Mussolini decides not to help Franco

[Peter89]

Preston states on the same page that between 270 and 899 million pounds was spent on generals and such. The Brits (and that´s what matters here) believed the money did arrive in the hands of the generals through March and they believed the money came from him.

This seems to be a misunderstanding; total yearly Spanish trade was somewhere between 25 and 125 million pounds during 1939-1944. Maybe he was writing about pesetas?

[nuyt]

Sorry, Preston says "in contemporary terms". Pounds, his words.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Guys,

I find in my notes that 75% of Nationalist artillery in early 1937 came from the Italians.

Cheers,

Sid.

[nuyt]

I note now that the original WI question was looking for consequences for Italy, while most of us jumped on Spain

I think the Italians would miss out on a lot of first hand experience and training by not participating in the SCW. Would leave them with less experience and virgin troops. Unless they attack someone else of course.

Equipment wise I think some of what was modern in 1937 might have lost its value by 1940/41 especially when it came to planes and tanks. So they would not have lost that much.

But back to Spain I was wondering if we did not miss something there as well:
If no Italian intervention, would that automatically mean a Franco defeat? What if the Soviets in reaction also lose their interest and hold back their supplies? What if the rest of the world simply watches and blocks the coast? Does the war peter out by itself or will Spain be carved up between a nationalist part (or parts) and Republican ones, a free (leftwing) Catalonia perhaps?

[Ironmachine]

But British intelligence was actively involved with several factions in Franco's establishment and tried to influence it, undermining pro-Axis officials.

Oh, they surely tried, but the question here is whether they succeeded or not, and if they did, how much real power in Spanish affairs had those so "influenced".
The Germans also tried to do the same, by the way.

Preston has been accused of a left wing bias,

guilty as charged!

but his book is still well researched.

I have my own opinion about Preston's research, but it really doesn't matter. What's matters is whether he shows any evidence that the money reached the Spanish generals. From your words, it seems he doesn't

Page 353 is enlightening. Eden thought the Spanish leadership was "a corrupt gang of generals" and the book elsewhere is full of corruption in Franco's regime, right up to the very top. So much for a disciplined, ideologically driven movement.

Oh, but it was not, in any way, a disciplined, ideologically driven movement. In fact, it was not a movement. There were some such people (disciplined, ideologically driven) in the Falange, but even in the party there was much more people that was there simply to thrive. As for the Army, the generals were a bunch of varied ideologies, from the very Falangists to the openly pro-Allied. That's not really surprising, considering Franco's own opinion about politics. In fact, at least in those first years of this "reign", he kept his power by continously outmaneouvering his opponents and by a careful use of the different political groups.

But these stories must be hard to swallow both for Spaniards and Brits, I agree.

Can't see why. It is well-known how much corruption there was in Spain at the time. But the level of corruption is not an indicator of the level of influence attained by the British in Spanish politics.

Preston states on the same page that between 270 and 899 million pounds was spent on generals and such.

That no exact quantity can be given and that the estimates go between 270 and 899 million pouns should be a clear indicator that there is something a bit fishy about all this matter.

The Brits (and that´s what matters here) believed the money did arrive in the hands of the generals through March and they believed the money came from him.

No, that's not what matters here. The question that matters is what degree of influence did the British had over the Spanish generals, and it should be clear that if no money arrived in the hands of the generals, then that level of influence would have been zero, despite what the Brits believed.
On the other hand, even if the generals were really "bribed", it is still questionable what they would have done had Franco decided to throw in his lot with Germany and, not less important, what was the real power they had to do something against that decision (it seems to me that you believe they were far more powerful and had much more influence that they really had).

[Ironmachine]

I think the Italians would miss out on a lot of first hand experience and training by not participating in the SCW. Would leave them with less experience and virgin troops. Unless they attack someone else of course.
Equipment wise I think some of what was modern in 1937 might have lost its value by 1940/41 especially when it came to planes and tanks. So they would not have lost that much.

However, the experience they obtained in the SCW was not really valuable to fight WWII. The SCW was like a poor's man WWI with some WWII weapons thrown in. Even in the air, where the SCW was most "WWII-like", they reached the wrong conclusions. I don't really see they would miss a lost by not participating. And if they don't participate, on the plus side they keep a significant quantity of weaponry (even if outdated it would have been valuable) and above all a significant quantity of money that could have been used to obtain modern weapons.

If no Italian intervention, would that automatically mean a Franco defeat?

Would depende on a number of variables (for example, do the Germans still intervene, and do they increase their support to compensate for the lack of Italian material and men?), but certainly it would have made a rebel defeat much more possible. The first months of the war were a near-run thing.

What if the Soviets in reaction also lose their interest and hold back their supplies?

