If the Axis would have retreated to the Daugava-Dnieper Line early enough, would they have had a chance at a stalemate?

[wm]

And how many of the non-Poles wanted to become Soviet citizens, even the friendly Jews couldn't stand that communism. They were handed over to the Soviets like cattle for slaughter.

[Futurist]

And how many of the non-Poles wanted to become Soviet citizens, even the friendly Jews couldn't stand that communism. They were handed over to the Soviets like cattle for slaughter.

There was no plebiscite there, so no idea. Possibly not too many if news of the 1930s famines were well-known among them. Though if one wants to be Machiavellian I really do think that the influx of western Ukrainian nationalists did Ukraine a lot of good in the post-Cold War era. Without them, Ukraine might have very well eventually slipped back into Russia's orbit.

[Peter89]

Back to the OP: no, there was no chance of a stalemate. While rivers seem to be good natural borders, only the major ones could be used to a greater extent. The problem is that even big rivers like Danube can be crossed with relative ease. About 10 years ago me and my pal crossed the Danube in the summer with a funny rubber kayak. It took about 5 minutes and we were not rowing for our lives. The thing is with the European rivers is that in the winter, they can freeze, and in the summer, they can lose their volume and/or width, thus their effectivity can vary greatly. And the Soviets became professionals in crossing rivers as well.

[stg 44]

Back to the OP: no, there was no chance of a stalemate. While rivers seem to be good natural borders, only the major ones could be used to a greater extent. The problem is that even big rivers like Danube can be crossed with relative ease. About 10 years ago me and my pal crossed the Danube in the summer with a funny rubber kayak. It took about 5 minutes and we were not rowing for our lives. The thing is with the European rivers is that in the winter, they can freeze, and in the summer, they can lose their volume and/or width, thus their effectivity can vary greatly. And the Soviets became professionals in crossing rivers as well.

Were you trying to cross under fire from fortified positions on the high ground to the west of the river? Because that would be the situation if the Panther line had been completed. As it was the Soviets were only really able to cross undefended or lightly defended sections of the Dnieper historically.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of ... he_Dnieper

The crossing of the Dnieper was extremely difficult. Soldiers used every available floating device to cross the river, under heavy German fire and taking heavy losses. Once across, Soviet troops had to dig themselves into the clay ravines composing the Dnieper's western bank.

German troops soon launched heavy counterattacks on almost every bridgehead, hoping to annihilate them before heavy equipment could be transported across the river.

For instance, the Borodaevsk lodgement, mentioned by Marshal Konev in his memoirs, came under heavy armored attack and air assault. Bombers attacked both the lodgement and the reinforcements crossing the river. Konev complained at once about a lack of organization of Soviet air support, set up air patrols to prevent bombers from approaching the lodgements and ordered forward more artillery to counter tank attacks from the opposite shore. When Soviet aviation became more organized and hundreds of guns and Katyusha rocket launchers began firing, the situation started to improve and the bridgehead was eventually preserved.

Such battles were commonplace on every lodgement. Although all the lodgements were held, losses were terrible – at the beginning of October, most divisions were at only 25 to 50% of their nominal strength.

That was with an unfortified line and pretty badly worn down defenders who had waited too long to withdraw thanks to Hitler:

On 15 September 1943, Hitler ordered Army Group South to retreat to the Dnieper defence line.

The order to construct the Dnieper defence complex, known as "Eastern Wall", was issued on 11 August 1943 and began to be immediately executed.

Fortifications were erected along the length of the Dnieper. However, there was no hope of completing such an extensive defensive line in the short time available. Therefore, the completion of the "Eastern Wall" was not uniform in its density and depth of fortifications. Instead, they were concentrated in areas where a Soviet assault-crossing were most likely to be attempted, such as near Kremenchuk, Zaporizhia and Nikopol.

[stg 44]

Just how crucial was this to France's 1940 fall? As in, if the French have better defenders at Sedan in 1940, do the Germans still win the Battle of France due to their air superiority, albeit with much more casualties?

Extremely so. Air superiority wins wars. I don't think the Germans could have won in 1940 without air superiority.

But could they have won with air superiority but with much stronger French defenses at Sedan?

Maybe since at it was the defenders took very few casualties, but were psychologically broken by the continuous air assault and loss of communications when the telephone lines were cut outside the bunkers by the bombardment. It would really depend on what you mean by 'much stronger defenses at Sedan'.

[Peter89]

Back to the OP: no, there was no chance of a stalemate. While rivers seem to be good natural borders, only the major ones could be used to a greater extent. The problem is that even big rivers like Danube can be crossed with relative ease. About 10 years ago me and my pal crossed the Danube in the summer with a funny rubber kayak. It took about 5 minutes and we were not rowing for our lives. The thing is with the European rivers is that in the winter, they can freeze, and in the summer, they can lose their volume and/or width, thus their effectivity can vary greatly. And the Soviets became professionals in crossing rivers as well.

