with "1"s.

Wake me when we get to something actually interesting.

[paulrward]

Hello All :

Mr Takao stated :

#303 by Takao » 10 Jul 2022 10:49

Typical and unimaginative.
One side uses dice marked only with "20"s and the other side uses
dice marked only with "1"s.
Wake me when we get to something actually interesting.

Typically unimaginative and apparently asleep - You know Mr. Takao, you would have been a perfect
officer in the U.S. Navy in the final years leading up to Pearl Harbor ! And, At Dawn, You Slept !

The raw fact is, if McClusky had turned SOUTH, the USN would have been beaten at Midway. At that moment,
the USN carriers had used up eight of their twelve squadrons. If McClusky had turned SOUTH, another two
squadrons would have been out of the fight, leaving only one SBD squadron and one squadron of F4Fs on the
USN carriers. Even with the Soryu out of the fight, that gives the IJN six squadrons of attack aircraft and
three squadrons of fighters. Up until the moment that McClusky sighted the Kido Butai, the IJN didn't
need 20s on their dice, because the incredible mistakes and poor performance of the USN meant that
the USN was rolling Snake Eyes !

Sorry, Mr. Takao, you just Crapped OUT !



Mr. T.A.Gardner wrote:

#299 by T. A. Gardner » 09 Jul 2022 22:12

The most likely outcome at Midway to Paulward's scenario is the landing
forces try to land and are wiped out in the process.

No, the most likely outcome is the the SNLF and IJA come in from the west, through the Seward Roadstead,
land on beaches at Welles Harbor, and with about 2500 men, assisted by strafing IJN aircraft and the big
guns of IJN Battleships and Heavy Cruisers, along with direct fire support from IJN Destroyers, the landing
force,led by the 1000 ton destroyers that the IJN had converted to the equivalent of APDs, would carry out
the landing on Sand Island, and overwhelm the defenders, who numbered less than 1000, in about eight
hours.

The Japanese rest and reorganize all night, and the next day, carry out landings on Eastern Island, which
goes the same way. The Army evacuates the last of the B=17s, and Navy pulls out the few surviving PBYs,
and the Midway Marines join the Guam Marines, the Wake Marines, and the Corregidor Marines as POWs.

Only at Midway, the landing forces can't run their ships aground but must sit
offshore and use small boats to try and cross an open reef and heavy surf.

Only an idiot would believe that the Japanese planned to cross the southern reefs. The Japanese had occuped
Midway for more than 30 years during the 19th century, until driven off in 1903. They had excellent maps and
charts, and knew all about the Roadstead and the Harbor, having used it for years themselve. Trying to take
both islands simultaneously is stupid, no reasonably bright Japanese commander would have tried it. Going
in through the Seward Roadstead is clearly the correct way, and, with Sand Island masking the gunfire from
Eastern Island, you get to knock off the two garrisons one at a time.

And, Mr. Gardner, it is EASY to run boats aground on the beaches of Welles Harbor - you can watch YouTube
videos of it being done !

Wake was a near-run thing the second time around for Japan.

Only to the USMC Fanboys. Two thousand Japanese over-ran 500 Americans, who surrendered after suffering
20% casualties. Surrendered in less than eight hours.

The second problem is the IJN are amateurs at underway replenishment.

And the USN, the USMC, and the USA are Amateurs at EVERYTHING ! For six months the Japanese had been
using American forces like an inflatable sex doll. Midway would have been no different.

As for "blockad(ing)" Hawaii, that's an utter absurdity. Japan has no means
to keep a fleet off those islands

Ah, So! The Myth of the Helpless Imperial Navy ! They can't do ANYTHING ! They can't bomb Pearl Harbor,
they can't raid Darwin, they can't take the Dutch Indies or go raiding into the Indian Ocean, slaughtering
British Ships ! They can't take the Philippines, they can't take Wake Island, they are HELPLESS !!!

This ignores that fact that the IJN COULD do underway replenishment, and DID have a Naval Gunfire Support
Doctrine, and DID, on December 7th, 1941, and for the following year, HAVE MORE TANKERS AND OILERS IN
THE PACIFIC THAN DID THE USN !

If the USN loses at Midway, and then loses that last of it's Fast Carriers fighing to keep the IJN away from
Hawaii, then Hawaii IS blockaded ! With NO flight decks, the Battleships, Cruisers, and Destroyers have
to retreat to the West Coast, or be bombed into helplessness. The useless USN submarines, moved back
to San Diego, now have to travel more than 2000 miles just to get to Hawaii, where they find their torpedoes
STILL don't work, and won't work until September, 1943 !

