OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

[Peter89]

Let's not forget that most of the Axis positions in Africa was held by the Vichy forces, and Britain systematically cleared them up, but didn't quite finish before Torch. If the Italians were beaten in 1941, they'd attack French West Africa, Madagascar, etc. nontheless.

What kind of deltas do you have in mind after 1943?

It took the British until (arguably) May, if not November, 1941 to finish the Italians in East Africa; they'd already lost the chance to destroy the Italians in Libya by that point, and the Japanese were about to open an entirely new set of theaters for the British in Asia...

I don't really get your point here.

The British eliminated all Axis or potentially hostile neutral footholds outside of North Africa before Torch. They'd have done the same anyway, which was, in my opinion, the correct strategy.

The British would be able to do so on their own, too, as US forces were not involved in the colonial fights from Dakar until Madagascar.

The chance to destroy the Italians was not lost, the chance to destroy the Italians AND the Germans was lost, but on the long run, it didn't really matter; the Axis operated on the far end of a vulnerable and inadequate logistical line. It was only a question of time before the Germans would lose that ground, regardless of the US involvement. For the British, even keeping Axis divisions in West Egypt was strategically beneficial; the Germans had to support them via sea and air, one option was worse than the other.

Also, if the Brits would simply just spin the web around the Axis from Iran to Western Africa, it would be enough. The Axis would feed more and more resources into that theatre instead of focusing solely on the SU. For the Brits, almost everything was beneficial in the MTO; a long stalemate, limited Axis gains, Axis defeat, Axis effort to a hopeless situation, etc. The only thing that would crush the Allied positions in the MTO would be an Axis victory on a scale that was impossible by late 1942; and I'm talking about a situation without US military involvement.

Even the British/Allied offensive into Cyrenaica in 1942 after 2nd Alamein required US support, and the final successful offensive to Tripolitania/Tunisia required TORCH.

It didn't really matter, because for the Allies, it was perfect that the Axis starved in Cyreneica. What was there, actually? Population, industries, raw materials, strategic positions? Nothing, really. It was perfect for the British to wear down the Axis' air and sea transport capacities and keep their forces very far from the SU.

Besides; I do not think that the British-led Allies were unable to pull of successful amphibious operation against Vichy-held territories. They've just captured Madagascar, as the last colony outside of North Africa. The Axis withdrew their capitals from the Atlantic, and the British were able to confuse the U-boats... also, the Germans would be forced to divide their forces once again, and drew resources from the SU to occupy Southern France, Tunisia, etc. So even just opening a new front in Northwest Africa would be a success, even if no decisive breakthrough would be achieved.

In 1943, after the final Axis surrender, there were various options, from Sardinia-Corsica to Sicily-Italy, in play; even southern Italy to the historical winter line and then holding, which would have given the Allies the Foggia complex, the only significant operational target for the Allies in Italy, before the winter of 1943. Avoiding the British defeat in the Dodecanese in 1943 would have been useful; avoiding SHINGLE in 1944 would have been as well.

These "delta" scenarios would not change the outcome by any meaningful margin.

[Sheldrake]

Basically, once the decision to do TORCH was made, any chance of a 1943 invasion of France was gone.

Not necessarily, were the Allies not expecting to take Tunisia relatively quickly? If the Vichy government had chosen to resist the Germans or if Hitler had decided not to send forces to Tunisia, the Torch campaign might have been over before the end of November, the whole North African campaign before the end of January.

Churchill and Brooke might have then found it very difficult to resist the calls for a 1943 invasion of France.

Presumably, the British "could" (there's that word again) have been dragged kicking and screaming, but yes, they would have fought it to the end. Both were, presumably, influenced by their experiences in 1914-17 and 1939-42.

The Americans were as well, of course; just in the "opposite" way.

I am glad that they were in charge rather than you..─ So would the relatives of the men called to risk their lives to end the war.

