WI: Germany conserves its forces after the Fall of France - Britain is left alone

[Politician01]

Raeder and Dönitz convince Hitler that an invasion of Britain is not possible even with air superiority - as a result there is no BoB and Germany conserves as many forces as possible for the confrontation against he Soviet Union - the U boat campaign continues though - how does this change the course of the war?

-Germany saves around 3000 Pilots and 4000 aircraft that were lost against Britain in the July 1940 to May 1941 period
- Less US support for Britain because there are no pictures of a bombed London - perhaps this prevents Lend-Lease from being passed?
- Germany saves a lot of aircraft fuel

IMO this is a serious threat to the Soviets in 1941 and could alter the outcome of the 1941 campaign.

[glenn239]

IMO this is a serious threat to the Soviets in 1941 and could alter the outcome of the 1941 campaign.

Agreed, but unlikely to alter the outcome of the war in the East itself.

[Politician01]

Agreed, but unlikely to alter the outcome of the war in the East itself.

I am not so sure about that. OTl Barbarossa started with just 3000 aircraft of which just 2000 were operational. In this ATL the Germans have 7000 of which at least 5000 are operational - thats 2.5x their OTL strenght. The additional damage inflicted on the Soviets by these thousands of aircraft might well be enough to shift the balance in 1941 or 1942.

[pugsville]

Raeder and Dönitz convince Hitler that an invasion of Britain is not possible even with air superiority - as a result there is no BoB and Germany conserves as many forces as possible for the confrontation against he Soviet Union - the U boat campaign continues though - how does this change the course of the war?

-Germany saves around 3000 Pilots and 4000 aircraft that were lost against Britain in the July 1940 to May 1941 period
- Less US support for Britain because there are no pictures of a bombed London - perhaps this prevents Lend-Lease from being passed?
- Germany saves a lot of aircraft fuel

IMO this is a serious threat to the Soviets in 1941 and could alter the outcome of the 1941 campaign.

I'd question those numbers.

The Germans would be unable to support more aircraft operating deep into Russia than they did historically. They would have the exact same logistical base supporting more stuff. The Same amount of stuff could be supplied, more aircraft could be supplied only if other stuff did not get fuel, spares, replacements and food.

No difference.

[Politician01]

No difference.

Wrong. Tremendous difference.

While you are - partially - right that the Germans could not have supplied 2 or 3 times the OTL number of aircraft - they would have practially infinite reserves to keep up their strenght of 2000 operational machines. OTL they had 2000 operational ones in June 41 but less than 1000 by October and some 500 in December (quoting from memory here). If they keep up the 2000 number the entire time - they have double the operational number in October and 4 times the number in December.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Germany saves around 3000 Pilots and 4000 aircraft that were lost against Britain in the July 1940 to May 1941 period

Hi,

How do you think the British would have responded in this ATL? What would they have done with all those spare Hurricanes? How many losses did Germany suffer between June 1940 - 1941 that didn't involve the Battle of Britain? Balkans, Mediterranean, North Africa, etc?

Regards

Tom

[Peter89]

Agreed, but unlikely to alter the outcome of the war in the East itself.

I am not so sure about that. OTl Barbarossa started with just 3000 aircraft of which just 2000 were operational. In this ATL the Germans have 7000 of which at least 5000 are operational - thats 2.5x their OTL strenght. The additional damage inflicted on the Soviets by these thousands of aircraft might well be enough to shift the balance in 1941 or 1942.

The Germans would try to bomb Britain in any case. If they do so, they lose that air campaign and the planes.

If by any chance they don't do so, they'd do so in the SU, as they planned to bomb the SU's industries east of the A-A line; thus, they'd lose those planes over the Urals instead of over Britain.

If by any chance the Germans were extraordinarily successful in the SU, and then didn't waste their aircrafts against the remaining Soviet industry - then they would never increase and rationalize production. Milch & co. never get their positions and the Messerschmitt factories would produce aluminum ladders for vineyards even in 1943.

[Admiral Bloonbeard]

Raeder's Mediterranean strategy would happen here instead of Goering's Battle of Britain

[Peter89]

Raeder's Mediterranean strategy would happen here instead of Goering's Battle of Britain

What was Raeder's Mediterranean strategy?

[thaddeus_c]

Germany could have pursued a more ... ?? ... cautious bombing campaign directed at the British ports and shipping in the Channel?

the KM could hold all the surface ships in Norway, a real fleet-in-being, while constructing the u-boat bunkers there also.

not sure if that would conserve enough to impact Barbarossa, or where it could impact operations? if they addressed their transport aircraft deficiencies (and shortage) that might change things.

[pugsville]

No difference.

Wrong. Tremendous difference.

While you are - partially - right that the Germans could not have supplied 2 or 3 times the OTL number of aircraft - they would have practially infinite reserves to keep up their strenght of 2000 operational machines. OTL they had 2000 operational ones in June 41 but less than 1000 by October and some 500 in December (quoting from memory here). If they keep up the 2000 number the entire time - they have double the operational number in October and 4 times the number in December.

How are these aircraft moved, maintained. The problems with serviceability in decemebe were a lot to do with weather, and maintenance, the Germans still have the same maintenance resources.These aircraft do not magically appear at teh front, soem how gift wrapped to be unwrapped when some other aircraft goes out of service.

