Impact of the R4M if it was ready earlier?

[TheMarcksPlan]

Or can you for once admit that logical analysis has brought you to view something differently?

Yes, I admit openly that 10,000 F-15 might not be realistic either.

But... I can't prove it.

So in my day job this is what a judge calls "resisting the hypothetical." An accusation that one is doing so is the surest sign one is going to lose.

The lawyer resisting the hypothetical is either (1) failing to distinguish between a test of theory and a test of facts because he's not smart enough to know the difference, or (2) is smart enough to know the difference but realizes that obfuscation on his legal theory is better than conceding he's in error (if the client is watching, this is an especially attractive fallback).

Were this a court, a competent judge would note that you began by arguing on the theory then, when challenged, pivoted to disputing facts. He'd probably ascribe (2) as the explanation.

[Peter89]

Or can you for once admit that logical analysis has brought you to view something differently?

Yes, I admit openly that 10,000 F-15 might not be realistic either.

But... I can't prove it.

So in my day job this is what a judge calls "resisting the hypothetical." An accusation that one is doing so is the surest sign one is going to lose.

The lawyer resisting the hypothetical is either (1) failing to distinguish between a test of theory and a test of facts or is (2) not smart enough to know the difference, or (3) is smart enough to know the difference but realizes that obfuscation on his legal theory is better than conceding he's in error.

Were this a court, a competent judge would note that you began by arguing on the theory then, when challenged, pivoted to disputing facts. He'd probably ascribe (3) as the explanation.

I assume you know, as an educated lawyer, that I am used to a very different judicial sytem than the one you claim to work in.

[TheMarcksPlan]

I assume you know, as an educated lawyer, that I am used to a very different judicial sytem than the one you claim to work in.

Sure but I assume your legal system involves matters of pure logic and of facts as well.

Therefore your judges - I am all but certain - use hypotheticals to test different logical theories of how the law should be read.

Does a law banning all vehicles from a park mean literally all vehicles? Ok so if an ambulance drives into the park to pick up a sick person, does the ambulance get a ticket?

Bad lawyer: There are barriers around the park so an ambulance couldn't get in.
Good judge: [annoyed, condescending tone] You're resisting the hypothetical, counselor. Ok say it's a medic on a motorcycle, I assume the barriers are of cone style so you can walk through them?
Bad lawyer: Errrrrr, ummmmm....
Judge: Does the law mandate a ticket for the medic or not?
Bad lawyer: Errr, ummm....

Good lawyer: Answers the hypothetical (sees the logical issue beforehand, is prepared to address it).

Bad Lawyer's Client: Shit, should have hired that other lawyer.

[Peter89]

I assume you know, as an educated lawyer, that I am used to a very different judicial sytem than the one you claim to work in.

Sure but I assume your legal system involves matters of pure logic and of facts as well.

Therefore your judges - I am all but certain - use hypotheticals to test different logical theories of how the law should be read.

Does a law banning all vehicles from a park mean literally all vehicles? Ok so if an ambulance drives into the park to pick up a sick person, does the ambulance get a ticket?

Bad lawyer: There are barriers around the park so an ambulance couldn't get in.
Good judge: Ok say it's a medic on a motorcycle, I assume the barriers are of cone style so you can walk through them?
Bad lawyer: Errrrrr, ummmmm....

Good lawyer: Answers the hypothetical (sees the logical issue beforehand, is prepared to address it).

I am not an educated lawyer, so I can not make wild assumptions what would happen in a court room.

I really do not use it as an excuse; my few encounters with the legal system here (and by "here" I mean a dozen of European countries) never involved "hypotheticals". Let it be an S-Bahn ticket validation issue in Berlin or opening a bank account in Greece or renting an apartment in Slovenia or founding a self-employed company in Spain, no one really accepted the idea of "what if".

Sometimes it is good to admit that you don't know something, but I guess it is not a reasonable policy for a lawyer in front of any court.

[TheMarcksPlan]

my few encounters with the legal system here (and by "here" I mean a dozen of European countries) never involved "hypotheticals".

In most cases the law is pretty clear, unless it's not. When it's not, hypotheticals are bread and butter to the legal process.

These cases are usually decided by appellate judges being argued to by appellate lawyers, all of whom are practiced in and comfortable with counterfactual reasoning. Listen to any U.S. Supreme Court oral argument and a significant portion of every one is taken up by discussing hypotheticals.

The point is that hypotheticals are done at the highest level of serious intellectual discourse daily. Somehow they're not seen as respectable on Axis History Forum's "What If" section; here people are above that stuff. It's risible.