Were you trying to cross under fire from fortified positions on the high ground to the west of the river? Because that would be the situation if the Panther line had been completed. As it was the Soviets were only really able to cross undefended or lightly defended sections of the Dnieper historically.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of ... he_Dnieper

The crossing of the Dnieper was extremely difficult. Soldiers used every available floating device to cross the river, under heavy German fire and taking heavy losses. Once across, Soviet troops had to dig themselves into the clay ravines composing the Dnieper's western bank.

German troops soon launched heavy counterattacks on almost every bridgehead, hoping to annihilate them before heavy equipment could be transported across the river.

For instance, the Borodaevsk lodgement, mentioned by Marshal Konev in his memoirs, came under heavy armored attack and air assault. Bombers attacked both the lodgement and the reinforcements crossing the river. Konev complained at once about a lack of organization of Soviet air support, set up air patrols to prevent bombers from approaching the lodgements and ordered forward more artillery to counter tank attacks from the opposite shore. When Soviet aviation became more organized and hundreds of guns and Katyusha rocket launchers began firing, the situation started to improve and the bridgehead was eventually preserved.

Such battles were commonplace on every lodgement. Although all the lodgements were held, losses were terrible – at the beginning of October, most divisions were at only 25 to 50% of their nominal strength.

That was with an unfortified line and pretty badly worn down defenders who had waited too long to withdraw thanks to Hitler:

On 15 September 1943, Hitler ordered Army Group South to retreat to the Dnieper defence line.

The order to construct the Dnieper defence complex, known as "Eastern Wall", was issued on 11 August 1943 and began to be immediately executed.

Fortifications were erected along the length of the Dnieper. However, there was no hope of completing such an extensive defensive line in the short time available. Therefore, the completion of the "Eastern Wall" was not uniform in its density and depth of fortifications. Instead, they were concentrated in areas where a Soviet assault-crossing were most likely to be attempted, such as near Kremenchuk, Zaporizhia and Nikopol.

In your very quote it is written that all bridgeheads held.

For the casualties: it didn't matter as long as the replenishment rate so decisively favoured the Soviets. Also, a retreat from the east would mean that the Soviets could cull the manpower of those areas as well.

By 1943, the Germans were losing the firepower battle. They had major commitments in the Mediterraneum as well. There was no chance to construct a 2000km long defensive line, whatever that would entail. The Soviets would be able to break it in time - with superior artillery and air superiority. In order to keep the Soviets at bay or bled them white, the Germans needed a kill / loss ratio more favourable for them than the disparity in replenishment rate. And that was impossible, especially with the Western Allies landing in Europe.

[stg 44]

In your very quote it is written that all bridgeheads held.

Right, because as I said the line was basically unfortified except in a few places were bridgeheads were not established. Bridgeheads were only able to be established in areas that were at most lightly defended and even then casualties were very high. Had the entire line been ready and units retreated before their situation had gotten so bad that they were too disorganized to properly defend the river line it would have been a very different story.

For the casualties: it didn't matter as long as the replenishment rate so decisively favoured the Soviets. Also, a retreat from the east would mean that the Soviets could cull the manpower of those areas as well.

To a point yes. Though quite a few men were evacuated during the scorched earth retreat and with a prepared retreat planned instead of one forced by the circumstances at the front they could have evacuated more out of the way of the Soviets. Plus once the line hold the Soviets are denied all the millions of replacements they managed to get west of the Dnieper historically.

By 1943, the Germans were losing the firepower battle. They had major commitments in the Mediterraneum as well. There was no chance to construct a 2000km long defensive line, whatever that would entail.

That's what fortifications are for. They are a force multiplier.
There was plenty of chance to construct the line, they did complete it in several places like Narwa and other areas of AG-North that held and allowed the outnumbered and gunned Axis troops to inflict heavily disproportionate losses on Soviet forces. The problem was as you'll note from the link that the line was only started a few weeks before troops retreated to it, so they didn't have time to even get it remotely ready. Once it is the front line it is much harder to build up. Had they started in June 1943 it would have been ready by September at the latest.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panther%E ... Wotan_line

Construction had barely started when Manstein's Army Group South commenced to fall back on it as part of a general withdrawal ordered on 15 September 1943.[3]

https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panther-Stellung

As early as the spring of 1943, the Army General Staff had demanded the construction of positions that were far back in order to free up forces for defense and counterattacks by straightening the front by straightening the front. Hitler repeatedly opposed this strategic direction of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein because of political concerns and only approved the establishment of front-line detachments a few kilometers behind the front line. Hitler argued that the very existence of such an expanded line of defense would induce soldiers to retreat from the actual front line. [1]

....