The Japanese, on the other hand, now have both the Mandates, Wake, and Midway to use as forward bases,
and IJN submarines, free from the threat of USN ASW warships, can go marauding in the waters to the
east of Hawaii, destroying convoy ships at will Again, I must emphasize, 80 % of all foodstuffs, and 100 %
of all fuel used in Hawaii was brought in by ship. No shipping, no food or gasoline, and in about two months,
the wheels start coming off the Hawaiian Defense Force.

If the USN is stupid enough to try to send a large, escorted Convoy, it will have NO Carriers with it. Long
range IJN flying boats based at Midway, and refueled at sea from submarines, locate the USN Convoy,
and an IJN task force with two or three Carriers, escorted by Battlecruisers, intercepts it and wipes it out.
IJN submarines, which are equipped with torpedoes that actually work! , polish off the survivors.

They certainly aren't taking Hawaii by any means.

Right. Because Oahu is the Gibralter of the Pacific. Just like Singapore......

Mr. Gardner, this kind of bombast is beneath you. Go wargame it, and then come back to me with a
real conclusion. The fact is, Midway was Nimitz's last throw of the dice. A loss there potentially puts
the entire Pacific into the hands of the Japanese. And Nimitz and his staff knew it.

Even if the Japanese first took one of the other islands that wasn't
occupied by masses of US troops, their forces would find themselves quickly
outnumbered in the air and faced with iffy chances of resupply. Basically,
they'd become a self-imposed POW camp.

Right. The Japanese would be just like the Americans at Guadalcanal. Surrounded by an Ocean they
control, fighting against forces that are cut off and running out of supplies with each passing day.
Obviously the Japanese would have to surrender, just like the Marines did in the Solomons.......

Taking Oahu directly would take easily four infantry divisions with
massive supporting units.

Yet, somehow the Japanese managed to defeat the British in Malaya, even though they had insufficient
supplies and were outnumbered.......

But, with the USN out of the game for at least a year, and Hawaii cut off, with their bellies getting hungrier
with each passing day, with no new supplies of fuel, ammunition, or spare parts for their aircraft, the mood
on Hawaii would start to shift. The garrison would remember what happened in Malaya, the Dutch Indies,
Guam, Wake, the Philippines, and Midway. All cut off, all starved into weakness and helplessness, and
all forced to surrender to the 'BANZAI'ing ' Japanese soldiers. The ' Battling Bastards of Bataan ' would
be joined by the ' Hopeless Haoles of Hawaii '. And every Doughboy and every Leatherneck would remember
how, in each case, the United States Navy simply sailed away and left them to their fate.

At Wake, the Marines suffered 20 % casualties before surrendering. The same thing happened in the Philippines,
It would also happen on Hawaii. Sorry, Mr. Gardner, but John Wayne and Captain America have just left the
building.

June 1942 39 F4F, and 92 PBY on Oahu alone. The USMC and USAAF had
more. From what I can gather there were at least three fighter groups on the
island with about a bit over 100 P-40E fighters alone for the USAAF. There might
have been more.

ALL the Avgas had to come from the Mainland. With IJN submarines doing to USN Tankers in the Pacific
what Doenitz's U-boats were doing along the Atlantic Coast, in the Gulf of Mexico, and in the Carribean,
that means after a few months there is no more fuel for all those fighters.

Mr. Gardner, a P-40 with empty fuel tanks is a very expensive Lawn Ornament !


Mr. Gardner, you and Mr. Takao have the same Problem - you look at WW2 BACKWARDS through the lens
of 1944-45, when U.S. Military Power was invincible. But, if you go back to 1942, when U.S. Forces were
weak and demoralized, when the Officers were inexperienced and incompetent, and our enemies had
equipment that, in many cases, was much better than ours, your view changes.

Mr. Gardner, you claimed to have created Wargames. So, go ahead. Set up a Wargame assuming the
USN loses at MIdway, all three carriers, and sinks the Soryu. Then go forward from there. Find a good,
smart opponent to play the Japanese. And get ready to have your world turned upside down !

Respectfully ;

Paul R. Ward

[Von Schadewald]

As already outlined, the kamikaze mindset pre-existed Pearl Harbor in the fighting units. Not just for the single fighter attack mentioned, but during planning in which kamikaze attacks on anti-torpedo nets were being openly discussed. These attitudes were not endorsed at the higher command levels, but it does not stretch imagination that different attitudes could have prevailed.

Is the G3M 'kamikaze' at Midway depicted at 4.40 in this clip fanciful, or did it occur?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pwqxEviunF4?

[Rob Stuart]

As already outlined, the kamikaze mindset pre-existed Pearl Harbor in the fighting units. Not just for the single fighter attack mentioned, but during planning in which kamikaze attacks on anti-torpedo nets were being openly discussed. These attitudes were not endorsed at the higher command levels, but it does not stretch imagination that different attitudes could have prevailed.

