Decision for S Pac. May 1942

[Carl Schwamberger]

They didn't. This was one of the 'Limited War' imperatives on them. Depending on the commodity Japan had a six - twelve months reserve of material for its industry. In 1940 a bit over eleven millions tons GRT service Japans intake. They badly needed to return to that level before the end of 1942. A crash program started late 1939 to double the cargo fleet was underway the peak available was close to eight million tons in 1943. Then losses to Allied airpower, and then submarines sank that & then some in less than 18 months. The 'Starvation Island' syndrome had as much to do with Japans severe shortage of cargo shipping as it did with USN blockade. They were dumping 10,000 50,000 100,000 man garrisons on islands with no assurance a supply ship would return when needed.

[Peter89]

They didn't. This was one of the 'Limited War' imperatives on them. Depending on the commodity Japan had a six - twelve months reserve of material for its industry. In 1940 a bit over eleven millions tons GRT service Japans intake. They badly needed to return to that level before the end of 1942. A crash program started late 1939 to double the cargo fleet was underway the peak available was close to eight million tons in 1943. Then losses to Allied airpower, and then submarines sank that & then some in less than 18 months. The 'Starvation Island' syndrome had as much to do with Japans severe shortage of cargo shipping as it did with USN blockade. They were dumping 10,000 50,000 100,000 man garrisons on islands with no assurance a supply ship would return when needed.

Hmm, sometimes these 6-12 months of reserves sounds awful little, but many major powers didn't have such reserves. I have no numbers for the British and the Americans, but I seriously doubt that Britain had such material reserves on the island. And I believe it wouldn't make sense to stockpile this amount if replenishing it was possible.

In any case, the Japanese seem to be terribly overstretched.

[Carl Schwamberger]

John Ellis in 'Brute Force' has come comments on Japans reserves and cargo shipping, and a few numbers for both. There is a useful chart showing maritime cargo capacity each year, ships built, and sunk.

From Ellis, and literature about Japans decision for war it looks like they understood the resource vulnerability. Circa 1940 & perhaps earlier in some cases they made a decision to invest is accumulating a war reserve. Which clearly was not cheap. There was not near term threat of war then, but the border skirmishes with the USSR and US support of China had long term implications. There was also the changes wrought by the European war. It made future supplies unpredictable both in availability and price. The same for cargo ships. The growing Battle of the Atlantic and blockade of nazi Europe made shipping contracts difficult and increasingly expensive. expanding the cargo fleet looked like a good investment. Even if it took 5-7 years to pay off.

[Peter89]

John Ellis in 'Brute Force' has come comments on Japans reserves and cargo shipping, and a few numbers for both. There is a useful chart showing maritime cargo capacity each year, ships built, and sunk.

From Ellis, and literature about Japans decision for war it looks like they understood the resource vulnerability. Circa 1940 & perhaps earlier in some cases they made a decision to invest is accumulating a war reserve. Which clearly was not cheap. There was not near term threat of war then, but the border skirmishes with the USSR and US support of China had long term implications. There was also the changes wrought by the European war. It made future supplies unpredictable both in availability and price. The same for cargo ships. The growing Battle of the Atlantic and blockade of nazi Europe made shipping contracts difficult and increasingly expensive. expanding the cargo fleet looked like a good investment. Even if it took 5-7 years to pay off.

I finished a book on the German merchant fleet in the spring. It's still kind of shocking. I long thought that Mahan and his intellectual offsprings like Raeder had a terribly wrong grasp of naval warfare. Now I see it a bit differently. And I also came to respect certain aspects of the global network of the British Empire.

[T. A. Gardner]

Japan was correct in one respect in continuing to take land in China. That is in opening a land route from locations like Singapore and Haiphong (in Vietnam) via railroad to ports on the Sea of Japan. By doing so, the Japanese could access the various critical resources of SE Asia and the DEI via very short and well protected shipping lanes. They could also use smaller, coastal-type merchant ships to haul these. Such ships were more within the capacity of Japan's shipbuilding industry to construct and replace than larger transoceanic merchant ships were.

The Sea of Japan had access only through narrow straights that could be mined and easily controlled with a combination of coast defenses and small ships. The result of all that was the Japanese by 1944 had constructed a highly secure means of moving resources to Japan that the Allies really couldn't stop.
It was only the lack of rolling stock and rail capacity--not to mention inefficiency in transferring cargo and operating that rail system--that was holding Japan back economically.