The United Nations had overwhelming material and economic advantages. However as democracies they were answerable to their electorates about how the lives of their menfolk would be risked. The British aim might be seen to win while minimizing their maximum exposure to casualties. The Americans had deeper pockets and avoided the horrendous losses of the Great War so were more gung ho about losing the odd ten thousand casualties. However, until =the US were providing the vast majority of manpower the British had a veto. Its how alliances work.

You are right in some respects. The British were informed by extensive previous experience of fighting German armies. They had heard the optimistic arguments based on false premises- like the ones you proposed, ignoring any inconvenient facts or risks. The allied air supremacy of 1943? (kind of struggled over schweinfurt and Berlin). Battle of the Atlantic? Who cares? The ideas you propose are pure conjecture with rosy tinted spectacles about the risks and difficulties.

All the statements about how easy a 1943 invasion would have been were as credible as the promises of the Big Push of 1916 or Nivelle's smoke and mirrors act in Spring 1917. They had heard this horse manure before and righting were not going to risk Britain's last army because some people in Washington wanted to be seen to be consistent with their 1941 concept of how to fight the war.

[Sheldrake]

Basically, once the decision to do TORCH was made, any chance of a 1943 invasion of France was gone.

But at the time nobody said it out loud.

Have you ever seen "Yes Minister" I don't want the truth. I want something I can tell Parliament!

This is why there is a statue of Brooke outside the Ministry of Defence. He prevented what could have been the worst disaster(s) in British Military History the 1942 and 1943 cross channel invasions.

He also prevented what "could" have been the surrender of Nazi Germany in 1944, but oh well, that's the way the Empire crumbles...

More to the point, He prevented what might have been the disastrous 1942 or 1943 failed cross channel assaults which was about the only scenario in which the Germans win the war.

[Tom from Cornwall]

So would a failed 1944 invasion of France. So would a failed 1945 invasion of France. So would have been a failed 1919 invasion of Germany. So what?

Hmmm, are you losing your way a bit now? The invasion of France in 1944 was successful!

Given the Germans were demonstrably weaker in France in 1943 than they were in 1944,

Hmmm, I wonder why?

Hum, who is missing? Do these individuals "count," in your book?

Oh, I see - a STRAWMAN - and a pretty distasteful one at that.

Your response will be illuminating...

Why would I bother responding to a STRAWMAN?

I'll just repost what Sheldrake posted, as it sums up my position as well:

You are right in some respects. The British were informed by extensive previous experience of fighting German armies. They had heard the optimistic arguments based on false premises- like the ones you proposed, ignoring any inconvenient facts or risks. The allied air supremacy of 1943? (kind of struggled over schweinfurt and Berlin). Battle of the Atlantic? Who cares? The ideas you propose are pure conjecture with rosy tinted spectacles about the risks and difficulties.

All the statements about how easy a 1943 invasion would have been were as credible as the promises of the Big Push of 1916 or Nivelle's smoke and mirrors act in Spring 1917. They had heard this horse manure before and righting were not going to risk Britain's last army because some people in Washington wanted to be seen to be consistent with their 1941 concept of how to fight the war.

Regards

Tom

[Carl Schwamberger]

Getting back, sort of, to the DRAGOON question.

I think we can all agree that having Marseilles was a good thing to have. But I'd hate to argue that it was absolutely essential to victory in the ETO. If you do, that makes Marshall's plans for shutting down the MTO at Casablanca in Jan 43 and/or invading France in 1943 (cf "Roundup" or "Sledgehammer") in 1942, non-starters. After all, Dragoon was only possible in Aug 1944, because we had already have lots of troops in the MTO.

IOW, if Dragoon and Marseilles were absolutely essential to success of Overlord, then how could any invasion of France and Conquest of Germany have succeeded without it? And that means, an invasion of North Africa, and the consequent build up in the MTO, were essential to victory in the ETO, since that's the only way you get Dragoon. And therefore Marshall was wrong in 1942 and 1943 to oppose going into the Med.

