OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

[daveshoup2MD]

Given the Germans were demonstrably weaker in France in 1943 than they were in 1944, it's an pen question whether the odds of an Allied failure were higher or not; rational consideration of the correlation of forces and the distance involved between the Eastern Front and Western Front in 1944 and between the Eastern Front and a potential Western Front in 1943 would suggest strongly otherwise. That's a topic for another thread, however.

Why is it a topic for another thread, given you have brought it up in this one? If the Germans were demonstrably weaker in France in 1943 weren't the Allies too?

It is a topic for another thread.

Don't touch the keys Rich!

OH NOOO!!

Agreed.

[daveshoup2MD]

Returning to the question I asked on several posts.

Regardless of whether hind sight allows us to argue that it might have been possible, what was the actual benefit going to be of launching Op Anvil simultaneously with OP Overlord? How was the strategic, or even operational outcome going to be improved significantly over the historic strategic allied victory in excess of anticipated results?

The only advantage I have seen so far was the argument that an earlier capture of Marseilles might have improved logistics in Q4 of 1944. That assumes that a simultaneous Op Anvil didn't also require a Transportation plan to isolate the target landing sector, which then trashed the rail connections to Marseilles. The other possibility is that this may have changed the German response from "fight for every inch", which led to the destruction of 7th and 5th Panzer armies to a delaying strategy that might have left half of France in German hands through the winter of 1944-45

This definitely connects to the OP & should have more depth of answer earlier.

One aspect is the materialschalcht, which the battles of 1944-45 were very much a part of. OTL the months of April & May the attrition of ground forces under Rundsteadt was low. What losses there were came from air attack, I understand they fell somewhere between insignificant & as high as 1 or 2%. This was 'replaceable' by the German production system. In June-July the losses rocket upwards and exceed replacement. The larger number of Allied 'division's engaged with the defense, not just present and pining for truck fuel, the greater the overall losses and the larger the loss/replacement gap.

The loss/replacement gap actually occurs & can be measured at several levels. One is in gross industrial production vs the combat & general wastage losses, another is in delivery amounts to the combat forces vs their losses. Both tell us something related about the same overall problem.

To digress, one such ratio thats been examined is the Allied cargo ship production vs lost from either specific submarine attacks or general losses in the Battle of the Atlantic. The raw or refine numbers show the Allies were approaching winning this 'battle' in the III Quarter of 1942, & clearly were winning in the final quarter. of 1942. You can find a similar crossover point in submarine production/loss, or in the air battles of January-September 1943 in the Mediterranean Theatre. Point here being; the German Materialschlacht loss in OB West was a static zero through May 1944. Moving the start of the battle to May, or April gives you seven of eight months of losses to the the defense, vs the six of OTL. There are of course a number of variables here. But having twenty Allied 'divisions' in France committing destruction in May vs zero has a effect on the long term. Ditto for losses in men.

Good points. Comes down to you can't win if you don't play.

There's a converse, as well; every month of "rest" the Allies gave the Germans (in 1944, for example) moved the window of how long it would take, once the fight started, to actually push the German forces past the point of no return, that much farther to the right... and towards (for example) the winter of 1944-45.

[Richard Anderson]

The Germans were demonstrably weaker in France in 1943 than they were in 1944 because of the Soviets. Is that in question?

You keep saying that, but then fail to demonstrate it. What were they "weaker in France in 1943" than? Than they were in 1944? Than they were in 1942? Were the Germans invading France in 1943? Were they more weaker proportionately to the American and British forces that could be landed in 1943 than those that could be landed in 1944?

[Richard Anderson]

1. Actually, pretty sure you brought it up; you want to kick it around further, open a thread.

No, actually, you have brought it up. Now twice.

daveshoup2MD wrote: ↑
Today, 15:16
The Germans were demonstrably weaker in France in 1943 than they were in 1944

You brought it up. Or are we simply supposed to take your word for it?

