RAN at Milne Bay: August-September, 1942

[daveshoup2MD]

In a Pacific War where WATCHTOWER is ordered postponed in July, 1942, the IJN landings at Milne Bay goes forward as (more or less) historically on the night of 25-26 August, 1942, and are equally (more or less) historically thwarted by the mostly Australian defense. At the end of the month, however, given the lack of the 1st Marine Division being ashore on Guadalcanal-Tulagi, the Japanese decide to reinforce what's left of the (originally) 2,000-strong IJN landing force at Milne Bay, beginning with none other than Kiyonao Ichiki's detachment (~1,000) of men from the IJA's 28th Infantry Regiment.

The reinforcement is carried by the destroyers Kagero, Hagikaze, Maikaze, Urakaze, Isokaze, and Hamakaze; the covering force is Matsuyama's cruiser-destroyer force, Tatsuta, Tenryu, Arashi, Tanikaze, Hamakaze, Murakumo, and Yayoi.

The Allies, alerted by reconnaissance and code-breaking, send in Crutchley's (augmented) surface force, namely the heavy cruisers Australia and Canberra, the light cruiser Hobart, and the destroyers Arunta, Stuart, Vendetta, and Voyager.

Mikawa is still swinging around the hook at Rabaul.

Can the RAN under a RN admiral win a solo night battle against an (admittedly) mixed IJN force of two elderly light cruisers, 10 modern destroyers (six of which are serving as APDs, however), and one old destroyer?

[T. A. Gardner]

Short answer: They get creamed. One or more of the Australian ships eats a torpedo or three and is crippled or sunk. Confusion follows, and the Allies retreat needing to preserve their force more than defeat the Japanese.

[Takao]

Huh?

Absent Guadalcanal, the Japanese take Milne Bay with relative ease.

Absent Guadalcanal, more air power is dedicated to the original landing. With more air power, the IJA goes along with the original scheme, so not only do more troops come ashore, but they are IJA troops, not the Navy's ill-trained landing forces. Absent Guadalcanal, Mikawa is prowling around looking for targets.

[paulrward]

Hello All :

LONG Answer ! The Australians won ! I just gamed it using an computer game
called Task Force 1942, which allows you to simulate small fleet actions in the
South Pacific

The forces were:

CA - Australia Flag - Crutchley
CA - Canberra
CL - Hobart
DDs - Arunta, Stuart, Vendetta, Voyager , the two V class date from 1917.
I used four USN DDs, two Farragut Class and two WWI Flush deckers
to simulate the two V Class destroyers.


CL - Tenryu - Flag - Matsuyama
CL - Tatsuta
DDs ( Transports ) Kagero, Hagikaze, Maikaze, Urakaze, Isokaze,

DDs - ( Cover Force ) Arashi, Hamakaze, Tanikaze, Murakumo, Yayoi


Action started shortly after midnight, with Crutchley coming in parallel to the coast,
on a heading of 090. The Australian force, operating without radar, was limited to
visual sighting and so the three Cruisers were leading the four destroyers, with Crutchley's
flagship at the head of the column. The force heading directly for Milne Bay,and at 00:30
the Japanese were sighted standing away from the coast in two groups, the Cover Force
DDs leading the two CLs, followed by the Transport DDs. The Australians did not detect
the IJN force until they were fired upon, but immediately responded with star shells,
and accurate fire from the three Australian cruisers promptly sank the Tenryu, reduced
the Tatsuta to a wreck, and damaged several of the other DDs of the Covering Force, in
most cases reducing their speed.

Suddenly, the Australians found themselves in the midst of spreads of torpedoes. The
Arunta took a hit amidships and went down, and the Australia suffered a hit in the port
bow, which caused flooding and reduced her speed to 21 knots, but did not endanger
the ship, and Crutchley kept his flagship in the fight.

