The Soviets retreat from Kiev in early September 1941

[historygeek2021]

You read the chart on page 1012 wrong, it says an average of 21 days to recover from sickness in 1941. The claim on p.1014 refers to the sick from the entire period of September 1941-August 1942, but the chart says the sick in 1942 recovered on average after 40 days. So the 49% within 1 month recovered mostly refers to the sick of 1942 not 1941. I'm guessing that the majority of those in 1941 who were sick for an extended period of time were the frostbite cases of the winter of 1941-42, so mostly those well after the period we are discussing.

The chart on page 1020 specifically says only 56,800 departures due to the illness, so the vast majority stayed and if the average recovery time for 1941 was 21 days, then at least 50% recovered within 21 days and probably at least 2/3rds within 30. Only the more extreme illness cases were evacuated. Exhaustion was probably a significant case for some people to drop out of action and there is no indication that it was the combat arms that were disproportionately hit for that. They might have even been less likely to be hit due to casualties chewing up those that might have gotten sick and fresh replacements who were less likely to get sick filling their slots.

Your mistake seems to have been taken every departure for July 1941 and multiplying by 1.75 rather than just the casualties caused by weapons (which did not include missing either, so remove them from your calculations). So you've doubled counted all the evacuated sick and added in other categories that should have not have been included.

So yeah, basically what I thought, you were misreading your own source.

To get the number of sick, I multiplied by the 1.75 by total departures, and arrived at more than 300,000. You are correct that I should have multiplied by the number of wounded (about 125,000 from what I can see in the blurry Kindle edition, I don't have the hardcopy on me atm). Multiplying 125,000 by 1.75 gives us 218,750 soldiers out sick at any given moment in July (and presumably a similar number in August). Even if the period of sickness only averages 21 days, that is still over 200,000 soldiers out of action on any given day. Which means the combat strength of the infantry division is still only 60%, and the combat strength of the panzer and motorized divisions is only 50%.

Also per this thread the Soviets are evacuated anyway, so that just makes the job of AG-South and Center easier, as their opponents are running east away from them anyway.

The Soviet reserve armies were mobilized in advance where they were needed, which was Ukraine and Leningrad; they would have time to be mobilized in front of Moscow if Stalin opted to retreat since the mobilization process would have been started well before August 19th when you say the decision to evacuate would have been made. Later on they could have been mobilized around Moscow, but that's a longer process and one that won't be perceived as necessary until after the evacuation is underway. Too late to redirect mobilization for August and likely the majority of September given how much transport will be needed to evacuate Ukraine. If anything that might just break down the mobilization process as trains are diverted to saving their armies rather than creating new ones.

We're conflating ATL's now. Southwestern Front will only evacuate to the east if Guderian is driving south. If Guderian is driving south, then AGC isn't attacking Moscow in August or even early September. If, as per Stolfi's ATL, Guderian and Hoth drive east in the middle of August 1941, then the Southwestern Front has no reason to evacuate from Kiev. Likewise, the Soviet reserve armies will be mobilized where they are needed - where the Germans are attacking.

December 1941 is not August 1941. Trying to compare the situations is utterly absurd. What house to house fighting in Moscow? After Vyazma there is no reserves to fight for Moscow in the city and there is no mud to slow down the Germans either. New armies weren't mobilized in the city, just passed through it.

You're WAY overestimating Soviet abilities in August-September and underestimating AG-Center's abilities in the same period. We can look at what happened to Soviet forces that tried to stop the Leningrad and the Kiev encirclements. Hint: they were destroyed.

In a situation where Moscow is seized in September (I'm assuming given that the march on Moscow would start later in August) the Soviets lack the ability to move reserves to counter attack Moscow, they would lack their central rail and telephone line hub (pretty vital to organizing reserves; hard to do it on the fly from Kubyshiev, the planned new capital if the government fled in time), and they'd lack the industry to make the necessary weapons that equipped forces in December historically. Meanwhile the Germans have all the airfields of Moscow, the captured supplies and rail lines/rolling stock, have a flood of refugees fleeing east and into Soviet infrastructure that couldn't handle them, have 10% of Soviet industry that was concentrated around Moscow and provided much of the specialized weapons and equipment that wasn't made elsewhere, and more importantly have eliminated the bulk of Soviet forces that might threaten them. The only sizable force left would be the force fleeing from Ukraine, which still has to deal with AG-South chasing them down. The Leningrad forces are still on the Luga and now split between also screening the Moscow axis, but now without the rail lines to supply them.

The timelines and ATLS are, again, getting confused in this thread. But if we just stick to Stolfi's ATL, in which AGC, including all of Panzer Group 2 and Panzer Group 3, drive east in the middle of August, then the 11 new Soviet armies that were mobilized in August and 3 armies that were mobilized in September (all but 2 of which were deployed to Leningrad and Ukraine in the OTL), would have been sent to the Moscow theater. If AGC's assault performs as well as Operation Typhoon did in the OTL, then it will encircle 4-5 Soviet Armies. Even not counting the 14 new armies mobilized in August and September, the Soviets still have 5 other armies in the Moscow region, plus the forces of the Central/Briansk Front and forces at Velikiye Luki that will have a free hand in Stolfi's ATL because Panzer Groups 2 and 3 aren't attacking them. Source for mobilization of Soviet armies is Map 2 in David Glantz's Barbarossa.

Please explain how the encirclement of 4-5 Soviet armies in late August/early September leads to Moscow falling in September, given the more than 20 other armies that the Soviets will be able to assign to countering this offensive (before another 5 Soviet armies arrive in October, and another 11 arrive in November-December)?

Also note that Army Group Center was holding its portion of the front in August and September with almost no reserves. How is it then going to have the manpower to hold the two/three sides of a salient protruding toward Moscow, against 20+ Soviet armies? When it tried this in the OTL in December, it was forced to retreat.

Lend-Lease is not available yet either and if Moscow falls probably will never be authorized either.

Lend-lease to the USSR began in October 1941. Please explain why the Germans capturing Moscow would cause FDR and Churchill to cancel the program.

The Soviets would be fucked without their capital and industry and the Germans are highly unlikely to suffer the losses they took from October on without Moscow organizing resistance and mobilization and production. The Soviets would be completely unraveling by May 1942 especially without LL.