2. The Allies weren't in France in 1943 (other than the mostly latent FFI and some small numbers of SOE and MI types, so yeah, that's a pretty easy answer.

Given I can find no "2.", I'm not sure what you're referring to. However, given you are making the claim the "Germans were demonstrably weaker in France in 1943 than they were in 1944", perhaps it has something to do with substantiating that claim...or at least putting some context into it?

3. Where? Globally? And why just the Americans?

What part of "in the west" did you find it difficult to understand? Do you think the RAF was substantially stronger in 1943 than it was in 1944? I'm afraid I'm not following your logic.

4. Data about what? Ground forces? Air forces? Naval forces? In theater? Available? Globally? And most importantly: as of when do any deltas come into play?

Well, how about anything other than shibboleths like "the Germans were demonstrably weaker in France in 1943 than they were in 1944"?

Start a thread, if you wish.

Why? You started it when you invaded Poland in 1939...

[daveshoup2MD]

The Germans were demonstrably weaker in France in 1943 than they were in 1944 because of the Soviets. Is that in question?

You keep saying that, but then fail to demonstrate it. What were they "weaker in France in 1943" than? Than they were in 1944?

Yes. It's common knowledge, but here's a source:

On 1 July 1943 there had been 186 divisions on the Eastern Front, seven in Italy, and 44 in the west; on 1 June 1944, five days before the invasion, after the destruction of Army Group Center in the east, there were 156 divisions in the east, 27 in Italy, and 54 in the west, 19 percent of all those available to Hitler.

P495, The German Army, 1933-1945, by Matthew Cooper.

[Aber]

11 months from Normandy to VE Day. Road distance is better than 800 miles; one wonders what the critics expect.

Interesting comparison with road distance from Calabria to the Brenner Pass; 750 miles, more or less. That one took 20 months; if you extend it back to Sicily, 22 months.

One of these things is not like the other.

Not quite.

If you don't remove the forces for Dragoon, then 13 months to the Brenner pass looks possible.

August, 1944 + 13 months is November, 1945. Presumably the 8th Army would be at the Brenner and the Red Army at the Channel...

September '43 to October '44.

The key issue for Dragoon is that it took 2 Corps from the Italian campaign in June '44 when those Corps might have enabled the Allies to cross into the Po valley and force mobile warfare on the German defenders.

And no, I'm not expecting the Allies to fight through the Brenner Pass.

[Tom from Cornwall]

On 1 July 1943 there had been 186 divisions on the Eastern Front, seven in Italy, and 44 in the west; on 1 June 1944, five days before the invasion, after the destruction of Army Group Center in the east, there were 156 divisions in the east, 27 in Italy, and 54 in the west, 19 percent of all those available to Hitler.

Is that right? Five days before the invasion but “after the destruction of Army Group Centre”? Wasn’t AGC demolished after the invasion in Normandy, not before?

I note the juvenile counting of divisions as well.

Where do German forces (air, land and sea) based in say, Yugoslavia or Greece, fit under these geographical terms? Eastern front, Italy, Balkans?

Regards

Tom

[Gooner1]

But without an invasion of Sicily there was no trigger for a revolt. In the absence of an invasion Mussolini's power is strengthened. The Allies are deterred from invading Italian soil.
<>
The idea of Italy going neutral or joining the allies without an allied landing in Italy is a nonsensical fantasy. Hitler had a good idea of what might happen. He called off his summer offensive in Russia after the allies landed in Sicily, anticipating a possible Italian defection. As soon as the Italians deposed Mussolini Hitler deployed an Army in Italy ready to take over that country. The Allied landings in Italy took place because this was the condition under which the FGC would declare their armistice. The Italian campaign was the price for Italy's surrender.

