Who would have had the technological edge in 1946?

[danebrog]

An example:
On 31 March, 26 Me 262s attacked a bomber group over Hamburg in the best visibility and practically without escort and could only achieve 5(!) kills, although some jets were even equipped with R4M. (So wonder weapons that were equipped with wonder weapons)
Actually, this should have been a spectacular massacre, especially since some pilots were quite experienced and had already achieved kills with the 262.
But they were the only ones who had scored any hits at all.

[Peter89]

As always, the human factor is completely neglected here: not "everyone" can fly the machine, it needs very qualified personnel to realise its potential.
This was already lacking in the Bf 109 and Fw 190 pilots in late 1943, because pilot training was an unloved and neglected stepchild in the Luftwaffe. (Even when there was still enough fuel).

Even an "F-86" or "MiG-15" with a swastika would not have made a difference when accident-free take-offs and landings were already a challenge.
In this respect, the question of technological edge is irrelevant for the course of the war if there is a lack of sufficient specialists who can also turn this edge into successes.

The source we are looking for here is the "Verluste und beschädigungen an Flugzeugen auf deutscher Seite ohne Feinderwirkung".

But this is just the pilots.

I am collecting data now on ground personnel mistakes, which were also much more common than it was implied in the CIOS report regarding aircraft maintenance. It seems that the curtailed training - and the idea that front Werks can finish the practical training - left the Luftwaffe ground crews with limited knowledge as the war went on. By late 1944, it would be impossible to keep a radically new design in the air, if they arrived in numbers - most ground crews would be unable to repair them, perform major overhauls, test the engines, etc. Even if they could acquire the necessary knowledge over time, there was a learning curve in aircraft maintenance. At first, most problems were addressed by "grounding the aircraft" ("nicht flugklar"); secondly, they cannibalized and used spare parts (relying gradually more on the latter), then spare part useage hit a bottom, and they started to do more and more actual repair jobs.

The effects on operational readiness would be, of course, abysmal.

[danebrog]

The source we are looking for here is the "Verluste und beschädigungen an Flugzeugen auf deutscher Seite ohne Feinderwirkung".

What I have found quickly are statistics on pilots wounded/killed in non-hostile aircraft accidents. But these should also reflect the situation quite well:

AHF.jpg

source: Die Luftwaffe im Kampf um die Luftherrschaft. Dissertation Ernst Stilla
https://bonndoc.ulb.uni-bonn.de/xmlui/b ... sAllowed=y

[Peter89]

The source we are looking for here is the "Verluste und beschädigungen an Flugzeugen auf deutscher Seite ohne Feinderwirkung".

What I have found quickly are statistics on pilots wounded/killed in non-hostile aircraft accidents. But these should also reflect the situation quite well:
AHF.jpg
source: Die Luftwaffe im Kampf um die Luftherrschaft. Dissertation Ernst Stilla
https://bonndoc.ulb.uni-bonn.de/xmlui/b ... sAllowed=y

This is a better statistics for the pilots than the one I quoted for the aircrafts. Because a dead pilot is a dead pilot, but a damaged or malserviced aircraft, if it could be repaired or fixed in 48 hours, never made it to the statistics.

It must be noted that a lot of accidents that Stilla attributes to the pilots' deficient training was in fact a result of bad servicing or maintenance.

[danebrog]

What caught my eye was the striking discrepancy in practice hours per accident:
This ratio is exceptionally poor among the Front units. There are reports that only in ordinary transfers were 20% failures almost the norm.

It must be noted that a lot of accidents that Stilla attributes to the pilots' deficient training was in fact a result of bad servicing or maintenance.

There is a passage on page 239 on the failures due to defective technology:

In the fall of 1944, the Air Force Joint Staff noted that the ratio of losses without enemy action due to human error to losses due to technical error was still well above all statistical experience, which was about the same for all air forces worldwide:

"For decades the following figures have been almost the same in the air forces of all powers: of all aircraft losses without enemy action, technical errors account for 35%, personal errors for 60%, unavoidable 5%. If in the case cited the personal errors amounted to 70%, this is much too high, because in fighter aircraft the ratio of losses due to technical errors must be above the standard of 35%." Führungsstab/Ausb.Abt., Study, betr. Herabsetzung der Flugzeugverluste ohne Feindeinwirkung, 7.10.1944, Annex 1, Statistical Documents of 1.9.1944, Item 5, p. 2, in: BA-MA RL 2II/181.

However, just a few weeks after the report date, numerous reports show that the failure rate due to technical errors also went through the roof. From the beginning of '45, all loss factors together were so cumulative that the service life of a Bf 109/Fw190 was estimated at 6(!) flight hours, and even that was often no longer achieved.

[Peter89]

What caught my eye was the striking discrepancy in practice hours per accident:
This ratio is exceptionally poor among the Front units. There are reports that only in ordinary transfers were 20% failures almost the norm.

It must be noted that a lot of accidents that Stilla attributes to the pilots' deficient training was in fact a result of bad servicing or maintenance.

There is a passage on page 239 on the failures due to defective technology:

In the fall of 1944, the Air Force Joint Staff noted that the ratio of losses without enemy action due to human error to losses due to technical error was still well above all statistical experience, which was about the same for all air forces worldwide:

"For decades the following figures have been almost the same in the air forces of all powers: of all aircraft losses without enemy action, technical errors account for 35%, personal errors for 60%, unavoidable 5%. If in the case cited the personal errors amounted to 70%, this is much too high, because in fighter aircraft the ratio of losses due to technical errors must be above the standard of 35%." Führungsstab/Ausb.Abt., Study, betr. Herabsetzung der Flugzeugverluste ohne Feindeinwirkung, 7.10.1944, Annex 1, Statistical Documents of 1.9.1944, Item 5, p. 2, in: BA-MA RL 2II/181.