Nevertheless, the construction of the position began on September 8, 1943. For this purpose, more than 50,000 workers, mostly from the civilian population, were drawn together in the area of Army Group North alone , who built around 6,000 field fortifications (800 of them concrete bunkers ), laid 180 km of barbed wire and more than 30 km of anti- tank trenches were dug. In November and December 1943, 100 freight wagons with building materials arrived every day. [5]When the Army Group began planning the retreat to this line in September 1943, it also took into account that around 900,000 people lived in the area, which then had to be abandoned, who could then be recruited by the Red Army. The deportation of the male population capable of military service to Lithuania and Latvia soon began . About 250,000 men were affected by this coercive measure. [6]

Due to a major Soviet offensive in January 1944 (→ Leningrad-Novgorod Operation ), General Field Marshal Georg von Küchler (1881–1968) ordered the unauthorized disengagement into the panther position (for which he was released). This was, favored by the longer preparation time, much better developed than in the areas of the other army groups. So the Soviet offensive could be stopped on March 1, 1944 along this line. It was only in the course of the collapse of Army Group Center in the summer of 1944 that Army Group North was also ready to withdraw further from the Panther position forced.

So it was an issue of time to prepare the line, not lack of resources to do so.

The Soviets would be able to break it in time - with superior artillery and air superiority. In order to keep the Soviets at bay or bled them white, the Germans needed a kill / loss ratio more favourable for them than the disparity in replenishment rate. And that was impossible, especially with the Western Allies landing in Europe.

Yet they couldn't force Army Group North out of their positions. They tried hard in Belarus too and from July 1943-April 1944 tried to break the line only to suffer over 1 million casualties shoving the Germans back a short ways. Every time they did the Germans just built up a new line where they needed to and repeated the process. The casualty rates and ammo expenditures the Soviets were suffering were prohibitively expensive, leading to the removal of a front commander in early 1944 in Belarus.

If the Dnieper Line is actually built when requested and the line holds the Allied landings in France will be facing a lot more German troops and firepower without the heavy losses of men and equipment in the historical fighting from October 1943-March 1944 in Ukraine.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10. ... ode=fslv20

[Peter89]

In your very quote it is written that all bridgeheads held.

Right, because as I said the line was basically unfortified except in a few places were bridgeheads were not established. Bridgeheads were only able to be established in areas that were at most lightly defended and even then casualties were very high. Had the entire line been ready and units retreated before their situation had gotten so bad that they were too disorganized to properly defend the river line it would have been a very different story.

For the casualties: it didn't matter as long as the replenishment rate so decisively favoured the Soviets. Also, a retreat from the east would mean that the Soviets could cull the manpower of those areas as well.

To a point yes. Though quite a few men were evacuated during the scorched earth retreat and with a prepared retreat planned instead of one forced by the circumstances at the front they could have evacuated more out of the way of the Soviets. Plus once the line hold the Soviets are denied all the millions of replacements they managed to get west of the Dnieper historically.

By 1943, the Germans were losing the firepower battle. They had major commitments in the Mediterraneum as well. There was no chance to construct a 2000km long defensive line, whatever that would entail.

That's what fortifications are for. They are a force multiplier.
There was plenty of chance to construct the line, they did complete it in several places like Narwa and other areas of AG-North that held and allowed the outnumbered and gunned Axis troops to inflict heavily disproportionate losses on Soviet forces. The problem was as you'll note from the link that the line was only started a few weeks before troops retreated to it, so they didn't have time to even get it remotely ready. Once it is the front line it is much harder to build up. Had they started in June 1943 it would have been ready by September at the latest.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panther%E ... Wotan_line

Construction had barely started when Manstein's Army Group South commenced to fall back on it as part of a general withdrawal ordered on 15 September 1943.[3]

https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panther-Stellung

As early as the spring of 1943, the Army General Staff had demanded the construction of positions that were far back in order to free up forces for defense and counterattacks by straightening the front by straightening the front. Hitler repeatedly opposed this strategic direction of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein because of political concerns and only approved the establishment of front-line detachments a few kilometers behind the front line. Hitler argued that the very existence of such an expanded line of defense would induce soldiers to retreat from the actual front line. [1]

....