This is in the scenario where the Allied invasion hits France. I doubt there would be much cheering for Il Duce because Italy dodged that blow (but likely little respite from bombing) or any faith in armi miracalosa saving them from eventual defeat if they remained in alliance with Germany.
German attitude to a wavering Italy has to be either put a lot of troops there, as historical, or none at all, because to leave just a few invites them becoming hostages should the situation change.
Also remember Mussolini wasn't the head of state, that was the King and the House of Savoy hadn't lasted nearly a thousand years without a good survival instinct.

[daveshoup2MD]

11 months from Normandy to VE Day. Road distance is better than 800 miles; one wonders what the critics expect.

Interesting comparison with road distance from Calabria to the Brenner Pass; 750 miles, more or less. That one took 20 months; if you extend it back to Sicily, 22 months.

One of these things is not like the other.

Not quite.

If you don't remove the forces for Dragoon, then 13 months to the Brenner pass looks possible.

August, 1944 + 13 months is November, 1945. Presumably the 8th Army would be at the Brenner and the Red Army at the Channel...

September '43 to October '44.

The key issue for Dragoon is that it took 2 Corps from the Italian campaign in June '44 when those Corps might have enabled the Allies to cross into the Po valley and force mobile warfare on the German defenders.

And no, I'm not expecting the Allies to fight through the Brenner Pass.

The key issue for DRAGOON was it opened the door to get the 6th Army Group, with two entire Allied field armies, into position to invade Germany, take the Ruhr, and threaten Berlin and Vienna, along with helping liberate France and - along the way - got the French Mediterranean ports that helped sustain both the 6th and 12th army groups in just that invasion.

The Po Valley hardly compares.

[daveshoup2MD]

On 1 July 1943 there had been 186 divisions on the Eastern Front, seven in Italy, and 44 in the west; on 1 June 1944, five days before the invasion, after the destruction of Army Group Center in the east, there were 156 divisions in the east, 27 in Italy, and 54 in the west, 19 percent of all those available to Hitler.

Is that right? Five days before the invasion but “after the destruction of Army Group Centre”? Wasn’t AGC demolished after the invasion in Normandy, not before?

I note the juvenile counting of divisions as well.

Where do German forces (air, land and sea) based in say, Yugoslavia or Greece, fit under these geographical terms? Eastern front, Italy, Balkans?

Regards

Tom

That's not how I read the sentence, but Cooper is British, so maybe take it up with him. I read it as "On 1 July 1943 there had been 186 divisions on the Eastern Front, seven in Italy, and 44 in the west; on 1 June 1944, five days before the invasion, (and after the destruction of Army Group Center in the east), there were 156 (remaining) divisions in the east, 27 in Italy, and 54 in the west, 19 percent of all those available to Hitler."

Divisions are commonly used as counters in these sort of conversations, and in this case, make it crystal clear where the Germans felt a need to concentrate their forces...if you have a different measurement of the German forces in France in the summer of 1943 to compare to the Germans forces in France in the summer of 1944, provide it.

The German forces in the Balkans were garrison and occupation forces; a mix of mostly second-line infantry divisions, that mostly remained in the Balkans until late in 1944, when the Soviet offensives forced their withdrawal after the Romanian surrender in August, the Bulgarian declaration of war the same month, and then the Hungarian collapse.

[daveshoup2MD]

But without an invasion of Sicily there was no trigger for a revolt. In the absence of an invasion Mussolini's power is strengthened. The Allies are deterred from invading Italian soil.
<>
The idea of Italy going neutral or joining the allies without an allied landing in Italy is a nonsensical fantasy. Hitler had a good idea of what might happen. He called off his summer offensive in Russia after the allies landed in Sicily, anticipating a possible Italian defection. As soon as the Italians deposed Mussolini Hitler deployed an Army in Italy ready to take over that country. The Allied landings in Italy took place because this was the condition under which the FGC would declare their armistice. The Italian campaign was the price for Italy's surrender.