Supply and maintenance resources are not infinitely expandable, they are finite. Practically increasing the number of aircraft in Germany does not increase aircraft at the front.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Raeder and Dönitz convince Hitler that an invasion of Britain is not possible even with air superiority - as a result there is no BoB and Germany conserves as many forces as possible for the confrontation against he Soviet Union - the U boat campaign continues though - how does this change the course of the war?

-Germany saves around 3000 Pilots and 4000 aircraft that were lost against Britain in the July 1940 to May 1941 period
- Less US support for Britain because there are no pictures of a bombed London - perhaps this prevents Lend-Lease from being passed?
- Germany saves a lot of aircraft fuel

IMO this is a serious threat to the Soviets in 1941 and could alter the outcome of the 1941 campaign.

A few things to consider:

• Bombing Britain (at night), after the BoB proper, was probably extremely efficient. For a few hundred bombers, Germany forced Britain to divert enormous resources to factory dispersal and AA defense.
• Impact on Stalin? Increased Soviet preparations for Barbarossa can make more of a difference than a stronger LW.
• Britain also lost planes in the BoB, you'd need to account for German losses to these planes in Circus sweeps over France or elsewhere. Good news for Germany is the casualty ratios (especially pilots) are much better over France than over Britain but still...

IMO the optimal strategy would have been not to do the daylight BoB - Hitler never really believed in it anyway - but to start night-bombing immediately. Portray it as a longer-term strategy aimed especially at Britain's sea LoC's (as indeed it was partially OTL and should more have been). Hitler simultaneously gives a speech rousing the German public to maximal war effort, saying they'd get to London this year or next - however long it took. That keeps Stalin satisfied that Hitler's tied up in the West.

This alternate strategy still leaves you a significantly stronger LW because most losses were in the daylight campaign and increased losses over France will be lower than in BoB.

Re impact on US, what's your evidence/argument that BoB was decisive/necessary in, for example, getting Lend-Lease approved or convoying ships? It's not an implausible argument, I just hesitate to accept it absent more.

[T. A. Gardner]

The Germans are still going to be forced to bail the Italians out in N. Africa, and they'll still have to invade the Balkans for the same reason. No BoB just means the British start their bomber war earlier and force a German response on that earlier.

Now, if the Luftwaffe was told to make a concentrated effort on sinking British shipping while carrying out a campaign of harassment against Britain itself to keep the RAF busy, that might have a serious effect. British merchant shipping in the second half of 1940 was mostly unarmed, and those ships that did have some weapons were usually equipped with obsolete materials on a pathetic level. This would mean that the Luftwaffe could pretty much freely attack any merchant they found and usually sink it.
That would have created a huge crisis for the Royal Navy. They didn't have the hulls, aircraft, or weapons to mount a serious and concerted defense against an all-out war on shipping. The RAF lacks the sort of aircraft necessary to provide any sort of real air cover for shipping either.

The Luftwaffe did try this to an extent with the Kanalkrieg but that was poorly executed. What the Luftwaffe needed to be doing is ranging further out to sea in an organized fashion and tracking down and sinking ships there. Look at how successful a mere handful of FW 200 were doing that mission.
Where the Luftwaffe planes can't get out to shipping at sea, have them target shipping in port.

[History Learner]

IMO this is a serious threat to the Soviets in 1941 and could alter the outcome of the 1941 campaign.

Agreed, but unlikely to alter the outcome of the war in the East itself.

To quote from Denis Havlat (2017) Western Aid for the Soviet Union During World War II: Part I, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies -

With Britain’s refusal to make peace with Germany, the Luftwaffe was forced to commit substantial forces into the bombing of Britain, and later into the Mediterranean, resulting in costly losses. From 1 July 1940 to 22 June 1941, the Luftwaffe lost 4,313 aircraft, including 1,688 bombers and 1,100 fighters.108 Additionally, not all available aircraft could be used against the USSR. By 22 June 1941 a total of 1,561 German aircraft were stationed at other fronts in Europe and in the Mediterranean fighting against Britain, as compared to 3,104 stationed at the Eastern Front.109 German historian Rolf Dietrich-Müller concludes that if Britain had arranged itself with Hitler in the summer of 1940, the Luftwaffe could have used up to 9,640 aircraft at the start of Barbarossa, which would have resulted in a quick victory over the USSR.110 In the second half of 1941, Luftwaffe losses against the Royal Air Force (RAF) remained far lower than the losses sustained against the Soviet air force; however, they were still substantial. By 27 December 1941 the Germans had lost 2,505 aircraft in the East, while losses on all other fronts since June 1941 amounted to 779 aircraft.111​

[History Learner]

[*]Impact on Stalin? Increased Soviet preparations for Barbarossa can make more of a difference than a stronger LW.

OTL was the best case for them in this regard; Stalin was doing everything he could.

[*]Britain also lost planes in the BoB, you'd need to account for German losses to these planes in Circus sweeps over France or elsewhere. Good news for Germany is the casualty ratios (especially pilots) are much better over France than over Britain but still...

This strategy was unsustainable for the RAF even in 1942, so I'd imagine it would be even worse in 1940 or 1941.