The Australian force turned away from the Japanese ships to evade the torpedoes,
and after about ten minutes, when the last of the Long Lances had gone past, turned
back north to resume the attack. The Canberra and Hobart steamed past the Australia,
and in short order finished off the Tatsuta, then, in quick succession, sank the Arashi,
and the Yayoi with 8" and 6" shellfire. They then continued east, and rapidly ran down
the Hamakaze, Murakumo, and Tanikaze, destroying each one in turn.

The Sacrifice of the Covering Force Destroyers was not, however, in vain, as they
allowed the five Transport DDs, which were loaded with the Ichiki Detachment, to
escape the carnage and protect the lives of the soldiers on board.

Crutchley continued on his easterly heading in an attempt to pursue and destroy the
last of the IJN DDs, But, by this time, the Stuart had taken heavy damage and had been
reduced in speed to 17 knots, and the two V Class destroyers had also been slightly
damaged. In addition, the Canberra and Hobart had begun accumulating hits, and
Canberra had been slowed to a speed of only 21 knots.

Then, at 03:15, Crutchley's force began taking shellfire from non-visible ships to the
east. Knowing that there might be additional IJN cruisers in the area, Crutchley
reversed his course, formed up the battered remnants of his squadron, and headed
back to the west, slowing only to search for survivors of the sunken Arunta as dawn
broke over the South Coast of New Guinea.

The final results of the battle, determined weeks later from JN-25 decrypts, were:

Tenryu - Sunk
Tatsuta - Sunk

Arashi - Sunk
Hamakaze - Sunk
Murakumo - Sunk
Tanikaze - Sunk
Yayoi - Sunk

On the Australian side,

Australia - Moderate Damage, primarily flooding from the torpedo hit
Canberra - Moderate Damage
Hobart - Light damage

Arunta - Sunk
Stuart - Heavy Damage, primarily due to hits on the engine rooms.


The naval victory became known as The Battle of Milne Bay, and Crutchley, following this
action and his handling of the Warspite at Narvik, was Knighted. Douglas MacArthur
requested and President Roosevelt approved of Crutchley being awarded The Legion
of Merit, and this action served as the last time that the IJN would be on the offensive
in the Pacific - from this point on, the Japanese were fighting a hopeless defensive
battle against the ever increasing industrial might of the United States. However,
British and Australian Naval Historians point to this action as being the true ' Turning
Point ' of the war in the Pacific.


Respectfully :

Paul R. Ward

[T. A. Gardner]

Except, IJN doctrine at the time would have had the Japanese force launch torpedoes and begin reloading for a second salvo. Unspotted, they would hold gunfire until the torpedoes ran their course and scored hits or missed. Since there would be no wakes from those torpedoes they'd go unspotted. If we assume that the Japanese get between 2 and 4 hits on the Australian cruisers. Let's say three on two, one on Hobart and two on Canberra. Those two go DIW and are sinking. The surprise of that with the Japanese now opening fire, throws the rest of the Allied force into confusion. The Japanese put a second salvo in the water and on its way. With 2 out of three of their cruisers down, the Australians seek to avoid contact rather than continue the fight.

Even in the above version, if the Australia took a torpedo to the bow, a long lance would have nearly crippled the ship. The forward turrets would have gone down leaving the ship with half its guns in action and slowed to a crawl or standstill. You can look to First Savo Island as proof of that.

[daveshoup2MD]

Short answer: They get creamed. One or more of the Australian ships eats a torpedo or three and is crippled or sunk. Confusion follows, and the Allies retreat needing to preserve their force more than defeat the Japanese.

Quite possibly, if both forces run into each other at sea - but there's also the "Narvik" possibility. The IJN destroyers - not under Tanaka, as they were not historically at this point - are unloading Ichiki's finest and the covering force is operating outside the Bay itself when Crutchley shows up. He doesn't have Warspite this time, but still ... who better to steam full speed into the tropical equivalent of a fjord than Crutchley?

[daveshoup2MD]

Huh?