This is in the scenario where the Allied invasion hits France. I doubt there would be much cheering for Il Duce because Italy dodged that blow (but likely little respite from bombing) or any faith in armi miracalosa saving them from eventual defeat if they remained in alliance with Germany.
German attitude to a wavering Italy has to be either put a lot of troops there, as historical, or none at all, because to leave just a few invites them becoming hostages should the situation change.
Also remember Mussolini wasn't the head of state, that was the King and the House of Savoy hadn't lasted nearly a thousand years without a good survival instinct.

It's worth noting that none of the minor Axis powers left peaceably; Bulgaria (which wasn't really an Axis combatant in the sense the Finns, Romanians, and Hungarians were, but to be complete) stayed until the Soviets were on their doorstep in August, 1944; the Romanians did (essentially) the same, in the same month; and Hungary tried, was occupied, collapsed, and became a battlefield. The Finns signed their armistice with the Soviets in September.

So, absent an Allied threat to mainland Italy beyond the theoretical, odds are they would have remained with the Axis (as, one can argue, they partly did, historically, with the RSI), at least until the writing was literally on the wall (which is what happened in the other smaller Axis powers); if the Germans maintained control of the Alpine passes and sustained the forces they had (historically) already deployed into Italy after the surrender in Tunisia and before Cassibile, odds are pretty close to certain Mussolini's government would have lasted.

[Carl Schwamberger]

...
Divisions are commonly used as counters in these sort of conversations, and in this case, make it crystal clear where the Germans felt a need to concentrate their forces....

Common is not always the better metric in these complex historical questions. One problem is the use of some limited snapshots of numbers where the reality was numbers fluctuated monthly. Then there is condition or combat capability. Heres part of a ongoing effort to analyze the constantly changing OB in the west. It includes a effort to match the German Category or combat ability ratings to divisions at important dates, Those could change swiftly or abruptly but have some clarifying effect. Category here usually corresponds to the date to the right. Cat IV usually indicate a lack of equipment of any significance.


-2 Pz Cat II Jan 1944 Ameins
-9 Pz Cat IV April from eastern front
-11Pz Cat III Jan 1944 On eastern front. To France March ?
-19th Pz Cat IV Actual location ambiguous sources place it in Netherlands and in east simultaneously
21 Pz Cat II Jan 1944 Caen & other locations. Mostly French tanks
24Pz Cat I Jan 1944 in Italy???
25Pz Cat II Jan1944 in Denmark??
26Pz Cat I Jan 1944 Italy
-116 Pz Cat II March 1944 Rhineland and Westphalia areas
?Lehr Pz Cat II Jan 1944 at Nancy-Verdun. Formed November 1943. To Hungary March?

3PG Cat I Jan to summer 1944 in Italy
-2d Para Cat III May 1944 USSR To Germany
3d Para Cat I Jan 1944 from Chalons sur Marne to Melin Brittiany
5th Para Cat I Jan 1944 @ Reims, moved to Rennes May
6th Para

84th ID Cat II February 1944 Rouen?
85 Field Cat II February 1944 Lille?
91 Air Landing Cat II Jan 1944 Baumholder Formed in January
243d Static Cat Iii July 1943 Cotientin/Cherbourg
272 Field Cat II Dec 1943- April 1944 @ Antwerp Belgium
275th Field Cat II Jan 1944 @ St Naziere
277 Field Cat II Nov 1943 in Croatia. Jan ?
319 Static Cat IV Jan 1944 Channel Islands
352 Field Cat I Nov 1944 West side Cotientin

709 Static Cat III Jan 1944 Cotientin ?
711 Static Cat III Jan 1944 on coast Orne to Seine Rivers
716 Static Cat III Jan 1944 Calvados coast/Caen
719 Static Cat III Jan 1944 Netherlands

19th Army
148 Reserve Cat III Jan 1944 Nice?
242 Fortress Cat III Oct 43
244 Static Cat III Jan 1944 Tolun?
326 Fortress Cat III >Dec 43
338 Static Cat III Jan 1944 Marsailles ?

