Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

[Takao]

You could do that with conventional Val dive bombers and still keep planes & pilots to fight another day.

[OpanaPointer]

Ljdaw you simply can not explain why Japanese people didn't commit suicide en masse if they were so much enthusiastic about it.

No amount of warping the factual truth can prove that. Therefore it does not really make sense to continue this rather boring topic.

I think teaching 15 year old girls to attack hordes of invading gaijin with wooden awls counts as suicide enough.

[glenn239]

Well that is quite a lot. It might make more sense to operate them from land, no?

Wow, winning a world war requires up to 300 hours training per kamikaze pilot? Maybe the IJN can defeat the greatest navy of all history on the cheap, mmmnn?

Basing them on land bases sounds great, if you're Admiral Nimitz. Not so much, if your Admiral Nagumo.

[glenn239]

You could do that with conventional Val dive bombers and still keep planes & pilots to fight another day.

Well trained kamikazes flying with escort against 1942 USN defenses might score with 1,000lbs bombs at around a 70% hit rate. Dive bombers might score at a 30% hit rate with 550lbs bombs. Maybe about 2.5 - 4 times more effective. But then, you need to factor in that the dive bomber pilot has to have 600 hours to get to a 30% hit rate on a frontline aircraft, and the kamikaze pilot needs 300 hours on a second line B5N1.

[Huszar666]

As far as I remember, the Japanese didn't have 500kg (i.e. 1100pdr) bombs, only 250 and 800kg ones.
It would be an interesting question if a D3A1 could even take off with an 800kg ordnance, even without the gunner sitting in the back. I don't know.

However, the whole kamikaze-thing was utterly wastefull, and the late-war kamikaze had nothing to do with the "original" intention. The latter one was to complete the attack no matter what, the former was to crash intentionally on the enemy. There is a little difference between the two.

Japan had too few trained pilots in 1941/1942 as it was, intentionally sacraficing half-trained ones would deplete the pool even faster.


As for the orginal question: Japanese strategic choice with HINDSIGHT
With HINDSIGHT, no attack on the su would be possible, because we KNOW that the soviets resisted the invasion. With TODAY'S KNOWLEDGE (i.e.: hindsight), the Japanese would enter a loosing war as soon as they invade the su. For exactly no economic gains whatsoever.
That invasion depends on NOT occupying French Indochina, since if that occupation occures, the US will implement the sanctions, and Japan has no other choice but to go South-East, not North-West.

I think it is almost guaranteed,that IF Japan does NOT occupy French Indochina but invades the su, the sanctions would be implemented the same. With Japan bound in China AND the su they would have no chance to at least TRY to get the ressources from the South-East.

So yes, in HINDSIGHT, occupying French Indochina and after the sactions were implemented, invading the South-East was the correct strategic choice.
Not that there were any other choices...

In HINDSIGHT, the Aleutean-Midway expedition was the wrong strategic choice, the correct one would have been to continue the South-East drive and take Port Moresby (maybe even in May), New Caledonia and maybe Fiji.
After THAT perimeter is secured, wait for the US counterattack sometimes mid-late 1943.

Oh, actually, THAT was the initial plan...

[glenn239]

As far as I remember, the Japanese didn't have 500kg (i.e. 1100pdr) bombs, only 250 and 800kg ones.
It would be an interesting question if a D3A1 could even take off with an 800kg ordnance, even without the gunner sitting in the back. I don't know.

Post said B5N1, not D3A1. The B5N1 could carry an 800kg torpedo, but was underpowered, so dropping it to 500kg compensates a bit. In terms of a D3A1, it carried about 1,000kg in fuel to lug a 250kg bomb. If trying for an 800kg bomb, that's 450kg less of something, and if fuel, then its range would be severely curtailed.

However, the whole kamikaze-thing was utterly wastefull, and the late-war kamikaze had nothing to do with the "original" intention.