Absent Guadalcanal, the Japanese take Milne Bay with relative ease.

Absent Guadalcanal, more air power is dedicated to the original landing. With more air power, the IJA goes along with the original scheme, so not only do more troops come ashore, but they are IJA troops, not the Navy's ill-trained landing forces. Absent Guadalcanal, Mikawa is prowling around looking for targets.

Air power from where? Rabaul? Not exactly "close," even to Milne Bay, and what was left of the IJN carrier force did not have happy memories of the Coral Sea.

And IJA troops from where? If it's a typical Japanese lash-up, historically what's available are Ichiki and his merry men, who - odds are - will engage in the tactical equivalent of "scream and leap" against the Australians and US Army at Milne Bay in the same way they tried it against the Marines on the Tenaru.

[daveshoup2MD]

Hello All :

LONG Answer ! The Australians won ! I just gamed it using an computer game
called Task Force 1942, which allows you to simulate small fleet actions in the
South Pacific

The forces were:

CA - Australia Flag - Crutchley
CA - Canberra
CL - Hobart
DDs - Arunta, Stuart, Vendetta, Voyager , the two V class date from 1917.
I used four USN DDs, two Farragut Class and two WWI Flush deckers
to simulate the two V Class destroyers.


CL - Tenryu - Flag - Matsuyama
CL - Tatsuta
DDs ( Transports ) Kagero, Hagikaze, Maikaze, Urakaze, Isokaze,

DDs - ( Cover Force ) Arashi, Hamakaze, Tanikaze, Murakumo, Yayoi


Action started shortly after midnight, with Crutchley coming in parallel to the coast,
on a heading of 090. The Australian force, operating without radar, was limited to
visual sighting and so the three Cruisers were leading the four destroyers, with Crutchley's
flagship at the head of the column. The force heading directly for Milne Bay,and at 00:30
the Japanese were sighted standing away from the coast in two groups, the Cover Force
DDs leading the two CLs, followed by the Transport DDs. The Australians did not detect
the IJN force until they were fired upon, but immediately responded with star shells,
and accurate fire from the three Australian cruisers promptly sank the Tenryu, reduced
the Tatsuta to a wreck, and damaged several of the other DDs of the Covering Force, in
most cases reducing their speed.

Suddenly, the Australians found themselves in the midst of spreads of torpedoes. The
Arunta took a hit amidships and went down, and the Australia suffered a hit in the port
bow, which caused flooding and reduced her speed to 21 knots, but did not endanger
the ship, and Crutchley kept his flagship in the fight.

The Australian force turned away from the Japanese ships to evade the torpedoes,
and after about ten minutes, when the last of the Long Lances had gone past, turned
back north to resume the attack. The Canberra and Hobart steamed past the Australia,
and in short order finished off the Tatsuta, then, in quick succession, sank the Arashi,
and the Yayoi with 8" and 6" shellfire. They then continued east, and rapidly ran down
the Hamakaze, Murakumo, and Tanikaze, destroying each one in turn.

The Sacrifice of the Covering Force Destroyers was not, however, in vain, as they
allowed the five Transport DDs, which were loaded with the Ichiki Detachment, to
escape the carnage and protect the lives of the soldiers on board.

Crutchley continued on his easterly heading in an attempt to pursue and destroy the
last of the IJN DDs, But, by this time, the Stuart had taken heavy damage and had been
reduced in speed to 17 knots, and the two V Class destroyers had also been slightly
damaged. In addition, the Canberra and Hobart had begun accumulating hits, and
Canberra had been slowed to a speed of only 21 knots.

Then, at 03:15, Crutchley's force began taking shellfire from non-visible ships to the
east. Knowing that there might be additional IJN cruisers in the area, Crutchley
reversed his course, formed up the battered remnants of his squadron, and headed
back to the west, slowing only to search for survivors of the sunken Arunta as dawn
broke over the South Coast of New Guinea.