Is the G3M 'kamikaze' at Midway depicted at 4.40 in this clip fanciful, or did it occur?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pwqxEviunF4?

This incident did happen, but not during the battle of Midway. It happened during one of the post-PH raids conducted by PacFlt carriers. The G3M in question had been hit and was obviously not going to be able to make it back to base. It was not a kamikaze in the 1944-45 sense.

[T. A. Gardner]

Mr. Gardner, you claimed to have created Wargames. So, go ahead. Set up a Wargame assuming the
USN loses at MIdway, all three carriers, and sinks the Soryu. Then go forward from there. Find a good,
smart opponent to play the Japanese. And get ready to have your world turned upside down !

Let me start with just this for right now, I'll get to the rest of Paul's fantasy a bit later.

Okay, let's assume exactly that. The USN loses all three carriers and sinks just Soryu. In doing so, the air wings on their carriers take historical casualties. That means, in exchange for this outcome, the three remaining Japanese carriers have their aircraft and pilot strength at about 20 to 25% of the total. That is, and this is historically accurate, they lose roughly 75% of their aircraft and pilots in sinking the US carriers.
You can read Lundstrom's The First Team for exacting evidence that would have been the case.

So, the Kido Butai is a carrier force without any aircraft. No, they aren't suddenly going to get more either. The IJN's replacement system as well as their assignment of air wings was per carrier. That is, the aircraft and pilots on one carrier are not interchangeable with another. So, the carriers return to Japan, await replacements from the training schools, and then work them up on the carrier to which they are assigned. That will take months to accomplish. It's the reason Zuikaku didn't participate in Midway.

The Wasp and Saratoga are still available, operational, and in the Pacific. Wasp arrives at San Diego days after the Midway operation ends. Saratoga in in route to Pearl Harbor at the same time or at Pearl Harbor depending on the exact date. Both have full air wings aboard.

So, while the Japanese have more physical fleet carriers remaining, they don't have any that can be used operationally due to heavy losses among their aircraft and aircrews. Unlike the US where any squadron can be assigned to any carrier and the individual squadrons can work up in training and then be fed individually into the pipeline, the Japanese system puts all the crew and planes into a group by ship to work up together.

The result is that regardless of the outcome of the Midway operation, the IJN returns to home waters to make good their losses and the surface component goes back into anchorages at places like Truk or Japan. Planning for some new operation takes a month or more, and largely depends on how fast the carriers can work up their replacement aircrew. It could be, and likely will be, several months in the process.

Sure, the Japanese can use Zuikaku and Shokaku along with light carriers as they historically did, but those alone won't be enough to deal with the USN thoroughly. The Junyo and Hiyo are not considered fleet carriers but sort of a substitute, so they're likely only to get used in secondary roles or as an absolute last resort.

So, the outcome really doesn't change much.

[T. A. Gardner]

No, the most likely outcome is the the SNLF and IJA come in from the west, through the Seward Roadstead,
land on beaches at Welles Harbor, and with about 2500 men, assisted by strafing IJN aircraft and the big
guns of IJN Battleships and Heavy Cruisers, along with direct fire support from IJN Destroyers, the landing
force,led by the 1000 ton destroyers that the IJN had converted to the equivalent of APDs, would carry out
the landing on Sand Island, and overwhelm the defenders, who numbered less than 1000, in about eight
hours.

The Japanese rest and reorganize all night, and the next day, carry out landings on Eastern Island, which
goes the same way. The Army evacuates the last of the B=17s, and Navy pulls out the few surviving PBYs,
and the Midway Marines join the Guam Marines, the Wake Marines, and the Corregidor Marines as POWs.
Only at Midway, the landing forces can't run their ships aground but must sit
offshore and use small boats to try and cross an open reef and heavy surf.

Only an idiot would believe that the Japanese planned to cross the southern reefs. The Japanese had occuped
Midway for more than 30 years during the 19th century, until driven off in 1903. They had excellent maps and
charts, and knew all about the Roadstead and the Harbor, having used it for years themselve. Trying to take
both islands simultaneously is stupid, no reasonably bright Japanese commander would have tried it. Going
in through the Seward Roadstead is clearly the correct way, and, with Sand Island masking the gunfire from
Eastern Island, you get to knock off the two garrisons one at a time.

And, Mr. Gardner, it is EASY to run boats aground on the beaches of Welles Harbor - you can watch YouTube
videos of it being done !

The above is a combination of ignorance and--I assume--wargame fantasy on Paul's part.