Strictly speaking no single port, or 'port group' was essential. Over the long haul the US Army thought the French Atlantic ports were essential. The planning estimates for the Bereton port group, including operation CHASITY was well north of 18,000 tons daily. Or at a minimum 5,400,000 tons in ten months starting from 1 August 1944. Rich might have the exact estimates at hand. I don't, so I'll leave it at the low end. But of course the Beretonand other Atlantic ports were largely unavailable. In retrospect that could have crippled the US logistics effort. There are are arguments they did. Eisenhower lucked out, or created his luck as it were by having the ability to secure the Marseilles port group instead. Arguably not the perfect solution but certainly very Good Enough. That DRAGOON could be executed hardly six weeks after the first hints Op CHASITY might not work. Nice to be able to take advantage of what resources you have and show a flexibility of mind so quickly.

Eisenhower needed X number of ground and air combat formations on the continent to close to and threaten the German frontier, & Y port/railway capacity to sustain that X combat capability. Any combination of ports and railway sectors can work, some better than others, but no single is essential to the grand strategy. As it worked out the Marseilles Group slipped neatly into the slot vacated by the long delayed Atlantic Port Groups.

[Carl Schwamberger]

I think we can all agree that having Marseilles was a good thing to have. But I'd hate to argue that it was absolutely essential to victory in the ETO. If you do, that makes Marshall's plans for shutting down the MTO at Casablanca in Jan 43 and/or invading France in 1943 (cf "Roundup" or "Sledgehammer") in 1942, non-starters. After all, Dragoon was only possible in Aug 1944, because we had already have lots of troops in the MTO.

IOW, if Dragoon and Marseilles were absolutely essential to success of Overlord, then how could any invasion of France and Conquest of Germany have succeeded without it? And that means, an invasion of North Africa, and the consequent build up in the MTO, were essential to victory in the ETO, since that's the only way you get Dragoon. And therefore Marshall was wrong in 1942 and 1943 to oppose going into the Med.

Don’t forget the other option. No Marseilles probably means that Operation Chastity would have gone ahead to provide the additional port facilities to keep the armies supplied.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Chastity

What the linked article fails to make clear is that as early as 10 July there were strong hints Op CHASITY was not going to work as planned. Ruppenthal 'Logistics in Overlord' has some details on that. Before July was out personnel for CHASIT?Y and related operations were being diverted to enhance the Cherbourg Port Group. Further authorizations to withdraw substantial men & material were made in August, which effectively ended possibility of execution.

Op CHASITY depended on the Germans following the Allied game plan and withdrawing their field armies from Normandy/Brittiany in June-July. As we know the Germans did not follow that plan. In mid July Ike had only to look at the map & Monties projections for the battle in Normandy to understand why Lee & the ASF guys were looking unhappy at the start of the meeting. In hindsight we can see Op CHASITY was a dead letter in mid July. Tho it took another month before SHAEF & the rest put its dying hand aside.

[Richard Anderson]

Given the Germans were demonstrably weaker in France in 1943 than they were in 1944, it's an pen question whether the odds of an Allied failure were higher or not; rational consideration of the correlation of forces and the distance involved between the Eastern Front and Western Front in 1944 and between the Eastern Front and a potential Western Front in 1943 would suggest strongly otherwise. That's a topic for another thread, however.

Why is it a topic for another thread, given you have brought it up in this one? If the Germans were demonstrably weaker in France in 1943 weren't the Allies too?

Compared to June 1944, in June 1943, the USAAF had 29% of the HB in theaters facing Germany, 60% of the medium bombers, 36% of the light bombers, 47% of the fighters, 45% of the reconnaissance, and 29% of the transports.

In terms of tanks, American forces in mid 1943 had 788 medium and 532 light available, compared to 3,134 medium and 1,507 light tanks in June 1944.

There were many fewer divisions available for American forces in 1943 than in 1944 and fewer landing craft to land them with.

