The Allies invade neutral countries to cut off German imports of crucial metals

[Carl Schwamberger]

Re: Cease exports to Germany

There was no chance the Allies could have convinced Sweden to do any such thing before about 1945, for the reason that the Swedes knew perfectly well that if they cut iron ore exports to Germany, Germany would invade Sweden. So, the Allies cannot just occupy the Kiruna iron mines because the Germans will be coming and if Sweden believes the Germans will get to Stockholm first, they will throw their lot in with the Germans.

Specifically November 1944. All exports were halted. The agreement to do so was reached somewhat earlier. What I've not been able to find is when the Swedes ceased escort operations for their ships, and when they required all shipments to Germany to be in German ships. They were concerned about Swedish flagged ships being in position to be seized by the Germans. Also there was a earlier concern about losses to the Soviet navy, which was becoming active again. The latter proved a low threat, but they did not know that going in.

[John T]

That's a partial analysis; to complete it you'd have to account for at least (1) economic exploitation of Sweden as occupied country versus neutral, (2) strategic impact of Sweden's occupation on Norway's defense.

Re (1):

With a little arithmetic, we can see that the Germans got KR 654mil more from Sweden than they gave in real prices. As Sweden's 1938 GDP was KR 12.1bn, that's 5.4% of Swedish GDP over '41-'44 or ~1.3% extracted per year. Germany paid for Swedish ore with a lot of chemicals, coal, and other high-value goods:
....<Snip>

Occupied Sweden would receive far less from Germany than OTL. Meanwhile Germany would use financial methods (clearing accounts, occupation accounts) as efficiently as it did elsewhere to plunder Sweden economically.

Thanks for the sources.

The German deficit on the clearing account in May 1945 was in the ballpark of your calculation.
The Thing the Swedes managed to get in 1939 was a "commodity scale" so the price basket of a handful of the Swedish exports would be proportional to the most important imports. and that ration stayed during the war with one exception.
Only in June 1940 did the Germans manage to double the "rate" for Coal (with the explanation that They now had to supply France and Belgum with Coal)

The Germans managed to extend the clearing account a couple of times at their strength, but it ended around 500 MSek


Cheers
/John

[John T]

Invading Sweden would be a significant undertaking for either Germany or the Allies. Ultimately, Sweden would lose, but it would put up a good fight. There are also several factors that work in the Allies' favor but not Germany's:

The Germans could have invaded and occupied Sweden in 1940 at comparatively little effort. With hindsight, it is more than a little surprising they did not.

Depends on when and if the Swedes fight like the Finns.
Attacking Sweden and Norway in parallel and at the same time be first at the northern ore fields was out of the question.
The Norwegians would open up for the Allies, probably even if Norway herself wasn't attacked.

Attacking Sweden after Norway was invaded and after the fall of France would be a foregone conclusion, as Sweden would be alone and hardly motivated to fight to the last man.
But on the other hand, then Sweden was rather submissive without a military effort.

The Germans considered the terrain north of a line Trondheim-Sundsvall to be wilderness and German had few units with the capacity for advance in that terrain. So the Swedes would have ample time to implement the threat of destroying infrastructure. Railways, hydroelectric power, and the mines (open pit). The miners were used to blow things up.

If Sweden were forced to choose sides due to Britain's actions, they very well might choose Germany (not because they like the Germans more, but because the British were weak and far away).

The Chance was bigger than most Swedes like to admit, Social democrats were staunch democrats and had more than 50% of the votes.

Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and Soviet attack on Finland was the biggest reason why the right-wing anti-communists got a problem with Germany.
Those groups had always seen Germany as the counterpart to evil Russia (and Communist Russia was even eviler than the old Tzar)
But Still, a large majority of the population was against any involvement at all.


Cheers
/John

[TheMarcksPlan]

the Swedes would have ample time to implement the threat of destroying infrastructure. Railways, hydroelectric power, and the mines (open pit). The miners were used to blow things up.

Do we know of the Swedish contingency planning for German invasion after the Fall of France? Did they plan to scorch the earth? I know Belgium made advance decisions not to destroy infrastructure to ease the population's plight under occupation. Of course Belgium had recent memory of the logic of doing so, maybe the Swedes would have acted differently.

