IF the Turks had joined the Axis in time for the 1942 offensive - Axis amphibious operations in the Black Sea?

[AnchorSteam]

Oh, and you will need more than 9 x DDs, the Russians had a lot of Subs down there. I would add 8 more DDs to what you have above, plus at least one Heavy cruiser and a seaplane tender.... for ASW float-planes.

The Axis "Black Sea Fleet" outlined above is (roughly) half of what the Italians were willing to commit to HERCULES/C3, so that's two of the modernized old battleships, Andrea Doria and Caio Duilio, four Italian light cruisers, and nine Italian destroyers, plus various escorts, minesweepers, and assorted small craft, along with the Romanian fleet (four destroyers), and - presumably - at least Hermes to represent the KM surface force ... plus various submarines, Italian, German, and Romanian. If the Turks are willing to kick in, that's Yawuz/Goeben, four modern destroyers (for a total of 18), submarines, small craft, etc.

Considering the realities of the war record of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet under Oktyabrsky, especially the major warships, presumably they'd go down fighting, but hard to see them "winning" against an Axis naval surface force worth the name ...

Well, what the Axis planned and what they ended up doing often had no resemplance to each other.


If they had not been stuck with the 6th army at Stalingrad, 4th Panzer was supposed to have gone all the way to Ashtrakhan!
.... and you thought the other guys had long, exposed flanks?

Yes, the situation would have been radically altered if the Black Sea had been cleared quickly, but to do that you have to tailor a force to meet the situation at hand, not just say "half of what was there for Malta" and go with that. I understand the concept, but alterations have to be made.
The Red Fleet had about 2 dozen subs, that's why I am walking about ASW here.
Another item is the lack of air cover. Sicily is close to Malta, the Crimea is not close enough to Poti and Batum for anything but recon/bombers. You would have to work your way down a little more gradually.

This is why I suggested modifications.

Timing is also critical, you should look up the dates critical events like Operation Bustard Hunt and the fall of Sevastopol.A lot of things happened surprisingly late, so maybe the basic idea here should be; can the Itlalian fleet speed everything up in this theater?

[daveshoup2MD]

Oh, and you will need more than 9 x DDs, the Russians had a lot of Subs down there. I would add 8 more DDs to what you have above, plus at least one Heavy cruiser and a seaplane tender.... for ASW float-planes.

The Axis "Black Sea Fleet" outlined above is (roughly) half of what the Italians were willing to commit to HERCULES/C3, so that's two of the modernized old battleships, Andrea Doria and Caio Duilio, four Italian light cruisers, and nine Italian destroyers, plus various escorts, minesweepers, and assorted small craft, along with the Romanian fleet (four destroyers), and - presumably - at least Hermes to represent the KM surface force ... plus various submarines, Italian, German, and Romanian. If the Turks are willing to kick in, that's Yawuz/Goeben, four modern destroyers (for a total of 18), submarines, small craft, etc.

Considering the realities of the war record of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet under Oktyabrsky, especially the major warships, presumably they'd go down fighting, but hard to see them "winning" against an Axis naval surface force worth the name ...

Well, what the Axis planned and what they ended up doing often had no resemblance to each other.


If they had not been stuck with the 6th army at Stalingrad, 4th Panzer was supposed to have gone all the way to Astrakhan!
.... and you thought the other guys had long, exposed flanks?

Yes, the situation would have been radically altered if the Black Sea had been cleared quickly, but to do that you have to tailor a force to meet the situation at hand, not just say "half of what was there for Malta" and go with that. I understand the concept, but alterations have to be made. The Red Fleet had about 2 dozen subs, that's why I am walking about ASW here. Another item is the lack of air cover. Sicily is close to Malta, the Crimea is not close enough to Poti and Batum for anything but recon/bombers. You would have to work your way down a little more gradually.

This is why I suggested modifications.

Timing is also critical, you should look up the dates critical events like Operation Bustard Hunt and the fall of Sevastopol. A lot of things happened surprisingly late, so maybe the basic idea here should be; can the Italian fleet speed everything up in this theater?