Nevertheless, the construction of the position began on September 8, 1943. For this purpose, more than 50,000 workers, mostly from the civilian population, were drawn together in the area of Army Group North alone , who built around 6,000 field fortifications (800 of them concrete bunkers ), laid 180 km of barbed wire and more than 30 km of anti- tank trenches were dug. In November and December 1943, 100 freight wagons with building materials arrived every day. [5]When the Army Group began planning the retreat to this line in September 1943, it also took into account that around 900,000 people lived in the area, which then had to be abandoned, who could then be recruited by the Red Army. The deportation of the male population capable of military service to Lithuania and Latvia soon began . About 250,000 men were affected by this coercive measure. [6]

Due to a major Soviet offensive in January 1944 (→ Leningrad-Novgorod Operation ), General Field Marshal Georg von Küchler (1881–1968) ordered the unauthorized disengagement into the panther position (for which he was released). This was, favored by the longer preparation time, much better developed than in the areas of the other army groups. So the Soviet offensive could be stopped on March 1, 1944 along this line. It was only in the course of the collapse of Army Group Center in the summer of 1944 that Army Group North was also ready to withdraw further from the Panther position forced.

So it was an issue of time to prepare the line, not lack of resources to do so.

The Soviets would be able to break it in time - with superior artillery and air superiority. In order to keep the Soviets at bay or bled them white, the Germans needed a kill / loss ratio more favourable for them than the disparity in replenishment rate. And that was impossible, especially with the Western Allies landing in Europe.

Yet they couldn't force Army Group North out of their positions. They tried hard in Belarus too and from July 1943-April 1944 tried to break the line only to suffer over 1 million casualties shoving the Germans back a short ways. Every time they did the Germans just built up a new line where they needed to and repeated the process. The casualty rates and ammo expenditures the Soviets were suffering were prohibitively expensive, leading to the removal of a front commander in early 1944 in Belarus.

If the Dnieper Line is actually built when requested and the line holds the Allied landings in France will be facing a lot more German troops and firepower without the heavy losses of men and equipment in the historical fighting from October 1943-March 1944 in Ukraine.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10. ... ode=fslv20

My problem with this agenda is threefold.

First, the Germans did not have a defensive mindset. Have they had that, they could simply opt for a defensive strategy in mid-1941. They were forced on the defensive.
Second, when they attacked the SU, the power ratio that was already bad, became immeasurably worse. When they declared war on the US, they ensured that they will have to face a southern or western front that might not be there for a year more or so. The replenishment rates, as well as their diplomatic position took the most serious blow (ie. they could not count on their allies as much as before). The disparity in resources, manpower and production could not be challenged with holding a fortified river bank or staging a fighting retreat. Of course, it could delay the inevitable for a little time more, but that is about it.
Third, nobody liked bloody wars. As the Germans opted for a bloodbath that reminded the people of Europe too much on the last war, nobody wanted to be in the frontline. Thus, a defensive strategy could just as easily crack the Axis, increase sabotage, open up hostilities and whatnot. Historically, the Axis allies left Germany as soon as they had a real chance to change sides. I don't see millions of Romanians, Hungarians, Bulgarians and Italians streaming to the East to fill the gaps of the German line. Most likely they'd want to keep as much units at home as possible, maybe to use them against each other when the inevitable German defeat drew near.

[stg 44]

My problem with this agenda is threefold.

Agenda?

First, the Germans did not have a defensive mindset. Have they had that, they could simply opt for a defensive strategy in mid-1941. They were forced on the defensive.

You do realize we are talking about alternate history, right? Obviously there is a reason they didn't do it historically, but we're discussing an alternate scenario where they do this. If you want to fixate on what and why things happened as they did historically we have other subsections for that.

Second, when they attacked the SU, the power ratio that was already bad, became immeasurably worse. When they declared war on the US, they ensured that they will have to face a southern or western front that might not be there for a year more or so. The replenishment rates, as well as their diplomatic position took the most serious blow (ie. they could not count on their allies as much as before). The disparity in resources, manpower and production could not be challenged with holding a fortified river bank or staging a fighting retreat. Of course, it could delay the inevitable for a little time more, but that is about it.

Your 'analysis' fails to actually take into consideration that the Wallies had to ship everything across the Atlantic to make the British economy run, provide LL to the Soviets, and of course to deploy any American divisions. Even with Germany first the Pacific theater sucked up a lot of resources for both the British and US to the point that both were maxed out in terms of manpower even before D-Day, hence why the British had to start breaking up divisions to keep the rest up to strength prior to Normandy and after it had to start reducing the number of companies in divisions as well.

The US too had a chronic shortage of replacements as well (in part a function of poor planning) and was getting the point of having to mobilize factory workers for more manpower, which would have negatively impacted their output, which has not hitting planned targets in 1944-45 either.

The Soviets too were depending on capturing more territory to generate replacements to keep going, so with a planning retreat to prepared defenses they'd have deprived the Soviets of major manpower gains in 3 and 4Q 1943 and byeond.