The kamikaze tactic was the only thing the Japanese did in WW2 that actually scared US Navy leadership. Peter talked of land based versions. For that, the Betty/Ohka combination deployed earlier in the war would have been far more effective than later.

Japan had too few trained pilots in 1941/1942 as it was, intentionally sacraficing half-trained ones would deplete the pool even faster.

Actually, in WW2 I believe the IJN went through the entire war with more pilots than frontline planes.

[glenn239]

As for the orginal question: Japanese strategic choice with HINDSIGHT
With HINDSIGHT, no attack on the su would be possible, because we KNOW that the soviets resisted the invasion. With TODAY'S KNOWLEDGE (i.e.: hindsight), the Japanese would enter a loosing war as soon as they invade the su. For exactly no economic gains whatsoever.

As carefully explained already, there is no scenario for Japan to fight in WW2 without losing the war. So, saying that it will lose if it fights the USSR is meaningless, because it would lose if it does not fight the USSR as well. As such - and this is key the point - for Japan will attacking the USSR early on see Japan losing WW2 in a manner that better transitions Japan into the post-war US order.

I think it is almost guaranteed,that IF Japan does NOT occupy French Indochina but invades the su, the sanctions would be implemented the same. With Japan bound in China AND the su they would have no chance to at least TRY to get the ressources from the South-East.

That could well be true, and if Japan is eventually forced to capitulate to the Americans due to sanctions, and not war, this would be a far better outcome for Japan in WW2.

So yes, in HINDSIGHT, occupying French Indochina and after the sactions were implemented, invading the South-East was the correct strategic choice.

That road leads to war with the US, so you must think that Japan could defeat the US. Care to share how?

[ljadw]

As for the orginal question: Japanese strategic choice with HINDSIGHT
With HINDSIGHT, no attack on the su would be possible, because we KNOW that the soviets resisted the invasion. With TODAY'S KNOWLEDGE (i.e.: hindsight), the Japanese would enter a loosing war as soon as they invade the su. For exactly no economic gains whatsoever.

As carefully explained already, there is no scenario for Japan to fight in WW2 without losing the war. So, saying that it will lose if it fights the USSR is meaningless, because it would lose if it does not fight the USSR as well. As such - and this is key the point - for Japan will attacking the USSR early on see Japan losing WW2 in a manner that better transitions Japan into the post-war US order.

I think it is almost guaranteed,that IF Japan does NOT occupy French Indochina but invades the su, the sanctions would be implemented the same. With Japan bound in China AND the su they would have no chance to at least TRY to get the ressources from the South-East.

That could well be true, and if Japan is eventually forced to capitulate to the Americans due to sanctions, and not war, this would be a far better outcome for Japan in WW2.

So yes, in HINDSIGHT, occupying French Indochina and after the sactions were implemented, invading the South-East was the correct strategic choice.

That road leads to war with the US, so you must think that Japan could defeat the US. Care to share how?

1 For the 1941 Japanese leaders and population,a transition in the 1941 US order was a very bad thing .
2 It was not needed for Japan to defeat the US,but it was needed for the US to defeat Japan : PH would not automatically result in Hiroshima.
3 For the Japanese leaders and their population the choice was between to become cultural Americans or to become a world power .
4 It is not on us to decide what was better for Japan,this is reserved to the Japanese themselves .

[Takao]

Post said B5N1, not D3A1. The B5N1 could carry an 800kg torpedo, but was underpowered, so dropping it to 500kg compensates a bit. In terms of a D3A1, it carried about 1,000kg in fuel to lug a 250kg bomb. If trying for an 800kg bomb, that's 450kg less of something, and if fuel, then its range would be severely curtailed.

If the Kamikaze is only going on way, it does not need a full load of fuel.

Considering the Japanese saw the torpedo as the only way to reliably sink major warships...They are unlikely to sacrifice torpedo bombers as opposed to dive bombers.

