IF the Turks had joined the Axis in time for the 1942 offensive - Axis amphibious operations in the Black Sea?

[thaddeus_c]

we might be forgeting Turkey viewed USSR as enemy #1 and Italy as enemy #2 and also the Iraqi coup attempt which the British quickly stomped made a bit impression on them?

if there was a neutral Italy, or Germany had replaced the Italians on the Dodecanese islands circling them (Turkey) AND Vichy had not lost Syria in the aftermath of the failed Iraqi coup, there is a much better chance of recruiting Turkey?

[daveshoup2MD]

we might be forgeting Turkey viewed USSR as enemy #1 and Italy as enemy #2 and also the Iraqi coup attempt which the British quickly stomped made a bit impression on them?

if there was a neutral Italy, or Germany had replaced the Italians on the Dodecanese islands circling them (Turkey) AND Vichy had not lost Syria in the aftermath of the failed Iraqi coup, there is a much better chance of recruiting Turkey?

True. The 1942 Black Sea idea as a transposition of HERCULES/C3 depends on political developments that were - to be charitable - unlikely, but weirder things happened in the Balkans during WW II.

If the alternative is a transposition of SEALION to the Baltic in 1941, is the expected goal/result the Axis take Leningrad? That's certainly going to be a blow to the USSR, but does the strategic situation change markedly elsewhere on the Eastern Front in 1942? Presume the Soviets will still fight it out around Moscow in the winter of 1941-42, and - if not "win" - certainly prevent the Germans from doing so...

[thaddeus_c]

we might be forgeting Turkey viewed USSR as enemy #1 and Italy as enemy #2 and also the Iraqi coup attempt which the British quickly stomped made a bit impression on them?

if there was a neutral Italy, or Germany had replaced the Italians on the Dodecanese islands circling them (Turkey) AND Vichy had not lost Syria in the aftermath of the failed Iraqi coup, there is a much better chance of recruiting Turkey?

True. The 1942 Black Sea idea as a transposition of HERCULES/C3 depends on political developments that were - to be charitable - unlikely, but weirder things happened in the Balkans during WW II.

If the alternative is a transposition of SEALION to the Baltic in 1941, is the expected goal/result the Axis take Leningrad? That's certainly going to be a blow to the USSR, but does the strategic situation change markedly elsewhere on the Eastern Front in 1942? Presume the Soviets will still fight it out around Moscow in the winter of 1941-42, and - if not "win" - certainly prevent the Germans from doing so...

firstly, the Axis needed to eliminate one of the three fronts, and AGN/ Leningrad seems the most logical?

second, they have a competent ally in Finland, and victory might increase their political influence over Scandinavia? likely not to the point Sweden joins the war too, but who knows?

third if the Germans had not fouled up and the British weren't in Syria? a capture of Leningrad might bring Turkey into the Axis, it is often said they would join the day Moscow fell, but agian who knows?

[daveshoup2MD]

we might be forgeting Turkey viewed USSR as enemy #1 and Italy as enemy #2 and also the Iraqi coup attempt which the British quickly stomped made a bit impression on them?

if there was a neutral Italy, or Germany had replaced the Italians on the Dodecanese islands circling them (Turkey) AND Vichy had not lost Syria in the aftermath of the failed Iraqi coup, there is a much better chance of recruiting Turkey?

True. The 1942 Black Sea idea as a transposition of HERCULES/C3 depends on political developments that were - to be charitable - unlikely, but weirder things happened in the Balkans during WW II.

If the alternative is a transposition of SEALION to the Baltic in 1941, is the expected goal/result the Axis take Leningrad? That's certainly going to be a blow to the USSR, but does the strategic situation change markedly elsewhere on the Eastern Front in 1942? Presume the Soviets will still fight it out around Moscow in the winter of 1941-42, and - if not "win" - certainly prevent the Germans from doing so...

firstly, the Axis needed to eliminate one of the three fronts, and AGN/ Leningrad seems the most logical?

second, they have a competent ally in Finland, and victory might increase their political influence over Scandinavia? likely not to the point Sweden joins the war too, but who knows?

third if the Germans had not fouled up and the British weren't in Syria? a capture of Leningrad might bring Turkey into the Axis, it is often said they would join the day Moscow fell, but agian who knows?

Sure, it makes as much sense as "anything" the Germans/Axis tried to do in 1941-42, but I don't know if picking the least bad option is necessarily a war winner...