[danebrog]

After the invasion of Norway, the Kriegsmarine had the desired seaports, but had no suitable ships for them
And what troops there were in Norway were barely enough to secure the long coastline in 1940 and important supply lines ran across Swedish territory that would have been difficult to secure
The army was massed in France, and the Luftwaffe was completely occupied with the BoB immediately afterwards.
After the irrevocable decision to attack the Soviet Union in July 1940, the completely overstretched German war economy needed Swedish exports
Since in the event of an invasion of Sweden it was impossible to calculate whether and when important supplies would be available again, one would have risked production disruptions in this phase.

The British and German agreements concerning Sweden are also interesting:
In the autumn of 1940, the Ministry of Economic Warfare came to the conclusion that it would be in the British interest if Sweden were supplied with goods from overseas and could thus maintain a more independent position vis-à-vis Germany; on 28 November, London offered to resume transatlantic trade under certain conditions.
After the inconclusive air battle for England, Berlin came to the conclusion that Sweden should provide itself with valuable raw materials and foodstuffs from overseas, as this would indirectly benefit exports to Germany and above all make it possible for the Swedish fleet to import oil and thus continue to provide escort for German ships through Swedish waters.

[Peter89]

Invading Sweden would be a significant undertaking for either Germany or the Allies. Ultimately, Sweden would lose, but it would put up a good fight. There are also several factors that work in the Allies' favor but not Germany's:

The Germans could have invaded and occupied Sweden in 1940 at comparatively little effort. With hindsight, it is more than a little surprising they did not.

Depends on when and if the Swedes fight like the Finns.
Attacking Sweden and Norway in parallel and at the same time be first at the northern ore fields was out of the question.
The Norwegians would open up for the Allies, probably even if Norway herself wasn't attacked.

Attacking Sweden after Norway was invaded and after the fall of France would be a foregone conclusion, as Sweden would be alone and hardly motivated to fight to the last man.
But on the other hand, then Sweden was rather submissive without a military effort.

The Germans considered the terrain north of a line Trondheim-Sundsvall to be wilderness and German had few units with the capacity for advance in that terrain. So the Swedes would have ample time to implement the threat of destroying infrastructure. Railways, hydroelectric power, and the mines (open pit). The miners were used to blow things up.

If Sweden were forced to choose sides due to Britain's actions, they very well might choose Germany (not because they like the Germans more, but because the British were weak and far away).

The Chance was bigger than most Swedes like to admit, Social democrats were staunch democrats and had more than 50% of the votes.

Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and Soviet attack on Finland was the biggest reason why the right-wing anti-communists got a problem with Germany.
Those groups had always seen Germany as the counterpart to evil Russia (and Communist Russia was even eviler than the old Tzar)
But Still, a large majority of the population was against any involvement at all.


Cheers
/John

I think the opinion of the people is a bit overrated in these discussions, somewhat like the American unwillingness to go to war or the British voices about coming to terms with Germany in 1940 / 1941. These are democracies, and as such, have different opinions in almost every kind of matters. It is really-really hard to achieve anything like an overwhelming majority - let alone unanimity - in case of foreign policy, alliances or war. That's the natural state of affairs.

The Swedish decision makers were realistic and keen people, they knew they could profit from the war immensely if they could protect Sweden's integrity, industry and manpower, while maintaining relations with all the parties. They had little chance to defend the populous and industrial southwestern part of the country against German invasion, so until German defeat was imminent, they would be unlikely to declare for the Allies, no matter what part of the population wanted.

[John T]

the Swedes would have ample time to implement the threat of destroying infrastructure. Railways, hydroelectric power, and the mines (open pit). The miners were used to blow things up.

Do we know of the Swedish contingency planning for German invasion after the Fall of France? Did they plan to scorch the earth? I know Belgium made advance decisions not to destroy infrastructure to ease the population's plight under occupation. Of course Belgium had recent memory of the logic of doing so, maybe the Swedes would have acted differently.

Valid point.
What the Germans were told is one thing, actual behavior another.
It was first in 1943 that the doctrine of "any messages of surrender are false" was made public and at that time large-scale demolitions were expected.

That military units retreating would destroy bridges was expected from the beginning, and the rail line Narvik- Kiruna was prepared for demolition at a number of places in April 1940.
but no "russian" burned earth policy.