This is the part that requires further explanation. Please provide hard analysis, with specific sources. Happy to move that to a new thread since this one is already very involved.

[KDF33]

Which means the combat strength of the infantry division is still only 60%, and the combat strength of the panzer and motorized divisions is only 50%.

I don't see how this can be. The establishment strength for elements counted in the Kampfstärke of the divisions used for Barbarossa amounted to ~1.2 million men. Registered combat and non-combat losses for June - August amounted to 500,859, and replacements to 215,000, including 40,000 non-evacuated convalescents.

That's a net loss of 285,859 men. Even if we assume that 100% of the casualties occurred among personnel included in the Kampfstärke, that still leaves 914,141 men - 76% of the initial figure.

[History Learner]

Yes, I do believe that an advance on the Moscow axis would have been possible at some point in the second half of August. How comparable in vigor to Taifun this would have been is IMO the important question.

Okay, so long as we are agreed on the logistical viability.

Ok. You need time to regroup your widely dispersed units, then. So an offensive in the first half of September with, admittedly, a sound logistical basis perhaps comparable to the historical Taifun.

2nd and 3rd Panzer Armies were still in position at this point, with Guderian heavily lobbying in favor of a Moscow strike.

I have. Stolfi is hardly a reputable source. The paragraph you have quoted contains no archival data on readiness. Stolfi's figure of 72% of the initial "striking power" of 2,792 operational tanks on August 13th is backed by nothing, and would require us to believe German tanks had a 74% readiness rate at the time.

How he derives his figures is anyone's guess, but it is clearly contradicted by strength reports, which, as I have shown previously, indicate far lower levels of operational readiness among long-engaged Panzer formations.

Okay, for one, he does include citations I just didn't attach them like I did for the logistics portion since there was no objection then to Stolfi as a source. If you would like the citations for Chapter 10, from which the tank strength is drawn, here you go:

1. See in Halder, Diaries, vol. 6. p. 210, the comment by Col. Eberhard Kinzel at the Army General Staff 1100
review of the Russian situation on 8 July 1941.
2. See Halder. Diaries, vol. 6, p. 125. the entry for 20 May 1941, in which Generaloberst Friedrich Fromm, chief of
army equipment and commander of the replacement army. presents these figures.
3. Average numbers among nine divisions (four panzer, three infantry, and two motorized infantry) assigned to
Panzer Group Guderian on 22 June 1941. See in Pz. A.O.K. 2. H.Qu. den 27 Dezember 1941. Starken Pz. A.O.K. 2.
U.S. National Archives. Records of German Field Commands. Panzer Armies, Microcopy T-313. Roll 103. Fr.
7346281.
4. Average numbers among eight divisions (five panzer and three motorized infantry) assigned to Panzer Group
Guderian on 23 August 1941. See Pz. A.O.K. 2, H.Qu. den 23.8.1941. Starken Panzergruppe, U.S. National
Archives. Records of German Field Commands, Panzer Armies. Copy T-313. Roll 103. Fr. 7346313.
5. Ibid.. Fr. 7346281. in which strength figures are given for the same divisions of Panzer Group 2 on 22 June
1941. Comparison shows the Germans operating at 80 percent of their original strength on the later date.
6. Feist and Nowarra. German Panzers.
7. Senger und Etterlin. Kampfpanzer, pp. 63. 68. 423.
8. See Brereton and Feist, Russian Tanks, pp. 12. 20, 32. 33. 48, as supplemented for road ranges by Senger und
Etterlin, Kampfpanzer. pp. 357, 362, 386, 391.
9. See in Hoherer Art.Kdo. 302. la Nr. 588/41 geh. Gef Stand, den 20.10.1941, U.S. National Archives, Records
German Field Commands, Armies, Microcopy T-312. Roll 145, Fr. 7684409. where the report comments that the
10.5cm howitzer required the 10.5cm antitank projectile and the number 6 load of propellant to knock out the T-34
at that time.
10. See the German analysis in Pz. A.O.K. 4. Ic. . . . 12.7.1941 . . . Abschrift eines Berichten des Pz. Rgts. 25 über
den schwersten Sowjet Panzerkampfwagen. U.S. National Archives. Records German Field Commands. Panzer
Armies. Microcopy T-313. Roll 131. Fr. 7378951. which reveals the challenges of fighting the big Soviet tanks
(KV-1.2) in the Baltic.
11. See in O.K.H. Gen Sta d H. Op. Abt. (I), Nr. 1503/41. g.Kdos. Chef. Panzerlage, U.S. National Archives,
Records Headquarters German Army High Command, Copy T-78. Roll 335. Fr. 6291784. The numbers do not
include German tanks manufactured as command vehicles, e.g., Pz.Kw. I, Pz.Kw. III. and TNHS 38
Panzerbefehlswagen.
12. See Foss. Illustrated Encyclopedia, p. 173. figure for T-26 tanks.
13. See Senger und Etterlin, Kampfpanzer, pp. 386, 391. Figures are for T-34 and KV tanks manufactured by 22
June 1941.
14. See Christensen. Steinlager Allendorf, trans., Questions Asked Guderian and Answers Given by Guderian. U.S.
Army. European Command. Historical Division, MS B-271.
In answer to the question of how many tanks the Germans expected the Russians to have. Guderian notes, ''I
reckoned on 17-20,000."
15. See Zusammenstellung, U.S. National Archives, Records Headquarters German Armed Forces High Command.
Microcopy T-77. Roll 15, Fr. 726363, which presents figures of 13.176 "3.7 cm Pak. u. Pak 38 (5 cm)" for
"Bestand 1.5.40." See also Heereswaffenamt, Wa. Stab la 3, Ausschnitt Bestand am 1.7.40. U.S. National Archives,
Records Headquarters German Army High Command. Microcopy T-78. Roll 143, Fr. 6973765. The Germans had
produced the vast total of 13,029 of the 3.7cm Pak for the antitank defense of the field divisions by 1 July 1940,
according to the source.
16. See, for example. Fernschreiben. 3. A.K., Ic. an Panzergruppe 1.4.7.41. U.S. National Archives, Records
German Field Commands. Panzer Armies. Microcopy T-313. Roll 10. Fr. 7236603, which states: "Russian tanks:
seldom more than battalion strength at one time."
17. See Selz, Das Grüne Regiment, pp. 58. 59.
18. German infantry in Army Group South faced similar, huge Soviet tank forces. See. for example, A.O.K. 17.
K.T.B. Nr. 1, 15.5.41-12.12.41. U.S. National Archives, Records German Field Commands, Armies. Microcopy T312. Roll 668. Fr. 8301934. in which headquarters. 17th Army, notes: "Around noon [23 June 1941] the 262nd
Infantry Division was in danger from about 150 enemy tanks from the area around Kornie."
19. The most powerful antitank gun used by the Germans in Barbarossa, the 5.0cm Pak, was "effective only at
ranges under 200 m . . . the [KV heavy] tanks can also be put out of action by chance hits of 5.0 cm Pak at the
turret ring." See Pz. A.O.K. 4. lc . . . 12.7.1941 . . . Abschrift eines Berichten des Pz. Rgts. 25 uber den schwersten
Sowjet Panzerkampfwagen. U.S. National Archives, Records German Field Commands. Panzer Armies, Microcopy
T-313. Roll 131, Fr. 7378951.
20. Note the typical Soviet experience in Oberkommando der 4. Pz. Armee, Ic. Interrogation Report. T-34 Crew
Member Georgiewitsch Kowalenko. July 1941, U.S. National Archives. Records German Field Commands. Panzer
Armies. Microcopy T-313, Roll 131, Fr. 7378923. where the Soviet tank man in the Soviet 107th Panzer Division
notes heavy fighting around Orsha on 9 July 1941 followed by the attempt of a pack of sixty Soviet tanks "to fight
its way eastward through Smolensk" on 17 and 18 July 41 out of the cauldron, 50 to 60 km to the west. Kowalenko
notes that only two of the Soviet tanks escaped over the Dnieper toward Smolensk.
21. Note that approximately one month later, under Guderian. the 18th Panzer Division. 47th Panzer Corps would
be "standing ready for insertion in further combat at about 60% of its original strength." See 18. Panzer-Division.
XXXXVII. Pz. Korps. Meldung vom 15.9.1941 nachdem Stand vom 10.9.1941. U.S. National Archives. Records
German Field Commands. Panzer Armies. Microcopy T-313. Roll 103. Frs. 7347178, 7347180.
22. See in Halder. Diaries, vol. 7, p. 17.
23. See Ferschreiben. 9. Pz. Div. an Pz. Gr. 1. U.S. National Archives, Records German Field Commands. Panzer
Armies. Microcopy T-313, Roll 4. Fr. 7227458. which notes on the day of the start of the campaign that the 9th
Panzer Division had "approximately 80 percent of the wheeled motor vehicles of the division ready for insertion in
combat."
24. See Author No. 313, Antitank Defense in the East (April. 1947), p. 3. U.S. Army. European Command.
Historical Division. MS D-253.