True re the Axis and this statement: "Well, what the Axis planned and what they ended up doing often had no resemblance to each other."

But having said that, the Axis had a few options for 1942, which was the last campaign season before the U.S. strength really came into play; they could try for a resolution in the Med OR in southern Russia, but not both - and the only asset they had that was - essentially - "in reserve" was the Italian fleet and the amphibious capabilities the Germans and Italians had developed in 1940-41. Putting it into play in a theater that actually promised a strategic benefit - the oilfields of Transcaucasia - comes closer to the Axis eking out a stalemate than anything else, including Malta (much less Stalingrad).

Hence the 'what if." The answer to your final question is "yes, of course" but it also can only make a difference if the Turks allow passage.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Some back of the envelope calculation suggests a operation aimed at seizing the Estonian ports in June-July 1941 would have been more productive.

[daveshoup2MD]

Some back of the envelope calculation suggests a operation aimed at seizing the Estonian ports in June-July 1941 would have been more productive.

That's an interesting concept. Going to put it up?

[Peter89]

The fundamentals are wrong. The amphibious force the Axis collected for Herkules were a serious investment in time, resources and energy. Not to mention specialized equipment. And there were no goals in the Caucasus that the Germans couldn't reach on land, especially if Turkey would allow Axis troops through its territory (which it would not in 1942). First of all, it is unlikely that the Germans - let alone the Italians - would send their specialized formations through a questionable enterprise deep into Turkey and then into the Caucasus. The divisions assembled for Herkules were not mountain infantry units either.

What Carl says is correct, in the Baltics the Germans could easily build up a local naval superiority and air cover, thus landing a few units to envelope the Soviet units in front of the AGN could make much more sense. But as we know it, the SKL had a mind of its own about warfare.

[daveshoup2MD]

The fundamentals are wrong. The amphibious force the Axis collected for Herkules were a serious investment in time, resources and energy. Not to mention specialized equipment. And there were no goals in the Caucasus that the Germans couldn't reach on land, especially if Turkey would allow Axis troops through its territory (which it would not in 1942). First of all, it is unlikely that the Germans - let alone the Italians - would send their specialized formations through a questionable enterprise deep into Turkey and then into the Caucasus. The divisions assembled for Herkules were not mountain infantry units either.

What Carl says is correct, in the Baltics the Germans could easily build up a local naval superiority and air cover, thus landing a few units to envelope the Soviet units in front of the AGN could make much more sense. But as we know it, the SKL had a mind of its own about warfare.

Well, except that the Axis did not reach Baku overland, did they? Which was the point of the invasion of the Caucasus, after all.

The concept (and freely admitting that's all it is) is - again, IF the Turks will allow passage through the Straits of the necessary Italian warships and merchant shipping) mount a corps to army-sized operation, aimed at Poti, staging from Axis ports in Romania and southern Russia, and - if the lodgment can be secured - driving east toward Tbilisi and Baku.

Is it likely? Probably not, but this is "what if" world, where SEALIONs successfully swim ashore on a regular basis... it's not as crazy as most what ifs.

[Peter89]

The fundamentals are wrong. The amphibious force the Axis collected for Herkules were a serious investment in time, resources and energy. Not to mention specialized equipment. And there were no goals in the Caucasus that the Germans couldn't reach on land, especially if Turkey would allow Axis troops through its territory (which it would not in 1942). First of all, it is unlikely that the Germans - let alone the Italians - would send their specialized formations through a questionable enterprise deep into Turkey and then into the Caucasus. The divisions assembled for Herkules were not mountain infantry units either.

What Carl says is correct, in the Baltics the Germans could easily build up a local naval superiority and air cover, thus landing a few units to envelope the Soviet units in front of the AGN could make much more sense. But as we know it, the SKL had a mind of its own about warfare.

Well, except that the Axis did not reach Baku overland, did they? Which was the point of the invasion of the Caucasus, after all.

The concept (and freely admitting that's all it is) is - again, IF the Turks will allow passage through the Straits of the necessary Italian warships and merchant shipping) mount a corps to army-sized operation, aimed at Poti, staging from Axis ports in Romania and southern Russia, and - if the lodgment can be secured - driving east toward Tbilisi and Baku.

