Soviets invade Romania Autumn 1941

[historygeek2021]

This ATL has two points of departure:

(1) Germany decides not to invade the USSR in 1941.
(2) The USSR invades Romania in the autumn of 1941.

In Chapter 5 of "Hitler's Panzers East", RHS Stolfi states that a Soviet lieutenant captured at Kiev in September 1941 told his German interrogators that the Soviets were planning an attack on Romania in the autumn of 1941. Whether or not the Soviets actually were planning such an attack, the possibility of such an attack raises an interesting ATL.

If the Soviets struck at the right time, they could overrun the Ploesti oil fields right before the weather precluded a counter-offensive by Germany. Imports, mostly from Ploesti, accounted for approximate 25% of Germany's sources of oil in 1942 per Table 37 (page 75) of USSBS:

German oil ww2.png

https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id= ... 1up&seq=89

The following chart from page 26 A of the USSBS oil division final report shows that German gasoline consumption was close to production for most of the war:

German gasoline consumption.png

https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id= ... &skin=2021

Thus, the loss of Ploesti would have had a crippling effect on German military operations. Germany would have been forced to drastically reduce its civilian and military consumption of gasoline, which was already severely restricted.

In the OTL, only the German 11th army was stationed in Romania after the Greek campaign. Could the 11th Army and the Romanian army have held off the entire Soviet Southwestern and Southern fronts? While the Red Army's performance in Barbarossa is not inspiring, in this ATL they would have had 3 or 4 months of additional preparation and had the initiative. Germany would presumably be focusing the Wehrmacht elsewhere if it decided not to invade the USSR. Ploesti is only about 200 km across flat open terrain from the then border with the USSR, so it's plausible the Red Army would have overrun and captured Ploesti. In addition, Bulgaria was historically friendly with Russia, as were the Serbians, who were on the border with Romania. Thus, the Red Army would be linking up with two friendly peoples on the southern and western flanks of the invasion. Hungary, on the other hand, was historically enemies with Romania and would be reluctant to come to its aid or allow German passage for that purpose.

Even if Hungary allows Germany to pass through, the Germans would have to cross the Carpathian mountains to reach Ploesti, and the onset of winter would have made this even more difficult. If Hungary stalled the Germans, the Wehrmacht would have to go through hostile Serbia, reinforced by the Red Army. With every month that passes without Romanian oil, Germany's military potential is falling.

By spring 1942, Germany's oil shortage will likely preclude it from being able to mount offensive action against the USSR. Stalin will then be free to strengthen the USSR's position in the Balkans and the Baltic. Stalin will likely refrain from an all out offensive against Germany, as Germany could still fight defensively effectively. Rather, he would use a crippled Germany and distracted Allies as an opportunity to strengthen the USSR's position on the northern and southern flanks of Europe. Germany, meanwhile, will be doomed to slow suffocation between the USSR and the Allies.

Edit: typo

[daveshoup2MD]

This ATL has two points of departure:

(1) Germany decides not to invade the USSR in 1941.
(2) The USSR invades Romania in the autumn of 1941.

In Chapter 5 of "Hitler's Panzers East", RHS Stolfi states that a Soviet lieutenant captured at Kiev in September 1941 told his German interrogators that the Soviets were planning an attack on Romania in the autumn of 1941. Whether or not the Soviets actually were planning such an attack, the possibility of such an attack raises an interesting ATL.

If the Soviets struck at the right time, they could overrun the Ploesti oil fields right before the weather precluded a counter-offensive by Germany. Imports, mostly from Ploesti, accounted for approximate 25% of Germany's sources of oil in 1942 per Table 37 (page 75) of USSBS:

German oil ww2.png

https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id= ... 1up&seq=89

The following chart from page 26 A of the USSBS oil division final report shows that German gasoline consumption was close to production for most of the war:

German gasoline consumption.png

https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id= ... &skin=2021

Thus, the loss of Ploesti would have had a crippling effect on German military operations. Germany would have been forced to drastically reduce its civilian and military consumption of gasoline, which was already severely restricted.

In the OTL, only the German 11th army was stationed in Romania after the Greek campaign. Could the 11th Army and the Romanian army have held off the entire Soviet Southwestern and Southern fronts? While the Red Army's performance in Barbarossa is not inspiring, in this ATL they would have had 3 or 4 months of additional preparation and had the initiative. Germany would presumably be focusing the Wehrmacht elsewhere if it decided not to invade the USSR. Ploesti is only about 200 km across flat open terrain from the then border with the USSR, so it's plausible the Red Army would have overrun and captured Ploesti. In addition, Bulgaria was historically friendly with Russia, as were the Serbians, who were on the border with Romania. Thus, the Red Army would be linking up with two friendly peoples on the southern and western flanks of the invasion. Hungary, on the other hand, was historically enemies with Romania and would be reluctant to come to its aid or allow German passage for that purpose.