The Japanese committed 2 SNLF with a total of about 1200 men to taking Sand Island. Eastern Island was to have the 1000 men of the IJA Ichiki detachment land and take that. The Japanese landing plan was to anchor the transports offshore, unload into landing craft and try to cross the reef. If the landing craft got stuck, the troops would transfer to rubber rafts and continue in on those.
The two landings would be uncoordinated, with each proceeding at its own pace.

That was the Japanese plan. That is what they would have tried to carry out.

viewtopic.php?t=113320#:~:text=The%20ma ... unreliable.

The head planner, Commander Yasumi Toyama, had little to no actual amphibious operations experience. He was working with badly outdated maps that showed little detail of the waters right off Midway. He had ZERO knowledge of US dredging operations that had created a harbor and seaplane take off / landing area within the atoll. That is, the Japanese didn't know Welles harbor existed. Work on both only started in 1939 and really didn't get going in full until well into 1940.

https://www.nps.gov/articles/world-war- ... midway.htm

He planned the operation based on previous Japanese landings, primarily in China and generally unopposed.

Only an idiot wouldn't have done even the most basic research to know these facts.

As for the landings, the Japanese troops were armed with just small arms and grenade launchers. They had no heavy weapons for support during the early stages. The few of those assigned, were to come ashore once a firm beachhead had been established. They would have no means to call for naval gunfire support once ashore, particularly the IJA contingent.
Unlike at Wake, the Japanese--numbering about the same per island-- faced approximately three times the defenses on both islands as well as a handful of tanks and the Marine Raider battalion as backup infantry to the 3 defense battalions present.

It is likely that most of both landings would have been massacred well before they reached the beaches. It's entirely possible most of the transports were sunk or crippled before even unloading their cargo.

As for fire support, the IJNAF on the carriers--whatever was left of it--had ZERO training in close-air support. It is unlikely they would have been used at all to support the landings as that wasn't in Japanese doctrine. As for naval gunfire, the cruisers were supposed to do this prior to the landings directing their own fire and firing a limited number of rounds as they were to retain sufficient rounds for a naval action.
So, the cruisers would do a short drive-by of Midway and shell it for a short period with no specific targets in mind, just mostly hitting the island.

Once that was done, the transports would go in and the landings would start. The Japanese would likely try to start the landings at dawn as that was doctrine at the time. When the Marines started demolishing the transports with their 5" and 7" guns, the Japanese likely would have had their cruisers, and possibly some destroyers return fire. Of course, by the time that happened, several of the transports would likely be burning or sinking, pretty much ending whatever slim chance the landings had of success.

[paulrward]

Hello All ;

Let me start with this - I will get with Mr. Gardner's prejudices later......

In the two days of fighting at the Coral Sea, on the first day, from a total of 139 aircraft available,
the IJN lost 30. This includes 18 that were sunk on the Shoho, so that in one day of operations,
the IJN lost 12 aircraft operationally and in combat.

On the second day, the IJN lost 29 aircraft, including 12 that were jettisoned from the Zuikaku to
speed her recovery of Shokaku aircraft after Shokaku's flight deck had been put out of action. This
means that on the second day, the IJN, in sinking one carrier and wrecking another, lost 17 aircraft
operationally and in combat.

So, in two days of fighting, the IJN lost less than 20 aircraft per day to operational and combat losses.
At Midway, taking an average number of aircraft at about 60 per carrier, that gives you 240 aircraft.
On the first strike against Midway, of the 108 Japanese aircraft involved in this attack, 11 were destroyed
(including three that ditched), 14 were heavily damaged, and 29 suffered lighter damage. If we assume
that half the lightly damaged aircraft are out of action, that means that the Midway strike cost the
Kido Butai about 40 aircraft. If we assume them equally divided among the four carriers, that leaves
about 50 aircraft per carrier for operations.

The loss of the Soryu then costs the IJN another 50 aircraft. ( We can ignore any orphans that land
on the other flight decks.)

Now, the IJN performs the Three Carrier Strike against the USN - using the non Midway strike aircraft.
This means that they send approximately 70 aircraft ( 40 VT , 20 VB , and 10 VF, against the USN
carriers. Assume they suffer similar losses to those suffered at Coral Sea, or about 20 aircraft lost in
the strike. This leaves 50 to return home to the IJN carriers.

The second IJN strike is the survivors of the Midway Strike - If we leave ALL the lightly damaged aircraft
behind on the carriers, ( Which the IJN did NOT do, they sent EVERY aircraft that could fly from the
Hiryu ) then we are sending 53 aircraft as the second strike. Assume another 20 aircraft lost in sinking
the now burning, crippled, motionless USN carriers left from the first strike. This leaves 33 aircraft to
return to the IJN carriers.