The kamikaze tactic was the only thing the Japanese did in WW2 that actually scared US Navy leadership. Peter talked of land based versions. For that, the Betty/Ohka combination deployed earlier in the war would have been far more effective than later.

Yes...And the U-Boat war was the only thing the Germans did that scared the Western leadership. Yet, both proved to be statistically insignificant.

Actually, in WW2 I believe the IJN went through the entire war with more pilots than frontline planes.

Japan planned to enter the war with 5500 pilots, it entered the war with about 3500 pilots.

Yes, Japan entered the war with more pilots than frontline planes. Every nation did. Training aircraft are not frontline planes. Transports are not frontline planes. Reconnaissance aircraft are not frontline planes. Aircraft for the defense of the Home Islands and occupied territories are not frontline planes. ASW patrols are not frontline planes. Etc.

Yet, all are necessary, needed for the continuation of the war effort, and need pilots.

[ljadw]

You could do that with conventional Val dive bombers and still keep planes & pilots to fight another day.

Well trained kamikazes flying with escort against 1942 USN defenses might score with 1,000lbs bombs at around a 70% hit rate. Dive bombers might score at a 30% hit rate with 550lbs bombs. Maybe about 2.5 - 4 times more effective. But then, you need to factor in that the dive bomber pilot has to have 600 hours to get to a 30% hit rate on a frontline aircraft, and the kamikaze pilot needs 300 hours on a second line B5N1.

You forget the most important thing for the hit rate,which is the detection by the kamikaze pilots of the US war ships :in 1942,1943 the detection rate was much lower than in 1945 when the US war ships were close to Japan .Thus it had not much sense to send in 1942 and following years kamikaze pilots to search for US war ships which were hundreds of miles away .

[Huszar666]

That could well be true, and if Japan is eventually forced to capitulate to the Americans due to sanctions, and not war, this would be a far better outcome for Japan in WW2.

The problem is that, that you assume the "western way of life" is the only one one should aspire to lead, and it is the very bestest way for everyone.
Even today, there are a "few" countries (say, China, Russia, a large part of Africa and Asia) that don't think so.

For the '40s Japanese, it was not something they wanted to do. Being a slave to the white masters and the only idenpendent and powerfull country in the Far East it would mean a colossal loss of face.

As carefully explained already, there is no scenario for Japan to fight in WW2 without losing the war. So, saying that it will lose if it fights the USSR is meaningless, because it would lose if it does not fight the USSR as well. As such - and this is key the point - for Japan will attacking the USSR early on see Japan losing WW2 in a manner that better transitions Japan into the post-war US order.

You assume, that after loosing a war against the su Japan would be able to capitulate to the Americans. At best, Japan would be divided between a soviet and an anglo-american occupational zone (much like Germany), and having to live in the Japanese People Democratic Republic... Wouldn't be such a nice prospect for the Japanese. Oh, and ask any Koreans, how they would like to live in North Korea - with a war lost against the su, the whole Korean peninsula would be under North Korea...

So, going against the su, and loosing that war earlier, would be even worse for Japan. And the Koreans...

As for America:
Japan did not need to outright defeat the US, land on the Westcoast and such. What Japan needed was to establish a perimeter, sink the offensive ships of the USN in the first year - without suffering cripling losses themselves - and wait for the counterattack. Sometimes Late 1943. With a strong perimeter and a strong IJN, there was a chance to hold out. If the US deems defeating Japan as too much of a hassle or to expensive, Japan "won".

Japan did not lose the war on 07.12.1941, but at Midway.

[Takao]

The problem is that, that you assume the "western way of life" is the only one one should aspire to lead, and it is the very bestest way for everyone.
Even today, there are a "few" countries (say, China, Russia, a large part of Africa and Asia) that don't think so.

Depends what you mean by "western way of life."
China & Russia do seem to enjoy the "western way of life." However, the disagree over "western POLITICAL way of life - Those in power want to remain in power.