Beyond that though, using figures from September-while 3rd and 2nd Panzer were getting use by AGN and AGS-for a mid/late August estimate is a pretty bad standard. Looking at your data, you're pulling it from Panzertruppen by Jentz, which makes it all the more odd because August returns are presented for several of the divisions, but also I am not sure why you are citing them the way you are?

Case in point is 3rd Panzer, which started Barbarossa with 229 tanks and by September 4th total losses were only 70, meaning that even in September, they had a roughly 70% rate of tanks either in operation or repairable. If we take your suggestion of a few days halt, most-if not all-of those under repair would be put back in position. However, as stated, looking at September returns seems odd to me.

A figure pulled out of thin air. Also, according to Stolfi's reasoning, the figure would be 2,010, not 2,223, given that he calculates the ratio on an estimate of 90% operational readiness for the initial inventory.

Again, not true that it's pulled out of thin air, but even still that results in a markedly higher position than most estimates for Typhoon.

No, summation as in "the process of adding things together"', i.e., combining strength reports for the different Fronts.

So estimates, since they were in the process of adding things and thus did not have a finalized count. Even dropping this point, I don't find it very convincing since you've already conceded Central Front/Briansk Front will not be in a position to be of use previously.

That link doesn't refute in anyway the figures from the GKO. It doesn't even mention them.

Quite frankly you didn't read it then because that entire discussion is about the numbers drawn from the GKO and their validity.

You're conflating two things. 1941 saw problems with the casualty reporting system, but AFAIK not with the strength reporting system. Take the difference in the reported strength of Southwestern Front between early September and early October: it drops from 850,000 to 408,000 men, a collapse consistent with the impact of the Kiev pocket.

If you can't figure out what your actual casualties are then you don't know what your actual strength is; these are very obviously connected, no?

The Germans having superiority in mobile formations does not automatically mean Vyazma-level victories. The Germans were also superior during the Smolensk operation, and they were far less successful at bagging Soviet units.

Because of poor tactical decisions on their part, in particular Guderian moving to seize Yelna in his haste to advance upon Moscow. If you are going to argue the tactical rather than the force numbers, then this debate transitions back into what I said earlier about Central Front; you're counting them in your force totals to argue against such a drive on Moscow while ignoring their specific dispositions and how that would impact the course of the hypothetical battle.

Ok. On what date is it pulled out and sent south?

Presumably sometime in August, I'd imagine they would-as noted-counter the Starya Russai offensive and secure Velikiye Luki.

"Almost 1,000" more tanks how?

What is your position on the tank count for AGC in the historical Operation Typhoon? There are different ranges, so let's see first what number you pick.

How long does it take you to set this up with a POD of August 19?

Presumably the Germans will detect the Soviet withdraw in a few days, giving AGC the ammo it needs to elect to continue the drive on Moscow. If we elect to take your halt period-say five or six days like after Smolensk-to regroup and repair tanks, we could have the operation start before the end of August.

2nd and 3rd Panzer Groups were widely dispersed and not in any way in position to jump off. Here is the disposition of HGM's mobile formations on August 19:

• XXXIX. Armeekorps (mot.): En route to Heeresgruppe Nord, with 12. Panzer, as well as 18. and 20. Infanterie (mot.)