Thus, as the sun goes down on June 4th, the IJN have 50 aircraft from the first strike, 33 aircraft from
the second strike, along with 14 heavily damaged and 29 lightly damaged aircraft. Let us assume that
the IJN maintenance crews work all night like slaves in hell, pulling parts from dead aircraft, and making
spot repairs on the lightly damaged aircraft. As the Sun Rises on June 5th, all 29 lightly damaged aircraft
are airworthy, at least for a limited number of missions. This give the IJN 112 aircraft, plus floatplanes
from the Battlecruisers and Heavy Cruisers, about another 12 aircraft, for use in Search and as Early
Warning Pickets.

The Soryu is still floating. As the McClusky attack never occurred, the other three IJN carriers are still
in sight of the Soryu, and with no necessity to flee the scene, two destroyers are tasked to take the
burned out hulk under tow the next morning. It will require nearly a year for the Soryu to be repaired.

So, Mr. Gardner, ignoring the writings of a USN Fanboy , using the Coral Sea battle as a loss model,
after reducing Midway to helpless impotence, and sinking three USN carriers, on the second day, the
IJN would still have had nearly 50 % of their original carrier aircraft strength, and are ready for battle.
If the Saratoga blunders north, she will be facing three flight decks with fifty percent more aircraft than
Saratoga carries, all flown by veteran, blooded crews. Most of the Saratoga aircraft are flown by green
pilots, with no combat experience. And we have just seen what this leads to.

So, the Kido Butai is a carrier force without any aircraft. No, they aren't suddenly
going to get more either. The IJN's replacement system as well as their assignment of air
wings was per carrier. That is, the aircraft and pilots on one carrier are not interchangeable
with another. So, the carriers return to Japan, await replacements from the training schools,
and then work them up on the carrier to which they are assigned. That will take months to
accomplish. It's the reason Zuikaku didn't participate in Midway.

Mr. Gardner, a number of years ago, while digging through the stacks at my favorite Used Book Shop, I came
across a large cardboard parcel that contained a number of flat, irregular fragments of blue glass that were
incised with some sort of writing. The Proprietor of the shop informed me that the parcel had been in the
estate sale of a recently deceased Archaeologist, and he had purchased the parcel, along with a handgun,
a Fedora, and a bullwhip. I negotiated a price, took the parcel home, unpacked the shards of saphire, and
set to work with a tube of Super Glue and some Scotch Tape.

Mr. Gardner, I am in possession of THE THREE TABLETS OF THE HOLY COMMANDMENTS OF GOD, brought down
from Mt Sinai by Moses. I have ALL THREE, including the third tablet, which contains commandments eleven
through fifteen. ( just to let you know, Commandment Twelve is: Thou Shalt Not Covet Thy Neighbor's Wife's
Ass...... )

Now, Mr Gardner, I just dug those tablets out of my storage locker, and I have checked them over VERY
carefully, front, back, sides, even the fine printing at the bottom where God claims that the contents
are copyrighted , AND NOWHERE DOES GOD SAY THAT THE JAPANESE CANNOT IMPROVISE !!!


The USN improvised a pair of paddle wheeled aircraft carriers on the Great Lakes. The USAAF improvised
long range missions with paper mache drop tanks. The USA improvised Salt Water Protectors for the
M1 Garand using Condoms.

You Improvise. You Adapt. You Overcome ! Or you get defeated.

Mr. Gardner, ONLY IN YOUR MIND are the Japanese so Rigid. And, Mr. Gardner, that tells me
more about you than it tells me about the Japanese.....



After a brutal fight at Midway, which, though victorious, was more costly than they had assumed, the IJN
will simply begin to improvise how to put together air groups, in exactly the same way the USN did on it's
carriers. You learn as you go. With Genda and Fuchida pushing them along, and perhaps with Rear Admiral
Yamaguchi taking over for Nagumo, ( who gets kicked upstairs ) the IJN carrier fleet might have been
able to be completely reconsitituted by the end of July of 1942.


I am certain that, had the IJN believed that there were three USN carriers somewhere in the wind, that
the Zuikaku would have been sent into battle with a composite airgroup of her own and the Shokaku's
surviving aircraft, giving her a full complement of aircraft. This would have been made easier by
the fact that the two carriers were identical sisters, and had identical flight decks for landing operations.

And, had the IJN known about the three USN carriers, they probably would have teamed the Zuiho with
the Ryujo, and as each of these small carriers could carry about 20 aircraft, they would have made an
acceptable stand-in for the Shokaku. This means putting off the Aleutians campaign, but, as Sun Tzu
put it, " The Tiger uses ALL his strength, even when attacking the lowly Rabbit. "



Respectfully

Paul R. Ward

[glenn239]

Considering the Japanese saw the torpedo as the only way to reliably sink major warships...They are unlikely to sacrifice torpedo bombers as opposed to dive bombers.