Even if Hungary allows Germany to pass through, the Germans would have to cross the Carpathian mountains to reach Ploesti, and the onset of winter would have made this even more difficult. If Hungary stalled the Germans, the Wehrmacht would have to go through hostile Serbia, reinforced by the Red Army. With every month that passes without Romanian oil, Germany's military potential is falling.

By spring 1942, the Germany's oil shortage will likely preclude it from being able to mount offensive action against the USSR. Stalin will then be free to strengthen the USSR's position in the Balkans and the Baltic. Stalin will likely refrain from an all out offensive against Germany, as Germany could still fight defensively effectively. Rather, he would use a crippled Germany and distracted Allies as an opportunity to strengthen the USSR's position on the northern and southern flanks of Europe. Germany, meanwhile, will be doomed to slow suffocation between the USSR and the Allies.

It's an interesting idea, but the "(1) Germany decides not to invade the USSR in 1941" element needs something more; why not? and where/what instead of BARBAROSSA?

The strategy of destroying the USSR to bring the war with the UK et al to an end was daft, but it's unclear that Germany under Hitler could have come up with anything else. The "Mediterranean strategy" was considered and set aside because of its multiple inherent weaknesses: resources that didn't exist, were outside of German control, or simply daunting, including the capacity of Italian sea power, Spain's or Turkey's willingness to enter the war, and the simple realities of distance from any Axis entry point (Libya, essentially) to anywhere important (the Suez Canal or the Straits of Gibraltar) in northern Africa.

The other thing that comes to mind is the Germans were well aware of their dependency on Romanian oil and the need to secure it against any threat - the USSR to the northeast, Allied air power to the south, or both - was part of their strategic calculus throughout the conflict.

[historygeek2021]

It's an interesting idea, but the "(1) Germany decides not to invade the USSR in 1941" element needs something more; why not? and where/what instead of BARBAROSSA?

The ATL of Germany not invading the USSR and instead focusing on the Mediterranean/U-boats/Sea Lion '42 has been proposed and discussed at length on this forum, so I'm exploring a possible Soviet reaction to those ATLs.

The other thing that comes to mind is the Germans were well aware of their dependency on Romanian oil and the need to secure it against any threat - the USSR to the northeast, Allied air power to the south, or both - was part of their strategic calculus throughout the conflict.

Yes, the question is how they would do so. 12th Army was doing garrison duty in Greece. The Germans had 7 infantry armies and 4 Panzer Groups elsewhere on the eastern front in 1941 in the OTL. If Germany isn't invading the USSR, some of these will be shifted to other fronts or disbanded to free up labor for industry. If Hitler shifts another infantry army to Romania, that leaves Germany vulnerable in Poland. It's not clear another infantry army would be enough to hold off a concerted Soviet effort, especially given the poorer railroads leading to Romania. The Germans might not be able to sustain large scale operations in Romania given the poor logistical situation.

[daveshoup2MD]

It's an interesting idea, but the "(1) Germany decides not to invade the USSR in 1941" element needs something more; why not? and where/what instead of BARBAROSSA?

The ATL of Germany not invading the USSR and instead focusing on the Mediterranean/U-boats/Sea Lion '42 has been proposed and discussed at length on this forum, so I'm exploring a possible Soviet reaction to those ATLs.

The other thing that comes to mind is the Germans were well aware of their dependency on Romanian oil and the need to secure it against any threat - the USSR to the northeast, Allied air power to the south, or both - was part of their strategic calculus throughout the conflict.

Yes, the question is how they would do so. 12th Army was doing garrison duty in Greece. The Germans had 7 infantry armies and 4 Panzer Groups elsewhere on the eastern front in 1941 in the OTL. If Germany isn't invading the USSR, some of these will be shifted to other fronts or disbanded to free up labor for industry. If Hitler shifts another infantry army to Romania, that leaves Germany vulnerable in Poland. It's not clear another infantry army would be enough to hold off a concerted Soviet effort, especially given the poorer railroads leading to Romania. The Germans might not be able to sustain large scale operations in Romania given the poor logistical situation.

Okay; still leaves the Germans with (presumably) a pretty significant strategic reserve, and if the Axis aren't attacking the USSR, that actually gives them even more reason to reinforce the Balkans...