• LVII. Armeekorps (mot.): 3 days away (22 August) from launching an attack on Velikiye Luki, with 19. and 20. Panzer

• VIII. Armeekorps: Defending north-east of Smolensk, with 7. Panzer, as well as 14. Infanterie (mot.)

• XXXXVI. Armeekorps (mot.): Defending south-east of Smolensk, with 10. Panzer, as well as Das Reich

• XXXXVII. Armeekorps (mot.): Pushing south against 13th Army and holding the right flank of Panzergruppe 2, with 17. and 18. Panzer, as well as 29. Infanterie (mot.)

• XXIV. Armeekorps (mot.): Pushing south against 21st Army and about to take Starodub, with 3. and 4. Panzer, as well as 10. Infanterie (mot.)

I'm not really seeing them as all that dispersed then or not in a position to jump off, particularly Guderian with his 2nd Panzer Army; Glantz in Barbarossa Derailed covers this well with Chapter 8 from Volume I. To quote from Page 393:

Because the forces of Zhukov’s Reserve Front were still attacking El’nia, the OKH
cancelled plans for any further advance eastward across the Desna River as counseled by
Guderian and left it to Bock to decide whether or not to abandon the El’nia bridgehead,
and when. The OKH did so because Vietinghoff’s SS “Das Reich” Division and
“Grossdeutschland” Regiment were still in the line near El’nia and would remain there
until 18 August, thus depriving Vietinghoff’s motorized corps, which had been in near
constant combat since 22 June, of much needed time to rest and rehabilitate its forces.
Meanwhile, Stalin assigned Zhukov’s reinforced Reserve Front the multiple tasks
of backing up the Western Front, eliminating Army Group Center’s bridgehead at
El’nia, and continuing to fill in and defend the growing gap between the Western and
Central Fronts southward from El’nia to the region northwest of Briansk.
From the Stavka’s perspective, the obliteration of the defenses of Golubev’s 13th
Army along the Sozh River and the withdrawal of Gordov’s 21st Army toward Gomel’,
both of which were now threatened with encirclement in the Gomel’ region, permitted
a sizeable gap to form between the Western Front east of Smolensk and Southwestern
Front defending Kiev. For the moment, however, the Stavka expected Zhukov’s Reserve
Front and the remnants of Efremov’s Central Front to help fill this gap. Compounding
the Stavka’s problems, on 11 August it received news that General V. I. Kuznetsov’s
3rd Army, which it had reestablished by 1 August and deployed on the western bank
of the Dnepr River west of Gomel’ to protect the Central Front’s left flank, was
withdrawing without authorization to do so.19 Reacting angrily, Shaposhnikov sent a
scathing message to Timoshenko, the Main Western Direction commander:
Despite the absence of overwhelming enemy superiority, Kuznetsov is continuing
to withdraw without proper resistance, at the same time creating a serious situation
for Potapov [5th Army on 21st Army’s left flank]. The front’s military council
must compel Kuznetsov to fight as he should and not abandon his positions to
the enemy without a fight. This situation cannot continue any longer.20
When reinforcement of the Reserve Front and threats to the Central Front and
3rd Army proved inadequate to solve “the Guderian problem,” on 14 August the
Stavka acted even more decisively to block Guderian’s southward advance by forming
the new Briansk Front to plug the gap between the Reserve and Central Fronts and
assigning the “fighter,” General Eremenko, as its commander. By doing so, it also kept
its hopes alive for a new and more powerful offensive against Army Group Center.

And they were at a low level of operational readiness. Kiev was won with comparatively weak forces, because they turned the Soviets' even weaker flank. Vyazma, on the contrary, was won with mobile formations that were either completely fresh, or had 2-4 weeks of rehabilitation.

And yet they managed to help AGN break the Luga Line and encircle Southwestern Front, even taking the charges made at face value. Seems odd they suddenly are too weak to do this when they did major things on two different fronts, after traveling hundreds of kilometers no less. As it were, STAVKA was very concerned about their flanks being caved in, as Glantz notes.

A couple things:

1. You still have produced no data on the impact of the loss of Moscow on Heeresgruppe Nord. Your assertions regarding supply are speculation.

Nope, they are directly drawn from David Glantz, having been directly cited from his book on Leningrad. Glantz emphatically states the loss of railway connections with Moscow would be fatal to the defense of Leningrad; to that, you have only offered speculation in retort.

2. With Southwestern Front surviving, come winter Heeresgruppe Süd will be even more hollowed out than historically. It won't be able to do much but hold its position.

Uh, what? How exactly is Southwestern Front able to inflict damage while it is retreating in the face of AGS? That makes no sense at all.

3. Why would the Soviets be dispersed on the Gorky axis?

Because that is how the Soviet railway network is structured? Once Moscow is lost most of the major Soviet cities that can be used to replace it are hundreds of kilometers back and have their own railway ties to Moscow, meaning there is no one central mobilization point to use. Even David Stahel, who is less than bullish (to say the least) on the German chances for taking Moscow, concedes that the loss of said city would be extremely damaging to the Soviet logistics given this fact.

4. If the Germans dig in in September and forego inflicting mass casualties on the Soviets during October, the latter will be even stronger come their counterattack.

Except they've already inflicted massive casualties in August-September instead of October, as in OTL?

What weak flanks? You realize that by the end of the campaign, the Germans have no meaningful ability to do anything but defend a static front?

Given the OTL situation, sure, but such has been decisive changed here. Somehow Soviet forces near Leningrad and in Ukraine-despite being deprived of reinforcements for at least the entire month of September-are somehow strong enough to attempt flank attacks despite AGN and AGS sitting to their immediate front and able to attack them should they attempt action against AGC. There is nothing baked in that said German forces can't take advantage of the situation, particularly when AGN and AGS have take substantially less losses from August onwards while the Soviet forces facing them are much, much weaker than historically.

Not necessarily. For some factories, it is shorter to transit through Kirov than through Moscow.

Than by all means, give us some data, particularly what military supplies this entails and what the difference is compared to what happened historically.

I said not such things.

Except you did when I asked you about the September divisions you cited, to which you replied the Soviets would send them to where the strategic situation called for it; i.e. the defense of Moscow. Soviet forces can't be in two places in once.