Then in late 1944 and into 1945, the US finally found a way to get subs into the Sea of Japan (better sonar that allowed them to avoid the mines) and within range of maritime patrol aircraft that could attack shipping. That effectively put a huge crimp in Japan's access to resources coming from China and SE Asia.

[Carl Schwamberger]

I finished a book on the German merchant fleet in the spring. It's still kind of shocking. I long thought that Mahan and his intellectual offsprings like Raeder had a terribly wrong grasp of naval warfare. Now I see it a bit differently. And I also came to respect certain aspects of the global network of the British Empire.

What was the title of the book? Id Like to see any views it has of the BoA from the German side. Looking at the raw numbers, & after some refinements they make a strong case the Battle of the Atlantic was won by the Allies in the last quarter of 1942. But the Brits were still concerned through March 1943 and Doneitz kept at it through the first quarter of 1943, not ending his maximum effort in the North Atlantic until late March. I have some ideas why both sides kept the idea the Germans could win another 3-4 months. Hopefully more info on the German PoV would clarify this.

[Peter89]

I finished a book on the German merchant fleet in the spring. It's still kind of shocking. I long thought that Mahan and his intellectual offsprings like Raeder had a terribly wrong grasp of naval warfare. Now I see it a bit differently. And I also came to respect certain aspects of the global network of the British Empire.

What was the title of the book? Id Like to see any views it has of the BoA from the German side. Looking at the raw numbers, & after some refinements they make a strong case the Battle of the Atlantic was won by the Allies in the last quarter of 1942. But the Brits were still concerned through March 1943 and Doneitz kept at it through the first quarter of 1943, not ending his maximum effort in the North Atlantic until late March. I have some ideas why both sides kept the idea the Germans could win another 3-4 months. Hopefully more info on the German PoV would clarify this.

The title was Die deutsche Handelsflotte 1939 - 1945 Band 1 + 2. (If you need a copy, I can post one to you for the shipping price only; I ordered two accidentally.)

It's not written explicitly, but my understanding of the underlying thesis is that Raeder & co. knew that even if the Wehrmacht will occupy any resource areas, they will need ships, strongpoints and a surface fleet to control maritime traffic. Germany could never challenge the British Empire without having a sizeable merchant fleet; and a sizeable merchant fleet required a sizeable surface fleet to protect it.

Germany needed safe sea lanes at least to allow its merchant fleet to arrive home. Germany needed "Axis lakes" like the Baltic sea in 1940, because Germany relied on neutral shipping to an alarming degree already. Procuring coal and bunker fuel all over the planet should have been a must, but in the light of the German foreign currency situation, it was close to hopeless.

The tonnage war emphasized by Dönitz could never work. It could have been one leg of forcing Britain to submission, but one can not rule the seas with submarines; can not guarantee the safety of sea lanes. Just one realization I had while reading the book: even if the Axis denies the naval access for enemy surface units with submarines and naval aviation, they could still deploy submarines to attack the Axis merchant fleet. Thus, the Axis still needs destroyers and other escort vessels, ie. surface units...

I mean the U-Boots posed a threat at a vulnerable point, a great asset for asymmetric warfare, but ultimately, Germany could not be a great power without a surface navy. And Raeder was correct that at least the Mediterranean should have been closed to the British at Gibraltar, so the German ships stuck in the Canaries, the Azores, Casablanca, etc. could move into the Mediterranean.

What Raeder really screwed up was the role of the Hilfkreuzers in "his war". But by the time he realized the importance of those ships (April 1941), the Axis lost its most valuable bases in the Southern Atlantic Ocean and the Indian Ocean. And they successfully mustered the USN to the British cause soon thereafter.

Concerning the view of the BoA what you mentioned... yeah, that image is shattered for me as well. What really mattered was the Wallies' tightening grip on the sea lanes. No matter how many U-Boots the Germans could deploy the the BoA, they could never win that fight, and ultimately the outcome of the battle depended on the same factors: bases, resources, air cover. No wonder why the British grand strategy was about sewing a spider web around the Axis' sea access in 1939-1942. It helped to save resources and deny the option of victory. I seriously underestimated British strategic brilliance in this regard.

If I take into account the German (and other Axis) shipping losses thanks to Britain's resilience to continue the war and cling to key positions of maritime traffic, I'd wager to say that the ultimate outcome of the war was decided when the Axis failed to take these key positions at the first strokes.