[danebrog]

Did I actually read something here about 10.000 Japanese F-15s during the World War? In a WI about an earlier deployment of the R4M?
Sometimes I can't get out of my amazement.
And at the risk of appearing totally boring, I would prefer to return the focus to the actual subject matter:

The Me 262 was virtually thrown into front-line service as a pre-production sample. The main reason was that only it could break through the effective fighter screen.
If one were to assume an earlier date - let's just say mid-1944 - then R4M missions would have been flown with Fw-190 A-8 versions.
We can also gladly assume that this was done at the expense of the urgently needed fighter-bomber versions on the Eastern Front.
An assault group of, let´s say, 60 aircraft would then be mathematically capable of firing over 1400 rockets at a bomber group. This would probably result in an increased loss rate for the bombers. However, I dare not make any assumptions about the actual number. But let's just assume that the losses will be quite painful.

Off the top of my head I can think of 3 possibilities to directly counter an assumed higher loss rate of the bombers:
Missions above 7000m, since the performance of the 190 was pretty miserable here. (This could be reduced by an MW-50 injection, but it only worked for 10 minutes).
Increased bad weather operations, as also practised by OTL.
In addition, a significant increase in escort fighter strength, as was already practised by the German Luftwaffe during the BoB in 1940.

If this did not solve the problem, the only option would be to switch to night operations. Here one could profit from the RAF's wealth of experience.
And the Luftwaffe would not have been in a position to counter this with a corresponding reinforcement of the night fighters....
I simply lack any reliable data for further speculation.

In the end, however, IMHO it would only have delayed the outcome of the war, because it would certainly not have prevented Overlord and even more so Bagration.

[Richard Anderson]

Not all these 182,000 sorties are against heavy bombers though are they? Isn’t that total LW sorties in West?

You are correct Tom, 29,353 engaged daylight HB raids on the "Reich" (which periodically included places like Budapest, but close enough). Another 15,746 engaged night HB raids. There were also of course a large number of sorties flown, which did not engage, although I have not calculated the total. For example, in the raid on Pilsen 23 September 1944, 72 1E fighters sortied, but only 1 managed to engage, suffering 60% damage and making no claim of inflicting losses on the bombers.

[Ружичасти Слон]

So in my day job this is what a judge calls "resisting the hypothetical." An accusation that one is doing so is the surest sign one is going to lose.

The lawyer resisting the hypothetical is either (1) failing to distinguish between a test of theory and a test of facts because he's not smart enough to know the difference, or (2) is smart enough to know the difference but realizes that obfuscation on his legal theory is better than conceding he's in error (if the client is watching, this is an especially attractive fallback).

Were this a court, a competent judge would note that you began by arguing on the theory then, when challenged, pivoted to disputing facts. He'd probably ascribe (2) as the explanation.

I think you was just explain that legal system on your country have nothing to do on justice nothing to do on facts nothing to do on truth but it have everything to do on hypotheticals (= imaginations storys)

Tmp lawyer : My client was not be guilt because i propose blah blah blah

resisting the hypothetical lawyer : Blah blah blah is not credible and have no resaonableness

Judge : [annoyed, condescending tone] You're resisting the hypothetical, counselor. You must accept hypothetical must to be true . Resistence is futile.

[Richard Anderson]

Let's look at the German effort versus daylight strategic bombing in April 1944.

The Luftwaffe flew 4,469 1E and 547 2E sorties against USAAF missions on 19 days. Of those, 2,998 1E and 273 2E fighters actually engaged, 67.1% and 49.9% respectively.

German losses were 378 destroyed, 46 missing, and 153 damaged 60% or more, sadly not differentiated between 1E and 2E. Thus, 11.5% of all sorties launched and 17.6% of engaged sorties were lost.

Eighth AF flew 6,447 effective HB sorties and lost 324 HB, 5.0%. Fifteenth AF flew 1,381 sorties and lost 52, 3.8%. Combined it was 376 lost of 7,828 sorties, 4.8%.

Overall in April, the Luftwaffe in the West reported 61 1E and 2E day fighters missing in the West (Reich, Ob.West, and Ob. Süd), 356 destroyed by enemy contact, 34 without enemy contact, 51 damaged 60% by enemy contact, 52 damaged 60% without enemy contact, 57 destroyed on the ground, 48 damaged 60% on the ground, 84 destroyed in non-combat operational flights, 111 60% damaged in non-combat operational flights, 109 destroyed in non-operational flights, and 234 60% damaged in non-operational flights. So 659 lost classified as to enemy action and 343 lost not to enemy action.

But the R4M will solve all the Luftwaffe's problems...

[EKB]

There is more to predictions than sorting out past results and technical limits of unguided rockets. With group dynamics changing from day to day, good luck trying to reckon with the math of human error. Pilots were excited in the heat of combat and made miscalculations when shooting. It’s not easy to forecast how many pilots would make mistakes on the same mission.