Yes, the German forces were also somewhat weaker, but were they weaker proportionate to the weaker American forces? At least the Luftwaffe wasn't. Luftwaffe day fighter strength in the west in June 1943 was 94% of its strength in June 1944 and, arguably, was much better qualitatively than it was in 1944, while the USAAF was still gaining experience and had yet to field large numbers of technologically advanced air superiority fighters. In 1943, just 26% of the American fighters were P-47 and P-51, while 44% were P-39 and P-40.

Or do you have data that indicates otherwise?

[Carl Schwamberger]

This, Post #275, caught my eye some time ago, but I've just got around to following to where it may lead.

Which is an interesting question, but it's not a "capacity" question - it's a "policy" question ... which is where things really get interesting.

Well, I'd say it was a capacity, policy, and personalities question, which is indeed where things get interesting. Too many of these what ifs simply tweak capacity issues - what I call the "lets move these counters from here to there and win the war" syndrome - without really understanding what those capacity issues really were or how hard it is in real life to move men, equipment, and stores intercontinental distances, and then proceed to ignore the issues of doctrine, competing strategic aims, the introduction of new equipment and TTPs in a wartime environment of vastly expanding militaries, and the cussedness of people supposedly interacting with one another to achieve a goal.

I suspect that had it been solely a US Navy decision (there are various hints IIRC in the administrative histories of the 11th PHIB that point that way), the landing craft availability estimate of 90-95% may have been enough for the USN to accept a simultaneous NEPTUNE and DRAGOON, but that is just my suspicion.

What does that last mean in terms of the assault and follow up size of the critical first week? The same size as OTL NEPTUNE /DRAGOON, or 90%, 80% ??

When I tested it on the game board I reduced the NEPTUNE capacity by 30% for what is defined here as a 'simultaneous' ANVIL operation. In the context of your answer here was my baseline correct, too low, or... ?

[Carl Schwamberger]

Given the Germans were demonstrably weaker in France in 1943 than they were in 1944, it's an pen question whether the odds of an Allied failure were higher or not; rational consideration of the correlation of forces and the distance involved between the Eastern Front and Western Front in 1944 and between the Eastern Front and a potential Western Front in 1943 would suggest strongly otherwise. That's a topic for another thread, however.

Why is it a topic for another thread, given you have brought it up in this one? If the Germans were demonstrably weaker in France in 1943 weren't the Allies too?

It is a topic for another thread.

Don't touch the keys Rich!

OH NOOO!!

[Carl Schwamberger]

Returning to the question I asked on several posts.

Regardless of whether hind sight allows us to argue that it might have been possible, what was the actual benefit going to be of launching Op Anvil simultaneously with OP Overlord? How was the strategic, or even operational outcome going to be improved significantly over the historic strategic allied victory in excess of anticipated results?

The only advantage I have seen so far was the argument that an earlier capture of Marseilles might have improved logistics in Q4 of 1944. That assumes that a simultaneous Op Anvil didn't also require a Transportation plan to isolate the target landing sector, which then trashed the rail connections to Marseilles. The other possibility is that this may have changed the German response from "fight for every inch", which led to the destruction of 7th and 5th Panzer armies to a delaying strategy that might have left half of France in German hands through the winter of 1944-45

This definitely connects to the OP & should have more depth of answer earlier.

One aspect is the materialschalcht, which the battles of 1944-45 were very much a part of. OTL the months of April & May the attrition of ground forces under Rundsteadt was low. What losses there were came from air attack, I understand they fell somewhere between insignificant & as high as 1 or 2%. This was 'replaceable' by the German production system. In June-July the losses rocket upwards and exceed replacement. The larger number of Allied 'division's engaged with the defense, not just present and pining for truck fuel, the greater the overall losses and the larger the loss/replacement gap.

The loss/replacement gap actually occurs & can be measured at several levels. One is in gross industrial production vs the combat & general wastage losses, another is in delivery amounts to the combat forces vs their losses. Both tell us something related about the same overall problem.