A few months ago I began to draw a map with the 1940 July situation of the stranded German merchant fleet, moving individual ships on the map up to 1941 May; where those ships were, what did they carry, how much coal/fuel they've got. But the thing is that although this book's abstract promises the fate of every German merchant ship, about 80 ships are still unaccounted for. Or in this book at least.

[Peter89]

Just one more remark, if someone speaks French and familiar with the Marine Nationale sources, I'd like to ask a few questions about that. Especially (super-)destroyers. So far I think the French navy's doctrine got too little attention because they were too quickly overran on the ground.

[Carl Schwamberger]

...

Concerning the view of the BoA what you mentioned... yeah, that image is shattered for me as well. What really mattered was the Wallies' tightening grip on the sea lanes. No matter how many U-Boots the Germans could deploy the the BoA, they could never win that fight, and ultimately the outcome of the battle depended on the same factors: bases, resources, air cover. No wonder why the British grand strategy was about sewing a spider web around the Axis' sea access in 1939-1942. It helped to save resources and deny the option of victory. I seriously underestimated British strategic brilliance in this regard. ...

The references to air cover and the Hilfskruzers touch on a critical point. Its seldom a single weapon system that wins. Rather its combinations & in the BoA air support was badly needed, so were surface ships. Raeder did try, but other than three short cruises the cruiser and bb raids were a failure. The armed merchant cruisers had a lot more success, but lacked the numbers. Had Raeder been able to get adequate Luftwaffe support, and avoid Hitlers interference and some of the other problems with deploying the surface fleet more might have been accomplished.

Raeder was correct that at least the Mediterranean should have been closed to the British at Gibraltar, so the German ships stuck in the Canaries, the Azores, Casablanca, etc. could move into the Mediterranean.

Left out of 99% of the 'Gibraltar Falls' dialogues. How many Italian & German cargo ships could have straggled back into the Med? I expect the Brits would have been swiftly decending on the Cape Verde & Canaries Islands & tried to intercept this group. But, if the opportunity develops fast enough a majority may escape. Its a interesting item to consider adding into a Mediterranean campaign game.

[Peter89]

...

Concerning the view of the BoA what you mentioned... yeah, that image is shattered for me as well. What really mattered was the Wallies' tightening grip on the sea lanes. No matter how many U-Boots the Germans could deploy the the BoA, they could never win that fight, and ultimately the outcome of the battle depended on the same factors: bases, resources, air cover. No wonder why the British grand strategy was about sewing a spider web around the Axis' sea access in 1939-1942. It helped to save resources and deny the option of victory. I seriously underestimated British strategic brilliance in this regard. ...

The references to air cover and the Hilfskruzers touch on a critical point. Its seldom a single weapon system that wins. Rather its combinations & in the BoA air support was badly needed, so were surface ships. Raeder did try, but other than three short cruises the cruiser and bb raids were a failure. The armed merchant cruisers had a lot more success, but lacked the numbers. Had Raeder been able to get adequate Luftwaffe support, and avoid Hitlers interference and some of the other problems with deploying the surface fleet more might have been accomplished.

Raeder was correct that at least the Mediterranean should have been closed to the British at Gibraltar, so the German ships stuck in the Canaries, the Azores, Casablanca, etc. could move into the Mediterranean.

Left out of 99% of the 'Gibraltar Falls' dialogues. How many Italian & German cargo ships could have straggled back into the Med? I expect the Brits would have been swiftly decending on the Cape Verde & Canaries Islands & tried to intercept this group. But, if the opportunity develops fast enough a majority may escape. Its a interesting item to consider adding into a Mediterranean campaign game.

Quite a few escaped even with Gibraltar on British hands. After the fall of France many ships steamed to the French Atlantic ports, and some tried and succeeded to circumvent the British isles and travelled back to Germany proper. We are talking about a good year's worth of shipping production by Axis standards. I also began to question the British capacity to easily occupy the Canaries, Cape Verda, Madeira, etc. in 1940 or early 1941. They had to patrol immense areas with resources stretched to the limit.

[Carl Schwamberger]

... I also began to question the British capacity to easily occupy the Canaries, Cape Verda, Madeira, etc. in 1940 or early 1941. They had to patrol immense areas with resources stretched to the limit.

They'd have to give up something somewhere else. Thats what usually is done. Force H was already expected to cover that region & would be a start to a reorganized force to cover the same There were discussions within various HQ staff of the Army and Navy & State Dept on this subject in 1940. I don't know how serious those were, but in mid 1941 War Plan GREY was written up.