Germany invades France in 1939

[Adeptus Mechanicus]

The nightmare scenario

Germany concludes a pact with the Soviet Union and attacks France in 1939 instead of Poland.
The Mannstein plan works, France capitulates, and the British Expeditionary Force is captured at Dunkirk, with a demoralising effect in the UK.
Hitler makes up his mind to knock out the British Empire. In a feverish effort, Germany builds an invasion fleet of speedboats that can outmanoeuvre the ships of the Royal Navy, and torpedo planes to deal with enemy vessels.
The invasion of the UK is set in march in the summer of 1940, preceded by extremely heavy losses of both air forces in a bitter struggle for air superiority. The sinking of several battleships and destroyers by torpedoes and mines prompts the British Admiralty to withdraw larger assets from the Channel, in order to preserve them for the defence of the Empire.
The German invasion succeeds and the British government and Royal family escape to Canada, wowing to continue the fight. Appeasement-minded British politicians sue for peace. A collaborationist British government is installed under German supervision. A pact with Ireland allows Germany to set up military bases and airports there, too.
In the Winter of 1940/41 Germany invades and occupies North Africa and the Middle East in a blitzkrieg operation.
According to the peace terms with the UK, most of Europe's Jewish population is settled in British colonies administered by officials loyal to the London government.
Tension mounts with the Soviet Union. Stalin is flabbergasted by the fall of France and the UK. Ever the cautious fox, he tries to buy time while he secretly negotiates with the USA about an alliance against Germany. But before the USA can intervene on a large scale, Hitler persuades the Japanese emperor that the Soviet Union should be knocked out with a quick, decisive attack on several fronts, in order to secure Japan's back for its its looming war with the USA.
In May 1941 the Soviet Union is invaded from the West, through Poland and Romania, and from the South, through the Caucasus by Germany, and from the East by Japan. The people of the Caucasus rally the German invaders. The loss of the Baku oil fields deals a severe blow to the war efforts of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Red Army suffers tremendous losses. Moscow falls in August 1941. An embittered General Vlasov arrests and executes Stalin and his Politburo and installs a nationalist military dictatorship based in the city of Perm. In large-scale purges the NKVD and the Communist Party are dismantled, their leaders exterminated. Vlasov tries to negotiate a honourable peace and an alliance with Germany. The peace terms are severe: Russia loses the Ukraine, the Baltic, Belarus, the Karelian Isthmus North of the line Leningrad-Arkhangelsk, and the territory South of Rostov-on-Don - Stalingrad - Astrakhan, including these cities to Germany. The Central Asian Republics become independent, allied to Germany. Japan occupies the territory East of the River Lena and Lake Baikal.
Impressed by these victories, in early 1942 Heisenberg makes up his mind to perform serious calculations about the construction of an atomic bomb, and large scale experiments begin...
President Roosevelt tries to engage the USA into a war against Japan, but his admirals are reluctant. Finally, under the pressure from an isolationist-turned public Congress impeaches him in 1943.
Adolf Hitler dies in may 1945 from an overdose of his cocktail administered by his physician, dr Morell. Hermann Göring takes his place and he reshuffles the government by getting rid of Himmler, Göring, Bormann and other potential rivals.
Arranged by Indian president Subhas Chandra Bose, German foreign minister Ernst von Weizsäcker and US state secretary Joseph Kennedy sign a "détente" agreement in New Delhi, on the basis of the doctrine: "Eurasia for the Eurasians, America for the Americans". The US annexes Canada and the British royal family retires to Australia.

[Peter89]

1. If the Germans turn to the west first, they most likely lose.
2. Even if they win, the loss of the BEF at Dunkirk does not mean too much except morale.
3. The Germans couldn't build an invasion fleet by the summer of 1940.
4. They could not win aerial superiority either.
5. There were not too many "large assets" in the Channel; the battle fleet was stationed at Scapa Flow, and other units at Gibraltar and Alexandria. The defense of the Channel was the task of many destroyer flottilas.
6. Torpedoes could basically come from U-boats, but they were vulnerable if deployed against properly screened battle fleets. Torpedoes from aircrafts, even if possible, were in their diaper age in 1940.
7. The mining operation was not successful.
8. Thus, the British defenses never failed and were never even close to defeat. The Germans were not stupid; they didn't launch Sealion because they knew they could not win it.
9. Before the Middle East and North Africa could be conquered, Scandinavia and the Balkans should be secured, no? In any case, if Britain falls, the NA and the ME immediately falls into German hands. If Britain doesn't fall, the Germans had little chance to conduct a campaign in NA and the ME, especially in the winter of 1940/1941.
10. Japan was already swamped in China. Its forces deployed against the Soviets were always inferior to them; besides, there was nothing in the Far Eastern SU that Japan would need. Japan needs could only be met in SE Asia, so that's where they attacked. They could also profit from a conclusion of war in China, if such thing was possible at all (no, if you ask me).
11. Why would the people of the Caucasus rally the German invaders?
12. There was no chance for a German atomic weapon. Mother never pregnant, baby never born.
13. As far as I know, Hitler got vitamins and not drugs injected. He never smoke, he didn't drink, he was either devoted to one woman or abstinent and he was a vegetarian. By today's standards, he ran a perfectly healthy lifestyle (although we take vitamins orally these days), unlike his opponents who were alcoholics, narcos, smoke like a rubber factory and had many extramartial relationships with questionable women.