The final results of the battle, determined weeks later from JN-25 decrypts, were:

Tenryu - Sunk
Tatsuta - Sunk

Arashi - Sunk
Hamakaze - Sunk
Murakumo - Sunk
Tanikaze - Sunk
Yayoi - Sunk

On the Australian side,

Australia - Moderate Damage, primarily flooding from the torpedo hit
Canberra - Moderate Damage
Hobart - Light damage

Arunta - Sunk
Stuart - Heavy Damage, primarily due to hits on the engine rooms.


The naval victory became known as The Battle of Milne Bay, and Crutchley, following this
action and his handling of the Warspite at Narvik, was Knighted. Douglas MacArthur
requested and President Roosevelt approved of Crutchley being awarded The Legion
of Merit, and this action served as the last time that the IJN would be on the offensive
in the Pacific - from this point on, the Japanese were fighting a hopeless defensive
battle against the ever increasing industrial might of the United States. However,
British and Australian Naval Historians point to this action as being the true ' Turning
Point ' of the war in the Pacific.


Respectfully :

Paul R. Ward

Entertaining.

[T. A. Gardner]

Quite possibly, if both forces run into each other at sea - but there's also the "Narvik" possibility. The IJN destroyers - not under Tanaka, as they were not historically at this point - are unloading Ichiki's finest and the covering force is operating outside the Bay itself when Crutchley shows up. He doesn't have Warspite this time, but still ... who better to steam full speed into the tropical equivalent of a fjord than Crutchley?

This is still very much the period when the Allies weren't up to speed fighting the IJN at night, particularly their destroyers. The Japanese are very likely to run a torpedo ambush and then finish things with gunfire. While the Allied ships, particularly the cruisers, don't need to be sunk just one Long Lance hit is enough to cripple any one of them. It doesn't help that the three British designed and built cruisers listed are not nearly as resilient as the later US designs and those were generally finished as far as fighting in one hit.

[daveshoup2MD]

Quite possibly, if both forces run into each other at sea - but there's also the "Narvik" possibility. The IJN destroyers - not under Tanaka, as they were not historically at this point - are unloading Ichiki's finest and the covering force is operating outside the Bay itself when Crutchley shows up. He doesn't have Warspite this time, but still ... who better to steam full speed into the tropical equivalent of a fjord than Crutchley?

This is still very much the period when the Allies weren't up to speed fighting the IJN at night, particularly their destroyers. The Japanese are very likely to run a torpedo ambush and then finish things with gunfire. While the Allied ships, particularly the cruisers, don't need to be sunk just one Long Lance hit is enough to cripple any one of them. It doesn't help that the three British designed and built cruisers listed are not nearly as resilient as the later US designs and those were generally finished as far as fighting in one hit.

Agree generally, but Balikpapan and Cape Esperance demonstrate that even early on in 1942, the IJN's reputation of being masters of surface action is not everything it was advertised to be... of course, it helped that each were fought by the USN alone, and in Paul Talbot and Norman Scott, the SOPA were realists when it came to what their forces could accomplish. Each also show the realities of circa-1942 C3I before radar and the CiC really came into play. "Chance" is a thing.

How the RAN and Victor Crutchley would have compared is an interesting question.

[paulrward]

Hello All ;


Mr TAGardner posted :

This is still very much the period when the Allies weren't........
............... generally finished as far as fighting in one hit.

In the Wargame we fought, The Australians came in about 20,000 yards from the shore,
from the East, to avoid shoals and reefs. As they arrived at Milne Bay, the IJN had
already been there for some time, and were in the process of beginning the unloading
of the troops and the supplies that rendered the five Transport DDs incapable of using
their torpedo tubes effectively.

Milne Bay 1.jpg

The two IJN CLs were at the head of the column of Covering DDs, and as Crutchley's
force came into night visual range, and both the CLs and the DDs were stationary. As
a result, as they began to build up speed, they laid down covering fire, which alerted
the RAN to their presence, and all three RAN cruisers and the four RAN DDs opened
fire, with deadly effect. It may have been at this time that the two IJN CLs fired their
torpedoes.