Cheers
/John

[John T]

After the invasion of Norway, the Kriegsmarine had the desired seaports, but had no suitable ships for them
And what troops there were in Norway were barely enough to secure the long coastline in 1940 and important supply lines ran across Swedish territory that would have been difficult to secure
The army was massed in France, and the Luftwaffe was completely occupied with the BoB immediately afterwards.
After the irrevocable decision to attack the Soviet Union in July 1940, the completely overstretched German war economy needed Swedish exports
Since in the event of an invasion of Sweden it was impossible to calculate whether and when important supplies would be available again, one would have risked production disruptions in this phase.

Obviously that was the German reasoning.

The British and German agreements concerning Sweden are also interesting:
In the autumn of 1940, the Ministry of Economic Warfare came to the conclusion that it would be in the British interest if Sweden were supplied with goods from overseas and could thus maintain a more independent position vis-à-vis Germany; on 28 November, London offered to resume transatlantic trade under certain conditions.
After the inconclusive air battle for England, Berlin came to the conclusion that Sweden should provide itself with valuable raw materials and foodstuffs from overseas, as this would indirectly benefit exports to Germany and above all make it possible for the Swedish fleet to import oil and thus continue to provide escort for German ships through Swedish waters.

And even more interesting is the Soviets reaction to Weserübung:

Frame 112110, serial 103

Telegram

VERY URGENT
Moscow, April 13, 1940-10:31 p. m.
Received April 14, 1940-5:20 a. m.
SECRET

No. 687 of April 13
Molotov today asked me to see him and brought up the following:

Persistent rumors were being circulated everywhere that Germany would soon be forced to include Sweden in her Scandinavian operations, particularly in order to ship more troops to Norway. Molotov added that in his opinion Germany, and definitely the Soviet Union, were vitally [lebhaft] interested in preserving Swedish neutrality. He asked me how much truth there was in these rumors.

First, I referred to my statement to him on April 9, that our operations would not touch Sweden and Finland and added that I was not aware of the slightest indication that we had any designs on Swedish territory. Nevertheless, I would pass his inquiry on to Berlin.

In conclusion, Molotov declared that the Soviet Government was greatly interested in preserving Swedish neutrality, that its violation was frowned upon by the Soviet Government, and that it hoped the inclusion of Sweden in our operations would not take place, if this could at all be avoided. Request instructions by wire.

SCHULENBURG

From
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/ns127.asp

So every body wanted Sweden to stay out of the war.


Cheers
/John

[TheMarcksPlan]

A brand new article from Jonas Scherner forecloses the notion that Germany could rapidly have been defeated by shutting off access to certain metals.

I won't hold this against the OP, as such notions underlay much of Allied strategy and there were serious proposals to rely on it even more heavily. Scherner's article also uncovers much German blockade preparation that was intentionally concealed from the public and even from in the German government.

On tungsten, for example:

In the case of tungsten, the exploration programme continued after the start of the war.164 In 1942, the Reichsamt für Bodenforschung considered the German tungsten mines as rich as those of Portugal and Spain.165 By the end of 1942, when annual German production amounted to only 180 tons per annum, standby capacities would have allowed an immediate annual output increase to 700 tons per annum, roughly one-third of German tungsten consumption in 1943.166 Yet, up to mid-1944, a full utilisation of these standby capacities was not considered necessary. Only when it was certain that tungsten imports from the Iberian Peninsula, so far the main foreign source, would stop in the second half of 1944, was a massive capacity expansion of the German tungsten mines ordered. Within a year, total German tungsten production was supposed to increase to 1,200 tons, covering two-thirds of Germany’s consumption needs.167 Combined with the still-existing stocks, German tungsten consumption could have been met up to 1948.168

The basic error in historical strategy and in nearly all subsequent historiography is to neglect the possibility of substitution in matters of both demand and supply. Mark Harrison has a good treatment of the economic/theoretical framework.

As Harrison reminds us, substitution is not costless. To replace Iberian tungsten, for example, Germany would have had to re-task workers into their standby mining capacity. Scherner's article doesn't discuss iron ore but even taking Narvik would only have forced Germany to produce more domestically and in occupied Europe (Salzgitter, Alsace, later the SU).Of course the cost of substitution for some materials - oil most prominently - can be enormous.

Nonetheless, imposing substitution costs on Germany would have come nowhere close to the disastrous economic results predicted by people like Churchill when he pushed his various peripheral and mineral-focused schemes. These schemes almost certainly would have cost more to the Allied war effort than the substitution costs imposed on Germany.

[historygeek2021]

A brand new article from Jonas Scherner forecloses the notion that Germany could rapidly have been defeated by shutting off access to certain metals.