Why would there be fewer Soviet forces? You said yourself that Panzergruppe 4 would be sent south after August 19. After that, the front becomes static.

Because of the above and that the front would be static is your claim, to which you have yet to provide a meaningful explanation. You have already, as noted, suggested the September reinforcements to Northwestern Front do not occur, you have likewise also conceded that the capacity limits of the railways are lower even if we don't fact in a time delay, which means fewer supplies. There is also quite literally nothing stopping the transfer of 4th Panzer Army back to AGN in September, after Moscow is taken. So we have a decisive armor and manpower advantage by AGN over their Soviet opponents, who have not received reinforcements in September and also have a reduced supply flow. Yet, somehow this remains a static front?

It absolutely did. The only advance by HGN past the first week of September was the Tikhvin offensive that was quickly pushed back to its start line.

An odd claim, not supported by the actual data given Tikhvin was a serious offensive that lasted some six weeks from late October to early December. It also saw its namesake city fall and the Soviets desperately trying to reinforce their collapsing armies in the first phase, reinforcements not possible here.

To buttress your claim, you would need to:

1. Detail the amount of supplies needed by the northern Fronts.
2. Detail the capacity of the remaining railways.

As for Glantz, you're misconstruing his claim. The importance of Tikhvin lay in constituting the last remaining link with the USSR in general, not just with Moscow. He was also speaking of the cut off Leningrad Front. In this scenario of ours, no Soviet forces are cut off in the north.

I'm not misconstructing them, given I directly cited it with picture evidence so there could be no claim of me misquoting him. He directly notes the loss of the railway links with Moscow-he directly specifies Moscow, not the USSR as a whole-would be fatal. You don't have to quote the railway links if you have taken Moscow directly, but even then, given the above link, it seems exceedingly likely the Germans will take Tikhvin too.

[historygeek2021]

Which means the combat strength of the infantry division is still only 60%, and the combat strength of the panzer and motorized divisions is only 50%.

I don't see how this can be. The establishment strength for elements counted in the Kampfstärke of the divisions used for Barbarossa amounted to ~1.2 million men. Registered combat and non-combat losses for June - August amounted to 500,859, and replacements to 215,000, including 40,000 non-evacuated convalescents.

That's a net loss of 285,859 men. Even if we assume that 100% of the casualties occurred among personnel included in the Kampfstärke, that still leaves 914,141 men - 76% of the initial figure.

Here is the full quote from DRZW Volume V/IB, Part III.V.1.b ("The Problem of large scale casualties"):

At the end of July 1941 the German army in the east had already sustained more casualties than during the whole of the campaign in the west. By mid-September 10 per cent of the 142 divisions involved in the campaign against the Soviet Union had lost over 25 per cent of their strength of June 1941. In 28 per cent of the divisions the losses were over 20 per cent, while in another 21 per cent the losses were 12 per cent or higher. Barely half of the divisions employed had suffered casualties of less than 12 per cent. Owing to the tremendous wastage, measured according to the operational capability of men and material, the combat strength of the divisions had been reduced still further. In the second half of August it fell to 60 per cent among the infantry divisions, and to 50 per cent among the mobile troops.

Bernhard R. Kroener; Rolf-Dieter Muller; Hans Umbreit. Germany and the Second World War: 5 (Germany & Second World War) . OUP Oxford. Kindle Edition.

[historygeek2021]

I'm not misconstructing them, given I directly cited it with picture evidence so there could be no claim of me misquoting him. He directly notes the loss of the railway links with Moscow-he directly specifies Moscow, not the USSR as a whole-would be fatal.

Can you provide the chapter and the exact quote where Glantz says this? I can't find it.

[KDF33]

Can you provide the chapter and the exact quote where Glantz says this? I can't find it.

The entire quote is this: "[Leeb] was to attack through Tikhvin to Lake Ladoga to sever Leningrad's last rail links to Moscow and completely encircle the city."

Here's where he quotes the excerpt.

As far as he's shown, he feels this single quote validates his view that, without Moscow, the entire northern direction would collapse.

[stg 44]

To get the number of sick, I multiplied by the 1.75 by total departures, and arrived at more than 300,000. You are correct that I should have multiplied by the number of wounded (about 125,000 from what I can see in the blurry Kindle edition, I don't have the hardcopy on me atm). Multiplying 125,000 by 1.75 gives us 218,750 soldiers out sick at any given moment in July (and presumably a similar number in August). Even if the period of sickness only averages 21 days, that is still over 200,000 soldiers out of action on any given day. Which means the combat strength of the infantry division is still only 60%, and the combat strength of the panzer and motorized divisions is only 50%.

For September the chart says about 99,000 wounded. It is over 100,000 for August.
Again though remember that within the same month the majority of the sick would have recovered and returned to their units and never even left their armies; only about a quarter were evacuated and they are already present in the chart.

I hate to break it to you, but your math doesn't check out for the 50 and 60% even with the sick.

As an aside I read more of Askey's book and he claims that the numbers in the chart we're discussing on p.1020 is in error and that the 509,000 arrivals in 1941 are actually just recovered wounded and sick, not replacements. He bases that claim on using the medical data in the chart on p.1012 and adding up all the sick and wounded for 1941 and using the recovery rate data he gets to about 509,000 recovered for the year with then over 545,000 replacements on top of that. I don't necessarily think he's right, but given that the DRZW uses some dubious numbers like the 50% and 60% states based on a letter sent to Halder by another officer without any context in a single throw away line in the text, maybe his argument has some merit.

We're conflating ATL's now. Southwestern Front will only evacuate to the east if Guderian is driving south. If Guderian is driving south, then AGC isn't attacking Moscow in August or even early September. If, as per Stolfi's ATL, Guderian and Hoth drive east in the middle of August 1941, then the Southwestern Front has no reason to evacuate from Kiev. Likewise, the Soviet reserve armies will be mobilized where they are needed - where the Germans are attacking.