However, just a few weeks after the report date, numerous reports show that the failure rate due to technical errors also went through the roof. From the beginning of '45, all loss factors together were so cumulative that the service life of a Bf 109/Fw190 was estimated at 6(!) flight hours, and even that was often no longer achieved.

Stilla liked to mention the Lebensdauer of aircrafts in Betriebsstunde; the number dropped from 115 to 65 for Me 109 from 1941 to 1942, and of course it went downhill from then.

However, be careful with late war inquiries about who is to blame for the underperformance of the fighter arm. Ground personnel was never really appreciated much by Göring and the rest of the airmen, as Rieckhoff pointed out. They were ordered to fight in chanceless units in the last stage of the war - the high command thought they don't do their share, really. But if you go through what these men studied, it is roughly an equivalent of a year at today's BSc-s.

But anyway, I have encountered documented cases when half-trained ferry flights resulted amazing losses from time to time. For example, I know a case when out of 10 Fw 190 2 belly-landed and 1 crash-landed; 1 belly-landing was because of human failure (committed by a flight instructor), the rest because of the external fuel tank wasn't properly fastened. I checked for the Werk that did the job with the external fuel tanks and it turned out that they haven't really done this kind of job before - the high command simply didn't care about this.

Regarding your topic, the reports and memoirs I've read about ferry flights are... mixed, to be polite. I wouldn't make any serious conclusions about the quality of front line units based on the performance of ferry flights. The tragedic performance of the ferry-flight system is a sign of neglect from the high command. A lot of those pilots had little experience in combat or real action, for example I know of a captain who had one and only aerial victory, but he was the leader of the squad. The ferry-flight pilots often opted for flights where they could go with 2-3 aircrafts, where a Ju 52 wasn't sent for them, so they could take the "longer route" back home, by train... accomodating themselves in elegant hotels and enjoying the night life along the way. Stilla spoke of the alcohol abuse as well.

I'm just wondering what would they do with thousands of Me 262 which was an entirely new technology. The ground personnel, the ferry-flight crews and the combat units... Let's say the Germans recapture their pre-Barbarossa borders in 1945... a third of the "only-Me 262 Luftwaffe" would crash en route from Germany to Normandy, Norway and Greece... most of the arriving planes would be grounded for mechanical failures and most of those in the air would be frustrated, panicking decoys for the 10-20% of pilots who were able to score kills at all

[Peter89]

I just found the relevant quote at Rieckhoff p.54 which says that in a Luftgau in West Germany, out of 20 airfields marked for being able to handle Me 262s, only one was actually useable...

So yes, I guess that was kind of a relevant thing

[Carl Schwamberger]

... and most of those in the air would be frustrated, panicking decoys for the 10-20% of pilots who were able to score kills at all.

Back in 1969 my after detoured the family vacation to Elmer NJ & we stayed over night with one of his college ROTC buddies. This balding middle aged banker had picture of himself and his P51. There may have been a P40 as well. There was also a medal, a DFC as well. The story had a lot of detail that I may misremember, but the core of it is that a Me262 approached a firing position on his tail. He did a violent split S maneuver, killing his speed and as he hoped causing the German to overshoot and pass by. But, the German unexpectedly did not complete his Boom & Zoom maneuver. Instead he had tried to turn with the P51 & as he passed presented a fat target for a deflection shot from the P51 pilot. He though he killed the German pilot as the Me went into a rapid roll and arced down into the ground.

This suggests the Me262 pilot either forgot, or had no clear idea of what his advantage of aircraft capability was, nor the capability of the P51 relative to the Me262.

[Peter89]

... and most of those in the air would be frustrated, panicking decoys for the 10-20% of pilots who were able to score kills at all.

Back in 1969 my after detoured the family vacation to Elmer NJ & we stayed over night with one of his college ROTC buddies. This balding middle aged banker had picture of himself and his P51. There may have been a P40 as well. There was also a medal, a DFC as well. The story had a lot of detail that I may misremember, but the core of it is that a Me262 approached a firing position on his tail. He did a violent split S maneuver, killing his speed and as he hoped causing the German to overshoot and pass by. But, the German unexpectedly did not complete his Boom & Zoom maneuver. Instead he had tried to turn with the P51 & as he passed presented a fat target for a deflection shot from the P51 pilot. He though he killed the German pilot as the Me went into a rapid roll and arced down into the ground.

This suggests the Me262 pilot either forgot, or had no clear idea of what his advantage of aircraft capability was, nor the capability of the P51 relative to the Me262.

Sad story... I mean I know that the American guy got lucky but these poor half-trained men were butchered in a manner that staggers my imagination... I can't think of a worse service than being a LW pilot in 1944/1945. It was a death sentence with extra steps

[T. A. Gardner]

If you look at the larger operational history of the 262, for example Kommando Nowotny, the picture becomes very clear that the plane was self-defeating. Kommando Nowotny went operational at the beginning of October 1944 with about 30 planes. By the end of the month they were down to 3 and many of the pilots had been killed or wounded, with a good portion being lost in accidents. The lack of training for ground crews exacerbated the loss rate which averages out to between 3 and 4% of the unit's strength per day.

The only thing worse than being a Luftwaffe pilot in 1944 / 45 was being assigned to a U-boat, and the worst of that was assignment to a midget submarine like the Seehund.