I won't hold this against the OP, as such notions underlay much of Allied strategy and there were serious proposals to rely on it even more heavily. Scherner's article also uncovers much German blockade preparation that was intentionally concealed from the public and even from in the German government.

On tungsten, for example:

In the case of tungsten, the exploration programme continued after the start of the war.164 In 1942, the Reichsamt für Bodenforschung considered the German tungsten mines as rich as those of Portugal and Spain.165 By the end of 1942, when annual German production amounted to only 180 tons per annum, standby capacities would have allowed an immediate annual output increase to 700 tons per annum, roughly one-third of German tungsten consumption in 1943.166 Yet, up to mid-1944, a full utilisation of these standby capacities was not considered necessary. Only when it was certain that tungsten imports from the Iberian Peninsula, so far the main foreign source, would stop in the second half of 1944, was a massive capacity expansion of the German tungsten mines ordered. Within a year, total German tungsten production was supposed to increase to 1,200 tons, covering two-thirds of Germany’s consumption needs.167 Combined with the still-existing stocks, German tungsten consumption could have been met up to 1948.168

The basic error in historical strategy and in nearly all subsequent historiography is to neglect the possibility of substitution in matters of both demand and supply. Mark Harrison has a good treatment of the economic/theoretical framework.

As Harrison reminds us, substitution is not costless. To replace Iberian tungsten, for example, Germany would have had to re-task workers into their standby mining capacity. Scherner's article doesn't discuss iron ore but even taking Narvik would only have forced Germany to produce more domestically and in occupied Europe (Salzgitter, Alsace, later the SU).Of course the cost of substitution for some materials - oil most prominently - can be enormous.

Nonetheless, imposing substitution costs on Germany would have come nowhere close to the disastrous economic results predicted by people like Churchill when he pushed his various peripheral and mineral-focused schemes. These schemes almost certainly would have cost more to the Allied war effort than the substitution costs imposed on Germany.

The article addresses copper, nickel, tungsten and tin. My post addresses iron, chromium and tungsten.

[TheMarcksPlan]

The article addresses copper, nickel, tungsten and tin. My post addresses iron, chromium and tungsten.

Two points.

------------------------------------

First, you're taking far too narrow a view of the article. It shows that Germany had available demand/supply substitution capabilities on particular metals and - far more importantly - it shows that the German state had a sophisticated and well-executed plan to overcome actual and potential blockade measure.

Your ATL proposes that interrupting Narvik inevitably collapses German steel production. That assertion ignores the deep capabilities and preparations of the German state for exactly these measures. It assumes that Germany could not increased ore production from places like Salzgitter and Alsace, and/or could not have done so at acceptable cost.

Given what the article uncovers (have you read it?), this is at least an unjustified assumption.

----------------------------------------

Second, the article does have info on chrome:

In the case of chrome, it was assumed that south-eastern Europe could fully satisfy the German demand: BArch, R 3102/5927, RwP, ʻDie rohstoffwirtschaftliche Bedeutung des Südostraums für die deutsche Wehrwirtschaft’, Mar. 1939.

Chrome is less fully discussed in the text. Given the above-discussed German capabilities, it is again unjustified to assume that the German state lacked the ability efficiently to substitute for Turkish chrome from Southeast Europe ("Sudostraums") had that supply been interdicted. Indeed Germany did not rely much on Turkish chrome until mid-war, as discussed upthread, and its later loss of such chrome coincided with the loss of Southeast Europe.

If you haven't read the article, I highly recommend doing so.

[TheMarcksPlan]

At the very least - on the most limited reading of the article that ignores structural analysis and looks only at particular minerals - it's at least clear that the proposed invasion of Spain/Portugal would have negligible effect (it only requires Germany to man its standby tungsten mines with a few thousand workers).

To accept any of the OP's assertions requires assuming that Germany can't substitute. That the assumption isn't conceived or addressed is a serious flaw in both the ATL and in Allied 1939 strategy.

Here's a quote from Scherner accurately describing the flawed paradigm under which nearly all historiography - and this ATL - operate:

Such findings demand a re-examination of Nazi Germany’s preparations to become ‘blockade safe’. This is especially true for non-ferrous metals. Despite the fact that German metal policy has been taken to epitomise the allegedly failed economic war preparations of the Nazi regime, metals are not only far less well researched than other autarky industries during the Third Reich, but existing studies rely on a very limited source basis and sometimes contradictory quantitative data.29