388 Fortress Cat III >Oct 43
-1SS Cat IV IApril 1944 from east front. “Shattered”
?2SS Cat III February 1944 from eastern front. North of Toulose
-9 SS Cat II between Chalons-sur-Marne and Troyes
-10SS Cat III Feb to April eastern front Charentes France.
-12SS Cat II Sept 1943 - march 1944 Beverloo Belgium
17SS Cat III Jan 1944 Poitiers. Not yet motorized.

In Italy
10th Army
On battle front early January
94 ID Cat II West coast (AG B >Oct 43)
15th PG Cat II Leppini Mountains
44 ID Cat III Liri Valley
5th Mtn Cat III Appeines
305 ID Cat III E Appeines
334 ID Cat III E coast
26 Pz Cat I E coast
1 Para Cat I E coast

Reserve
29 PG Cat I *Rome ... R to France
92 ID Cat I *West coast N of Rome >?
4 Para Cat II *Central Italy ... R to France ... R to Alps
90 PG Cat II E Adriatic coast
3 PG Cat II Liri valley early 1944?
HG Cat I *Rome ... R to France ? Returned to Italy early 1944?
16 Pz Cat I Nov-Dec 1943Sent East
42 Jager Cat II March 1944 Torino
356 Field Cat II *>Dec 43 ... R to Alps
65 ID Cat II Adria Dec 43. Anzio in February ... R to Alps
34 Cat II Genoa? ... R to Alps

14th Army early January
162 Turk Cat IV >Dec 43
71st ID Cat II >Dec 43 ... R to Alps
278 ID Cat II >Dec 43 under Prep
362 ID Cat II >Dec 43 under Prep
16th SS Cat II >Dec 43
114 Jg Cat II Anzio in February Formed out of 714 Div in
Croatia/Dalmatia. Move to Italy in January 1944
188 Res Cat III >Dec 43

[Carl Schwamberger]

...
This is in the scenario where the Allied invasion hits France. I doubt there would be much cheering for Il Duce because Italy dodged that blow (but likely little respite from bombing) or any faith in armi miracalosa saving them from eventual defeat if they remained in alliance with Germany.
German attitude to a wavering Italy has to be either put a lot of troops there, as historical, or none at all, because to leave just a few invites them becoming hostages should the situation change.

Have to agree. The consistent success of Allied deception ops leans towards this all or nothing approach.

[rcocean]

Excellent post. Further, all divisions aren't alike. Panzer and Panzer and Grenadier Divisions are in a special class. And static and "garrison" divisions are different from Mobile Divisions. And then there's the whole problem of quality. Your average German infantry or volks division wasn't the same as an elite Luftwaffe Parachute or Mountain Division.

BTW, anyone "counting divisions" would get the wrong idea about the amount of effort put into the Pacific and Europe by the US army. "Counting divisions" it was 68 vs. 21. But this ignores that all 16 armored divisions were used in Europe, along with 5 of the 6 elite Airborne/Mountain Divisions. Further, 2 of the 21 Pacific Divisions were used for Training/Garrison duty and weren't really expected to be used for hard fighting. And of course, just counting Divisions ignore the massive number of non-divisional Tank, TD, AAA, artillery battalions. Unlike the Germans, almost 50% of US Combat troops were in non-divisional units. As you might expect the overwhelming number of Armored units and Heavy non-divisional artillery was used in Europe. And finally, there's Replacements. Almost 400,000 Infantry Replacements were sent to the ETO/MTO in 1944/1945. The number sent to the Pacific was a fraction of that.

[Richard Anderson]

Common is not always the better metric in these complex historical questions. One problem is the use of some limited snapshots of numbers where the reality was numbers fluctuated monthly. Then there is condition or combat capability. Heres part of a ongoing effort to analyze the constantly changing OB in the west. It includes a effort to match the German Category or combat ability ratings to divisions at important dates, Those could change swiftly or abruptly but have some clarifying effect. Category here usually corresponds to the date to the right. Cat IV usually indicate a lack of equipment of any significance.