For the '40s Japanese, it was not something they wanted to do. Being a slave to the white masters and the only idenpendent and powerfull country in the Far East it would mean a colossal loss of face.

Correction...For the ultra-nationalist militant factional the 1930s & 1940s.

For the 1890s, 1900s, 1910s, and 1920s Japanese, they were perfectly happy living the "western way of life", they were not slaves to white masters and were the only independent and powerful country in the Far East, with no loss of face.

So, what changed?

As for America:
Japan did not need to outright defeat the US, land on the Westcoast and such. What Japan needed was to establish a perimeter, sink the offensive ships of the USN in the first year - without suffering cripling losses themselves - and wait for the counterattack. Sometimes Late 1943. With a strong perimeter and a strong IJN, there was a chance to hold out. If the US deems defeating Japan as too much of a hassle or to expensive, Japan "won".

Japan did not lose the war on 07.12.1941, but at Midway.

Well, yes Japan pretty much did need to defeat the US. Specifically, before US industrial production could come into play.

Japan could not set up a perimeter - The Pacific was far to vast for that, as very few of the island chains were in mutually supporting positions. Coupled with the fact that US industrial might allowed the US to attack along two different axis, while the Japanese industrial capacity was hard pressed to support one axis of attack.

Japan did not lose the war at Midway, but during the Solomons Campaign. Japan lost 4 carriers at Midway, but not that many aircrew. For the Solomons campaign, Japan stripped her carriers of planes & pilots 3 times to fight major battles...And each time took severe losses, which were made good only with ill-trained aircrew - This is why the Battle of the Philippine Sea is referred to as "a turkey shoot."

[paulrward]

Hello All :

Mr Takao stated :

#297 by Takao » 09 Jul 2022 13:03

Well, yes Japan pretty much did need to defeat the US. Specifically, before US
industrial roduction could come into play.

Japan could not set up a perimeter - The Pacific was far to vast for that, as very
few of the island chains were in mutually supporting positions. Coupled with the
fact that US industrial might allowed the US to attack along two different axis,
while the Japanese industrial capacity was hard pressed to support one axis of
attack.

Japan did not lose the war at Midway, but during the Solomons Campaign. Japan
lost four carriers at Midway, but not that many aircrew.

What Mr. Takao is repeating is the Doctrine of USN Invinciblity in WW2. The IJN could NOT
have won, the USN could NOT have lost, and that is because GOD SAYS SO !!!!!!

What he is forgetting is that, in the week leading up to the Battle of Midway, and on June 4th itself, the
Midway Defense Force made screw up after screw up. They blew up half their Avgas supply. They reserved
the B-17s for useless high altitude airstrikes against shipping instead of using them for long range recon.
The Midway Fighters were wiped out in one engagement, and the mixed force of Army, Navy, and Marine
Torpedo and Dive Bombers on Midway got badly hammered by the IJN, and inflicted no damage.

Then, the USN carriers sent their strikes off in uncoordinated gaggles, the Torpedo Squadrons going without
fighter escort to be slaughtered, Stanhope Ring getting two squadrons of SBDs and half a squadron of F4Fs
lost, with some of them ditching in the Pacific and the rest stuck for hours on Midway.

At about !0:15, the United States had lost roughly 75 aircraft, and had inflicted ZERO DAMAGE on the
IJN Carrier Force. Then the Dive bombers from the Yorktown hit the Soryu, and the two squadrons of
SBDs from the Enterprise got the Akagi and Kaga.


But, Mr. Takao, What if that had never happened. No UFOs, No Alien Space Bats, No Secret Weapons.
Just a different turn of events, due to ONE Decision, made in the heat of the moment by an inexperienced
young Air Group Commander who was under great stress.