[thaddeus_c]

we might be forgeting Turkey viewed USSR as enemy #1 and Italy as enemy #2 and also the Iraqi coup attempt which the British quickly stomped made a bit impression on them?

if there was a neutral Italy, or Germany had replaced the Italians on the Dodecanese islands circling them (Turkey) AND Vichy had not lost Syria in the aftermath of the failed Iraqi coup, there is a much better chance of recruiting Turkey?

True. The 1942 Black Sea idea as a transposition of HERCULES/C3 depends on political developments that were - to be charitable - unlikely, but weirder things happened in the Balkans during WW II.

If the alternative is a transposition of SEALION to the Baltic in 1941, is the expected goal/result the Axis take Leningrad? That's certainly going to be a blow to the USSR, but does the strategic situation change markedly elsewhere on the Eastern Front in 1942? Presume the Soviets will still fight it out around Moscow in the winter of 1941-42, and - if not "win" - certainly prevent the Germans from doing so...

firstly, the Axis needed to eliminate one of the three fronts, and AGN/ Leningrad seems the most logical?

second, they have a competent ally in Finland, and victory might increase their political influence over Scandinavia? likely not to the point Sweden joins the war too, but who knows?

third if the Germans had not fouled up and the British weren't in Syria? a capture of Leningrad might bring Turkey into the Axis, it is often said they would join the day Moscow fell, but again who knows?

Sure, it makes as much sense as "anything" the Germans/Axis tried to do in 1941-42, but I don't know if picking the least bad option is necessarily a war winner...

there certainly is a question of being able to completely eliminate a continent-sized country?

focusing on the north though does more than open the Baltic, it certainly hampers if not closes the Arctic Convoys route.

if the USSR looks set to collapse in the latter half of 1941, but prior to the US entry, it might change the dynamics from historical events.

you could have a one-two punch of Kiev-Leningrad, instead of Kiev-blunted attack on Moscow?

[daveshoup2MD]

we might be forgeting Turkey viewed USSR as enemy #1 and Italy as enemy #2 and also the Iraqi coup attempt which the British quickly stomped made a bit impression on them?

if there was a neutral Italy, or Germany had replaced the Italians on the Dodecanese islands circling them (Turkey) AND Vichy had not lost Syria in the aftermath of the failed Iraqi coup, there is a much better chance of recruiting Turkey?

True. The 1942 Black Sea idea as a transposition of HERCULES/C3 depends on political developments that were - to be charitable - unlikely, but weirder things happened in the Balkans during WW II.

If the alternative is a transposition of SEALION to the Baltic in 1941, is the expected goal/result the Axis take Leningrad? That's certainly going to be a blow to the USSR, but does the strategic situation change markedly elsewhere on the Eastern Front in 1942? Presume the Soviets will still fight it out around Moscow in the winter of 1941-42, and - if not "win" - certainly prevent the Germans from doing so...

firstly, the Axis needed to eliminate one of the three fronts, and AGN/ Leningrad seems the most logical?

second, they have a competent ally in Finland, and victory might increase their political influence over Scandinavia? likely not to the point Sweden joins the war too, but who knows?

third if the Germans had not fouled up and the British weren't in Syria? a capture of Leningrad might bring Turkey into the Axis, it is often said they would join the day Moscow fell, but again who knows?

Sure, it makes as much sense as "anything" the Germans/Axis tried to do in 1941-42, but I don't know if picking the least bad option is necessarily a war winner...

there certainly is a question of being able to completely eliminate a continent-sized country?

focusing on the north though does more than open the Baltic, it certainly hampers if not closes the Arctic Convoys route.

if the USSR looks set to collapse in the latter half of 1941, but prior to the US entry, it might change the dynamics from historical events.

you could have a one-two punch of Kiev-Leningrad, instead of Kiev-blunted attack on Moscow?

there certainly is a question of being able to completely eliminate a continent-sized country?

Yes, there is that.

One can add declaring war on the largest industrial power of the world in the same year, the same one that put an expeditionary force of 2 million men ashore in northwest Europe over the course of 18 months in 1917-18, just for the hell of it, of course.

The Russians and the Germans, historically, kept going for the "short, victorious war" concept, which sometimes works, but often turns into a "long, stalemated or even defeated" reality...

It's an intriguing question, this "Axis maritime campaign in the Baltic in 1941-42" concept, I'll grant you that ...

[Konig_pilsner]

One can add declaring war on the largest industrial power of the world in the same year, the same one that put an expeditionary force of 2 million men ashore in northwest Europe over the course of 18 months in 1917-18, just for the hell of it, of course.

Dumbest thing I have read lately.

[daveshoup2MD]

One can add declaring war on the largest industrial power of the world in the same year, the same one that put an expeditionary force of 2 million men ashore in northwest Europe over the course of 18 months in 1917-18, just for the hell of it, of course.