Where the kamikaze would fit into earlier war doctrine would be to knock out the US carriers so that the numerically IJN surface fleet could close upon and destroy the enemy.

Yes...And the U-Boat war was the only thing the Germans did that scared the Western leadership. Yet, both proved to be statistically insignificant.

Seems to me that early war kamikaze tactics would be anything but 'statistically insignificant'. Whether they could alter the overall trajectory of the war is another matter.

Japan planned to enter the war with 5500 pilots, it entered the war with about 3500 pilots.

Japan fought the war with more pilots than planes. These pilots were not well trained, and more poorly so as the years went on, but they were more numerous than the planes they flew.

Yet, all are necessary, needed for the continuation of the war effort, and need pilots.

Of the 3,500 frontline pilots at the start of the war, a dedicated kamikaze corps could be something in the order of 200 pilots and have a significant impact at the tactical level.

[paulrward]

Hello All :

More mindless quoting of sources that have long been disproved.

#308 by T. A. Gardner » 10 Jul 2022 16:39

The Japanese committed 2 SNLF with a total of about 1200 men to taking Sand
Island. Eastern Island was to have the 1000 men of the IJA Ichiki detachment land and
take that. The Japanese landing plan was to anchor the transports offshore, unload into
landing craft and try to cross the reef. If the landing craft got stuck, the troops would
transfer to rubber rafts and continue in on those.

The two landings would be uncoordinated, with each proceeding at its own pace.

OK, Mr. Gardner: Here is some bad news. You are basing your entire premise on a Post WW2 interrogation
of Commander Toyama, who was lying and bullshitting his way through an interrogation, desperately trying
to figure out what the Americans wanted him to say, in order to avoid being tried as a War Criminal. NOTHING
HE SAYS CAN BE TAKEN AT FACE VALUE !!

By June of 1942, the Japanese had carried out landings in China, Malaya, the NEI, the Philippines, Guam, and
Wake. There is NO WAY that Yamamoto would have given such an important assignment to an officer with
no experience.

Commander Yasumi Toyama, ................ was working with badly outdated maps
that showed little detail of the waters right off Midway. He had ZERO knowledge of US
dredging operations that had created a harbor and seaplane take off / landing area
within the atoll. That is, the Japanese didn't know Welles harbor existed.

Mr. Gardner, that is simply B.S. ! The Japanese had occupied Midway on a Seasonal basis from 1870
until 1903, when the USN drove them out. Each Summer, large Japanese ships would bring smaller
boats to Midway. The Large ships would enter the atoll via the Seward Roadstead, and anchor off
the shore at Welles Harbor. The Japanese would go ashore, and begin robbing the birdsnests on
the island of their eggs, which were candled, and if good, hard boiled and packed in jars of brine
and Rice Wine Vinegar, and shipped back to Japan, where they were a delicacy. The nestling birds
were stripped of their down, which was packed in bags and shipped back to Japan to be used to
stuff quilts and comforters.

To the Japanese, Midway was known as ' Feather Island ', and they were VERY pissed off when the USN
ran them out.

In fact, thirty six years earlier, the USS Lackawanna, a 230 foot long, 1500 ton Wooden Screw Sloop,
which drew 12 feet of draft and was commanded by Commander William Reynolds, entered the Seward
Roadstead and anchored off of Welles Harbor in August of 1867. Reynolds took accurate soundings of
the Roadstead and Harbor, and prepared a chart, which was later published, and was freely available
for sale.


Mr. Gardner, there was NO NEED for the Japanese to try to go over the reef. They knew all about the
Roadstead and the Harbor, and just looking at a map would have shown them that coming in from the
West shields them from any fire from Eastern Island.

And, invading one island at a time allows them to concentrate their forces against an enemy who has
divided his forces into two parts which are NOT mutually supporting.

Only an idiot wouldn't have done even the most basic research to know these facts.

Only a bigger idiot would believe anything said by a Japanese naval officer, under threat of death, during
his interrogation !

As for the landings, the Japanese troops were armed with just small arms and
grenade launchers. They had no heavy weapons for support during the early stages.

Wrong. The Japanese, anticipating resistance, had mounted 75 mm short barrelled ' Moutain Gun' type
howitzers in the bows of their landing craft. Whether or not they would have been able to hit anything
with them is another question, ( I have my doubts ! ) But the Japanese Landing Craft were armed.

As for fire support, the IJNAF on the carriers--whatever was left of it--had ZERO
training in close-air support. It is unlikely they would have been used at all to support
the landings as that wasn't in Japanese doctrine. As for naval gunfire, the cruisers were
supposed to do this prior to the landings directing their own fire and firing a limited
number of rounds as they were to retain sufficient rounds for a naval action.

