An alternate end to the Pacific War

[T. A. Gardner]

In this scenario, the US decides about the time of Iwo Jima and Okinawa that invading Japan directly will be too costly in manpower and material. So, the leadership decides to isolate Japan's home islands as thoroughly as possible without invading and is going to let them starve into the stone age until either invasion is possible at far less cost or Japan surrenders.

The US doesn't supply the Soviet Union with landing craft and other materials for an invasion of Japan since they see no reason to do so given their own postponement of an invasion. Bombing and shelling of Japanese cities continues as it has been. Nukes are still used on cities once they become available. Mining of harbors and movement into the Sea of Japan by the USN in force occurs.

The US instead of invading Japan invades China and Korea. Japan really can't do anything to stop either operation from happening. Their navy is crippled and the few ships left are starved of fuel and often in poor material condition.

As their army in China is wiped out, their colonies there fall, and the home islands are now facing starvation, and industry is grinding to a halt from lack of raw materials, at what point do the Japanese call it quits, or would they?

[Kingfish]

I'm with you on the first part but what is the reason for the second?

Operation downfall is nixed because of the estimated butcher's bill - so why then embark on a campaign that will virtually guarantee losses similar to Okinawa, and will have no effect whatsoever on the endurance of the home islands?

[OpanaPointer]

The Allies were under pressure to end the war as quickly as possible. If the atomic bombs had been known there would have been a demand that they be used along with every other weapon available.

[historygeek2021]

I suspect the Japanese would capitulate at roughly the same time. The Soviet Union would still invade Manchuria and Korea. Japan would be afraid that the Soviet Union would invade the home islands before the USA, even if Japan knew that the USA wasn't supplying the USSR with landing craft. Japan would do anything to submit to US rule over Soviet rule.

[Takao]

Why would the US need to invade China or Korea...If not to establish bases to invade Japan?

If Operation Carbonado succeeds in opening up some ports in China; the US can "quickly" supply China with much more Lend-Lease as opposed to the Ledo/Burma Road. Then let the Chinese troops do the heavy lifting fighting Japan on mainland China.

The US invading China just does not make much sense in this scenario.

[T. A. Gardner]

I'm with you on the first part but what is the reason for the second?

Operation downfall is nixed because of the estimated butcher's bill - so why then embark on a campaign that will virtually guarantee losses similar to Okinawa, and will have no effect whatsoever on the endurance of the home islands?

If the US government listened more to someone like George Kennan,

https://alphahistory.com/coldwar/george ... 0Europe%3A

it might be done to put more of a check on the Soviet Union postwar.

[T. A. Gardner]

The Allies were under pressure to end the war as quickly as possible. If the atomic bombs had been known there would have been a demand that they be used along with every other weapon available.

I did state that Japanese cites still get nuked. The pressure and bombing don't stop in this scenario, only the actual ground invasion is postponed indefinitely in favor of more activity to crush Japanese forces in China and Korea.

[OpanaPointer]

I suspect the Japanese would capitulate at roughly the same time. The Soviet Union would still invade Manchuria and Korea. Japan would be afraid that the Soviet Union would invade the home islands before the USA, even if Japan knew that the USA wasn't supplying the USSR with landing craft. Japan would do anything to submit to US rule over Soviet rule.

What would make Anami Korichi favor capitulation other than the a-bombs?

[Takao]

I suspect the Japanese would capitulate at roughly the same time. The Soviet Union would still invade Manchuria and Korea. Japan would be afraid that the Soviet Union would invade the home islands before the USA, even if Japan knew that the USA wasn't supplying the USSR with landing craft. Japan would do anything to submit to US rule over Soviet rule.

What would make Anami Korichi favor capitulation other than the a-bombs?

Anami Korechika

[Carl Schwamberger]

What would make Anami Korichi favor capitulation other than the a-bombs?

The Agricultural report compiled July 1945 & provided to the Cabinet in early August. Basically the section concerning Rice estimated the autumn rice harvest would 'fail'. Since only a few weeks food reserves existed, rationing had reduced the caloric allowance for soldiers to 2000 calories & industrial workers to 1500 daily, and imports had effectively fallen to zero, it meant starvation was starting now, not some future date next spring or something.

Exactly what 'failed' meant here I'd have to look up. 60% of minimum requirements comes to mind, but I can't trust my memory.