Dumbest thing I have read lately.

Pray tell - what is it that you disagree with in the above statement?

"Largest industrial power in the world" is based on the stats in Kennedy's Rise and fall of the Great Powers; some examples are Table 30, Table 32, Table 33, Table 34, Table 35, etc.

https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad- ... ennedy.pdf

The "2 million men ashore" as the size of the AEF is based on the US Army's official history (see below):

https://history.army.mil/html/books/023 ... b_23-6.pdf

The history of the American Expeditionary Forces. largely forgotten. remains an imposing element in the nation's military past. Over 2 million troops were transported to France. of whom 1.39 million served at the front. Of forty-two divisions active in the zone of operations. twenty-nine experienced combat. Eventually the Americans held about 160 kilometers of the Western Front, about 23 percent of the line in October-November 1918. The arrival of AEF units converted manpower superiority of 324.000 for the Germans on 1 April to an eventual edge of 600.000 for the Allies at the end of the war. American losses were 50,280 killed and 205.690 wounded. Americans should remember. however. that the Allies suffered nearly 7.5 million casualties in all theaters between August 1914 and November 1918. AEF units did not fight alone but as part of a great inter Allied force. and all of the components of that juggernaut made signal contributions to the triumph of November 1918.

[thaddeus_c]

It's an intriguing question, this "Axis maritime campaign in the Baltic in 1941-42" concept, I'll grant you that ...

items I left out

I don't have a good map of the Stalin Line (and its end point at the Baltic), that, although in a decrepit state, stalled the AGN, the German forces might have been able to somewhat circumvent it with sealift.

the Estonian oil shale industry was well developed, they later used some of the knowledge and personnel to develop areas inside Germany itself (Operation Desert)

the Northern Sea Route allowed 2 - 3 week transit to the Pacific, the Germans had sent the raider Komet that route, that might have become a route to Japan for better coordination?

[daveshoup2MD]

It's an intriguing question, this "Axis maritime campaign in the Baltic in 1941-42" concept, I'll grant you that ...

items I left out

I don't have a good map of the Stalin Line (and its end point at the Baltic), that, although in a decrepit state, stalled the AGN, the German forces might have been able to somewhat circumvent it with sealift.

the Estonian oil shale industry was well developed, they later used some of the knowledge and personnel to develop areas inside Germany itself (Operation Desert)

the Northern Sea Route allowed 2 - 3 week transit to the Pacific, the Germans had sent the raider Komet that route, that might have become a route to Japan for better coordination?

Found this one at Global Security; scale is huge, so not the best, but it looks like it covered the prewar borders with the Baltic states and integrated the lakes, so pretty challenging to turn it by sea in the north.

https://www.globalsecurity.org/military ... n-line.htm

The other two points are probably benefits, but not huge, unless the shale industry facilities were (historically) not taken intact and amphibious operations could have changed that...

[Carl Schwamberger]

Found this one at Global Security; scale is huge, so not the best, but it looks like it covered the prewar borders with the Baltic states and integrated the lakes, so pretty challenging to turn it by sea n the north.

https://www.globalsecurity.org/military ... n-line.htm

I agree 'turning the Red Army flank may not be practical with a Baltic amphib invasion. My thought originally was to establish a better logistics base for AGN ahead of when it closes to the Estonian region August. If that discomfits the Red Army flank earlier thats a bonus, but not my core aim.

The other point raised earlier would be the Soviet Baltic fleet. On paper this is fair powerful & cant be ignored. The submarines and minelaying ability may be the greatest danger. The ability of the Germans to rapidly clear the existing fields in June and keep the routes clear of mines and subs is essential. The shallow & restricted waters are a problem for both sides in this.

Of course if one were gaming this a fight between the battleships would be the first choice for the table top. Anyone care to test that one & let us know how it goes?

[thaddeus_c]

Found this one at Global Security; scale is huge, so not the best, but it looks like it covered the prewar borders with the Baltic states and integrated the lakes, so pretty challenging to turn it by sea n the north.

https://www.globalsecurity.org/military ... n-line.htm

I agree 'turning the Red Army flank may not be practical with a Baltic amphib invasion. My thought originally was to establish a better logistics base for AGN ahead of when it closes to the Estonian region August. If that discomfits the Red Army flank earlier thats a bonus, but not my core aim.

The other point raised earlier would be the Soviet Baltic fleet. On paper this is fair powerful & cant be ignored. The submarines and minelaying ability may be the greatest danger. The ability of the Germans to rapidly clear the existing fields in June and keep the routes clear of mines and subs is essential. The shallow & restricted waters are a problem for both sides in this.

