Rundstedt's central reserve

[Tom from Cornwall]

The German PZ divisions had never fought so poorly before for that matter due to the extreme tactical environment. So they were forced to disaggregate their tank forces and used recon battalions to hold ground. Their forces are designed to fight as entire divisions and grouped in a corps, just like those of their opponents.

As I understand it, this one was of the criticisms of the employment of 16th Panzer Division in southern Italy in the autumn of 1943 - it was certainly used in "penny-packets" at Salerno and also, I believe, on the Adriatic coast in October 1943 after which the commander was "moved on"! Who said "he who defends everything, defends nothing"?

Regards

Tom

[Aber]

Theres a degree of PoV here as well. I strongly suspect the US Army shortages would have looked like a god given corncoupia to the German artillery commanders. The US commanders complain their supply is only 75% of what they'd like to have had & only 120% of planned. The 7th Army staff were considering that deliveries to their depots & batteries were half, a quarter, & at the end 10% of requirement.

Covered in part in Ruppenthall vol 1, page 445...

First restrictions on artillery usage implemented 15 June, because there were shortages in Army dumps as divisions and corps were hoarding it off the books.

Storm had some impact but usage limits lifted on 2 July, followed by a period of heavy usage and new restrictions on 16 July.

Overall little evidence that the situation was ever critical.

[Aber]

My comment is referring to the jingoist/allied biased type of history that display very poor understanding of German forces' operating methods, unit history, and very poor knowledge of armored warfare on the Eastern Front, which composed the vast majority of their war experience.

But for Normandy the important part is the history of Panzer divisions facing the Western Allies.

The German PZ divisions had never fought so poorly before for that matter due to the extreme tactical environment.

So where had they performed better in an offensive role against the Western Allies? Alam Halfa, Second Alamein, Medenine, Sicily, Salerno?

There is not really a track record of success after the widespread introduction of 6pdr guns to protect the infantry divisions, and the right doctrine for armoured divisions.

Once Bayeux is taken the British-Canadian beachhead can start to be compressed.

Exactly what Montgomery expected and what the Allies prepared for.

[Juan G. C.]

Keep in mind that, as I said in the first post, Rundstedt wanted the central reserve to counterattack the Allies in the beaches as son as possible, before they had consolidated their position there. So the question is how much time do the reserves need to arrive in Normandy from the area of Paris and when they can attack, if they are ordered to move ir to prepare to move between 0330 and 0400.

On the other hand: what would the Allies have done differently knowing that the Germans are building ducha central reserve? I cannot think in anything which they weren't doing IRL. They were doing all they could to prevent or retard German units from arriving in Normandy.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Keep in mind that, as I said in the first post, Rundstedt wanted the central reserve to counterattack the Allies in the beaches as son as possible, before they had consolidated their position there. So the question is how much time do the reserves need to arrive in Normandy from the area of Paris and when they can attack, if they are ordered to move ir to prepare to move between 0330 and 0400.

Is your "central reserve" north and south of the Seine? It would need to be so that the first wave could respond to either the Pas-de-Calais or Normandy once it was decided that a landing was not a diversion.

Regards

Tom

[Carl Schwamberger]

Is your "central reserve" north and south of the Seine? It would need to be so that the first wave could respond to either the Pas-de-Calais or Normandy once it was decided that a landing was not a diversion.

Important point. There were no high speed bridges across the Seine remaining at the end of May. Just some pontoon bridges that were deployed at night & often camouflaged along the and during the day. Hustling a Armored Div across one or two of those in aa few hours aint practical. The Alternative is to backtrack to Paris were there were a fair number of bridges still standing. How congestion there slows progress I can say.

I recall Rommel having to take ferries across the Seine when he went off on inspections of the 15th & Netherlands Army districts.

[Kingfish]

So what is to prevent the German panzer divisions from being sucked into a static defense once it arrives on the front line as in the OTL?

With no immediate panzer reserve available the 716th will get steamrolled, thus leaving no coherent front line in the 21st AG sector until the central reserve divisions arrive.

Given the difficulties the Germans faced in getting formations to the front it stands to reason the central reserve will arrive in piecemeal fashion, meaning the first to arrive will have to commit a portion if not all of it's strength to man the front line.

It will be a repeat of the historical, except a few miles further inland.

[Juan G. C.]

Is your "central reserve" north and south of the Seine? It would need to be so that the first wave could respond to either the Pas-de-Calais or Normandy once it was decided that a landing was not a diversion.

Regards

Tom

As far as I know, that was the idea.

Important point. There were no high speed bridges across the Seine remaining at the end of May. Just some pontoon bridges that were deployed at night & often camouflaged along the and during the day. Hustling a Armored Div across one or two of those in aa few hours aint practical. The Alternative is to backtrack to Paris were there were a fair number of bridges still standing. How congestion there slows progress I can say.

I recall Rommel having to take ferries across the Seine when he went off on inspections of the 15th & Netherlands Army districts.