If not for massive strategic and operational mistakes Hitler made things could have been quite different.

Third, nobody liked bloody wars. As the Germans opted for a bloodbath that reminded the people of Europe too much on the last war, nobody wanted to be in the frontline. Thus, a defensive strategy could just as easily crack the Axis, increase sabotage, open up hostilities and whatnot. Historically, the Axis allies left Germany as soon as they had a real chance to change sides. I don't see millions of Romanians, Hungarians, Bulgarians and Italians streaming to the East to fill the gaps of the German line. Most likely they'd want to keep as much units at home as possible, maybe to use them against each other when the inevitable German defeat drew near.

Why would it be more than it historically was? That basically happened and wasn't enough to make a substantial difference. In fact the Soviets started fighting the UPA in this period and after they successfully ambushed and killed General Vatutin. That despite the defeats that happened historically but might not happen here.
If anything the lack of repeated defeats and retreats would convince people behind the lines to take a more 'wait and see' approach rather than risk pissing off the side that may stick around for a while. Plus you might see more collaboration if the lines stabilize, since as of June 1944 the Ukrainian SS division was ready for combat despite all the disasters leading up to the moment. If the line stabilizes on the Dnieper in 3Q 1944 then the Ukrainians could generate substantially more divisions given the German need for more manpower and the extra equipment they'd retain without the retreats/defeats.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collabora ... med_forces

On 28 April 1943 the German Governor of the District of Galicia, Otto Wächter, and the local Ukrainian administration officially declared the creation of the SS Division Galicia. Volunteers signed for service as of 3 June 1943 and numbered 80,000.[33] On 27 July 1944, the division was formed into the Waffen-SS as 14th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS (1st Ukrainian).[34]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukrainian_Liberation_Army

The Ukrainian collaborationist forces were composed of an estimated number of 180,000 volunteers serving with units scattered all over Europe.[4]

If things stabilized and the Germans held on to more core Ukrainian nationalist territories that number could well increase substantially even without major concessions being granted to groups like the UPA, though I think with more men serving in organized units concessions would have to be granted eventually, especially as greater manpower is needed.

Then there were the Russians.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collabora ... viet_Union

The two main forms of mass collaboration in the Nazi-occupied territories were both military in nature. It is estimated that anywhere between 600,000 and 1,400,000 Soviets (Russians and non-Russians) joined the Wehrmacht forces as Hiwis (or Hilfswillige) in the initial stages of Barbarossa, including 275,000 to 350,000 “Muslim and Caucasian” volunteers and conscripts,[2] ahead of the subsequent implementation of the more oppressive administrative methods by the SS. As much as 20% of the German manpower in Soviet Russia was composed of former Soviet citizens, about half of which were ethnic Russians.

The Ukrainian collaborationist forces comprised an estimated 180,000 volunteers serving with units scattered all over Europe.[3]

The second type of mass collaboration were the indigenous security formations (majority ethnic Russian) running into hundreds of thousands and possibly more than 1 million (250,000 volunteers in the East Legions alone). Military collaboration – wrote Alex Alexiev – took place in truly unprecedented numbers suggesting that, more often than not, the Germans were perceived at first as lesser of two evils by Soviet non-Russians.[4]

That number may well go up if the line holds and more effort is put into forming combat units like the ROA:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_Liberation_Army

By February 1945, only one division, the 1st Infantry (600th Infantry), was fully organised, under the command of General Sergei Bunyachenko. Formed at Münsingen, it fought briefly on the Oder Front
...
A small group of ROA volunteers fought against the Red Army on 9 February 1945. Their fighting spirit earned them the praise of Heinrich Himmler.[10]

That despite it being February 1945 and the war nearly over.

Several other Russian units, such as the Russian Corps, XVth SS Cossack Cavalry Corps of General Helmuth von Pannwitz, the Cossack Camp of Ataman Domanov, and other primarily White émigré formations, had agreed to become a part of Vlasov's army. However, their membership remained de jure as the turn of events did not permit Vlasov to use the troops in any operation (even reliable communications were often impossible).

And the previous section didn't even factor in these forces.

Historically the Axis allies who quit started really trying to do so after the Dnieper-Carpathian offensive in early 1944 proved to be massively successful thanks to Hitler ignoring Manstein. As of the late 1943 they were still loyal. So if the line stabilizes on the Dnieper for a while those Axis allies remaining aren't defecting. The Italians only partially changed sides when their mainland was invaded. As it was though there were close a million Romanians and Hungarians in the East as of early 1944.

