Mori wrote: ↑
23 May 2021 10:07
Back to the question starting this thread, this could mean that the Allied shortage of ammunition would hamper their progress but wouldn't give any German counterstrike more effective. Again, quantifying is mandatory to think further than that.
Shieldrake's (without asking him to join) book has figures.... "Gunners in Normandy". Some of the highest one-day losses by the Pz units in the attack in Normandy were those responding to EPSOM. KG 2.SS Pz, SS-PR1, and 9.SS. By then there was a large quantity of shells stockpiled, IIRC over 200,000. A big strike was made on top of elements of 2.SS Pz as it arrived. Naval artillery, as I expected, comes across as being overrated, like air power.
However I do not believe that the offensive to the coast would be made like the II SS Pz Corps counterattack, the I SS Pz C and II SS Pz C paper-napkin sketch or anything like what was practiced in the Eastern Front, but more like, as I said already, using a large quantity of short attacks with small improvised elements (company to battalion sized), often with armor, many times more than historical. These small actions put an upper limit on German losses, particularly when they get plastered by defensive fires. And became routine in the war in Normandy and the war in the west. So eg. three times more forces this would be a grind towards the coast, rather than a grind to eject the British-Canadians from the same positions over and over again.
The beachhead would have to be compressed in June to the degree where the British-Canadians don't have the space to deploy VII Corps. IMHO of course there would be a second landing if the Allies knew that there was a large "central reserve".