To digress, one such ratio thats been examined is the Allied cargo ship production vs lost from either specific submarine attacks or general losses in the Battle of the Atlantic. The raw or refine numbers show the Allies were approaching winning this 'battle' in the III Quarter of 1942, & clearly were winning in the final quarter. of 1942. You can find a similar crossover point in submarine production/loss, or in the air battles of January-September 1943 in the Mediterranean Theatre. Point here being; the German Materialschlacht loss in OB West was a static zero through May 1944. Moving the start of the battle to May, or April gives you seven of eight months of losses to the the defense, vs the six of OTL. There are of course a number of variables here. But having twenty Allied 'divisions' in France committing destruction in May vs zero has a effect on the long term. Ditto for losses in men.

[daveshoup2MD]

Basically, once the decision to do TORCH was made, any chance of a 1943 invasion of France was gone.

Not necessarily, were the Allies not expecting to take Tunisia relatively quickly? If the Vichy government had chosen to resist the Germans or if Hitler had decided not to send forces to Tunisia, the Torch campaign might have been over before the end of November, the whole North African campaign before the end of January.

Churchill and Brooke might have then found it very difficult to resist the calls for a 1943 invasion of France.

Presumably, the British "could" (there's that word again) have been dragged kicking and screaming, but yes, they would have fought it to the end. Both were, presumably, influenced by their experiences in 1914-17 and 1939-42.

The Americans were as well, of course; just in the "opposite" way.

I am glad that they were in charge rather than you..─ So would the relatives of the men called to risk their lives to end the war.

The United Nations had overwhelming material and economic advantages. However as democracies they were answerable to their electorates about how the lives of their menfolk would be risked. The British aim might be seen to win while minimizing their maximum exposure to casualties. The Americans had deeper pockets and avoided the horrendous losses of the Great War so were more gung ho about losing the odd ten thousand casualties. However, until =the US were providing the vast majority of manpower the British had a veto. Its how alliances work.

You are right in some respects. The British were informed by extensive previous experience of being defeated by German armies. They had heard the optimistic arguments based on false premises- like the ones you proposed, ignoring any inconvenient facts or risks. The allied air supremacy of 1943? (kind of struggled over schweinfurt and Berlin). Battle of the Atlantic? Who cares? The ideas you propose are pure conjecture with rosy tinted spectacles about the risks and difficulties.

All the statements about how easy a 1943 invasion would have been were as credible as the promises of the Big Push of 1916 or Nivelle's smoke and mirrors act in Spring 1917. They had heard this horse manure before and righting were not going to risk Britain's last army because some people in Washington wanted to be seen to be consistent with their 1941 concept of how to fight the war.

Not that it matters, but one of those on the front lines to end the war from 1942-45 was "Dave Shoup, Senior," ie my old man. He was in action from 1942 onwards, including in Italy, and given they were getting shot at by Nazis anyway, they'd have rather gotten into the title fight sooner, rather than later.

Beyond all that, defeating Germany required fighting the Germans, taking the Ruhr, and threatening Berlin; which was the Americans had planned to do in 1918-19; it wasn't done, which meant that two decades after "Dave Shoup the First" got discharged from the Ass End Forward, "Dave Shoup Senior" got to go back and help do it the right way.

Thankfully, when it was my turn, the Europeans and Japanese had seen enough, and I got to go try and cow some other recalcitrants; it has (sort of) worked, albeit not to the extent that Dear Old Dad's generation succeeded; oh well. Thankfully "Dave Shoup IV"'s generation just have somewhat less challenging locals to cow...

But to bring it back, the "Big Push of 1916" (British mistakes) or "Nivelle's smoke and mirrors act in Spring 1917"(French mistakes) were exactly the sorts of examples both sides took to heart; both the Americans and the British wanted to avoid any repeats the second time around; it's just that the lessons learned of how to do that were remarkably "different" ... remarkably.