Is it likely? Probably not, but this is "what if" world, where SEALIONs successfully swim ashore on a regular basis... it's not as crazy as most what ifs.

Putting aside all realistic considerations on diplomatic and strategic levels, the tactical problems would still be impossible to solve.
Staging an amphibious operation from Romania against Poti makes Sealion pale in comparison. The Axis resources assembled for Herkules were completely inadequate for such a move. Air cover would be nonexistent, etc.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Some back of the envelope calculation suggests a operation aimed at seizing the Estonian ports in June-July 1941 would have been more productive.

That's an interesting concept. Going to put it up?

I have nine other things of higher priority to research.

One question is the extent of Soviet minefields off the coast of Estonia 22 June. Could the Germans clear the fast enough.

Local Red Army reserves would be a problem. I don't have any useful information on what was in the region. That includes those east and North of Leningrad that might have responded. This include air forces that would survive the initial German air strikes.

Nominal capacity of the Tallinin & the other nearby ports. Hypothetically the beaches could have been used, but understanding that requires information on the nature of these beaches, water currents & surf, and weather.

What Carl says is correct, in the Baltics the Germans could easily build up a local naval superiority and air cover, thus landing a few units to envelope the Soviet units in front of the AGN could make much more sense. But as we know it, the SKL had a mind of its own about warfare.

In a strategic sense this is a envelopment. But, my operational goal is establishing a better logistics base for AGN. Particularly the north wing confronting Leningrad. Planning this from the start when the decision for attacking the USSR is made allows 7+ months of planning & preparation. that can resolve so many of the planning problems in the two months effort to prepare the invasion of England.

[glenn239]

[But having said that, the Axis had a few options for 1942, which was the last campaign season before the U.S. strength really came into play; they could try for a resolution in the Med OR in southern Russia, but not both

Has anyone ever taken a look at a far north Axis summer amphibious offensive in the direction of Murmansk via Norway?

[daveshoup2MD]

The fundamentals are wrong. The amphibious force the Axis collected for Herkules were a serious investment in time, resources and energy. Not to mention specialized equipment. And there were no goals in the Caucasus that the Germans couldn't reach on land, especially if Turkey would allow Axis troops through its territory (which it would not in 1942). First of all, it is unlikely that the Germans - let alone the Italians - would send their specialized formations through a questionable enterprise deep into Turkey and then into the Caucasus. The divisions assembled for Herkules were not mountain infantry units either.

What Carl says is correct, in the Baltics the Germans could easily build up a local naval superiority and air cover, thus landing a few units to envelope the Soviet units in front of the AGN could make much more sense. But as we know it, the SKL had a mind of its own about warfare.

Well, except that the Axis did not reach Baku overland, did they? Which was the point of the invasion of the Caucasus, after all.

The concept (and freely admitting that's all it is) is - again, IF the Turks will allow passage through the Straits of the necessary Italian warships and merchant shipping) mount a corps to army-sized operation, aimed at Poti, staging from Axis ports in Romania and southern Russia, and - if the lodgment can be secured - driving east toward Tbilisi and Baku.

Is it likely? Probably not, but this is "what if" world, where SEALIONs successfully swim ashore on a regular basis... it's not as crazy as most what ifs.

Putting aside all realistic considerations on diplomatic and strategic levels, the tactical problems would still be impossible to solve.
Staging an amphibious operation from Romania against Poti makes Sealion pale in comparison. The Axis resources assembled for Herkules were completely inadequate for such a move. Air cover would be nonexistent, etc.

The Allies managed TORCH at much longer distances, however. Air cover would be challenging, but bases in Crimea, the coastal areas north and east of the Sea of Azov would provide some facilities.

It's a stretch, especially given the Axis could never steel themselves to even try HERCULES/C3, but given the number of pixels that are slain in SEALION-related 'what ifs" it's something to kick around...

[daveshoup2MD]

Some back of the envelope calculation suggests a operation aimed at seizing the Estonian ports in June-July 1941 would have been more productive.