[OpanaPointer]

I suspect the Japanese would capitulate at roughly the same time. The Soviet Union would still invade Manchuria and Korea. Japan would be afraid that the Soviet Union would invade the home islands before the USA, even if Japan knew that the USA wasn't supplying the USSR with landing craft. Japan would do anything to submit to US rule over Soviet rule.

What would make Anami Korichi favor capitulation other than the a-bombs?

Anami Korechika

Either way.

[OpanaPointer]

What would make Anami Korichi favor capitulation other than the a-bombs?

The Agricultural report compiled July 1945 & provided to the Cabinet in early August. Basically the section concerning Rice estimated the autumn rice harvest would 'fail'. Since only a few weeks food reserves existed, rationing had reduced the caloric allowance for soldiers to 2000 calories & industrial workers to 1500 daily, and imports had effectively fallen to zero, it meant starvation was starting now, not some future date next spring or something.

Exactly what 'failed' meant here I'd have to look up. 60% of minimum requirements comes to mind, but I can't trust my memory.

Starvation of the non-military folks would just mean for of the food went to the soldiers. I don't see that as an issue for the hardliners. The first to go would be the infants, the elderly and the chronically sick, leaving a healthier-ish general population. The "we're all going to die anyway" attitude would allow for babies and grandparents to do their part by starving to death.

[T. A. Gardner]

Starvation of the non-military folks would just mean for of the food went to the soldiers. I don't see that as an issue for the hardliners. The first to go would be the infants, the elderly and the chronically sick, leaving a healthier-ish general population. The "we're all going to die anyway" attitude would allow for babies and grandparents to do their part by starving to death.

Well, the Allies would help some too by killing tens of thousands in bombing raids. The loss of a couple hundred thousand people would solve part of the problem... Of course, the lack of shelter and other basic survival needs as cities got smashed would kill more...

[OpanaPointer]

Gen. Anami was saying "One hundred million dead in defense of the Empire." "...a couple hundred thousand people..." was far from the low number the militarists were willing to kill to keep Yamato intact.

[Carl Schwamberger]

What would make Anami Korichi favor capitulation other than the a-bombs?

The Agricultural report compiled July 1945 & provided to the Cabinet in early August. Basically the section concerning Rice estimated the autumn rice harvest would 'fail'. Since only a few weeks food reserves existed, rationing had reduced the caloric allowance for soldiers to 2000 calories & industrial workers to 1500 daily, and imports had effectively fallen to zero, it meant starvation was starting now, not some future date next spring or something.

Exactly what 'failed' meant here I'd have to look up. 60% of minimum requirements comes to mind, but I can't trust my memory.

Starvation of the non-military folks would just mean for of the food went to the soldiers. I don't see that as an issue for the hardliners. The first to go would be the infants, the elderly and the chronically sick, leaving a healthier-ish general population. The "we're all going to die anyway" attitude would allow for babies and grandparents to do their part by starving to death.

What the leaders wee looking at here was the collapse of the infrastructure in the autum/winter as industrial workers could no longer keep the trains running, the telegraph operating, fuel delivered anywhere, ect... This would rapidly carry over into the Army as soldiers were forced to leave their defense posts to find and transport food. Theres a assumption this near mythical Japanese discipline & fanaticism will remain rock solid. But, as Col Yahara & lower ranking officers in the 10th Army on Okinawa testified this was not the case there. When the 10th Armies support units & communications fell apart discipline disintegrated, starting in the rear and carrying forward to the surviving infantry.

What the leadership were looking at was this infrastructure of support collapse starting relatively early in the Allied invasion vs in the final two weeks of the 10th Army on Okinawa.

The third leg influencing the Cabinet was the Soviet declaration of war. For the previous year Suzukis government had clung to a fantasy that the USSR would not only remain neutral but become friendlier to Japan as its alliance with the US & Britain ended. They saw this as giving Japan strategic depth in terms of obtaining raw materials, finished goods, and a inviolable shield of their western frontier. This all is very illogical from our perspective, but it had become a foundation wall of Japans strategy for successfully ending the war. The soviet DoW was unexpected and forced the Cabinet to see the bankruptcy of their position.

So, when the Cabinet started the last three days of meetings leading to the surrender decision they had on their mind:

1. The air offensive that had killed 400,000+ in the six principle raids & over 100,000 in lesser actions since the start of 1945

2. The failing 1945 rice crop & certainty of mass starvation in the autumn/winter.

3. Soviet DoW

Things like the petroleum and coal stocks below both military and industrial requirements & no replenishment occurring, other industrial stocks run out or below requirements, labor productivity plunging, were additional annoyances.