sandeepmukherjee196 wrote: ↑
19 Apr 2021 03:40
Just to restore context :
By that srage of the N African campaign Rommel had little authority left. He was nominally in command. Even von Arnim wouldnt listen to him what to say of the Italians. So the Medenine affair was NOT Rommel's plan. That sick joke was concocted by the Italian 1st Army Commander, Gen Giovanni Messe, who had spent his war getting kicked out of Greece before being bailed out by German troops in 40-41, Then chasing defeated Soviet troops in Russia, when the going was good, and in comfortable winter billets in Odessa when the real fighting went on elsewhere.
The three German panzer divs in Medenine had the majestic number of 162 tanks! Going in, under a blazing sun, bald headed, against Monty's 300 tanks of the 8th Army, 350 arty pieces, 460 ATs, ALL stacked up close to the FDLs since Monty had ULTRA intercepts about Messe's plan whch had been circulating for a week
The intel was about the expected timing of the attack, but the 8th Army never fully trusted Ultra on Rommel's intentions as he had a habit of not actually doing what he told the High Command.
Montgomery did not even have to use his superiority in tanks. It was a lopsided battle which never really got going - key Montgomery's comments
"He is trying to attack me in daylight with tanks, followed by lorried infantry.... It is an absolute gift, and the man must be mad."
and even more damming:
"The Marshall has made a balls of it. I shall go and write letters."
We are supposed to compare the above ensemble with the situation in the afternoon of 6th June, in Normandy, where Rommel had full control (I have at the very outset, made this scenario contingent on Rommel having been personally present in Normandy on the 6th) with 3 full Pz Divs
Rommel is not as good a commander as you think - see Medenine, Alam Halfa, the dash to the wire during Crusader. He had a tendency towards action but not always well directed. Those 3 Panzer Divisions will be arriving strung out and subject to air attack - see the problems 21st Panzer had on D-Day. And they have no idea what they will be up against. An attack against an unknown enemy is what they did at Medenine.
against an unsettled enemy, who have just emerged from the traumatic experience of a contested, low tide landing in choppy seas.. and are just getting their bearings.
Some evidence of disorganisation on D-Day please. The Canadians had the advantage of a clear plan where their own forces would be and the need to prepare for an armoured counterattack.
And whose Canadian component were green troops and commanders, proven later to be not very bright, when the going got rough (In Totalize, with overwhelming superiority, they allowed KG Waldmüller's 43 panzers to spook their 2 armoured brigades with 600 tanks, used in the most curious way conceivable!).
How is the performance of different armoured units in attack relevant to infantry units in defence?