That's an interesting concept. Going to put it up?

I have nine other things of higher priority to research.

One question is the extent of Soviet minefields off the coast of Estonia 22 June. Could the Germans clear the fast enough.

Local Red Army reserves would be a problem. I don't have any useful information on what was in the region. That includes those east and North of Leningrad that might have responded. This include air forces that would survive the initial German air strikes.

Nominal capacity of the Tallinin & the other nearby ports. Hypothetically the beaches could have been used, but understanding that requires information on the nature of these beaches, water currents & surf, and weather.

Fair. The Soviets are stronger in the Baltic in 1941, of course, than they were later in the year. Air power with any capacity for maritime strike is an open question for both sides, and the Baltic Fleet had two capital ships, two modern cruisers, and 20 or so destroyers of various vintages, plus escorts, submarines, small combatants, etc.

German surface forces presumably would have been concentrated, but if none of the historical Atlantic operations are run after Norway, that means the British have a pretty useful respite in 1940-41 - presumably the Home Fleet ships that spent much of 1940-41 chasing Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, and guarding against Bismarck, will have been gainfully employed somewhere...

[daveshoup2MD]

[But having said that, the Axis had a few options for 1942, which was the last campaign season before the U.S. strength really came into play; they could try for a resolution in the Med OR in southern Russia, but not both

Has anyone ever taken a look at a far north Axis summer amphibious offensive in the direction of Murmansk via Norway?

Historically in 1941, the Axis tried an overland offensive, but the available forces were slender and the distances and conditions helpful to the Soviet defense (which was also meager).

That being said, an amphibious assault with support from the KM presumably could have taken advantage of probably the only theater where the Germans could have had pretty close to uncontested maritime superiority...

In 1942, given the failure of the 1941 Arctic offensive and everything else going on in the East, probably too late for the Axis to try anything.

[Peter89]

The fundamentals are wrong. The amphibious force the Axis collected for Herkules were a serious investment in time, resources and energy. Not to mention specialized equipment. And there were no goals in the Caucasus that the Germans couldn't reach on land, especially if Turkey would allow Axis troops through its territory (which it would not in 1942). First of all, it is unlikely that the Germans - let alone the Italians - would send their specialized formations through a questionable enterprise deep into Turkey and then into the Caucasus. The divisions assembled for Herkules were not mountain infantry units either.

What Carl says is correct, in the Baltics the Germans could easily build up a local naval superiority and air cover, thus landing a few units to envelope the Soviet units in front of the AGN could make much more sense. But as we know it, the SKL had a mind of its own about warfare.

Well, except that the Axis did not reach Baku overland, did they? Which was the point of the invasion of the Caucasus, after all.

The concept (and freely admitting that's all it is) is - again, IF the Turks will allow passage through the Straits of the necessary Italian warships and merchant shipping) mount a corps to army-sized operation, aimed at Poti, staging from Axis ports in Romania and southern Russia, and - if the lodgment can be secured - driving east toward Tbilisi and Baku.

Is it likely? Probably not, but this is "what if" world, where SEALIONs successfully swim ashore on a regular basis... it's not as crazy as most what ifs.

Putting aside all realistic considerations on diplomatic and strategic levels, the tactical problems would still be impossible to solve.
Staging an amphibious operation from Romania against Poti makes Sealion pale in comparison. The Axis resources assembled for Herkules were completely inadequate for such a move. Air cover would be nonexistent, etc.

The Allies managed TORCH at much longer distances, however. Air cover would be challenging, but bases in Crimea, the coastal areas north and east of the Sea of Azov would provide some facilities.

It's a stretch, especially given the Axis could never steel themselves to even try HERCULES/C3, but given the number of pixels that are slain in SEALION-related 'what ifs" it's something to kick around...

It was not because they could not "steel themselves" but because Rommel could make gains without Malta. So it seemed obvious that these troops could be better deployed somewhere else, eg. at cutting off Suez, instead of a very high risk operation at Malta.

As for TORCH, there were like one million substantial differences, starting with that it was an unopposed landing on widely separated beaches where no Axis naval or aerial forces were stationed. It still did not go without hiccups. Not to mention that a quick diversion of forces by the Axis effectively halted the Allied advance for months. Such delay in the Caucasus was also entirely possible.