Milne Bay 2.jpg

The column of Covering DDs, chose to turn to the starboard to clear their gun arcs
and torpedo arcs, and this proved to be a mistake, for it delayed their firing their
torpedoes, and also put them in a situation where they were firing at RAN ships that
were moving on a nearly opposite course to theirs. As a result, only two torpedoes
scored hits, one, possibly from one of the IJN CLs, on the forward bow of the Australia,
causing some ' sheet metal ' damage, but not imparing the function of the ship, except
with respect to speed, which, almost immediately, dropped to 24 knots, and continued
to decrease thereafter due to slow flooding. The second torpedo struck the Arunta
amidships, ripping her apart and sinking her almost instantly.

Milne Bay 3.jpg

The RAN column initially turned south, to avoid torpedoes, and then reformed and
once again turned north, cutting across the T of the IJN destroyers, and sinking them,
first two, and then the other three, with shellfire. The Australia dropped out of line,
and from this point on, trailed the rest of the Cruisers, though she continued to
pour gunfire onto the IJN DDs that were in range. The Canberra and Hobard, along
with the three remaining RAN DDs, continued north.

Milne Bay 4.jpg

By this time, the Transport DDs had bent on 33 knots, and, heading due East along the cost,
were making good their escape. The Canberra and Hobart, along with the Australia and
the RAN DDs, blasted the three surviving IJN DDs, but in this exchange of shellfire, the
Stuart was badly hit in the engine room, reducing her speed to 17 knots, and the Canberra
also had a funnel knocked down and suffered flooding, reducing her speed to 24 knots.

Milne Bay 5.jpg

The Hobart and the two undamaged V Class DDs went in pursuit on the five fleeing IJN
Transport DDs, leaving the two CAs and the Stuart progressively further behind. However,
after about thirty minutes, the three lead RAN warships began taking shellfire from ships
which, in the visibility conditions and ranges, were not not visible to the Australian spotters.
As a result, Crutchley decided that discretion was the better part of valor, and, recalling
the leading ships, he reformed his force, and, after steaming back to the scene of the
initial engagement to search for survivors of the Arunta, he proceeded South West at
a column speed of 15 knots, which was the best his damaged ships could maintain.

********************************************************************************************************

Now, Mr. Gardner has stated that a torpedo hit on a British cruiser would sink it, or disable
it. This depends on WHERE the torpedo hits. A hit amidships on a County Class would
probably put in on the bottom. But, a hit in the extreme bow would only blow off a section
of the bow, and while it would cause flooding and slow the ship down due to disruption of
her streamlining, it might not be that fatal. In this game, the computer decides where
the hit occurs, and the degree of damage. I have been in games where a single 24" Torpedo
hit brings a battleship to a dead halt, and others where the damage proves to be quite
survivable. Which is exactly what WW 2 proved.



Respectfully ;

Paul R. Ward

[T. A. Gardner]

Actually, what WW 2 proved, was that a single 24" torpedo hit on any cruiser, pretty much anywhere, was going to cripple the ship in terms of combat space. A hit on the bow section would lead to loss of the forward turrets due to flooding, both initial, and progressive. Amidships, a loss of some or even all propulsion and power would result leaving the ship at least temporarily DIW and unable to fight. One astern would result in partial or total loss of propulsion due to damage to screws and rudder, and likely loss of after main armament.

Thus, any single Japanese torpedo hit pretty much would put the ship hit out of action for the battle space period of time.

With destroyers, a single hit if not outright fatal, would cripple the ship leaving it all but unable to fight.