Guderian drove south non-stop through August and into September. On August 8th he completed the destruction of the Soviet 28th army in his march south to Roslavl and then helped with the destruction of further Soviet forces in the Central Front on the 12th-14th during the Gomel fighting, and then continued further south. So Guderian would be driving south as of August 19th in this scenario because that is what he was already doing historically, though most of his army was still further north and it was a couple of corps that were pushing south while the rest were securing the flank and waiting for clarification from Hitler about where to go, east or south. So they could effectively turn on a dime if given the order to head east/northeast from Roslavl and the corps helping destroy Central Front could return north pretty quickly. At that point then there would be no threat to AG-Center from the south and 2nd army under von Weichs could maintain the pressure by continuing the march south as they already were.

So the pressure would be on, Central Front would be collapsing per OTL, and Guderian's forces would be able to switch to the East as soon as the order was given. And again you're completely discounting the collapsing position of SW Front on the Dniepr as a reason to get out of Ukraine. Otherwise why would Kiev be evacuated in August/early September? As to the reserve armies it seems like you completely just ignored my point about them needing to be mobilized in a specific point well in advance of their ability to become operational, so the Soviets cannot simply divert them on a dime, they'd need to select a mobilization point a month in advance and go with that, so reserve armies of August and most of September would already have their mobilization points set and changing them would disrupt the entire process and result in major delays, not least of which is due to the need to evacuate Ukraine. If they don't evacuate Ukraine though due to AG-Center attacking East then the new armies are still already set in their mobilization points unless STAVKA really wanted to introduce the disruption and delays from switching them in the process, as they'd have to then completely rework their train schedules and hope they can redirect trains already in motion plus move out units already showing up in their original mobilization sectors.

The timelines and ATLS are, again, getting confused in this thread. But if we just stick to Stolfi's ATL, in which AGC, including all of Panzer Group 2 and Panzer Group 3, drive east in the middle of August, then the 11 new Soviet armies that were mobilized in August and 3 armies that were mobilized in September (all but 2 of which were deployed to Leningrad and Ukraine in the OTL), would have been sent to the Moscow theater. If AGC's assault performs as well as Operation Typhoon did in the OTL, then it will encircle 4-5 Soviet Armies. Even not counting the 14 new armies mobilized in August and September, the Soviets still have 5 other armies in the Moscow region, plus the forces of the Central/Briansk Front and forces at Velikiye Luki that will have a free hand in Stolfi's ATL because Panzer Groups 2 and 3 aren't attacking them. Source for mobilization of Soviet armies is Map 2 in David Glantz's Barbarossa.

Please explain how the encirclement of 4-5 Soviet armies in late August/early September leads to Moscow falling in September, given the more than 20 other armies that the Soviets will be able to assign to countering this offensive (before another 5 Soviet armies arrive in October, and another 11 arrive in November-December)?

Also note that Army Group Center was holding its portion of the front in August and September with almost no reserves. How is it then going to have the manpower to hold the two/three sides of a salient protruding toward Moscow, against 20+ Soviet armies? When it tried this in the OTL in December, it was forced to retreat.

All of the 11 armies would have had their mobilization points set so couldn't shift without badly disrupting the entire mobilization process and introducing major delays while then the Fronts that were supposed to get them would be deprived of them at vital moments. I might give you the September armies being able to be diverted since there were so few of them, but then they arrive in time to be swept up in the retreat/defeat as there would be no mud to stall the Germans like in October. Soviet reserve armies did not perform well with limited time to organize after being officially mobilized; sometimes even with time they didn't do well, see the Reserve Front and the militia divisions.

Unfortunately your scenario for the Soviets requires them to have a teleportation device, which seems to be why you're having a problem understanding why it was impossible for the Soviets to achieve what you're claiming. You're also forgetting that historically it wasn't just 5 armies lost to the Soviets in Typhoon, but rather 1 million men out of the 1.25 million they had defending Moscow (that's from Glantz and a Russian historian citing actual Soviet sources). Technically HQs survived, but basically without men or equipment, so they were rendered useless for a while even if still technically existing on paper. You're getting into Hitler in the Berlin Bunker in April 1945 territory moving paper armies around. Also again December 1941 is not August-September 1941.

Lend-lease to the USSR began in October 1941. Please explain why the Germans capturing Moscow would cause FDR and Churchill to cancel the program.

The extension of the program to the Soviets only began because it looked like Moscow would be held, so it was safe to send them equipment since it wouldn't likely end up in German hands. If Moscow falls in September LL cannot be safely sent, since it might well end up supplying the Germans when the Soviets imploded. Politics and perception played a huge role in things, as the British and US thought until about October that the Soviets were about to collapse and cease to be a factor in the war.

This is the part that requires further explanation. Please provide hard analysis, with specific sources. Happy to move that to a new thread since this one is already very involved.

HL could provide quotes from Stolfi who did IIRC an entire chapter on that subject. You could consult sources on Operation Eisenhammer, which detailed the entire industry and resources of the Moscow-Gorki area and without which Soviet war industry would be crippled.
Here is a thread from this forum on the topic:
viewtopic.php?f=66&t=219561

[historygeek2021]

For September the chart says about 99,000 wounded. It is over 100,000 for August.
Again though remember that within the same month the majority of the sick would have recovered and returned to their units and never even left their armies; only about a quarter were evacuated and they are already present in the chart.

I hate to break it to you, but your math doesn't check out for the 50 and 60% even with the sick.

As an aside I read more of Askey's book and he claims that the numbers in the chart we're discussing on p.1020 is in error and that the 509,000 arrivals in 1941 are actually just recovered wounded and sick, not replacements. He bases that claim on using the medical data in the chart on p.1012 and adding up all the sick and wounded for 1941 and using the recovery rate data he gets to about 509,000 recovered for the year with then over 545,000 replacements on top of that. I don't necessarily think he's right, but given that the DRZW uses some dubious numbers like the 50% and 60% states based on a letter sent to Halder by another officer without any context in a single throw away line in the text, maybe his argument has some merit.

