Cult Icon wrote: ↑
19 May 2021 12:51
Mori wrote: ↑
19 May 2021 12:02
No doubt. The mass of Allied troops on the Normandy ground at the end of June 6th is just too huge to be defeated immediately. Things are a little different by D+6 or so, as someone noted above.
It was too huge for (isolated in time and location) regimental battlegroups which constituted the largest anti-invasion attacks..basically the Germans committed their forces lightly. The I SS Pz Korps was simply too small to contain all those extremely heavily armed forces that had reinforcements available (3.ID (B), 3.ID (C), 7.AD, 50.ID) and covered with vast artillery superiority & air supremacy. 50.ID was effectively a double division. Multiply the regimental KG attack by 10 which is what a two Pz Korps attack looks like and the situation is different. I have no idea what the road network can support though.
The deployment of German PZ KG in the first days to the first two weeks was heavily influenced by command confusion from the imaginary FUSAG/Pas-de-Calais landing/Operation Fortitude. Pz Group West tried to jockey for a position to attack with at least two of them at once, but they moved up to the front too slow. The 21.Pz was pre-empted by British attacks. The 12.SS division, now alone, saw modest commitments- starting from their win at Authie on June 7th- and was relatively idle after the 12th. The 12.SS won in several village fights in those days up to June 15th, lost a few (Bretteville and Norrey in particular) too. There were all line-adjustment attacks aimed at securing assembly areas for the I SS Pz Korps counterattack that didn't materialize.
It should be noted that by circa June 25th the 12.SS was still a strong division, approx. the infantry strength of full Pz division. The Pz Lehr infantry was burned out. The 21.Pz inf was heavily depleted. The 2.Pz had arrived in mid-June.
I've found the descriptions of Geyrs attempts to execute his long planned massed counter attack to be particularly instructive. Originally intended to be executed on the 8th June losses in the 21st PzD & delays in the arrival of the other PzDiv caused the attack date to be set at the 10th, D+4. Also the initial scope of the attack was altered. Instead of the massed simultaneous strike by 6-8 PzD a initial attack by Schweppenbergs Corps would be made with other PzD following the next day. Late afternoon the attack was still pending. Rommel arrived at Schweppenbergs HQ, conferring with him & Geyr. Geyer would have preferred to execute the 'massed strike' option, but Rommels argument there had been to many delays carried weight & the logic of initiating a first stage attack now was clear. Geyrs idea of a large massed armored assault 2-3 days after landing was a dead letter at this point.
The attack was never ordered. Just as afternoon was transiting into evening a air strike by a combination of RAF Mitchel bombers and Typhoons hit Schweppenbergs HQ putting it completely out of action. Although the Germns radio intel service detected the incoming strike and its target, they were not warned. The HQ staff & n service troops were caught out side their shelter & suffered severe losses. Rommel had left a hour before the first bomb hit, but Schweppenberg & Geyr were both wounded. Most of the Pz Corps staff were killed, & the bulk of the service/support soldiers were killed or wounded. Losses of equipment were severe, particularly vehicles & radio equipment. On the up side no Panther tanks were lost
This is a nice description about some aspects of the air attack
https://rafoverlord.blogspot.com/2019/0 ... -west.html
What struck me there was the relative speed of the Allied response when the cumulative evidence hit the tipping point the morning of the 10th June. Theres also in this article the question of what happens if Rommel is still present when the bombs hit.