And, sorry, who has made any statements about "how easy a 1943 invasion would have been"? Please, point them out.

[daveshoup2MD]

Basically, once the decision to do TORCH was made, any chance of a 1943 invasion of France was gone.

But at the time nobody said it out loud.

Have you ever seen "Yes Minister" I don't want the truth. I want something I can tell Parliament!

This is why there is a statue of Brooke outside the Ministry of Defence. He prevented what could have been the worst disaster(s) in British Military History the 1942 and 1943 cross channel invasions.

He also prevented what "could" have been the surrender of Nazi Germany in 1944, but oh well, that's the way the Empire crumbles...

More to the point, He prevented what might have been the disastrous 1942 or 1943 failed cross channel assaults which was about the only scenario in which the Germans win the war.

If your final sentence is true (debateable), then the reverse is, of course, Brooke also condemned tens of thousands of the UK's civilians and millions of European men, women, and children to what they suffered, historically, in 1943-45. I'm not certain he'd be so quick to claim credit for that, but if not, well then ... Well done! Bravo!

What planned 1942 assault are you referring to? SLEDGEHAMMER? That started out as British plan in case the Soviets began to fold up, and that's all it ever was; that's a strawman.

1943? ROUNDUP? Given what the Allies managed quite successfully in 1942-43, in theaters as far apart and as austere as the Southwest Pacific and MTO (setting aside the 1942-43 Arakan and 1943 Dodecanese fiascoes, of course, which came about - after all - because of British decisions), and the reality the German forces in France were demonstrably weaker in 1943 than they were in 1944, a successful 1943-44 campaign was quite possible, given an early enough decision point - arguably, during the 2nd Washington conference in the summer of 1942, perhaps later.

[daveshoup2MD]

So would a failed 1944 invasion of France. So would a failed 1945 invasion of France. So would have been a failed 1919 invasion of Germany. So what?

Hmmm, are you losing your way a bit now? The invasion of France in 1944 was successful!

Given the Germans were demonstrably weaker in France in 1943 than they were in 1944,

Hmmm, I wonder why?

Hum, who is missing? Do these individuals "count," in your book?

Oh, I see - a STRAWMAN - and a pretty distasteful one at that.

Your response will be illuminating...

Why would I bother responding to a STRAWMAN?

I'll just repost what Sheldrake posted, as it sums up my position as well:

You are right in some respects. The British were informed by extensive previous experience of fighting German armies. They had heard the optimistic arguments based on false premises- like the ones you proposed, ignoring any inconvenient facts or risks. The allied air supremacy of 1943? (kind of struggled over schweinfurt and Berlin). Battle of the Atlantic? Who cares? The ideas you propose are pure conjecture with rosy tinted spectacles about the risks and difficulties.

All the statements about how easy a 1943 invasion would have been were as credible as the promises of the Big Push of 1916 or Nivelle's smoke and mirrors act in Spring 1917. They had heard this horse manure before and righting were not going to risk Britain's last army because some people in Washington wanted to be seen to be consistent with their 1941 concept of how to fight the war.

Regards

Tom

1944 was successful. Glad we agree. 1943 could have been as well. Same for 1945. The historical success in 1944-45 does not mean the same possibility was not there a year earlier, or a year later.

The Germans were demonstrably weaker in France in 1943 than they were in 1944 because of the Soviets. Is that in question?

Was reducing Allied civilian casualties a British war aim? Presumably. And yes, the consequences of war are "distasteful;" (that's "a" word for it ); ask anyone who's been in one. Especially a civilian who can't shoot back ... How is it a strawman, then?

I'm not aware Haig or Nivelle were responsible for planning Allied grand strategy in 1941-45. Interesting how the Americans and the British learned lessons 180 degrees apart, because of poor leadership by the British and French two decades earlier... Interesting, that...

And, finally, who has made any "statements about how easy a 1943 invasion" would have been? Please, point them out.

[daveshoup2MD]

Getting back, sort of, to the DRAGOON question.