Exactly. Common can also lead to oversimplification and a lack of depth in understanding.

-2 Pz Cat II Jan 1944 Ameins
-9 Pz Cat IV April from eastern front Most of its replacements arrived between 15 May and 15 June
-11Pz Cat III Jan 1944 On eastern front. To France March ? End of May, not March and was still assembling in France as of 6 June.
-19th Pz Cat IV Actual location ambiguous sources place it in Netherlands and in east simultaneously The division began arriving on 24 May for refitting, then returned to the Ostheer beginning on 16 July.
21 Pz Cat II Jan 1944 Caen & other locations. Mostly French tanks
24Pz Cat I Jan 1944 in Italy??? No, sent east from northern Italy in November 1943. In January 1944 it was 6. Armee reserve in Krivoi Rog
25Pz Cat II Jan1944 in Denmark?? In January it was in Vinnitsa as part of 4. Panzerarmee. In June elements were rebuilding, split up between Denmark, Germany, and Hungary.
26Pz Cat I Jan 1944 Italy
-116 Pz Cat II March 1944 Rhineland and Westphalia areas No, it began organizing east of Rouen in April.
?Lehr Pz Cat II Jan 1944 at Nancy-Verdun. Formed November 1943. To Hungary March? April

3PG Cat I Jan to summer 1944 in Italy
-2d Para Cat III May 1944 USSR To Germany
3d Para Cat I Jan 1944 from Chalons sur Marne to Melin Brittiany
5th Para Cat I Jan 1944 @ Reims, moved to Rennes May Began organizing at Reims 2 March. While its manpower may have been Cat I it had little equipment and was only partly organized by 6 June.
6th Para

84th ID Cat II February 1944 Rouen? Paluel. Reached full strength in April, but was still organizing in June.
85 Field Cat II February 1944 Lille? Ligescourt. It too was still organizing 6 June. Both it were ïBewegungs or mobile divisions.
91 Air Landing Cat II Jan 1944 Baumholder Formed in January
243d Static Cat Iii July 1943 Cotientin/Cherbourg
272 Field Cat II Dec 1943- April 1944 @ Antwerp Belgium Completed organizing at Lyon at the end of March and moved to Perpignan.
275th Field Cat II Jan 1944 @ St Naziere
277 Field Cat II Nov 1943 in Croatia. Jan ? Moved to Carcassone in January.
319 Static Cat IV Jan 1944 Channel Islands
352 Field Cat I Nov 1944 West side Cotientin

709 Static Cat III Jan 1944 Cotientin ? Moved from Brittany to Normandy in December 1942
711 Static Cat III Jan 1944 on coast Orne to Seine Rivers
716 Static Cat III Jan 1944 Calvados coast/Caen
719 Static Cat III Jan 1944 Netherlands

19th Army
148 Reserve Cat III Jan 1944 Nice? Yes.
242 Fortress Cat III Oct 43 There is no distinction between a "fortress" and a "static" division they were both bodenständigen or stationary.
244 Static Cat III Jan 1944 Tolun? Toulon
326 Fortress Cat III >Dec 43 Vic. of Samer-Montreuil, reorganizing as an ad hoc bewegungs division using confiscated French vehicles.
338 Static Cat III Jan 1944 Marsailles ? Rhone delta.

388 Fortress Cat III >Oct 43 don't know this one?
-1SS Cat IV IApril 1944 from east front. “Shattered”
?2SS Cat III February 1944 from eastern front. North of Toulose
-9 SS Cat II between Chalons-sur-Marne and Troyes Eastern front with 10. SS from 2 April- c. 23 June
-10SS Cat III Feb to April eastern front Charentes France.
-12SS Cat II Sept 1943 - march 1944 Beverloo Belgium
17SS Cat III Jan 1944 Poitiers. Not yet motorized. It was motorized, but not fully equipped and short transport.