[T. A. Gardner]

If the Germans try the Belgium route with an Ardennes push like they did in 1940, they are going to fail. The push towards Liege runs into the Belgian fortress system intact. Eben Emael doesn't fall because there are no glider borne engineers to take it out. This means that leg slows to a crawl pushing through those forts. The Germans will, but the French and British are now forward and in their positions ready to meet them.

In the Ardennes, with less Luftwaffe support than in 1940, and panzer divisions less well equipped to deal with a major river crossing, the French are able to hold at the Meuse and the German plan dies. Now stuck in a war of attrition, the Germans are facing the very real possibility of another WW 1 stalemate.

If that happens, Hitler finds the public less and less willing to support a long war Germany likely can't win.

[maltesefalcon]

If the timeline of the French campaign goes similar to IRL and it takes place from 3 Sept/1939...
IMHO BEF will be a minor player. IRL they were not really ready to take their field positions until 6 weeks after hostilities started. This with no other distractions or spoiling attacks.
Again IRL, the German forces moved from Sedan to the coast in 10 days. This may not have happened quite this quickly in 1939, but I'm trying to add some perspective. So the part of the BEF that does land, may not get far from the coast at all. Most of them would still be in UK (and uncaptured) by late October.

[Carl Schwamberger]

If the Germans try the Belgium route with an Ardennes push like they did in 1940, they are going to fail. The push towards Liege runs into the Belgian fortress system intact. Eben Emael doesn't fall because there are no glider borne engineers to take it out. This means that leg slows to a crawl pushing through those forts. The Germans will, but the French and British are now forward and in their positions ready to meet them.

In the Ardennes, with less Luftwaffe support than in 1940, and panzer divisions less well equipped to deal with a major river crossing, the French are able to hold at the Meuse and the German plan dies. ...

Referring to Mays analysis of the development of the plans for the May 1940 campaign: Halder, Rundsteadt, & the other principles had zero confidence the October offensive would result in a 'victory'. Previous war games, map & field exercises, had poor results for the German team. After the October attack was canceled Halder scheduled additional map exercises in early November. Three were run, including one testing a attack through the Ardennes, all three failed to achieve decisive results, and one failed miserably. If the leaders most familiar with the German military capabilities thought it should fail I don't see much of a case for optimism on our part.

[MLW]

Keep in mind that the coordinated large unit maneuvers and combined operations that made the 1940 invasion of the West a success for Germany, were the result of experience gained in the Polish campaign and the planning and training conducted between the the Polish and Western campaigns.

[T. A. Gardner]

If you look carefully at the Belgian defenses, without being able to take out Eben Emael, the Germans are going to be two weeks or so crushing the defenses in front of Liege. An Ardennes push does nothing for them if the supporting flanking maneuver through Belgium isn't there to support. The panzer divisions would be much weaker in terms of tanks being mostly Pz I and II with only a relatively--much smaller--number of Pz III and IV. The smaller number of infantry divisions wouldn't help anything either.



Autin-Neufchateau held out to like May 29th before falling, as one example.

The point here is, without the preparations made for the May 1940 invasion, a September 1939 invasion will almost certainly fail.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Among the preparations made November 40 - March 41 was the idea of concentrating the armored corps. The plan Manstein wrote, for Rundsteadts Army Group A to use in the 7 November 39 war-game had less than half the armored divisions used in the 'schweherpunckt'. The primary mass of maneuver directed in this plan was composed of combined arms infantry/artillery corps and concentration of air support. As in the Polish campaign the armor corps were not concentrated but used operationaly separately. In May 1940 seven of the ten armored divisions and three of five motor rifle divisions were operationally concentrated in the Ardennes. Something that was not in the plans tested October thru January 1940. Guderian had argued from the start of the formation of the armored force in the 1930s for operational and strategic concentration of tanks, & Manstein claimed post war he had done the same for the offensive into Belgium. But, the actuality is no one understood in 1939 how this could actually be executed. it too four to five months of field exercises, staff analysis, and map tests to figure out the practical details.

[nuyt]

Will there be an attack on the Netherlands? If so, will it be the same or without airborne ops and less LW support as well? In that case the Dutch might hold out a bit longer, focus all they have at the advancing Germans (and not the airborne) and may get help from the French?

[Carl Schwamberger]

Will there be an attack on the Netherlands?

