Decision for S Pac. May 1942

[T. A. Gardner]

Why did they break up the six fleet carriers? And when two fell out for Midway, why didn't they wait for their repair and replenishment, or used another task force built around light carriers?

Greater minds than mine would be required to answer that one. It would be easy to say operational issues & retirements led to reduction of the KB, but that does not really answer the question.

After the PH strike the KB was split up & if I recall correctly not reconstituted as six carriers until Operation C.

Japanese carriers operated--well, normally--in divisions of two ships. The divisions could be combined into larger groups for specific missions. The air wings for each carrier were also specific to that carrier, and not like in US practice separate units that were assigned as available to any carrier.

For example, when Shokaku and Zuikaku had heavy losses of aircraft and pilots, along with damage, at Coral Sea the surviving pilots and aircraft remained with the ships and worked up replacements for those losses while the ships were repaired.

[Huszar666]

Positioning Enterprise & Hornet TF East of the Marshals. Is something I'd not seen before. Are there advantages in opposing the expected S Pac offensive? Both for the Coral Sea battle and the later Solomons battles they were positioned much further south.

"East of the Marshals" is about equidistance between Pearl/Midway and the Coral Sea. If you don't know where to enemy will attack, you will have to position your reserves behind both probable points.
If you position Enterprise and Hornet further south, they wouldn't be able to reach Pearl/Midway in time to make a difference. Or, if you position them further north, there would be no chance to oppose a Japanese attack in the Coral Sea.

As long as Yorktown is repaired and Saratoga is still on the West Coast, Nimitz could do three things:
1, split the two availabe carriers, send one to the south, keep the other in the North
2, send both to one location and risk uncovering the other (whichever he deems more likely to be attacked)
3, send both to a position, where they could, at least theoritically, reach both points within reasonable time.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Positioning Enterprise & Hornet TF East of the Marshals. Is something I'd not seen before. Are there advantages in opposing the expected S Pac offensive? Both for the Coral Sea battle and the later Solomons battles they were positioned much further south.

"East of the Marshals" is about equidistance between Pearl/Midway and the Coral Sea. If you don't know where to enemy will attack, you will have to position your reserves behind both probable points.
If you position Enterprise and Hornet further south, they wouldn't be able to reach Pearl/Midway in time to make a difference. Or, if you position them further north, there would be no chance to oppose a Japanese attack in the Coral Sea.

As long as Yorktown is repaired and Saratoga is still on the West Coast, Nimitz could do three things:
1, split the two availabe carriers, send one to the south, keep the other in the North
2, send both to one location and risk uncovering the other (whichever he deems more likely to be attacked)
3, send both to a position, where they could, at least theoritically, reach both points within reasonable time.

In the OP

King & Nimitz agree the enemy will move in the S Pacific within weeks, before 15 June. Possibly as early as 1 June.

Leads to #2, which is the S Pac. That is Nimitz thinks he knows the correct intent of the Japanese. Some sort of effort to continue where they had been thwarted by the Coral Sea battle.

[Huszar666]

Leads to #2, which is the S Pac. That is Nimitz thinks he knows the correct intent of the Japanese. Some sort of effort to continue where they had been thwarted by the Coral Sea battle.

If Nimitz thinks the next battle would be in the South Pac (and not at Midway), he will send Enterprise and Hornet (and most of the stuff that was funneled into Midway) to the South Pac. May even leave Yorktown there to be repaired in Australia.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Tough call on the Yorktown. The Navy bases in the US, were way more capable & less exposed. They were nervous blur Japanese air raids and submarines, around Australian ports. One of the reasons they depended on Wellington more than Brisbane ect... The deployment of the Saratoga might be hustled along a week. They did understand this was going to be a really big operations for the Japanese.

I suppose the usual S boat patrols will still be run in the Hawaian region, and a fairly decent air patrol. But, the PBY & B17 as a Oahu based strike force looks lame.

[Takao]

Leads to #2, which is the S Pac. That is Nimitz thinks he knows the correct intent of the Japanese. Some sort of effort to continue where they had been thwarted by the Coral Sea battle.

If Nimitz thinks the next battle would be in the South Pac (and not at Midway), he will send Enterprise and Hornet (and most of the stuff that was funneled into Midway) to the South Pac. May even leave Yorktown there to be repaired in Australia.

The Sutherland dry dock was not long enough to accommodate USS Yorktown.

[Carl Schwamberger]

That was the case for Wellington as well?

[Takao]

Yes.

[OpanaPointer]

After the PH strike the KB was split up & if I recall correctly not reconstituted as six carriers until Operation C.

The Army barely tolerated the raid on Pearl, demanding that the carriers be ready to aid the advance into the Southern Resources Area. Nagumo Kido Butai was meant to break up after that.

[Peter89]

After the PH strike the KB was split up & if I recall correctly not reconstituted as six carriers until Operation C.

The Army barely tolerated the raid on Pearl, demanding that the carriers be ready to aid the advance into the Southern Resources Area. Nagumo Kido Butai was meant to break up after that.

What was the Army idea in case the US declares war?

[OpanaPointer]

After the PH strike the KB was split up & if I recall correctly not reconstituted as six carriers until Operation C.

The Army barely tolerated the raid on Pearl, demanding that the carriers be ready to aid the advance into the Southern Resources Area. Nagumo Kido Butai was meant to break up after that.

What was the Army idea in case the US declares war?

Take PI & Singapore to protect their flank, take NEI for fuel to continue their futile efforts to take all of China. http://ibiblio.org/pha/monos/

[Peter89]

After the PH strike the KB was split up & if I recall correctly not reconstituted as six carriers until Operation C.

The Army barely tolerated the raid on Pearl, demanding that the carriers be ready to aid the advance into the Southern Resources Area. Nagumo Kido Butai was meant to break up after that.

What was the Army idea in case the US declares war?

Take PI & Singapore to protect their flank, take NEI for fuel to continue their futile efforts to take all of China. http://ibiblio.org/pha/monos/

So one strategy was impossible and the other is wrong

[Carl Schwamberger]

After the PH strike the KB was split up & if I recall correctly not reconstituted as six carriers until Operation C.

The Army barely tolerated the raid on Pearl, demanding that the carriers be ready to aid the advance into the Southern Resources Area. Nagumo Kido Butai was meant to break up after that.

What was the Army idea in case the US declares war?

Take PI & Singapore to protect their flank, take NEI for fuel to continue their futile efforts to take all of China. http://ibiblio.org/pha/monos/

I recall the US was to beg for a cease fire and peace terms in between the conquest of the Southern Resource Areas and the settling of the "China Incident".

[Peter89]

What I fail to understand is how the Japanese strategists imagined to sustain their economy with such a limited shipping space? IIRC it was about 6 m GRT

[OpanaPointer]

What I fail to understand is how the Japanese strategists imagined to sustain their economy with such a limited shipping space? IIRC it was about 6 m GRT

"Gypsy" steamers?