Really the big thing that would have changed the war situation is stabilizing the Ukrainian front, as after that happens German casualties go way down relative to what historically happened from September 1943 onwards, while people in the East who sided with Stalin after the Germans went from defeat to defeat from late 1943 on historically would more likely stay neutral or assist the side they perceived to be winning to avoid punishment. It is notable that German aligned Soviet citizens started switching back to Stalin after the retreat of September 1943 started and got worse in 1944.

[wm]

The Hiwis were mostly people escaping the deadly (later merely hellish) conditions in Nazi POVs camps.

The Ukrainian nationalists weren't anybody allies, they supported the Soviets and later the Nazis but always with the intention to stab their temporary ally in the back in an opportune moment (that actually happened in 1943).

A the bottom of the society there were tens of millions of (uneducated or barely educated) people without any political convictions, they lived basically for themselves.
They would gladly serve anybody who give them money, power, guns - from such people the axillary (or rather mercenary) formations were created. Against the highly motivated NKVD and later the Red Army they had little chance.

There were ideologically motivated native formations but not that many of them.

[stg 44]

The Hiwis were mostly people escaping the deadly (later merely hellish) conditions in Nazi POVs camps.

As I understanding most joined up in 1941 before the PoW camps became a death sentence. They were mostly joining in for either to gain the favor of who they thought was going to win or out of anti-Stalin sentiments. Many later did join to get out of the camps, but AFAIK that was not the majority.

The Ukrainian nationalists weren't anybody allies, they supported the Soviets and later the Nazis but always with the intention to stab their temporary ally in the back in an opportune moment (that actually happened in 1943).

Hard to say for sure what their eventual plans were; the Nazis backstabbing the Ukrainians in 1941 changed the situation, though they may have been plotting and were found out.

The 1943 situation was complicated.

A the bottom of the society there were tens of millions of (uneducated or barely educated) people without any political convictions, they lived basically for themselves.
They would gladly serve anybody who give them money, power, guns - from such people the axillary (or rather mercenary) formations were created. Against the highly motivated NKVD and later the Red Army they had little chance.

There were ideologically motivated native formations but not that many of them.

Agreed.

[Futurist]

Just how crucial was this to France's 1940 fall? As in, if the French have better defenders at Sedan in 1940, do the Germans still win the Battle of France due to their air superiority, albeit with much more casualties?

Extremely so. Air superiority wins wars. I don't think the Germans could have won in 1940 without air superiority.

But could they have won with air superiority but with much stronger French defenses at Sedan?

Maybe since at it was the defenders took very few casualties, but were psychologically broken by the continuous air assault and loss of communications when the telephone lines were cut outside the bunkers by the bombardment. It would really depend on what you mean by 'much stronger defenses at Sedan'.

Let's say that the French keep their strategic reserve in France instead of sending it over to the Low Countries. Then, they send their strategic reserve to Sedan in order to combat the German breakout there. Is this enough for France to prevent a German victory in the Battle of France and to avoid France's fall?

[Peter89]

My problem with this agenda is threefold.

Agenda?

Idea or theory might be better words.

You do realize we are talking about alternate history, right? Obviously there is a reason they didn't do it historically, but we're discussing an alternate scenario where they do this. If you want to fixate on what and why things happened as they did historically we have other subsections for that.

Yes I do, and I formulated my opinion based on that. I think a river line in relatively the western edge of the Soviet Union will not be impregnable in 1942/1943. There were larger forces at play than a proper defense line.

Your 'analysis' fails to actually take into consideration that the Wallies had to ship everything across the Atlantic to make the British economy run, provide LL to the Soviets, and of course to deploy any American divisions. Even with Germany first the Pacific theater sucked up a lot of resources for both the British and US to the point that both were maxed out in terms of manpower even before D-Day, hence why the British had to start breaking up divisions to keep the rest up to strength prior to Normandy and after it had to start reducing the number of companies in divisions as well.

If we are talking about the global war, the Axis have lost control of the seas, and the Japanese got badly beaten by 1944. For them, there was no chance to return to the game. The Axis was defeated simultaneously at D-Day, Bagration, LL, Italy, Southern France, etc. The Allied numerical superiority by 1944 was something that the Axis simply couldn't compete with. On top of that, the minor Axis allies didn't even want to.

The US too had a chronic shortage of replacements as well (in part a function of poor planning) and was getting the point of having to mobilize factory workers for more manpower, which would have negatively impacted their output, which has not hitting planned targets in 1944-45 either.

Negative impact on economy is what mobilization does. Germany didn't hit planned targets even before the war - what does that tell us? Relatively little.