At fist sight, a Soviet non-intervention is going to make a Republican victory just impossible. However, it could have made the Communists irrelevant and in turn, with a more moderate government in charge, who knows what could have been the reaction of France and Great Britain?
That's the problem with what-ifs and the main reason that I don't like them very much. There are so many things that could happen when you change a single factor that only the person's bias is going to make one option better than another.

What if the rest of the world simply watches and blocks the coast? Does the war peter out by itself or will Spain be carved up between a nationalist part (or parts) and Republican ones, a free (leftwing) Catalonia perhaps?

As my opinion is as good as anyone's, let's say that I see a rebellion defeated (perhaps maintaining Spanish Morocco and the Canaries) and a new civil war breaking up among the Republicans (Anarchists against Stalinists Communists against Troskyists Communists against Nationalists against moderates against....) that probably is going to last a long time, unless some foreign power decides to help decisively one of the factions. As for Catalonia (free from what, by the way?), just the same as in the rest of Spain: Anarchists against Stalinists Communists against Troskyists Communists against Nationalists against moderates against....

[Peter89]

What if the rest of the world simply watches and blocks the coast? Does the war peter out by itself or will Spain be carved up between a nationalist part (or parts) and Republican ones, a free (leftwing) Catalonia perhaps?

As my opinion is as good as anyone's, let's say that I see a rebellion defeated (perhaps maintaining Spanish Morocco and the Canaries) and a new civil war breaking up among the Republicans (Anarchists against Stalinists Communists against Troskyists Communists against Nationalists against moderates against....) that probably is going to last a long time, unless some foreign power decides to help decisively one of the factions. As for Catalonia (free from what, by the way?), just the same as in the rest of Spain: Anarchists against Stalinists Communists against Troskyists Communists against Nationalists against moderates against....

A free left wing Catalonia in 1939 with its current borders would be just as oppressive as it was, because the administrative borders did (and do) not coincede with the ethnic borders. And national identities and claims in 1930's, just as today, can not accept when a medieval or administrative construct, conceived well before or well beyond the concept of nationalism, is not a viable option for homogenous national existence.

On the other hand, I see no problem with a smooth shift from a moderate left to a radical communist regime. The same thing has happened in Hungary in a very short time, and many of the later hard liner communist leaders in the Eastern bloc were already there in Spain.

[nuyt]

Ironmachine, if I understand you correctly, the Italians would be better off in WW2 without the SCW intervention because they would save some equipment and would not make the mistakes learned in SCW? So they would be in a slightly better position, but not a gamechanging one?

[Ironmachine]

Yes, my opinion is basically that they gained nothing valuable from their involvement in the SCW and, on the other hand, the deficiencies of their armed forces in all aspects, compounded by the politics of the Fascist regime, were far too great to be corrected simply by not being involved in the SCW.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Ironmachine,

Whether the Italians ".....gained nothing valuable from their involvement in the SCW" rather depends on how decisive one considers Italian intervention.

In the early days, when the Nationalists were at their most vulnerable, it seems to have been very important. Apart from contributing directly to the highly publicized air lift of part of the Army of Morocco to southern Spain, Italian aircraft covered the larger sea lift and were a deterrent to Republican naval intervention. They then achieved the air superiority under which the Nationalists advanced on Madrid and the CTV may have been key to the capture of Malaga - the first significant Mediterranean coastal port to fall into Nationalist hands. By early 1937 reportedly 75% of Nationalist artillery was Italian-supplied. (This eventually totalled about 10% of Italy's entire artillery park, admittedly largely of the more obsolescent pieces).

If one believes that these early Italian contributions were decisive to the Nationalists getting a secure foothold in southern Spain, and thereby being in a position to go on and win, then the Italians gained a lot, because they ended up with an ideologically sympathetic Nationalist regime in Spain, as opposed to an ideologically hostile Socialist and/or Communist regime. This covered one of their strategic flanks in WWII.

However, the importance of the Italian contribution relative to the German dwindled after early 1937 and when the time came to share the spoils of Nationalist victory, it was the Germans, not the Italians, who scooped up all the best commercial rewards.

I do agree that ".....the deficiencies of their armed forces in all aspects, compounded by the politics of the Fascist regime, were far too great to be corrected simply by not being involved in the SCW." These deficiencies were so fundamental that it may have been beyond the capacity of any Italian regime to fully correct at the time, as only the northern third of the country was significantly industrialized.

Cheers,

Sid.

P.S. A graphic example of Italy's industrial limitations is provided by comparison with Canada. In 1939 Canada produced no warships, tanks or combat aircraft. By 1944 it had produced more warships, tanks and aircraft than had Italy.