The conclusion that by late August 1941 the combat strength of German infantry divisions was down to 60%, and that of mobile divisions was down to 50%, is made by Bernhard R. Kroener. Kroener is a native German whose father was an officer during WW2 and later a ministerial director for the German ministry of defense. Kroener served in the German armed forces, studied military history at the Sorbonne, worked for the German Military History Research Office, taught at the University of Freiburg, published extensively, and taught from 1997 to 2013 as a professor for military history at the Historical Institute of the University of Potsdam where he held the chair in military history. From 2004 to 2010, Kroener was dean of the Philosophical Faculty, set up the “Military Studies” master’s course at the University of Potsdam, and has a long list of students who are themselves academic professors of history.

https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bernhard_R._Kroener

The claim that Kroener is wrong is made by Nigel Askey ... a guy with a bachelors degree from the University of Sussex ... who served as a consultant for a video game about the eastern front. I'll let the readers of this thread form their own judgment about who to trust.

https://www.operationbarbarossa.net/about-us/

Guderian drove south non-stop through August and into September. On August 8th he completed the destruction of the Soviet 28th army in his march south to Roslavl and then helped with the destruction of further Soviet forces in the Central Front on the 12th-14th during the Gomel fighting, and then continued further south. So Guderian would be driving south as of August 19th in this scenario because that is what he was already doing historically, though most of his army was still further north and it was a couple of corps that were pushing south while the rest were securing the flank and waiting for clarification from Hitler about where to go, east or south. So they could effectively turn on a dime if given the order to head east/northeast from Roslavl and the corps helping destroy Central Front could return north pretty quickly. At that point then there would be no threat to AG-Center from the south and 2nd army under von Weichs could maintain the pressure by continuing the march south as they already were.

So the pressure would be on, Central Front would be collapsing per OTL, and Guderian's forces would be able to switch to the East as soon as the order was given. And again you're completely discounting the collapsing position of SW Front on the Dniepr as a reason to get out of Ukraine. Otherwise why would Kiev be evacuated in August/early September? As to the reserve armies it seems like you completely just ignored my point about them needing to be mobilized in a specific point well in advance of their ability to become operational, so the Soviets cannot simply divert them on a dime, they'd need to select a mobilization point a month in advance and go with that, so reserve armies of August and most of September would already have their mobilization points set and changing them would disrupt the entire process and result in major delays, not least of which is due to the need to evacuate Ukraine. If they don't evacuate Ukraine though due to AG-Center attacking East then the new armies are still already set in their mobilization points unless STAVKA really wanted to introduce the disruption and delays from switching them in the process, as they'd have to then completely rework their train schedules and hope they can redirect trains already in motion plus move out units already showing up in their original mobilization sectors.

All of the 11 armies would have had their mobilization points set so couldn't shift without badly disrupting the entire mobilization process and introducing major delays while then the Fronts that were supposed to get them would be deprived of them at vital moments. I might give you the September armies being able to be diverted since there were so few of them, but then they arrive in time to be swept up in the retreat/defeat as there would be no mud to stall the Germans like in October. Soviet reserve armies did not perform well with limited time to organize after being officially mobilized; sometimes even with time they didn't do well, see the Reserve Front and the militia divisions.

Unfortunately your scenario for the Soviets requires them to have a teleportation device, which seems to be why you're having a problem understanding why it was impossible for the Soviets to achieve what you're claiming. You're also forgetting that historically it wasn't just 5 armies lost to the Soviets in Typhoon, but rather 1 million men out of the 1.25 million they had defending Moscow (that's from Glantz and a Russian historian citing actual Soviet sources). Technically HQs survived, but basically without men or equipment, so they were rendered useless for a while even if still technically existing on paper. You're getting into Hitler in the Berlin Bunker in April 1945 territory moving paper armies around. Also again December 1941 is not August-September 1941.

Since you have dropped Stolfi's mid-August plunge for Moscow, I will focus on the ATL originally set up in this thread. According to Glantz's Barbarossa, Hitler made the decision to send Guderian's Panzer Group 2 to the Ukraine on August 18. The directive did not reach Bock at Army Group Center until August 23. Guderian returned from his personal appeal to Hitler on August 24. Meanwhile, Kirponos and the Soviet Stavka identified the growing threat to Southwestern Front's northern flank on August 18. On August 19, Soviet 5th Army was ordered to retreat across the Dnepr, while Soviet 37th Army was ordered to hold the western bank at Kiev. On August 26, Guderian's Panzer Group 2 reached Shostka and Korop, disrupting the three Soviet Armies that were deployed there to halt his advance. Guderian approached the Desna River on August 30 and crossed it on September 3.

Even if Stalin had ordered the 37th Army to retreat to the eastern bank of the Dnepr on August 18, that alone would not have caused Hitler to order Guderian to halt his advance south. Even if, as the threat from Guderian became apparent on August 26, Stalin had ordered the entire Soviet Southwestern Front to withdraw from its salient and abandon Kiev, that would not cause Hitler to change his directive for Guderian to drive south. Hitler still wanted the Ukraine for economic reasons and would have insisted on it being captured. The withdrawal of the Soviet Southwestern Front at this early date would mean that Guderian would be driving into the retreating Soviet forces as he drove south. His panzer group would have been bogged down in fighting east of Kiev for weeks, just as he was in the OTL, only this time he's not fighting encircled Red Army units who are simply trying to flee east.

So there really is no room in the ATL originally proposed in this thread for an advance on Moscow any time earlier than when it actually took place in the OTL at the start of October.

The extension of the program to the Soviets only began because it looked like Moscow would be held, so it was safe to send them equipment since it wouldn't likely end up in German hands. If Moscow falls in September LL cannot be safely sent, since it might well end up supplying the Germans when the Soviets imploded. Politics and perception played a huge role in things, as the British and US thought until about October that the Soviets were about to collapse and cease to be a factor in the war.

You claim this, but you need to offer something to back it up. Primary, secondary sources, anything.

HL could provide quotes from Stolfi who did IIRC an entire chapter on that subject. You could consult sources on Operation Eisenhammer, which detailed the entire industry and resources of the Moscow-Gorki area and without which Soviet war industry would be crippled.
Here is a thread from this forum on the topic:
viewtopic.php?f=66&t=219561

It's your claim, you make the argument. There's very little factual information in that thread.

[History Learner]

Can you provide the chapter and the exact quote where Glantz says this? I can't find it.

It's from The Siege of Leningrad, 1941-1944: 900 Days of Terror, Page 46.

Can you provide the chapter and the exact quote where Glantz says this? I can't find it.

The entire quote is this: "[Leeb] was to attack through Tikhvin to Lake Ladoga to sever Leningrad's last rail links to Moscow and completely encircle the city."