Mr. Takao, at 10:15, the USN was NOT poised to make and Incredible Victory, it was NOT about to write
A Glorious Page In Our History, it was NOT about to perform the Miracle at Midway. It was, in fact,
the USN was


" ONE FINAL F^(# - UP AWAY FROM DEFEAT ! "


Mr. Takao, WHAT IF McCLUSKY TURNED SOUTH ?

He never finds Nagumo. Akagi and Kaga are NOT bombed. McClusky heads for Midway and gasoline, and
finds himself stuck there for hours, just like Stanhope Ring. And while he is desperately trying to get his
SBDs refueled, Akagi launches her strike at 10:30, Hiryu dodges the last of the TBDs and launches at 11:05,
and pokey old Kaga gets its planes in the air at 11:15.

All three groups head for the USN carrier that has been spotted, and while they are in the air, the other
two carriers are also spotted and reported to Nagumo, who notifies the outgoing IJN airstrike. The two
squadrons of B5Ns and one squadron of D3As divide into three groups, and with their fighter escort chopping
through the F4Fs over the USN carriers, the airstrike is carried out with quick precision. The damaged
Yorktown is knocked out. and both the Hornet and Enterprise are left dead in the water, on fire and flooding.

As the IJN strike is outbound, the aircraft from the Midway strike are refueled, and starting at Noon, they
also leave the carriers, totalling some 30 dive bombers and 10 torpedo bombers, with fighter escort. They
have no trouble locating the three burning USN carriers, and all suffer fatal damage in this second strike.

With no further interference from the USN, the IJN spends June 5th pounding Midway with Bombers
and Gunfire, and the attack, which enters via the Seward Roads and hits on the beaches Welles Harbor,
takes Sand Island on the 6th and Eastern Island on the 7th.


The Subsequent victories by the IJN, in which the last three USN fast carriers and six Escort Carriers
were defeated in August and September in the Battle for Johnston Island and the Battle for Hawaii, spelled
the end of USN power in the Pacific. The Japanese imposed a naval blockade on Hawaii, which depended
for imports from the mainland for 80 % of it's foodstuffs, and by the beginning of November, the Japanese
began to occupy the Hawaiian chain, one island every week . Oahu fell on the first anniversary of the
attack on Pearl Harbor.

The Japanese quickly moved to fortify the islands, with the help of the nearly 40 % of the population
who were ethnic Japanese. The naval installations, airfields, and barracks were quickly repaired, and
Hawaii became Japan's Bastion in the Pacific. The USN was still nearly a year from having enough
carriers to challenge the IJN, and with the ongoing failures of the USN submarine force, there was
simply no way for the United States to continue fighting, especially when the Japanese began to
publicly offer to have Peace Talks, using Switzerland as their intermediary.

Any naval strategist who could read a map understood that, with the IJN in posession of Hawaii, there
was simply no way for the USN, even if it was rebuilt, to project power into the Pacific. And to defeat
the IJN at Hawaii, the USN would have to sail over 2500 miles from the West Coast, and engage the
IJN naval aviators using ' green ' pilots and trainee crews with un tested ships .

Even Franklin Roosevelt wasn't that stupid. In early March, 1943, he instructs the American Ambassador
to Switzerland to approach the Japanese about an Armistace, which is a face saving way of admitting
defeat. The Japanese are magnanimous. All prisoners are returned, the Philippines are to be granted
their independence on schedule, and free trade is to be re-established between the two nations. Japan
keeps it's conquests, and the Greater East Asian Co Prosperity Sphere is a reality. Chiang Kai Shek is
doomed, and he knows it.

With no more Pacific War, and nothing to show for a year of fighting but defeats and disasters, the
American People are sick of fighting. There is no Torch, no Husky, and no OverLord. Aid to Britain
and Russia goes back to being Lend Lease and Cash and Carry, with the British and Russians supplying
the ships.

And, with no War, there is no way to continue military research projects with potentially monumental
costs. The office in Manhattan is shut down, and the Physicists return to their Universities....