I think we can all agree that having Marseilles was a good thing to have. But I'd hate to argue that it was absolutely essential to victory in the ETO. If you do, that makes Marshall's plans for shutting down the MTO at Casablanca in Jan 43 and/or invading France in 1943 (cf "Roundup" or "Sledgehammer") in 1942, non-starters. After all, Dragoon was only possible in Aug 1944, because we had already have lots of troops in the MTO.

IOW, if Dragoon and Marseilles were absolutely essential to success of Overlord, then how could any invasion of France and Conquest of Germany have succeeded without it? And that means, an invasion of North Africa, and the consequent build up in the MTO, were essential to victory in the ETO, since that's the only way you get Dragoon. And therefore Marshall was wrong in 1942 and 1943 to oppose going into the Med.

Strictly speaking no single port, or 'port group' was essential. Over the long haul the US Army thought the French Atlantic ports were essential. The planning estimates for the Bereton port group, including operation CHASITY was well north of 18,000 tons daily. Or at a minimum 5,400,000 tons in ten months starting from 1 August 1944. Rich might have the exact estimates at hand. I don't, so I'll leave it at the low end. But of course the Beretonand other Atlantic ports were largely unavailable. In retrospect that could have crippled the US logistics effort. There are are arguments they did. Eisenhower lucked out, or created his luck as it were by having the ability to secure the Marseilles port group instead. Arguably not the perfect solution but certainly very Good Enough. That DRAGOON could be executed hardly six weeks after the first hints Op CHASITY might not work. Nice to be able to take advantage of what resources you have and show a flexibility of mind so quickly.

Eisenhower needed X number of ground and air combat formations on the continent to close to and threaten the German frontier, & Y port/railway capacity to sustain that X combat capability. Any combination of ports and railway sectors can work, some better than others, but no single is essential to the grand strategy. As it worked out the Marseilles Group slipped neatly into the slot vacated by the long delayed Atlantic Port Groups.

Good points.

[daveshoup2MD]

Given the Germans were demonstrably weaker in France in 1943 than they were in 1944, it's an pen question whether the odds of an Allied failure were higher or not; rational consideration of the correlation of forces and the distance involved between the Eastern Front and Western Front in 1944 and between the Eastern Front and a potential Western Front in 1943 would suggest strongly otherwise. That's a topic for another thread, however.

1. Why is it a topic for another thread, given you have brought it up in this one? 2. If the Germans were demonstrably weaker in France in 1943 weren't the Allies too?

Compared to June 1944, in June 1943, the USAAF had 29% of the HB in theaters facing Germany, 60% of the medium bombers, 36% of the light bombers, 47% of the fighters, 45% of the reconnaissance, and 29% of the transports.

In terms of tanks, American forces in mid 1943 had 788 medium and 532 light available, compared to 3,134 medium and 1,507 light tanks in June 1944.

There were many fewer divisions available for American forces in 1943 than in 1944 and fewer landing craft to land them with.

3. Yes, the German forces were also somewhat weaker, but were they weaker proportionate to the weaker American forces? At least the Luftwaffe wasn't. Luftwaffe day fighter strength in the west in June 1943 was 94% of its strength in June 1944 and, arguably, was much better qualitatively than it was in 1944, while the USAAF was still gaining experience and had yet to field large numbers of technologically advanced air superiority fighters. In 1943, just 26% of the American fighters were P-47 and P-51, while 44% were P-39 and P-40.

4. Or do you have data that indicates otherwise?

1. Actually, pretty sure you brought it up; you want to kick it around further, open a thread.

2. The Allies weren't in France in 1943 (other than the mostly latent FFI and some small numbers of SOE and MI types, so yeah, that's a pretty easy answer.

3. Where? Globally? And why just the Americans?

4. Data about what? Ground forces? Air forces? Naval forces? In theater? Available? Globally? And most importantly: as of when do any deltas come into play?

Start a thread, if you wish.