Of course if one were gaming this a fight between the battleships would be the first choice for the table top. Anyone care to test that one & let us know how it goes?

my understanding the panzer forces were outrunning the troops, my question would be whether the KM ships could follow along as a kind of left flank and disembark men and materials as needed? (faster than they could bring both by foot and/or horse-drawn)

the Soviets had a chaotic assembly https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_ev ... of_Tallinn that could have been made even more chaotic if the KM had been able to bring any naval guns into play? as it was they relied on air power and minelaying.

even with the historical numbers of ships lost the Soviets gained over 80k personnel for the defense of Leningrad https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kronstadt ... rld_War_II

[daveshoup2MD]

Found this one at Global Security; scale is huge, so not the best, but it looks like it covered the prewar borders with the Baltic states and integrated the lakes, so pretty challenging to turn it by sea n the north.

https://www.globalsecurity.org/military ... n-line.htm

I agree 'turning the Red Army flank may not be practical with a Baltic amphib invasion. My thought originally was to establish a better logistics base for AGN ahead of when it closes to the Estonian region August. If that discomfits the Red Army flank earlier thats a bonus, but not my core aim.

The other point raised earlier would be the Soviet Baltic fleet. On paper this is fair powerful & cant be ignored. The submarines and minelaying ability may be the greatest danger. The ability of the Germans to rapidly clear the existing fields in June and keep the routes clear of mines and subs is essential. The shallow & restricted waters are a problem for both sides in this.

Of course if one were gaming this a fight between the battleships would be the first choice for the table top. Anyone care to test that one & let us know how it goes?

Agree, there certainly seems to be a point where a KM amphibious effort in the Baltic states would have paid some benefits, in terms of speeding the German advance in the region and/or improving logistics, given the equipment and (semi)doctrine they had put together in 1940. That being said, the KM against the Baltic Fleet in the summer of 1941 would have presumably been a bloody shambles, given the German and Soviet correlation of air and sea forces and coastal defenses (and, to be honest, their relative lack of experience commanding at air-sea actions with the C3I of 1941). The British, Americans, and Japanese all had challenges trying to do the same in 1941-42.

There are also the minor points that a) any German landing force committed to ALBION II or whatever has to be withdrawn from the German field forces committed to the overland operations, and b) air support the same, and c) the RN and British Merchant Marine have a lot less to worry about in the North Atlantic in the summer and autumn of 1941.

[Carl Schwamberger]

my understanding the panzer forces were outrunning the troops, my question would be whether the KM ships could follow along as a kind of left flank and disembark men and materials as needed? (faster than they could bring both by foot and/or horse-drawn)

Supplying a half dozen armored and motorized divisions, their corps support, and any forward tactical air forces is going to require 5,000+ tons a day. Adding in three more corps of another six infantry divisions jumps that up to 10,000+ tons daily. That requires docks, cranes, electric power, dry storage, quarters for the people operating the 'port'. The US & Britain developed the ability to make this happen in backwater unimproved ports and anchorages, even across the beaches. Im unsure the Germans could have developed a extended littoral logistics delivery. So my thoughts centered on a relatively simpler single port group centered on Tallanin/Estonia. But, yes it the Germans can master all the challenges in 5-7 months preparation then a broad littoral logistics effort would be good.

[daveshoup2MD]

my understanding the panzer forces were outrunning the troops, my question would be whether the KM ships could follow along as a kind of left flank and disembark men and materials as needed? (faster than they could bring both by foot and/or horse-drawn)

Supplying a half dozen armored and motorized divisions, their corps support, and any forward tactical air forces is going to require 5,000+ tons a day. Adding in three more corps of another six infantry divisions jumps that up to 10,000+ tons daily. That requires docks, cranes, electric power, dry storage, quarters for the people operating the 'port'. The US & Britain developed the ability to make this happen in backwater unimproved ports and anchorages, even across the beaches. Im unsure the Germans could have developed a extended littoral logistics delivery. So my thoughts centered on a relatively simpler single port group centered on Tallanin/Estonia. But, yes it the Germans can master all the challenges in 5-7 months preparation then a broad littoral logistics effort would be good.

Did the Germans ever put much effort into the Italian and (occupied) French ports in North Africa in 1941-43, or did they just rely on what was in place, in terms of manpower and facilities? When the Axis took back Tobruk in 1941, for example, was there any German equivalent of the Allied port construction groups, or did they just rely on the Italians?

Seems like those would be the closest historical analogues.