Most of the European continent is either an island (like Britain, Ireland, etc.) or a peninsula. In fact, what we call Europe is largely France, Germany and the buffer states between Germany and Russia. German rule was so unpopular that landing on Europe would not be a hard thing: in Italy, in Scandinavia, in the Balkans, in Iberia... it could be done eventually. And then, those millions of people would stream towards Allied flags. Germany alone could not rule Europe. No state can.

The Soviets too were depending on capturing more territory to generate replacements to keep going, so with a planning retreat to prepared defenses they'd have deprived the Soviets of major manpower gains in 3 and 4Q 1943 and byeond.

Indeed. But, if the Germans would abandon the vast territories east of the D-D line, the Soviets could utilize the potential of those territories much more easily.

If not for massive strategic and operational mistakes Hitler made things could have been quite different.

The strategic mistake was to send the Soviet Union to the Allies, or to start the war to begin with. If Germany didn't start WW2, it could achieve anything in 10-20 years (when the colonial system collapsed).

Really the big thing that would have changed the war situation is stabilizing the Ukrainian front, as after that happens German casualties go way down relative to what historically happened from September 1943 onwards, while people in the East who sided with Stalin after the Germans went from defeat to defeat from late 1943 on historically would more likely stay neutral or assist the side they perceived to be winning to avoid punishment. It is notable that German aligned Soviet citizens started switching back to Stalin after the retreat of September 1943 started and got worse in 1944.

There was no chance to stabilize the Eastern front from 1943 onwards. Why? Because Germany has lost the Battle of the Atlantic, and the Allies began their bombing campaign, and they have lost the battles on the peripheries, and because they were defeated diplomatically. They had to occupy southern France, Italy, Denmark, etc. What they could do was to score a few defensive victories and prolong the suffering of the people affected by the war. It was utter nonsense. By 1943 nobody even wanted a German-dominated Europe.

If I'd want to follow your logic, I'd advocate for a much more moderate 1942 campaign in the SU, maybe to clear the Don bend and pinch off salients. This would probably require the evacuation of North Africa.

[PunctuationHorror]

The strategic mistake was to send the Soviet Union to the Allies, or to start the war to begin with. If Germany didn't start WW2, it could achieve anything in 10-20 years (when the colonial system collapsed).

I cannot stress this enough.

Even if they did the mistake and started a war with UK and France, attacking the Soviet Union after the conquest of France was the biggest mistake.
War with Soviet Union cost Germany ~ 50,000 - 100,000 losses per month. Compare this to the casualties they 'payed' for the whole campaign in France. Until Barbarossa, losses were sustainable - they managed to conserve their strength and win their victories very cheaply.
War with SU changed this. The two and a half years up to 1944 these monthly losses add up to a vast number. Germany could not afford such losses in manpower and materiel over a prolonged time whilst occupying and defending Europe against the WAllies. You can't redeploy dead soldiers and destroyed material to fend off an WAllied invasion and you can't relocate these dead soldiers back to industry.

Things would be different without the vast losses in manpower and materiel they had suffered in the war with the SU by 1943 or '44. I hardly see a successful Allied invasion in 1944 if Germany has not wasted itself on SU.
Maybe the Allies would have nuked German cities in the end of 1945. Or not because Germany would/could deliver chemical agents to UK. Of course, UK would/could retaliate in kind or unleash biowarfare but I'm not sure if all sides were willing to risk entering such a spiral. Maybe Allies drop one or two bombs and then leave it be because Germany threads to retaliate using nerve agents over London, Liverpool, Manchester, ....

Really the big thing that would have changed the war situation is stabilizing the Ukrainian front, as after that happens German casualties go way down relative to what historically happened from September 1943 onwards, while people in the East who sided with Stalin after the Germans went from defeat to defeat from late 1943 on historically would more likely stay neutral or assist the side they perceived to be winning to avoid punishment. It is notable that German aligned Soviet citizens started switching back to Stalin after the retreat of September 1943 started and got worse in 1944.

There was no chance to stabilize the Eastern front from 1943 onwards. Why? Because Germany has lost the Battle of the Atlantic, and the Allies began their bombing campaign, and they have lost the battles on the peripheries, and because they were defeated diplomatically. They had to occupy southern France, Italy, Denmark, etc. What they could do was to score a few defensive victories and prolong the suffering of the people affected by the war. It was utter nonsense. By 1943 nobody even wanted a German-dominated Europe.

If I'd want to follow your logic, I'd advocate for a much more moderate 1942 campaign in the SU, maybe to clear the Don bend and pinch off salients. This would probably require the evacuation of North Africa.