According to general Blummentritt in his biography of Rundstedt, Guderian had advised in April 1944 that camouflaged facilites for crossing the Seine be constructed in addition to the standing bridges, anticipating that the bridges would be destroyed either by saboteurs or the allied Air forces; and that he also urged that all match movements should take place off the main todas along by-ways and across country, and that full preparativos be made for doing so.

[Gooner1]

So what is to prevent the German panzer divisions from being sucked into a static defense once it arrives on the front line as in the OTL?

With no immediate panzer reserve available the 716th will get steamrolled, thus leaving no coherent front line in the 21st AG sector until the central reserve divisions arrive.

Given the difficulties the Germans faced in getting formations to the front it stands to reason the central reserve will arrive in piecemeal fashion, meaning the first to arrive will have to commit a portion if not all of it's strength to man the front line.

It will be a repeat of the historical, except a few miles further inland.

Yes. Caen would be taken D-Day and in the panzer free days after that its probably a question of where Second Army chooses to halt. Falaise would probably be gettable if not desirable, so a line south of Bourgebus - Mont Pincon - Vire? Or more modestly the line south of the Caen - Avranches road, Villers-Bocage - Saint Martin des Besaces?
Either way not only does Second Army have the opportunity to stake out significants territorial gains, they would probably also get to go over to the defensive on ground of their choosing before the panzers arrive in any strength.

[Michael Kenny]

Yes. Caen would be taken D-Day and in the panzer free days after that its probably a question of where Second Army chooses to halt. Falaise would probably be gettable if not desirable, so a line south of Bourgebus - Mont Pincon - Vire? Or more modestly the line south of the Caen - Avranches road, Villers-Bocage - Saint Martin des Besaces?

Because the Germans decided to stand and fight in Normandy they stayed in range of the Naval guns. If they had fallen back this problem would have gone away.

[Gooner1]

Because the Germans decided to stand and fight in Normandy they stayed in range of the Naval guns. If they had fallen back this problem would have gone away.

I think Monty and Dempsey would have happily traded naval gunfire support for more ground though.

[Michael Kenny]

I think Monty and Dempsey would have happily traded naval gunfire support for more ground though.

I think too much is made of the 'failure' at Caen. All it did was bring forward the decisive engagement that was expected to be fought in the interior. The Germans bled to death in Normandy. Naval gunfire was able to directly impact on the ground war attrition phase and that advantage was significant. The Air Force felt they were disadvantaged and thus they bought in to the 'Caen Failure' version of the campaign.

[Cult Icon]

Back to the question starting this thread, this could mean that the Allied shortage of ammunition would hamper their progress but wouldn't give any German counterstrike more effective. Again, quantifying is mandatory to think further than that.

Shieldrake's (without asking him to join) book has figures.... "Gunners in Normandy". Some of the highest one-day losses by the Pz units in the attack in Normandy were those responding to EPSOM. KG 2.SS Pz, SS-PR1, and 9.SS. By then there was a large quantity of shells stockpiled, IIRC over 200,000. A big strike was made on top of elements of 2.SS Pz as it arrived. Naval artillery, as I expected, comes across as being overrated, like air power.

However I do not believe that the offensive to the coast would be made like the II SS Pz Corps counterattack, the I SS Pz C and II SS Pz C paper-napkin sketch or anything like what was practiced in the Eastern Front, but more like, as I said already, using a large quantity of short attacks with small improvised elements (company to battalion sized), often with armor, many times more than historical. These small actions put an upper limit on German losses, particularly when they get plastered by defensive fires. And became routine in the war in Normandy and the war in the west. So eg. three times more forces this would be a grind towards the coast, rather than a grind to eject the British-Canadians from the same positions over and over again.

The beachhead would have to be compressed in June to the degree where the British-Canadians don't have the space to deploy VII Corps. IMHO of course there would be a second landing if the Allies knew that there was a large "central reserve".

[Gooner1]

but more like, as I said already, using a large quantity of short attacks with small improvised elements (company to battalion sized), often with armor, many times more than historical. These small actions put an upper limit on German losses, particularly when they get plastered by defensive fires. And became routine in the war in Normandy and the war in the west. So eg. three times more forces this would be a grind towards the coast, rather than a grind to eject the British-Canadians from the same positions over and over again.

The beachhead would have to be compressed in June to the degree where the British-Canadians don't have the space to deploy VII Corps. IMHO of course there would be a second landing if the Allies knew that there was a large "central reserve".

I'm trying to think which panzer divisions in Normandy managed more than a day or two attacking before becoming offensively spent.

[Carl Schwamberger]

... Yes. Caen would be taken D-Day and in the panzer free days after that its probably a question of where Second Army chooses to halt. Falaise would probably be gettable if not desirable, so a line south of Bourgebus - Mont Pincon - Vire? Or more modestly the line south of the Caen - Avranches road, Villers-Bocage - Saint Martin des Besaces? ...

IIRC there was a important cluster of 7th Army supply dumps in the Falaise area. Those may have influenced local decisions on where to defend.