In the above scenario, I'd expect the Japanese covering force to turn to port to unmask torpedoes and let go rather than steam directly at the Allied squadron and engage in gunfire. The transport group would immediately weigh anchor and begin to maneuver to to attack the Allies rather than continue landing operations.
That the Japanese destroyers don't execute a turn to expose their torpedoes and allow fire totally throws their doctrine out the window. The IJN would not expect to get into a gunfight at all with destroyers. This is particularly true given the known low rates of fire of their guns and doctrine that puts use of torpedoes as the main and decisive weapon in a night surface engagement.

If the Japanese column in picture 1 made a turn to port and remained unspotted, they would unmask torpedoes and launch a spread of 40 + and begin to reload for a second shot. The squadron commander would hold fire until the torpedoes either hit or timed out. The squadron is likely to remain in column with their light cruiser(s) squadron command ship leading. That is the purpose of assigning a light cruiser to a destroyer squadron after all for the Japanese.

The transport squadron would have executed a turn to starboard to follow the cover group and launched ASAP after executing their turn.

What we see above is the Japanese, with the advantage of spotting first, manage to execute everything wrong. They sail into the Allied formation unable to use their primary weapon while allowing the Allies to cap their T. They then engage first in a gunfight they'll lose while not using their strength of torpedoes and surprise to their advantage.

If the torpedoes hit first and the Allies are surprised--a common event in 1942 night actions with the Japanese--the Allied column is thrown into confusion. The cruiser(s) hit will cause the column to disintegrate port and starboard to avoid collision with the now slowed or DIW ship(s) hit by torpedoes. The Japanese at that point are on the verge of a second launch and flip on searchlights and open gunfire.
The Allies take a short period of time to get their own guns on target and begin to return fire.
More torpedoes arrive with possibly more casualties.

The transport group lets go their torpedoes (unspotted and unengaged) and there's going to be a likely third wave of hits to follow.

With the Allied cruisers under fire, the Japanese out of range of Allied torpedoes, and the confusion from the initial hits, the Allied response is one of confusion. Individual ships open fire on who or what they can, usually focused on a searchlight if the Japanese flicked these on.

For the Japanese, the torpedo is the killer, not gunfire. For the Allies, their first mistake was to form a long single line ahead (a very common practice in 1942) that makes a perfect torpedo target. Here, the Allied column whatever the arrangement would be a single line ahead about 3 to 4 NM long with roughly 30 to 50% of that being target area. The initial torpedo spread will hit something, and it will be an utter surprise to the Allies when it arrives since the Japanese would strive to remain unobserved.
Subsequent salvos of torpedoes would be equally a surprise as the Allies, at that time, didn't fully recognize the Japanese could and would rapidly reload their tubes for a second salvo.

This gives you some idea what a 24" torpedo does to a cruiser:

http://www.navsource.org/archives/04/050/0405044.jpg
https://www.navsource.org/archives/04/036/0403642.jpg

[paulrward]

Hello All :

To Mr. T.A.Gardner :

You stated:

Actually, what WW 2 proved, was that a single 24" torpedo hit on any cruiser,
pretty much anywhere, was going to cripple the ship in terms of combat space........
...............and likely loss of after main armament.

Here is a photo of the USS Chicago in Australia after Savo Island. This is apparently exactly the
same type of hit suffered by the Australia at Milne Bay - serious, damaging, but not fatal.

Milne Bay Chicago.jpg

...This gives you some idea what what a 24" torpedo does to a Cruiser........

In the above scenario, I'd expect the Japanese covering force to turn to port

Yes, but they DIDN'T. They turned Starboard. They were starting from a dead
stop, Zero Knots, and the lead DD Captain made a decision, and the others followed him. Possibly
they were following the two CLs, which were under fire, and may have turned to starboard to
unmask their batteries more quickly as the RAN Cruisers passed from their right to their left.
It was dark, things were confused for the IJN, and they made split second decisions that didn't
turn out well for them.