Here's where he quotes the excerpt.

As far as he's shown, he feels this single quote validates his view that, without Moscow, the entire northern direction would collapse.

You've stated exactly this yourself:

I agree that losing Moscow probably means losing the area North and North-West of it, but then that's not going to deliver the death blow to the USSR. Apart from the LL ports, there's little of value up there, as well as little population.

Regards,

KDF

[History Learner]

Cut-off, starving Leningrad was not a major center of industrial production during the war.

Except that's false:

Some researchers of the Siege of Leningrad consider that in the besieged city new military equipment wasn’t issued, and only its repair was carried out. Official reports don’t confirm this point of view. During the second half of the year 1941, (November – December of this year were one of the most difficult months), Leningrad gave to the front 713 tanks, near 3000 cannons, more than 10300 mortars, 480 armoured cars, 58 armoured trains. In July – December, 1941 Red Army received more than 3 million shells and mines, 40000 rockets, big quantity of other military equipment. It is a lot of or a little? The following comparative data are in this regard indicative: in the second half of the year 1941 in Leningrad was released 10,1 % from all cannons made in the country, 23,5 % of mortars and 14,8% of tanks. About 52% of mines and 68 % of the shells spent by the front during this period was made in Leningrad.​
​
Produced cannons, mortars and ammunition went not only to the Leningrad front, but also under Moscow. In the hardest period of the Moscow battle over 400 cannons, about 1 thousand mortars of various calibers and nearly 40 thousand armor-piercing shells were sent from the besieged Leningrad . On November 28, 1941 the commander of the Western front G. K. Zhukov sent the telegram to Leningrad: “Thanks to Leningrad people for the help to Moscow in fight against blood-thirsty Hitlerites”​

This must come as shocking news to the people of Kuibyshev, Kazan, Gorky and Novosibirsk.

No doubt they produced aircraft there, but did they produce something like 60% of the USSR's aero-engines? No, no they did not.

How many tens of millions of people do you think there were in the historically-occupied regions of west-central Russia and the left-bank Ukraine?

Exact figures I don't have, but given Leningrad and Moscow were the most populated cities in the USSR, likely less I feel comfortable saying.

You're going to need to give hard data and specific sources to construct your argument as to the effect of the loss of Leningrad and Moscow on the Soviet war effort, since that is they key to Stolfi's ATL winning the war on the eastern front.

See above, but if you want data specifically from Stolfi here you go:

The data are for the year 1955. They show that depending on the analysis by city or by region, the Germans occupied in the hypothetical advance by 10 October 1941 between 39 and 49 percent of the industrial capacity of the Soviet Union as distributed geographically in 1955. The distribution, however, was different in October 1941, concentrated farther west, even considering the frantic and effective Soviet transfer of industrial plant toward the Urals. A reasonable estimate of the percentage of Soviet industrial plant seized by the Germans by 10 October 1941 would be greater than 39 percent the minimum possible using 1955 data for output by cities and is estimated higher, at approximately 45 percent of the industrial capacity of the Soviet Union in 1941. The percentages for industrial output by regions indicate that the industrial output seized by the Germans in the hypothetical case could be somewhat higher.

[historygeek2021]

You're going to need to give hard data and specific sources to construct your argument as to the effect of the loss of Leningrad and Moscow on the Soviet war effort, since that is they key to Stolfi's ATL winning the war on the eastern front.

See above, but if you want data specifically from Stolfi here you go:

The data are for the year 1955. They show that depending on the analysis by city or by region, the Germans occupied in the hypothetical advance by 10 October 1941 between 39 and 49 percent of the industrial capacity of the Soviet Union as distributed geographically in 1955. The distribution, however, was different in October 1941, concentrated farther west, even considering the frantic and effective Soviet transfer of industrial plant toward the Urals. A reasonable estimate of the percentage of Soviet industrial plant seized by the Germans by 10 October 1941 would be greater than 39 percent the minimum possible using 1955 data for output by cities and is estimated higher, at approximately 45 percent of the industrial capacity of the Soviet Union in 1941. The percentages for industrial output by regions indicate that the industrial output seized by the Germans in the hypothetical case could be somewhat higher.

Thanks for this, but I'm still not seeing what specifically about Moscow would cause the Soviet Union to lose the war, just due to to losing the city. Can you give more information specific to Moscow that shows its war winning importance?

[History Learner]

You're going to need to give hard data and specific sources to construct your argument as to the effect of the loss of Leningrad and Moscow on the Soviet war effort, since that is they key to Stolfi's ATL winning the war on the eastern front.

See above, but if you want data specifically from Stolfi here you go:

The data are for the year 1955. They show that depending on the analysis by city or by region, the Germans occupied in the hypothetical advance by 10 October 1941 between 39 and 49 percent of the industrial capacity of the Soviet Union as distributed geographically in 1955. The distribution, however, was different in October 1941, concentrated farther west, even considering the frantic and effective Soviet transfer of industrial plant toward the Urals. A reasonable estimate of the percentage of Soviet industrial plant seized by the Germans by 10 October 1941 would be greater than 39 percent the minimum possible using 1955 data for output by cities and is estimated higher, at approximately 45 percent of the industrial capacity of the Soviet Union in 1941. The percentages for industrial output by regions indicate that the industrial output seized by the Germans in the hypothetical case could be somewhat higher.

Thanks for this, but I'm still not seeing what specifically about Moscow would cause the Soviet Union to lose the war, just due to to losing the city. Can you give more information specific to Moscow that shows its war winning importance?

For one, the fact that taking it removes 10-20% of Soviet industrial output, depending on if you use 1940 or 1941 values? Can an Army function without equipment or munitions?

[historygeek2021]

Can you give a specific cite for the claim that Moscow accounted for 10-20% of the Soviet Union's industrial output in 1940-1941?

[History Learner]

Can you give a specific cite for the claim that Moscow accounted for 10-20% of the Soviet Union's industrial output in 1940-1941?

I already have? See the first line of the screenshot.

[Futurist]

Can you give a specific cite for the claim that Moscow accounted for 10-20% of the Soviet Union's industrial output in 1940-1941?

I already have? See the first line of the screenshot.

What page is that from?