Mr. Takao, I give you a new Hollywood Motion Picture :

" MIDWAY : ONE FINAL F^(# - UP AWAY FROM DEFEAT ! "


Respectfully :

Paul R. Ward

[T. A. Gardner]

The most likely outcome at Midway to Paulward's scenario is the landing forces try to land and are wiped out in the process. Japan, without a backup plan for that and now having four carriers with somewhere north of 50% of their planes and pilots gone, along with ZERO way to stay on station off Midway, withdraw after pounding the islands there some more.

Does Japan regroup and try for a second invasion say a month later? I doubt it.

The two problems Japan has at Midway that loom larger than any others are: Their landing forces are an utter joke. They are going to land a force on each island about the size of the one that landed the second time at Wake. Only at Midway, the landing forces can't run their ships aground but must sit offshore and use small boats to try and cross an open reef and heavy surf. Those that get ashore face far more and better equipped defenders than at Wake.
Wake was a near-run thing the second time around for Japan. Here, they get creamed and the assault fails miserably.

The second problem is the IJN are amateurs at underway replenishment. Yes, they can refuel at sea but their process is slow and cumbersome. They have no means of doing an unrep for ammunition and stores. That means their fleet's stay time off Midway is severely limited.

As for "blockad(ing)" Hawaii, that's an utter absurdity. Japan has no means to keep a fleet off those islands and supply them on a long-term basis. None, zero, nada, zip-point-shit. They can't do it. They can't do it if they take Midway. They can't do it if they take Johnson Island.

They certainly aren't taking Hawaii by any means. For the IJN / IJA to even have a reasonable chance of success against Hawaii they'd have to send at least four infantry divisions with all the support troops for two corps and an army. It would tie up so much shipping that the Japanese economy would suffer from the shortage of shipping it imposed.
Even if the Japanese first took one of the other islands that wasn't occupied by masses of US troops, their forces would find themselves quickly outnumbered in the air and faced with iffy chances of resupply. Basically, they'd become a self-imposed POW camp.

Taking Oahu directly would take easily four infantry divisions with massive supporting units. There, the problem is by June 1942 the Japanese are facing far more complete and ready defenses than were present in December 1941. The number of aircraft has increased there too.

The USN had in late June 1942 39 F4F, and 92 PBY on Oahu alone. The USMC and USAAF had more. From what I can gather there were at least three fighter groups on the island with about a bit over 100 P-40E fighters alone for the USAAF. There might have been more.

[ljadw]

The problem is that, that you assume the "western way of life" is the only one one should aspire to lead, and it is the very bestest way for everyone.
Even today, there are a "few" countries (say, China, Russia, a large part of Africa and Asia) that don't think so.

Depends what you mean by "western way of life."
China & Russia do seem to enjoy the "western way of life." However, the disagree over "western POLITICAL way of life - Those in power want to remain in power.

For the '40s Japanese, it was not something they wanted to do. Being a slave to the white masters and the only idenpendent and powerfull country in the Far East it would mean a colossal loss of face.

Correction...For the ultra-nationalist militant factional the 1930s & 1940s.

For the 1890s, 1900s, 1910s, and 1920s Japanese, they were perfectly happy living the "western way of life", they were not slaves to white masters and were the only independent and powerful country in the Far East, with no loss of face.

So, what changed?

For the average Japanese in the 1890s,1900s,1910s,1920s, the ''western way of life '' was commodore Perry and the anti-Japanese laws in California and the US opposition to the Japanese intervention in China ,a country that for the average Japanese was not the business of the US .
For the average Japanese the policy of the US was one of double standards :US imposed a neocolonial regime in Latin America but were indignant when Japan did the same in China .
What hurt most Japan was the claim from the US that it was the moral guide, the moral bacon of the world and that it had the right to impose everywhere its political and social norms .
All this was only strengthen what is called wrongly the ''ultra nationalists ''.