If the Japanese column in picture 1 made a turn to port and remained unspotted

Yes, but they DIDN'T. They turned Starboard. I'm sorry, Mr. Gardner, that the IJN
didn't do what you think they should have done. They made a mistake. They Fucked Up ! This
happens in Wartime ! Just look at Savo Island - Reifkohl had his ships wandering around like ducks
in a pond, no one awake at the guns, no watertight integrity, and when the shooting started, most
of the captains in his force were in their bunks, sacked out. Officers on watch didn't have the
authority to open fire, and three USN cruisers got hammered like dogshit !

The transport squadron would have executed a turn to starboard

The Transport Squadron was ANCHORED, and motionless, getting ready to unload their SNLF
troops and the cargos, about 200 tons per DD. This cargo covered the decks, masking the
torpedo tubes, making it IMPOSSIBLE for them to launch their torpedoes.

Mr. Gardner, there is a big difference between one squadron moving at 31 knots, and another squadron,
half of which have been converted to transports, and ALL of which are stationary, with anchors streamed
to hold position in shallow waters ! The Japanese chose to open fire first, but that did not really
impact the battle that much. The RAN was coming into the anchorage area, and would have seen them
sooner or later.

If the torpedoes hit first and the Allies are surprised--a common event in 1942

Yes, but the Torpedoes could not outrun the RAN shellfire ! Let's see: 50 knots for a torpedo vs.
Mach 2 for an 8" shell - who gets there first ?

The Allies were NOT surprised ! In effect, Crutchley was Mikawa, coming in hot, loaded for bear,
against an IJN force that was trying to quietly unload SNLF troops in the dark without anyone knowing
about it ! The Australia had complete Watertight integrity set, all bulkheads sealed off, and all damage
control parties at their stations. The Guns were manned, the Fire Control Spotters ready, and when the IJN
CLs opened fire with their bow guns as they hoisted their anchors and revved up their turbines, the RAN
spotters saw the flashes, reported them, and Crutchley began to use his secondaries to illuminate the
targets with star shells.

Tough luck for Matsuyama - he died on his bridge like a Samurai !

As for the RAN disposition - they were every 500 yards coming into the bay. That means, with seven
ships, the total length of the column was just a shade over 4000 yards long. This means that with
the three cruisers being appx 600 feet long, and the four destroyers being 300 feet long, the total
length of ships in the column is:

( 3 x 600 ) = ( 4 x 300 ) = 3000 feet.

With a column length of 4000 yards, or 12,000 feet,

3000 feet / 12,000 feet = 0.25, or 25 % - NOT 30 - 50 % Target Area.

Dear God, am I the ONLY person on this forum who can do MATH ?


As for Crutchley's tactics: The initial torpedoes fired DID hit something - they scored an non-fatal hit
on the Australia - and Crutchley IMMEDIATELY ordered a Simultaneous Turn to the starboard. While his
ships were turning away from the Japanese force,, the Arunta took a torpedo and was sunk, but the rest
of torpedoes were approaching from astern, and by the time all the spreads reached the RAN force, they
were stern on to the oncoming spreads, and they were able to evade any further hits.

What can we say ? Crutchley exhibited real stones in making that turn back toward the IJN force -
probably he didn't know about IJN torpedo reload doctrine, but in any case, he got back into action
BEFORE the IJN could reload their tubes. The area was by this time illuminated by the burning hulks
of the Tatsuta and Tenryu, and as the Cover Force DDs tried to re-engage with their guns, they ran
into more firepower than they could handle.

The Transport Force DDs, their decks crowded with SNLF troops and stacked with tons of supplies-
just think of 200 pallets, each weighing a TON, tied down on the decks, secured all ' Ship-Shape
and Bristol Fashion ' - in the dark, with ships on fire and blowing up, the five Transport DD captains
chose to ' Beat Feet ' and got the hell out of there. And they ALL survived !


To be honest, I was surprised at how well the RAN did. They lost ONE destroyer, and sank TWO
light cruisers and FIVE destroyers in return.


Not bad for a bunch of Colonials.....


Respectfully :

Paul R. Ward