One of the points Mays makes in his 'Strange Victory' is the German air force leaders insisted on securing the Dutch airfields. They wanted them to use to better dominate the North Sea and make bombing raids on England practical. It appears the Luftwaffe leaders had no confidence the intended offensive would advance far enough into Belgium to give them airfields on the Channel. This lack of confidence was shared by many other generals and marshals.

Mays states at one point, in a January review of options and plans it was proposed the Netherlands be left neutral. The Luftwaffe representatives blackballed the idea, insisting the Dutch airfields were essential to subsequent operations.

'Strange Victory' is a good primer for understanding the evolution of the German offensive plans October 1939 - March 1940. And, for some of the decisions made during the campaign.

Another argument for advancing into the Netherlands is it provides a approach to block the Scheldt & the port of Antwerp. The latter provided a supply route to the Belgian and British armies fighting in central Belgium. Advancing along the Rhine not only outflanks the Belgian/Brit armies but threatens to interdict a direct supply route.

[nuyt]

Well in the plans from late Oct 30 to early 1940 the Germans do not envisage an attack on the Vesting Holland, the main cities and ports in the west of the country. Just a dash through the southern part to enter Flanders from the North. So that would leave the western NL in a far better position: no frontal attack on the Grebbelines, no attempt to cross the Afsluitdijk in the north and no airborne assault on the airbases, bridges and govt. The Dutch thus have a fighting chance of surviving a first round of fighting (map from https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fall_Gelb), with Allied help coming their way.

[Carl Schwamberger]

None of the plans tested in map or field exercises produced the results desired in 1939. Halders diary hints at a bit of frustration over this. Mays & others refer to a wargame of 7 Nov 1939 where Halders directed three plans be tested:

1 The main effort with Army Group B across soyuh Netherlands & into the Belgian Plain

2 Main effort through the Ardennes

3 No main effort in the initial attack, with a large reserve set aside to exploit any success in this broad front attack.

Mays states #3 showed clearly bad results. The other two also failed, tho #2 showed slightly better results. As I pointed out in a earlier post, the idea of massing the armored corps into a single operational strike group was not part of these early 1939 plans. Guderian & a few others argued for it, but the default at this time was a dispersal similar to the Polish campaign.

These negative results in map and field tests or exercises continued to. March 1940. By then Halder had decided to focus on the main effort wi Army Group A, or more specifically the Sickle Cut variation. In the tests that one failed less miserably than the others.

One other point that pops up in the books. In a March 1940 map exercise the intelligence officer controlling the Allied armies.proposed the French leaders would act slower than previously assumed. He delayed the critical Allied decisions by a extra 24-48 hours. This led to much better results in the map game. It was also criticized as being unrealistic and not a good test.

[Hiryu-]

The best part of this scenario is Göring getting rid of himself after taking power

Adolf Hitler dies in may 1945 from an overdose of his cocktail administered by his physician, dr Morell. Hermann Göring takes his place and he reshuffles the government by getting rid of Himmler, Göring, Bormann and other potential rivals.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Getting back to the OP. Following the most likely outcome, a autum/winter stalemate, The first question concerns s change in French leadership.

Gamelin may survive as the hero of the moment, but he was past his 'best before' date. His managerial style was suitable for organizing and training a army, bit not on battle command. If he is not replaced it's likely he would remain responsible for organizing the global war effort, but the conduct of the battle would be in the hands of a commander of the NW Front who'd report to the minister of defense & not Gamelin.

The longivetity of Daladiers government is another question. I'm not versed enough in French politics to judge if it lasts longer or shorter than OTL.

What I am certain of is there will be a steady replacement of the corps, army, army group, and front commanders. OTL several like George's seem to have had mental breakdowns early in the 1940 campaign. There was a increasing feeling OTL the old heros of 1918 had their time & fresh younger men were needed. A 1939 campaign will bring that to a head & any successful regiment or division & corps commander will enjoy some accelerated promotions.

[nuyt]

ok, so a winter stalemate. Holland survives and is now fully under arms and receives equipment from the allies and some troops. The south is occupied and so is Belgium.
RAF now uses Dutch airbases and Hurricanes have been supplied to the NL AF. AIr battle over the Western front must be intense. Bombing raids makes citizens suffer and flee from towns near the battle lines.
Can the Dutch lines hold when the frost is over by spring 1940?
Not without massive Allied aid...and since war started 6 months earlier than in reality, the Dutch miss several deliveries, like AA guns from Skoda, Bofors and Scotti, Bohler anti tank guns from Austria, the first batch of the 10,5 cm lFH from Germany, etc. And their own production is 6 months behind the real Fall Gelb.
If the Brits can deliver, let's say a 120 40mm Boforses, 60 or so Vickers 3.7 inch, 150 2 pdr antitank guns, 60 25pdrs, 200 Cruiser and Vickers light tanks, 10.000 Bren guns, 25.000 Tommy guns, 5000 Vickers MMG, 1000 .50s and lots and lots of ammo, plus one or two divisions to shore up NL defences, will that save the Dutch? It will be tight...