[Ironmachine]

Whether the Italians ".....gained nothing valuable from their involvement in the SCW" rather depends on how decisive one considers Italian intervention.

No. Whether the Italians gained something valuable from their involvement in the SCW depends only on whether they gained something valuable from their involvement in the SCW. How decisive the Italian intervention was (and indeed it was) does not change the value (or lack of) of what they gained.

In the early days, when the Nationalists were at their most vulnerable, it seems to have been very important. Apart from contributing directly to the highly publicized air lift of part of the Army of Morocco to southern Spain, Italian aircraft covered the larger sea lift and were a deterrent to Republican naval intervention. They then achieved the air superiority under which the Nationalists advanced on Madrid and the CTV may have been key to the capture of Malaga - the first significant Mediterranean coastal port to fall into Nationalist hands. By early 1937 reportedly 75% of Nationalist artillery was Italian-supplied. (This eventually totalled about 10% of Italy's entire artillery park, admittedly largely of the more obsolescent pieces).

Nothing new here. Anyone with even only a passing knowledge of the SCW should be aware that the Italian contribution was vital, basic, fundamental and essential for the National's victory. I have never said anything different. But all that is not relevant for assessing the benefits the Italians obtained for intervening in the SCW.

If one believes that these early Italian contributions were decisive to the Nationalists getting a secure foothold in southern Spain, and thereby being in a position to go on and win, then the Italians gained a lot, because they ended up with an ideologically sympathetic Nationalist regime in Spain, as opposed to an ideologically hostile Socialist and/or Communist regime. This covered one of their strategic flanks in WWII.

Considering how well having a sympathetic regimen in Spain covering one of their strategic flanks went for the the Italians in WWII, I have to maintain that they gained nothing valuable from their involvement in the SCW.
In fact, one can always wonder if not having that strategic flank covered would have forced the Italians to act more cautiously and perhaps refrain from entering WWII (which would have been (IMHO) far better for them), in which case it should be concluded that the sympathetic regime in Spain was not a gain, but a heavy loss for the Italians.

However, the importance of the Italian contribution relative to the German dwindled after early 1937 and when the time came to share the spoils of Nationalist victory, it was the Germans, not the Italians, who scooped up all the best commercial rewards.

It was a little more complex than that. It was clear for the Spanish leadership that Germany had much more to offer than the Italians in a post-war relationship, and at the same time German geo-political interests were not as directly opposed to those of the new Spanish regime as those of Italy. At the same time certain attitudes of the Italian leadership had caused some ill will towards them in the Spanish top ranks. All those factors and some more combined to exclude Italy from obtaining anything valuable from their involvement. Which, by the way, is the point that I maintain.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Ironmachine,

You post, "How decisive the Italian intervention was (and indeed it was) does not change the value (or lack of) of what they gained."

If one considers their early intervention to have been decisive, then the result was a Nationalist Government.

If one considers their intervention wasn't decisive, then the result may well have been a Socialist and/or Communist Government.

The question then is whether it was more advantageous to have a friendly neutral in the western Mediterranean or a hostile neutral (and later perhaps Allied country) there in WWII. My money is heavily on the former.

Italian intervention in 1936 arguably headed off the possibility of Spain being an unfriendly neutral or even actively hostile in WWII.

You post, "In fact, one can always wonder if not having that strategic flank covered would have forced the Italians to act more cautiously and perhaps refrain from entering WWII (which would have been (IMHO) far better for them)". That rather depends on how much one thinks a continued Fascist regime was a good thing for Italy.

Cheers,

Sid

[nuyt]

Wait a minute: if there is no Italian airlift in the coup, then there may not have been a coup in 1936, at least not as we know it. In fact there may not have been a civil war. The Republican govt would continue to muddle through, or there would be a coup attempt at a later stage, or one supported by Nazi-G only.

[Ironmachine]

You should note that in fact there was no Italian airlift in the coup, nor was it expected to be, as the coup was a purely Spanish affair. Unless I'm missunderstanding you, you mean the crossing of the Strait by the Army of Africa. Well, the Army of Africa was supposed to be transported by Spanish means, first by the Navy and when that failed by the meager aerial means available. The Italians began to operate quite later, when there was already a full blown war going on, and their asistance in that operation was minimal compared with that of the Germans. In fact, the transformation from a military coup to a civil war was almost immediate: as son as the coup failed in the main cities and the left political parties and unions obtained the weapons of the Army stockpiles, it was almost unavoidable.
Also, in case you don't know, there had been many coups, both from right and left, against the Republican governments before. Only they were usually wholly amateur affairs. It's not that the 18 July coup was an example of profesionalism as far as coups go, but compared with the previous ones...