Germany should avoid war with SU. If they did it anyways, they should have moved to a river defense line (there is nothing else in Western Russia) like the Panther-Wotan/Daugava-Dnieper Line as early as October 1941. Germany has to avoid losses both in materiel an manpower. This line is an option to avoid them: Instead of a wasteful advance to Moskow in '41, dig in, rest, repair, refit, and build logistics for the rest of '41. No overstretching, no heavy losses in forced retreats in Winter '41/42. Without these massive losses of seasoned men and material, Germany is better off in the next campaign. New production leads to an augmentation of forces and is not just consumed as replacements.

Germany did the same stupid mistake thrice in 1941, in 1942 and in 1943: Reckless advance in summer. Defeat, retreat and losses in winter. They would have done it a forth time if they had the means to do so, but they were throughly spent by 1944, so they couldn't.

Back to ATL:
May/June 1942: New offensive. Panzers and Mot do what they are made for. New encirclements, new pockets. Inflict losses like in Barbarossa. By autumn retreat again back to the Daugava-Dnieper Line. It's about reduction of Soviet manpower and materiel whilst conserving the German mp and material. If every year the 100km - 300km eastwards of this line are turned into a battleground, the area is of little economic use for SU.
1943: Do it again. By then, Soviet losses should become noticeable. Try to reach Jaroslavl, Nischni-Novgorod, Kasan, Saratov and establish Volga as new frontline. Then rinse and repeat. Advance, inflict losses and retreat to do it once again.

Fewer German losses in SU mean more resources are left to counter the WAllies. Maybe Soviet Union gets worn down enough by 1944 and Germany can redeploy an considerable amount of its troops to Italy and France.

[KDF33]

Even if they did the mistake and started a war with UK and France, attacking the Soviet Union after the conquest of France was the biggest mistake.

Well, it depends.

Not attacking the Soviet Union means, ipso facto, that German survival henceforth depends on Soviet goodwill.

Besides, your argument assumes that German failure against the USSR was inevitable, rather than contingent. My understanding of events leads me to conclude that it was very much contingent.

Things would be different without the vast losses in manpower and materiel they had suffered in the war with the SU by 1943 or '44. I hardly see a successful Allied invasion in 1944 if Germany has not wasted itself on SU.

Agreed. But by then Stalin would be in a position to break the tie and roll into Berlin. He might have chosen not to, of course, but the decision would have been entirely in his hands.

Germany has to avoid losses both in materiel an manpower.

I disagree. Germany has to seize Soviet territory while maintaining favorable loss ratios. Its own losses are significant only in relation to those suffered by the Soviets.

Instead of a wasteful advance to Moskow in '41, dig in, rest, repair, refit, and build logistics for the rest of '41.

The advance on Moscow wasn't wasteful to the Germans. On the contrary, the triple encirclements around Vyazma, Bryansk and the Sea of Azov were essential to safeguard German prospects going into 1942.

No overstretching, no heavy losses in forced retreats in Winter '41/42.

The winter of 1941/42 was very successful for the Germans: they inflicted close to 6 times their own combat losses to the Soviets.

Without these massive losses of seasoned men and material, Germany is better off in the next campaign.

The problem with this is that in the absence of German losses, there is also an absence of Soviet losses. With an operational pause instead of fall and winter campaigns, by the spring of 1942 the balance-of-forces in the East is probably more favorable to the Soviets than it was historically in summer 1943.

New production leads to an augmentation of forces and is not just consumed as replacements.

This is true, but again this is also true for the Soviets. And the latter have superior force generation.

Germany did the same stupid mistake thrice in 1941, in 1942 and in 1943: Reckless advance in summer. Defeat, retreat and losses in winter.

I disagree. The problem in 1941 was not a "reckless" advance, but the lack of German force (re)generation. The first winter campaign was also unarguably a German victory.

For the 1942 summer campaign, I actually agree that the advance was reckless. The sound strategy for Germany was to keep doing what they did in the spring, i.e. defeat the Soviets in detail without extending the length (rather than the depth) of the frontline.

The winter of 1942/43 is one of the few periods where Axis losses were not completely dwarfed by those of the Soviets, but even then attrition ultimately favored the Axis - which is why the Soviet advance stalled in February.

For 1943, the German mistake was to attack in early July, rather than as early as possible. The three-month pause (April - June) allowed the Soviets to gain a large numerical and material edge for the summer battles, which, coupled with low German reinforcements because of Allied advances in the Mediterranean, finally allowed the Soviets to win the attritional battle.

Back to ATL:
May/June 1942: New offensive. Panzers and Mot do what they are made for. New encirclements, new pockets. Inflict losses like in Barbarossa. By autumn retreat again back to the Daugava-Dnieper Line. It's about reduction of Soviet manpower and materiel whilst conserving the German mp and material.

If so, why retreat? Just keep defeating the Soviets in detail in a manner that avoids lengthening the frontline.