So, the cruisers would do a short drive-by of Midway and shell it for a short period with
no specific targets in mind, just mostly hitting the island.

Talk about racist Jingoism......You don't need training in close air support to carry out preliminary
bombardment the day before the landing. You send the VTs in high, and level bomb out of range
of the AA guns, and have the VBs do their dive bombing attacks, concentrating on the antique 7"
and 5" guns that are sitting in open air sand-bagged revetments, just waiting to be bombed into
oblivion. the VFs can go in with the VBs, and strafe anything that looks like a AA Gun.

The four Suzuya class cruisers had been designated for Gunfire Support - they were carrying a mix of
shells that was heavy on the HE and light on the AP. Each cruiser could sustain about an hour of fire-
which at a rate of three rounds per minute, and ten guns per cruiser, and four cruisers, and 200 lbs
per shell, means:

4 x 10 x 60 x 3 x 200 / 2000 = 720 TONS of shells hitting the two islands.

And that's JUST the four heavy Cruisers. Yamamoto is coming up with Nagato, Mutsu, and YAMATO !, and
only an idiot would believe that these ships would not be used to grind the USMC into Pork Patties....

When the Marines started demolishing the transports with their 5" and 7" guns,

The Marine Guns and their gunners were bombed into the ground the day before, and the few survivors were
turned into Sashimi by the guns of the cruisers and battleships of the IJN.

The actual occupation of Midway was a walkover - the stunned Marine survivors of three days of bombing and
shelling were too traumatized to resist, and surrendered almost without a shot.


Mr. Gardner, a word of advice: Don't believe anything a POW tells you under interrogation, unless it is
accompanied by severe torture.



Respectfully

Paul R. Ward

Banzai.jpg

Midway, June 7th, 1942

[glenn239]

The raw fact is, if McClusky had turned SOUTH, the USN would have been beaten at Midway.

If McClusky turns south, then Leslie hits one carrier, (probably Akagi), and Yamaguchi counterattacks around 1100-1115 with the staggered launches you describe. Can't say for sure that the Americans lose the battle, but the situation would have been serious for Fletcher.

Up until the moment that McClusky sighted the Kido Butai, the IJN didn't
need 20s on their dice, because the incredible mistakes and poor performance of the USN meant that
the USN was rolling Snake Eyes !

HIryu took out a US carrier through alerted CAP defenses with 6 fighters and 10 torpedo bombers; the USN simply did not have the defenses to handle the IJN 1st rank aerial forces in the 1st half of 1942.

Going
in through the Seward Roadstead is clearly the correct way, and, with Sand Island masking the gunfire from
Eastern Island, you get to knock off the two garrisons one at a time.

I agree that was the best move, but I'm not convinced the Japanese attack would have unfolded this way.

If the USN loses at Midway, and then loses that last of it's Fast Carriers fighing to keep the IJN away from
Hawaii, then Hawaii IS blockaded ! With NO flight decks, the Battleships, Cruisers, and Destroyers have
to retreat to the West Coast, or be bombed into helplessness. The useless USN submarines, moved back
to San Diego, now have to travel more than 2000 miles just to get to Hawaii, where they find their torpedoes
STILL don't work, and won't work until September, 1943 !

Hawaii was a tough nut to crack by mid-1942. The US just had endless land based air assets they could pour in, and in a pinch they could send numerous divisions to bolster the garrison.

Mr. Gardner, you claimed to have created Wargames. So, go ahead. Set up a Wargame assuming the
USN loses at MIdway, all three carriers, and sinks the Soryu. Then go forward from there. Find a good,
smart opponent to play the Japanese. And get ready to have your world turned upside down !

Nimitz is sacked if Midway is a disaster, straight off. With the 3 US carriers down, the USN is trying to parry Kido Butai with Saratoga and Wasp only. Seems impossible. OTOH, the Americans have land based air assets and can cancel or downgrade Torch in order to react to a loss at Midway. Yamato runs rampant into the 2nd half of 1942, but I don't see him landing a knockout blow.

[T. A. Gardner]

More fanciful delusions. I'm not going to repost all of the above--variously-- ad hominem, argumentum ad infinitum, special pleadings, no true Scotsmans, and magical thinking.

Let's start.

Coral Sea is a poor and largely irrelevant example of how the USN would do at Midway. The Navy learned from that action and made changes to their CAP procedures by Midway.
First, the number of radio channels for FDC of the CAP was doubled as were the directors. There were now two per carrier.
Next, the CAP size was greatly increased with 8 F4F on CAP with another 8 on deck ready to reinforce it.
Radar operations had improved and the operators knew better what to look for.