Like so many arguments in this forum, a rule change that favors one side does not account for the unknown but inevitable adjustments by the other side.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Let's look at the German effort versus daylight strategic bombing in April 1944.

Great, I'm sure this will directly address the marginal impact of R4M use in April 1944.

The Luftwaffe flew 4,469 1E and 547 2E sorties against USAAF missions on 19 days. Of those, 2,998 1E and 273 2E fighters actually engaged, 67.1% and 49.9% respectively.

German losses were 378 destroyed, 46 missing, and 153 damaged 60% or more, sadly not differentiated between 1E and 2E. Thus, 11.5% of all sorties launched and 17.6% of engaged sorties were lost.

Eighth AF flew 6,447 effective HB sorties and lost 324 HB, 5.0%. Fifteenth AF flew 1,381 sorties and lost 52, 3.8%. Combined it was 376 lost of 7,828 sorties, 4.8%.

Overall in April, the Luftwaffe in the West reported 61 1E and 2E day fighters missing in the West (Reich, Ob.West, and Ob. Süd), 356 destroyed by enemy contact, 34 without enemy contact, 51 damaged 60% by enemy contact, 52 damaged 60% without enemy contact, 57 destroyed on the ground, 48 damaged 60% on the ground, 84 destroyed in non-combat operational flights, 111 60% damaged in non-combat operational flights, 109 destroyed in non-operational flights, and 234 60% damaged in non-operational flights. So 659 lost classified as to enemy action and 343 lost not to enemy action.

Nope, another list of OTL stats.

At least this time you didn't pretend to analyze ATL R4M use by assuming its marginal impact would be precisely zero, as you did last time.

But the R4M will solve all the Luftwaffe's problems...

Once more AHF hysteria about magic cures. Neither Glenn239 nor I have claimed R4M would even stop the CBO, yet the hysterical see Wehraboos everywhere they look.

Moderators - this isn't strictly a rule violation but surely there must be a general disfavoring of misrepresenting the opposition?

Like so many arguments in this forum, a rule change that favors one side does not account for the unknown but inevitable adjustments by the other side.

...and of course more whining about neglected Allied responses by people making no arguments about such responses.

[Richard Anderson]

Has anyone else noticed that the assertion is now being made that the R4M was four to ten times more effective than the Jagdwaffe's guns? Without a shred of evidence. It is solely based upon glenn239's WAG. Christ wept.

Has anyone else noticed the strawman that I assumed the impact of the R4M would be zero? I assume, based upon the limited evidence, that it was no more and no less lethal than the Jagdwaffe's guns. That at least is based upon evidence rather than an addiction to "hypothetical" arguments.

My remark that the "R4M will solve all the Luftwaffe's problems..." is a commentary on the ability of some posters to ignore complexity while substituting magic bullets, then drawing conclusions from thin air.

[T. A. Gardner]

For example, the US might put a lot more effort into making glide bombs work............Those were tested in late 1944 on a few occasions with indifferent results but the theory was workable.

In wunderwaffe -speak that means it is a spectacular success and it can be put into production for immediate service with no more testing or pilot training required.

Not to mention fitted to hundreds of planes simultaneously with the pilots getting top notch skills in its use by osmosis...

[EKB]

Like so many arguments in this forum, a rule change that favors one side does not account for the unknown but inevitable adjustments by the other side.

...and of course more whining about neglected Allied responses by people making no arguments about such responses.

...

Let's reward rational, non-partisan dialogue and try to ignore the bad stuff.

…

[T. A. Gardner]

There is more to predictions than sorting out past results and technical limits of unguided rockets. With group dynamics changing from day to day, good luck trying to reckon with the math of human error. Pilots were excited in the heat of combat and made miscalculations when shooting. It’s not easy to forecast how many pilots would make mistakes on the same mission.

Like so many arguments in this forum, a rule change that favors one side does not account for the unknown but inevitable adjustments by the other side.

This is sometimes called the McNamara fallacy...

The McNamara Fallacy is to presume that (A) quantitative models of reality are always more accurate than other models; (B) the quantitative measurements that can be made most easily must be the most relevant; and (C) factors other than those currently being used in quantitative metrics must either not exist or not have a significant influence on success. This flawed approach to reasoning is also known as the quantitative fallacy.

This isn’t to say that quantification is always a mistake. The mistake of the McNamara Fallacy is to presume that quantitative analysis is always the most effective option.

Careful quantitative thinkers recognize the limitations of the metrics they employ. Statistician W. Edwards Deming, who founded Total Quality Management, warned his followers that, “Nothing becomes more important just because you can measure it. It becomes more measurable, that’s all.”

http://mcnamarafallacy.com/