[Kingfish]

And the reason for this attack on Ploesti is...???

[historygeek2021]

And the reason for this attack on Ploesti is...???

To weaken if not outright cripple Germany and secure Soviet interests in the Balkans.

[Kingfish]

And the reason for this attack on Ploesti is...???

To weaken if not outright cripple Germany and secure Soviet interests in the Balkans.

A threat not lost on Germany.

A few things to consider:
First, as pointed out earlier, a no-Barbarossa scenario leaves Germany plenty of strength to safeguard her eastern flank, and nowhere would be more important than Ploesti. Assuming the Germans would shift forces to other theaters and leave this plum ripe for the picking is ludicrous.

Second, this is the same Russian army that was embarrassed in Finland and in the opening phases of Barbarossa. An extra 4 months of prep is not going to make much of a difference.

Lastly, Germany doesn't have to intervene directly in Romania in order to turn this into a Russian rout. A strong push SE from Poland would cut directly across Russian LOCs in Romania, and again this is the Russian army of 1941.

[historygeek2021]

And the reason for this attack on Ploesti is...???

To weaken if not outright cripple Germany and secure Soviet interests in the Balkans.

A threat not lost on Germany.

A few things to consider:
First, as pointed out earlier, a no-Barbarossa scenario leaves Germany plenty of strength to safeguard her eastern flank, and nowhere would be more important than Ploesti. Assuming the Germans would shift forces to other theaters and leave this plum ripe for the picking is ludicrous.

Second, this is the same Russian army that was embarrassed in Finland and in the opening phases of Barbarossa. An extra 4 months of prep is not going to make much of a difference.

Lastly, Germany doesn't have to intervene directly in Romania in order to turn this into a Russian rout. A strong push SE from Poland would cut directly across Russian LOCs in Romania, and again this is the Russian army of 1941.

(1) Germany would have to commit substantial forces to Romania to hold off a Soviet invasion. But in the OTL, Germany did not do so. The Soviets could theoretically have attacked Romania at any time in the OTL, and yet the Germans only stationed the 11th Army there. It is likely that the Germans recognized the poor logistics of supporting an army in Romania and relied instead on the deterrent of their forces in Poland (which is your point 3).

(2) The Red Army ultimately defeated the Finns, and the Germans for that matter. The terrain between the USSR and Ploesti is flat and open, unlike Finland in the winter. It would probably have been a messy affair by the standards of the Heer or US Army, with lots of Soviet casualties. But the German armies were in northern Romania. It was just the Romanians in the south between the Soviets and Ploesti. The Romanians fought poorly against concentrated Soviet offensives in the OTL.

(3) Any German counteroffensive from Poland into Ukraine would be limited, since Germany wouldn't be preparing for a full scale invasion of the USSR in this ATL. The Germans might take northwestern Ukraine, but then the fall mud and winter would set in. The Soviet Baltic Fleet would control the Romanian coast and keep the invading Red Army forces supplied by sea.

[Kingfish]

(1) Germany would have to commit substantial forces to Romania to hold off a Soviet invasion.

Yes, and?
Given how important Ploesti is to her war effort why would she not?

But in the OTL, Germany did not do so.

Could it be that she was concentrating on another more important task at the time, such as the invasion of Russia?

The Soviets could theoretically have attacked Romania at any time in the OTL,

Your WI begins with a POW claiming the Russians were planning an attack in the autumn, so how could they have theoretically attacked any earlier?

(2) The Red Army ultimately defeated the Finns, and the Germans for that matter.

Which Red Army are you referring to?
Finland fought alone and still embarrassed a numerically superior Russian force. What do you think the outcome would have been if several German armies joined the fray?

And at what point in 1941 did the Russians defeat the Germans?

The Romanians fought poorly against concentrated Soviet offensives in the OTL.

Again, which Red Army are you referring to?

(3) Any German counteroffensive from Poland into Ukraine would be limited, since Germany wouldn't be preparing for a full scale invasion of the USSR in this ATL.

Why assume it would be limited?
As stated, no Barbarossa means substantial forces are available. It is also reasonable to assume contingency plans would be in place for such a move.

[Peter89]

1. Hungary would let Germany trough
2. Yugoslavia/Serbia was occupied by Germany in the spring of 1941
3. German forces could use multiple (including railroad) passes of the Carpathian Mountains
4. Germany knit its logistical network in this area for some time by then. They could deploy their forces pretty quickly to the theoretical Romanian front.