The result of this at Midway was the strikes on Yorktown by the Japanese were intercepted beyond 40 miles out and systematically slaughtered. Kimbal and Morse in Methods of Operations Research show that the USN figured out that early interception and greater time to work over a strike was the key to defeating it. The Navy pretty much did that at Midway. Not completely effectively, but damn close.

Of the dive bomber strike of 18 planes from Hiryu, 13 were shot down. Of the torpedo strike of 10 B5N, 5 were shot down. The escorting fighters took 5 losses for 28% of their numbers. Basically, to get the Yorktown, the Hiryu lost its air group.

That would be the likely result from a larger set of strikes on all three carriers. The F4F's would meet the strike at 40 to 50 miles out and then proceed to slaughter it all the way to the carrier.

Another change was USN policy was to immediately start launching all aircraft on deck to get them off the carrier to avoid a conflagration if they were caught on deck. So, most of the US carrier planes and crew would survive in any case, even if they had to land on Midway.

As for taking Midway.

First there is ZERO evidence that Japanese planners thought they would be tried as war criminals. So, unless you, Paul, have some evidence to the contrary, I call bullshit.

As for the planning, the Japanese intended to go in over the reef. That's a fact. You want some wargame fantasy, hindsight version that's nonsense. Next, the IJN and IJA landing forces were not going to cooperate and act in a unified manner. That's why they were assigned to separate landings on different islands. Only an idiot would argue that the IJN and IJA would cooperate in an operation any more than they absolutely minimally had to.

On the naval bombardment, your math is off. The four cruisers firing 60 rounds per gun amounts to just 332.4 tons in about 30 minutes of fire (277 lbs per shell, x 60 rpg x 10 guns per cruiser x 4 cruisers). That amounts to less than 10% of what the USN pumped into Tarawa. It also doesn't include the months of B-24 strikes of 20 to 40 bombers every few days flying from Funafuti atoll that bombed the island or the USN air strikes that went on for hours pumping about another 1000 tons of ordinance into the island.

If the Japanese chose to use what remaining aircraft they had to bomb the island defenses, that too would be of minimal value. The 3" AA guns the Marines have can easily shoot to 25,000 feet no longer using the powder train fuses but rather the now standard mechanical ones. Midway isn't the Philippines or Wake. That means the Japanese will be greeted by heavy AA fire and likely will lose more planes in the process.
Since the carriers have limited ordinance aboard, the planes will be very limited in the number of strikes they can make and without knowing where the defenses are, will expend most of their ordinance ineffectively.

Those "open revetments" had camouflage nets and other precautions against spotting from the air, or are you assuming the Americans are just total idiots?

There'd be the usual Japanese short bombardment followed by the ship captains conduction it making claims of great destruction that are all out of proportion to reality. The landing would go in as planned, probably at dawn, and get butchered. The Japanese would wonder WTF happened and have to withdraw as they have no plan B so-to-speak.

Ichiki's actions at Guadalcanal are a good guide to his probable behavior at Midway. The landing forces are nothing special. Ichiki's men are China veterans but not specially trained for amphibious operations. The SNLF are just naval infantry with basic infantry training. Neither unit is picked men or anything.

The defenders are mostly average Marines except for the Raider battalion infantry. Those are picked men who received specialized infantry training and were the best-of-the-best the USMC had to offer.

[Terry Duncan]

If people cannot remain polite, avoid ad-hominems, and name calling, then this thread will very quickly be locked. If people are having trouble following the rules they can always have a short break in order to study that strange book-like icon just below the site banner.

Terry

[Rob Stuart]

As already outlined, the kamikaze mindset pre-existed Pearl Harbor in the fighting units. Not just for the single fighter attack mentioned, but during planning in which kamikaze attacks on anti-torpedo nets were being openly discussed. These attitudes were not endorsed at the higher command levels, but it does not stretch imagination that different attitudes could have prevailed.

Is the G3M 'kamikaze' at Midway depicted at 4.40 in this clip fanciful, or did it occur?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pwqxEviunF4?

This incident did happen, but not during the battle of Midway. It happened during one of the post-PH raids conducted by PacFlt carriers. The G3M in question had been hit and was obviously not going to be able to make it back to base. It was not a kamikaze in the 1944-45 sense.

Per Lundstrom's The First Team, pp. 72-74, this attack occurred on 1 February. The segment in the movie is consistent with Lundstrom's account, however, it shows each Nell dropping (by my count) seven bombs. If they were all 250kg bombs, as one would expect and as Lundstrom implies, then each plane could have carried no more than three, since the Nell's maximum bombload was 800kg.

On pp. 101-104, the same author describes a 20 February attack on Lexington by G4Ms during which one of them, fatally damaged, attempted to crash into the carrier.