The fact that a lot of people spend insane amount of energy on nonsense, does not make another nonsense plausible.

[daveshoup2MD]

The fundamentals are wrong. The amphibious force the Axis collected for Herkules were a serious investment in time, resources and energy. Not to mention specialized equipment. And there were no goals in the Caucasus that the Germans couldn't reach on land, especially if Turkey would allow Axis troops through its territory (which it would not in 1942). First of all, it is unlikely that the Germans - let alone the Italians - would send their specialized formations through a questionable enterprise deep into Turkey and then into the Caucasus. The divisions assembled for Herkules were not mountain infantry units either.

What Carl says is correct, in the Baltics the Germans could easily build up a local naval superiority and air cover, thus landing a few units to envelope the Soviet units in front of the AGN could make much more sense. But as we know it, the SKL had a mind of its own about warfare.

Well, except that the Axis did not reach Baku overland, did they? Which was the point of the invasion of the Caucasus, after all.

The concept (and freely admitting that's all it is) is - again, IF the Turks will allow passage through the Straits of the necessary Italian warships and merchant shipping) mount a corps to army-sized operation, aimed at Poti, staging from Axis ports in Romania and southern Russia, and - if the lodgment can be secured - driving east toward Tbilisi and Baku.

Is it likely? Probably not, but this is "what if" world, where SEALIONs successfully swim ashore on a regular basis... it's not as crazy as most what ifs.

Putting aside all realistic considerations on diplomatic and strategic levels, the tactical problems would still be impossible to solve.
Staging an amphibious operation from Romania against Poti makes Sealion pale in comparison. The Axis resources assembled for Herkules were completely inadequate for such a move. Air cover would be nonexistent, etc.

The Allies managed TORCH at much longer distances, however. Air cover would be challenging, but bases in Crimea, the coastal areas north and east of the Sea of Azov would provide some facilities.

It's a stretch, especially given the Axis could never steel themselves to even try HERCULES/C3, but given the number of pixels that are slain in SEALION-related 'what ifs" it's something to kick around...

It was not because they could not "steel themselves" but because Rommel could make gains without Malta. So it seemed obvious that these troops could be better deployed somewhere else, eg. at cutting off Suez, instead of a very high risk operation at Malta.

As for TORCH, there were like one million substantial differences, starting with that it was an unopposed landing on widely separated beaches where no Axis naval or aerial forces were stationed. It still did not go without hiccups. Not to mention that a quick diversion of forces by the Axis effectively halted the Allied advance for months. Such delay in the Caucasus was also entirely possible.

The fact that a lot of people spend insane amount of energy on nonsense, does not make another nonsense plausible.

Rommel et al could make

gains

without Malta, but they could not win without it - that was demonstrated pretty conclusively by 1st Alamein, Alam Halfa, and 2nd Alamein.

As far as the Axis troops committed to a HERCULES/C3 (or even this fairy tale) not many of them ended up in North Africa, true? Superga and parts of Folgore for the Italians.

[thaddeus_c]

my earlier posting linked to that paper https://www.jstor.org/stable/44641609?s ... b_contents outlined a reasonable strategy (or strategies) that might have advanced German forces to Crimea, to the Caucasus, with a bit more success and/or speed.

however Carl made the point earlier the real effort by the KM was needed in the Baltic, my repeated speculation centers around the major evacuations (to Leningrad) by the Soviets.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_ev ... of_Tallinn and a bit later https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Hanko_(1941)

while it would have been a game changer for Germany to have recruited Sweden and its navy, the KM could organize an ad hoc fleet of WWI-era ships (of their own and captured from Netherlands and Norway) along with modern small ships.

there could be a counterpoint to such a scenario if they held all the modern surface fleet in home waters and Norway? 4 BBs (if they didn't sortie Bismarck) how many RN ships tied down with that force?

a success in the Baltic in 1941 eliminating the Soviet fleet even if not capturing Leningrad, would have given unimpeded use of sea transport.